issues with dualism

Question 1

explain the problem of other minds as an issue for dualism

Answer 1

• we cannot be sure that other people have mental states or minds at all
• I can access my own mind via introspection
• but I cannot directly access the contents of anyone else’s mind because minds are private
• because I can’t directly observe other minds, I have to infer that others have mental states from their bodies and behaviour
• but the behavioural evidence is insufficient to establish for certain what other’s mental states are, or wether they have brains at all

Question 2

explain the response to the problem of other minds; the argument from analogy

Answer 2

• offers a solution by saying we can reasonably justify the existence of other minds on the basis of others’ behaviour
• I am able to observe a connection between my mental states and the physical states of my body and behaviour
• e.g. when I step on a nail, I experience pain which causes me to scream
• I can observe that other people have very similar experiences to me
  e.g. when they step on a nail they also scream
• by using my case as an analogy, I can infer that others are likely to have similar internal mental states to mine because of the correlation between similar external observable states and behaviour
• this is an inductive argument, so it does not say for certain that we can know that others have minds, but it claims that the analogy is strong enough to give us good reason to accept the existence of other minds

Question 3

explain the response to the problem of other minds: the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis

Answer 3

• humans have very complex behaviour
• there are two reasons for this:
  a) there are mindless zombies whose behaviour is caused by the workings of our nervous systems and brains
  b) that humans have a complex inner life of sensations, beliefs and desires and that these conscious mental states are what cause our behaviour
• logically the second option makes much more sense as an explanation for our behaviour
• e.g. romish chooses to eat the vegetarian option at lunch because he feels strongly against eating meat and animal abuse. This can be explained by his conscious thoughts, but the zombie theory has no explanation for this
• because the other minds hypothesis is a much better explanation of peoples behaviour, it is reasonable to adopt it

Question 4

explain the issue for dualism: dualism makes a category mistake (Gilbert Ryle)

Answer 4

• Ryle says that dualists are making a category mistake, which occurs when one muddles one type of concept with another
• e.g. someone is shown around a university, all of the buildings that make it. Afterwards they ask “but where’s the university?” They have mistaken the university as belonging to the category of ‘buildings’ rather than ‘a collection of buildings’
• Ryle says that dualism makes a similar mistake; it treats the mind as if it were in the same category as non-physical things; just because the mind is not a physical thing, it doesn’t mean it is a non-physical thing
• he claims that the mind is not a ‘thing’ at all
• he says that the ascription of mental states to others makes reference to their publicly observable behaviour

Question 5

explain the issue for interactionist dualism: the conceptual interaction problem (Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia)

Answer 5

• interactionist dualism is a form of dualism which says the mind can interact with the physical world and the physical world can interact with the mind. In other words, the mental and physical can interact in both directions.
  (mind and body are in causal interaction)
• interactionism is mainly substance dualism
• Elisabeth says that because the mind and body are radically different sorts of substances it is difficult to imagine them to interact
• Elisabeth says that causal interaction requires physical contact, otherwise it is inconceivable for two things to interact with each other
• because the mind is an unextended substance, it has no surface and so cannot come into contact with the body
• therefore it is inconceivable for the mind and the body to causally interact
• what is inconceivable is impossible
• so mind-body interaction is impossible

(but Elisabeth acknowledges that common-sense strongly suggest that mind and body interact, and so says we should accept that the mind is actually extended and physical)

Question 6

explain the issue for interactionist dualism: the empirical interaction problem

Answer 6

• interactionist dualism is a form of dualism which says the mind can interact with the physical world and the physical world can interact with the mind. In other words, the mental and physical can interact in both directions.
  (mind and body are in causal interaction)
• interactionism is mainly substance dualism
• this is a more scientific approach to
  interactionist dualism
• physics says that every event in the universe can be explained by interaction with other physical events
• so physical events only have physical causes
• if this is true, then all events that occur in human bodies must be explained in terms of purely physical causes
• the mind is a non-physical cause but human actions do not have non-physical causes and so dualism is false
• as the mind is non-physical it cannot cause the physical to do anything, which presents a problem for interactionist dualism which says that the mental and the physical are in causal interaction
• likewise, the law of conservation of energy says that in a closed system energy cannot be created or destroyed, only changing form
• the universe is a closed system, but for a non-physical mind to interact with the body it would have to increase the amount of energy in the physical universe and this would break the law of conservation of energy

Question 7

explain the issue for epiphenomalist dualism: the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge

Answer 7

• epiphenomalist dualism says that the physical world can cause mental states but mental states cannot cause changes in the physical world – i.e. the causal interaction is one way.
• mental states (qualia) don’t do anything - mental has no causal influences on physical processes
• the mind is a by-product of the brain
• brain states cause mental states
• if qualia/mental state have no causal powers, then knowledge of qualia/mental states is impossible
• if my brain state is all that causes beliefs about my mental state, then I could have the same beliefs about my mental state even if the qualia was completely different
• e.g. when I have the brain state of pain, my pain qualia could swap with my red qualia or disappear entirely and we would still have the same belief that ‘I am in pain’
• this means that we can only ever have knowledge of our brain states, never of our mental states
• this implies that introspective self-knowledge of our mental states is impossible - but this seems obviously wrong, for I can know if I am in pain
• therefore, epiphenomalist dualism is wrong

Question 8

explain the issue for epiphenomenalist dualism: the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life

Answer 8

• epiphenomalist dualism says that the physical world can cause mental states but mental states cannot cause changes in the physical world – i.e. the causal interaction is one way.
• mental states (qualia) don’t do anything - mental has no causal influences on physical processes
• the mind is a by-product of the brain
• brain states cause mental states
• mental states/qualia seem to cause other mental states/qualia - there is causal interaction between them
• e.g. if someone is in constant chronic pain, this may cause them to feel sad. It is logical that the unpleasant feeling of being in pain caused them to feel the mental state of sadness
• e.g. if I go to the dentist surely it is the pain in my tooth that has led to this decision. Here, one mental event has caused the other
• but if epiphenomalism is correct, then qualia have no causal powers, but this seems false
• it seems obvious that qualia do cause other mental states
• denying this seems to be an affront against facts which seem self-evident in everyday experience

Question 9

explain the issue for epiphenomenalist dualism: the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution

Answer 9

• epiphenomalist dualism says that the physical world can cause mental states but mental states cannot cause changes in the physical world – i.e. the causal interaction is one way.
• mental states (qualia) don’t do anything - mental has no causal influences on physical processes
• the mind is a by-product of the brain
• brain states cause mental states
• evolution says that the characteristics of a species have evolved because they give some survival or reproductive advantage
• e.g. giraffes evolved to have long necks so they could eat better from the trees - it stopped them from dying
• if consciousness/qualia had no use then it wouldn’t have been selected during our evolutionary history
• if epiphenonalism is true then we wouldn’t expect to have mental states now because they have no use
• the fact that conscious mental states do exist strongly suggests that it has some evolutionary advantage and must have some causal influence on the physical realm