Professional Discipline and Enforcement - June 2 & 8 Flashcards
If a lawyer is disciplined by a bar association or other body for violating the rules of professional conduct, does that discipline typically include an award of damages in favor of a client who was harmed by the lawyer’s actions? (Q)
No. Professional discipline of lawyers under the rules of professional conduct typically does not include an award of damages in favor of a client who was harmed by the lawyer’s actions, although restitution is sometimes ordered as part of a disciplinary proceeding. In general, professional discipline is a matter between the lawyer and the state bar authority or the courts, and not between the lawyer and the client. Thus, clients who seek to recover damages against their lawyers must look to the laws of malpractice or other civil liability, and not to the rules of professional conduct.
What are the elements of a civil claim for professional negligence against a lawyer? (Q)
A lawyer will be civilly liable for professional negligence (1) to a client or other person to whom the lawyer owes a duty of care, (2) if the lawyer fails to exercise due care toward that person (i.e., breaches the duty of care), and (3) that failure is a legal cause of injury, (4) unless the lawyer has a defense. In general, the defenses available to a lawyer are the same defenses that apply elsewhere in the law of negligence.
In general, is a lawyer considered to be a fiduciary of a client? (Q)
Yes. A lawyer is generally considered to be a fiduciary of a client. Thus, the lawyer has a range of fiduciary duties toward a client, including competence, confidentiality, diligence, honesty, and loyalty in the handling of the client’s affairs.
In addition to professional-negligence liability, is a lawyer subject to civil liability to a client for breach of a fiduciary duty? (Q)
Yes. In addition to professional-negligence liability, a lawyer is civilly liable to a client for breach of fiduciary duty if (1) the lawyer breaches a fiduciary duty to the client, and (2) that failure is a legal cause of the client’s injury, (3) unless the lawyer has a defense. In general, the defenses available to a lawyer are the same defenses that apply elsewhere in the law of fiduciary duty.
Depending on the law in a particular jurisdiction, a claim for a lawyer’s breach of fiduciary duty will often overlap factually and legally with a claim for professional negligence. Likewise, the requirements of proof and the allowable damages may overlap substantially.
Are both professional-negligence claims and fiduciary-breach claims types of legal-malpractice claims? (Q)
Yes. The term legal malpractice encompasses both professional-negligence claims and fiduciary-breach claims against a lawyer. This collective term is often used in discussing proof, causation, and damages in light of the frequently substantial overlap between these two theories of malpractice.
Is a lawyer generally liable for malpractice if she reasonably believed that her actions were required by law or by a rule of professional conduct? (Q)
No. A lawyer generally is not liable for malpractice if she reasonably believed that her actions were required by law or by a rule of professional conduct. In other words, this reasonable belief is a complete defense to a plaintiff’s malpractice claim. This special defense applies in addition to the defenses generally available in the law of negligence or fiduciary duty.
In the context of a lawyer’s professional negligence, what standard of care is required to satisfy the lawyer’s duty to the client? (Q)
Under the professional-negligence standard of care, a lawyer must (1) deploy the competence and diligence normally used by lawyers in similar circumstances (2) to pursue the client’s lawful objectives within the scope of the representation.
In evaluating whether a lawyer has acted competently as required by the professional-negligence standard of care, will a court essentially ask whether the lawyer has acted reasonably under the circumstances? (Q)
Yes. In evaluating whether a lawyer has acted competently as required by the professional-negligence standard of care, the fundamental question is whether the lawyer has acted reasonably under the circumstances. Some of the most important factors in assessing reasonableness in this context are:
time pressures within the representation,
whether the law or the facts are uncertain,
the possibility that competent lawyers may choose different methods to accomplish the same goal, and
the fact that not all representations succeed in achieving the client’s goals.
In evaluating whether a lawyer has acted diligently as required by the professional-negligence standard of care, will a court essentially ask whether the lawyer has acted reasonably under the circumstances? (Q)
Yes. In evaluating whether a lawyer has acted diligently as required by the professional-negligence standard of care, the fundamental question is whether the lawyer has acted reasonably under the circumstances. Some of the most important factors in assessing reasonableness in this context are:
the scope of the representation,
the client’s instructions to to the lawyer,
the importance of the matter to the client,
the cost of undertaking particular activities within the representation, and
the time available within the representation.
In evaluating whether a lawyer has complied with the professional-negligence standard of care, will a court generally compare the lawyer’s actions to those of other lawyers in the state in which the lawyer practices? (Q)
Yes. In evaluating whether a lawyer has complied with the professional-negligence standard of care, a court will generally compare the lawyer’s actions to those of other lawyers within the state in which the lawyer practices, as opposed to those within the lawyer’s more immediate locality. However, a lawyer may sometimes be held to a national standard if a national practice exists in the relevant field, e.g., federal litigation or patent law.
May a lawyer’s assertions or disclaimers of expertise or ability affect the standard of care applicable to the lawyer’s conduct? (Q)
Yes. The standard of care applicable to the lawyer’s conduct can be affected by the lawyer’s assertions or disclaimers of expertise or ability, which in turn shape the client’s reasonable expectations of the lawyer. A lawyer who holds herself out as an expert in a field of law, or as an especially capable or diligent lawyer, will usually be held to a higher standard of care than a lawyer who disclaims particular expertise or does not claim special ability.
In general, does a lawyer breach the professional-negligence standard of care by following the lawful instructions of a properly informed client? (Q)
No. In general, a lawyer does not breach the professional-negligence standard of care by following the lawful instructions of a properly informed client. In other words, if the client understands the circumstances, risks, and rewards involved in a decision, the lawyer may follow the client’s instructions without fear of malpractice liability, even if the lawyer disagrees with the instructions.
In general, must a plaintiff in a legal-malpractice action present expert testimony regarding the care required and the defendant’s breach in order to prove the plaintiff’s claim? (Q)
Yes. In general, a plaintiff in a legal-malpractice action must introduce expert testimony regarding the duty of care (or the relevant fiduciary duty) and the defendant’s breach in order to prove the claim. Expert testimony is usually required because in most cases, a jury, and perhaps a judge, will not be familiar with the applicable field of law and the usual conduct of lawyers in the relevant circumstances. However, expert testimony is not required if the defendant’s duty and breach would be apparent to a layperson without expert testimony.
In general, does a lawyer’s violation of a statute regulating lawyer conduct or a rule of professional conduct give rise to an implied cause of action for malpractice? (Q)
No. In general, a lawyer’s violation of a statute regulating lawyer conduct or a rule of professional conduct does not give rise to an implied cause of action for malpractice. Instead, the plaintiff must establish the elements of duty and breach without relying solely on the statute or rule.
By contrast, some statutes that regulate lawyer conduct may expressly provide a cause of action for breach. Those causes of action are express, not implied, and thus are not affected by this general rule.
In general, does proof of a lawyer’s violation of a statute regulating lawyer conduct or a rule of professional conduct preclude the plaintiff from offering other proof of the lawyer’s malpractice? (Q)
No. In general, proof of a lawyer’s violation of a statute regulating lawyer conduct or a rule of professional conduct does not preclude the plaintiff from offering other proof of the lawyer’s malpractice. In fact, additional proof will normally be required if the rule or statute does not by its terms give rise to a cause of action for breach.
In general, under what circumstances may a trier of fact consider a lawyer’s violation of a statute regulating lawyer conduct or a rule of professional conduct in deciding whether a lawyer has committed malpractice? (Q)
In general, in deciding whether a lawyer has committed malpractice, a trier of fact may consider the lawyer’s violation of a statute or ethical rule if:
the statute or rule was designed to protect someone in the plaintiff’s position, and
proof of the content and interpretation of the statute or rule is relevant to the plaintiff’s claim.
The content and interpretation of the statute or rule might be relevant if they illustrate how lawyers in the relevant jurisdiction either do or should behave. In other words, the statute or rule may itself illustrate the relevant duty or standard of care and allow a comparison of that standard to the defendant’s conduct.
In the context of professional-negligence liability, does a lawyer owe a duty of care to a prospective client? (Q)
Yes. A lawyer owes a duty of care to a prospective client (i.e., a person who consults with a lawyer about forming a client-lawyer relationship), even if that person never becomes an actual client. The lawyer’s standard of care in fulfilling this duty includes acting competently and diligently in observing the applicable rules of confidentiality and conflicts of interest, as well as in providing any legal advice or services to the prospective client notwithstanding the absence of a full client-lawyer relationship.
In the context of professional-negligence liability, does a lawyer owe a duty of care to a former client? (Q)
Yes. A lawyer owes a duty of care to a former client. The lawyer’s standard of care in fulfilling this duty includes acting competently and diligently in appropriately returning papers and property to the former client, preserving confidentiality, and avoiding prohibited conflicts of interest.
In general, are the elements of causation and damages in a legal-malpractice case governed by the relevant jurisdiction’s standard laws of causation and damages? (Q)
Yes. In general, the elements of causation and damages in a legal-malpractice case are governed by the relevant jurisdiction’s standard laws of causation and damages. These principles will often be enunciated in the tort or contract law of the relevant jurisdiction. However, a few special rules have evolved for situations unique to legal-malpractice claims.
If a plaintiff in a legal-malpractice case alleges that but for the lawyer’s misconduct she would have obtained a more favorable judgment in a civil trial, must the plaintiff relitigate the trial evidence as part of the case against the lawyer? (Q)
Yes. If a plaintiff in a legal-malpractice case alleges that but for the lawyer’s misconduct she would have obtained a more favorable judgment in a civil trial, then the plaintiff must relitigate the evidence from the original trial as part of the case against the lawyer. In other words, the plaintiff must essentially retry the original case for the trier of fact in the malpractice action.
If the trier of fact in the malpractice action concludes based on this evidence that the lawyer’s malpractice caused the plaintiff to receive a different or lesser judgment than she should have, then the plaintiff may recover the difference between the amount actually obtained and the amount the plaintiff would have obtained but for the lawyer’s fault.
If a plaintiff in a legal-malpractice case recovers against a lawyer for the loss of a more favorable judgment in a prior case, may the lawyer always deduct the lawyer’s fees in the prior case from the award in the malpractice case? (Q)
No. If a plaintiff in a malpractice case recovers against a lawyer for the loss of a more favorable judgment in a prior case, the lawyer may sometimes, but not always, deduct the lawyer’s fees in the prior case from the malpractice award. A lawyer who has clearly violated a duty to the client and caused serious harm might be required to forfeit some or all of the fees incurred in rendering the inadequate representation. This would prevent the lawyer from deducting the lawyer’s fees from a later malpractice award.
Whether fee forfeiture is required will depend on factors including:
the egregiousness of the lawyer’s malpractice,
the importance of the matter to the plaintiff,
the magnitude of the harm to the plaintiff,
whether the plaintiff gained any benefit from the lawyer’s representation, and
the adequacy of other remedies to compensate the plaintiff.
In general, does a client who has been convicted of a crime have a cause of action against his lawyer if, but for the lawyer’s malpractice, the client would not have been convicted? (Q)
Yes. In general, a convicted criminal defendant has a cause of action against his lawyer if, but for the lawyer’s malpractice, the defendant would not have been convicted. Most jurisdictions require proof that the client was actually innocent of the crime to support this type of malpractice action, though the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers does not require proof of the convicted defendant’s innocence. In addition, in many jurisdictions the defendant must first have the conviction set aside on direct appeal or by collateral attack before bringing a malpractice claim.