Personal Injury and Civil Damages Flashcards
Bragdon v. Abbott
Abbott had asymptomatic HIV. Dentist, Bragdon, refused fill cavity unless it was done in a hospital, claiming that any other setting would pose a risk to him. Although Dr. stated he would not charge extra for his services, Abbott would have to pay any costs related to the use of the hospital’s facility. The ADA defines a health care provider’s office as a “place of public accommodation” covered by the act, but protections from the ADA may be set aside when the disabled individual “poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.” Abbott sued
on the ground that he violated the ADA because he discriminated against her on the basis of HIV, which she claimed met criteria as an ADA disability since it is a “physical impairment” that “substantially limits” a “major life activity (i.e., her ability to reproduce and bear children).”
Is HIV status a disability as defined by the American with Disabilities Act (ADA)? Yes.
Is reproduction a major life activity? Yes.
Can a physician refuse or alter care of a patient with HIV without violating portions of the ADA? In this case, no.
Carter v. General Motors, 106 N.W. 2d 105 (1960)
machine operator for General Motors, transferred to a hub assembly, which required him to transport material from his desk, another employee’s desk, and a conveyor belt, unable to keep up the pace of his work unless he transferred two hubs, he was told to stop because it would result in the materials being mixed up.
He continued to struggle with this job as he was afraid he would be laid-off again. If he took one hub, he fell behind, if he took two, he mixed up the pieces. This dilemma resulted in emotional problems and a month-long psychiatric hospitalization in which he required electroshock therapy.
Filed worker’s compensation claim. He was awarded a claim for “traumatic neurosis, traumatic psychosis, [and] functional disability.” He was also awarded reimbursement for medical and hospital care. The defendants appealed the case due to the split decision from the board. The Appellate Court affirmed the ruling and the case was eventually heard by the Michigan Supreme Court.
Can someone be compensated for a mental disability arising from gradual workplace stress rather than a singular event or incident?
Yes
Was the injury, in this case, a significant emotional distress and psychosis, related to the working conditions?
Was the plaintiff’s injury compensable?
Christy Brothers Circus v. Turnage (1928)
During circus, animal evacuated his bowels into the plaintiff’s lap, which occurred in full view of many people The plaintiff was caused much embarrassment, mortification, and mental pain and suffering. The plaintiff claimed the damage was allegedly due entirely to the defendant’s negligence and without any fault on the part of the plaintiff.
Can individuals make the claim that because they were mentally and emotionally “hurt” by another’s actions, they are therefore owed damages?
Yes, “There may be a recovery of damages for mental suffering, humiliation, or embarrassment resulting from a physical injury of which they are inseparable components.” “Any unlawful touching of a person’s body, although no physical hurt may ensue therefrom, yet, since it violates a personal right, constitutes a physical injury to that person.” “A person suffering a mental condition dependent upon an injury to the person may, in suing to recover damages for the injury, limit the damages to the mental suffering alone.” The Court ultimately determined that the plaintiff was damaged, by reason of humiliation and embarrassment.
Dillon v. Legg 1968
Dillon and her two children walking in their neighborhood when Legg negligently killed one child with his vehicle. Mary and her daughter survived the accident, but witnessed the death. Mary and her daughter sued Legg for wrongful death and emotional distress as a result of witnessing the accident. A trial court dismissed emotional distress claim under the prevailing “zone-of-danger rule:” . The court did not dismiss the daughter’s claim, as she was physically closer to the accident.
Does a negligent defendant owe a duty of care to a bystander/observer?
Yes, zone-of-danger rule “must collapse” because they found it contradictory to award the daughter damages but not the mother. The court relied on foreseeability to establish whether Legg owed a duty of care to Dillon. The court recommended a case-by-case analysis of several factors to determine if such a duty is created: 1.) whether the plaintiff was near the scene of the incident; 2.) Whether the plaintiff suffered emotional shock from contemporaneously observing the accident; 3.) Whether the plaintiff was closely related to the victim. Using the above criteria, the court determined that it was foreseeable that the negligent operation of an automobile could cause emotional distress to a mother witnessing the injury of her child in an accident.
Gough v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, (1993)
Fishing vessel around the Texas Coast and captained by Gough. He had fished in the same area for years and did not consult the updated navigational charts as he claimed to know that coastline. the ship backed over a natural gas pipeline that was supposed to have been buried. A fireball formed within seconds and killed 11 of the 14 crew members on the ship. Gough only survived by jumping overboard. 3 surviving crew members were rescued via helicopter. Gough sustained minimal injuries and was released from the hospital after a few days. Shortly following the accident, he began experiencing nightmares, flashbacks, and depression. Gough then sued the Natural Gas Pipeline (NGP) under general maritime law, claiming he was unable to return to work due to PTSD. He argued the pipe was unmarked and was supposed to be buried three feet underground. NGP elicited testimony that Gough’s handling of the ship could have contributed to the accident as he should have referenced the aforementioned plans. district court awarded Gough $2 million for lost earnings, pain and suffering, mental disability, and “mental anguish. They also assessed him to be 35% at fault for the accident and NGP 65% at fault. NGP appealed the ruling, arguing Gough’s primary damages were for emotional distress and maritime law does not permit recovery for purely emotional damages.
Issue: Can a plaintiff claim damages purely for emotional distress when determined to be partially at fault for an accident?
Holding: Yes, if the emotional injury satisfies the “physical injury or impact rule.” The court determined the facts of the case satisfied the impact test as the impact did cause him physical harm. They mentioned that Gough claimed to have been within the zone of danger but indicated they do not adopt the zone of danger test and declined to comment whether that was or was not the case.
NGP also argued the amount awarded to Gough was excessive. The Appellate Court indicated they could only overrule the amount if it was determined to be “entirely disproportionate to the injury sustained.” When considering the maximum amount Gough could have been awarded using the “maximum recovery” rule, the court determined the total cost was just over $1 million. They concluded the total amount of damages he would be owed would be $753,610, which took into account his 35% liability.
Gough then argued he was not 35% at fault. The Appellate Court determined Gough must “show that the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelming in his favor that reasonable persons could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” When reviewing the evidence, they determined there was enough evidence to conclude Gough’s actions did contribute to the accident as he could have foreseen the danger posed by potential unburied pipelines, which resulted in a duty to avoid them. Despite this duty, they held that NGP was also significantly at fault. The case was be remanded for a new trial unless Gough accepted the aforementioned payment.
Molien v. Kaiser (1980)
Molien went to Kaiser for a routine physical examination, was negligently examined and tested, and incorrectly diagnosed with syphilis, was treated with an unnecessary penicillin and told to tell husband; husband had negative blood test so Molien suspicious that her husband engaged in extramarital sexual activities and divorced, husband brought action against the defendants for mental suffering and the loss of consortium. The lower court ruled that no recovery of damages is warranted for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury. He appealed the case.
Can one recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress?
Emotional injury may be fully as severe and debilitating as physical harm, and there is no reason to dismiss negligently inflicted injury in the absence of some physical consequence. Therefore, the unqualified requirement of physical injury is no longer justifiable. When injury is emotional rather than physical, the plaintiff may have a more difficult task in proving negligence, causation, and the requisite degree of harm. The judgement was reversed. The lower court’s refusal to recognize a cause of action for negligently inflicted injury in the absence of some physical consequence was incorrect. He could recover for loss of consortium where his spouse had suffered a disabling, non-physical injury.
Molzof v. United States (1992)
Molzof had surgery at VA Hospital to remove the upper right lung. Post-op care included temporary placement on a ventilator which had alarm accidentally disconnected, which caused the tube providing life sustaining oxygen to also disconnect. discovered eight minutes later. By the time the physicians arrived, Molzof was in cardiac arrest and the lack of oxygen to his brain left him with irreversible brain damage. His wife sued US under Federal Tort Claims Act for damages she and her husband incurred as a result of the employees’ negligence.
US admitted liability and at bench trial, the court predicted the plaintiff’s life expectancy was three years from the date of trial and future medical expenses would be approximately $1,280,529, should he receive care at a private institution, also determined the plaintiff was entitled to free care from VA and care provided was reasonable and adequate. The court then ordered continuation of care at VA hospital and awarded future medical expenses in amount of $67,000. The amount was lowered because the court determined the government was already obligated to provide care and requiring them to pay the full amount it would be punitive. The case was affirmed on appeal. SCOTUS agreed to hear the case in 1990.
Are the plaintiff’s owed the full amount of damages? Would payment of the full amount be considered punitive as it would result in double payment as the plaintiff was going to continue receiving care from the VA?
SCOTUS held that requiring the government to pay for future medical expenses was not punitive because the case was based on negligence. However, they did not opine on whether the plaintiff was entitled to the full amount of future medical expenses. Instead, remanded back to district court to decide whether the damages were recoverable under Wisconsin Law.
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government and held that, plaintiffs were not entitled to future medical expenses because “it had not been shown that any monies would have been reasonably or necessarily expended by [the] plaintiff in the future for that care and treatment.” The court relied on instruction that future medical expenses should be awarded in the amount that “will reasonably and necessarily be expended by [the] plaintiff in the future for the care and treatment.” When determining their ruling, the district court found no evidence that the Molzof’s were planning to leave the VA and noted that Mrs. Molzof had generally been satisfied with the care her husband had received. The plaintiff again appealed and the case was heard by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court had to determine whether Wisconsin law permitted a plaintiff to recover future medical expenses from the federal government, even though the plaintiff was entitled to free medical care from the government as he was a veteran with a service-connected injury. Molzof argued that the district court misinterpreted Wisconsin law and maintained that all that is necessary for a plaintiff to obtain future medical expenses is expert evidence establishing that the plaintiff required future medical care and the reasonable costs of that care. The government argued that any payments rendered would constitute a “double recovery,” would result in the government paying for the same treatment twice, and that such payment was not permitted or required under Wisconsin state law. The Appellate Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, citing a previous court case which determined “the fact that necessary medical and nursing services are rendered gratuitously to one who is injured should not preclude the injured party from recovering the value of those services as part of his compensatory damages.” The court reversed the ruling and remanded the case back to the district court with the instruction to provide the plaintiff the full amount of damages.
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company (1928)
Palsgraf, was waiting at a Long Island Rail Road station in August 1924 with daughters. Two men attempted to board the train before hers; one (aided by railroad employees) dropped a package that exploded, causing a large coin-operated scale on the platform to hit her. After the incident, she began to stammer, and subsequently sued the railroad, arguing that its employees had been negligent while assisting the man, and that she had been harmed by the neglect. In May 1927 she obtained a jury verdict of $6,000, which the railroad appealed. Palsgraf gained a 3–2 decision in the Appellate Division, and the railroad appealed again.
No negligence because the employees, in helping the man board, did not have a duty of care to Palsgraf as injury to her was not a foreseeable harm from aiding a man with a package. The original jury verdict was overturned, and the railroad won the case.
PLAISANCE v. TEXACO, INC. 1990
Plaisance witnessed fire while working as captain of tug boat. The fire was extinguished, the boat was not damaged, and no one was injured as a result of the fire. Plaisance did not participate in fighting the fire, and people on other vessels in the vicinity of the fire escaped the fire by going to the vessel upon which Plaisance was working. He did not experience any actual physical impact that led to his emotional injury, but he perceived himself to be in actual danger. After the fire had been extinguished, the flotilla proceeded to Texaco’s camp at Caillou Island. At that point, the tug boat stopped at the Texaco fuel dock in order to fill its tanks. Mr. Plaisance docked the boat next to the workover barge to transfer fuel from the tanks. During this process, diesel fuel was spilled on the deck of the boat, and Mr. Plaisance allegedly slipped and fell, landing on his back and head. This accident occurred at least two to three hours after the fire. Plaisance did not record his alleged slip and fall on the boat log, nor on the handwritten accident report which he signed after the accident. Moreover, he did not report this incident to anyone from the boat or Texaco.
Plaisance reportedly asked to be relieved from his duties because he was upset about the fire. He said he was disturbed “that we could have all burned and all. That’s what I told him, you know, that I could have all-blew them up and all, you know… Well, that we could have all burned, you know, with the fire.” Plaisance also alleged that he still dreamed about the accident. He brought action seeking recovery for alleged emotional injury resulting from witnessing a fire and for the slip and fall. Texaco, Inc. made a motion to dismiss certain claims or for partial summary judgment.
Is being fearful, while not actually in the “zone of danger,” sufficient to warrant recovery for emotional distress?
No, Plaisance did not have a viable claim for emotional injury, as he did not seem to be in the “zone of danger” during the fire. His subjective belief that he was in danger, standing alone, is probably insufficient to give rise to a cause of action based on case law.
Because Plaisance included the plea for recovery related to the slip and fall in conjunction with the fire, these two factors were considered together. The court held that the potential cause of the action for the slip and fall was not related to the fire in terms of time, location or circumstance. Because it was not pled separately, the court held that the issue was not properly presented before the court and therefore would not be decided upon.
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. (1993)
In a common-law slander of title action in West Virginia state court, respondents obtained a judgment against petitioner TXO Production Crop for $19000 in actual damages and $10 million in punitive damages. The jury determined that TXO knew that the respondent Alliance Resources Corp, had good title to the oil and gas development rights at issue; that the royalties that TXO sought to renegotiate were substantial; that TXO Production Corp. acted in bad faith when it brought a frivolous lawsuit intended to deprive another company, Alliance Resources Inc., of oil and natural gas royalties that TXO had promised to pay Alliance in return for Alliance’s rights to the property; that TXO was a large, wealthy company and had engaged in similar activities in other parts of the country. TXO appealed and the West Virginia State Supreme Court affirmed the decision.
Did the punitive damages award violate the 14th Amendment due process clause because its amount is excessive or the product of unfair procedure?
No. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that disproportionate punitive damages were allowed for especially egregious conduct. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Stevens stated that while there was “dramatic and even shocking disparity” between the $19000 that Alliance spent fighting the frivolous lawsuit and the $10 million it won in punitive damages, the “shock dissipates” when considering the millions of dollars Alliance stood to lose had it not managed to defend itself and preserve its right to the royalties. With regard to the second issues at hand that the West Virginia Supreme Court had not given meaningful appellate review to the award, SCOTUS determined they had.
Waube v. Warrington (1935)
Waube was looking out the window of her home as her child crossed a busy highway and was hit and killed by a car driven by Warrington. Waube died shortly thereafter reportedly due to the shock and distress caused by witnessing the accident resulting in the death of her daughter. Following the death of Waube, husband and administrator of her estate, sued Warrington, her husband, and the Hardware Mutual Casualty Company for damages as a result of Waube’s death. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant’s appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Can the administrator of an estate sue to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of witnessing injury to another rather than as a result of fear of personal injury and safety?
No. Wisconsin Supreme Court noted a plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for emotional injuries unless the emotional injuries were a result of physical or fear of personal injury. In their arguments, the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued the rule should be extended to cases in which a defendant’s negligent conduct involved an unreasonable risk of harm to a child or spouse of the person sustaining injuries from shock and distress after witnessing injury to the loved one. They cited a previous case, similar to this one, in which a man witnessed a runaway truck kill his child, and later, the mother died from shock and emotional distress. In that case, the court based their decision on the fact that a plaintiff has a right to be free from peril and determined there was no distinction between the emotional damage caused from fear for personal safety versus damages caused by witnessing injury to someone else. The Wisconsin Supreme Court argued that trial court’s decision was incorrect. While they did acknowledge a defendant’s duty to not act in a way which could inflict shock or distress on another and a plaintiff’s right to be free of shock and emotional distress, they argued the right of the plaintiff does not extend to someone who was outside of the scope of personal injury. Thus, the Court reversed the ruling upon concluding they could not justify the extension of the rule to cases in which individuals claim personal injury out of the context of personal danger or peril including distress caused by witnessing the death or personal injury to another.
