Criminal Responsibiltiy Flashcards
Ake v. Oklahoma (1985)
In capital cases, does the Fourteenth Amendment require the government to provide an indigent defendant with the psychiatric assistance necessary to prepare an effective insanity defense?
The Court held that, when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense will be at issue during the trial, the Constitution requires the government to provide psychiatric assistance if the defendant cannot afford it. The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment requires state-provided assistance in cases where there is a private interest that will be affected by the state’s actions, value that will be derived from the additional safeguards, and when providing the assistance will only be a minimal burden to the state. All three of these factors were present in this case. Furthermore, both justice and the Fourteenth Amendment require a defendant to be able to participate meaningfully in the judicial proceedings, which is impossible if the government were to deny this type of assistance to Ake and similar defendants.
Clark v. Arizona (2006)
Does a state violate due process of law by preventing the introduction of evidence showing diminished capacity by a criminal defendant? Does a defendant have the right to present expert evidence about his mental state to counter the prosecutions’ evidence of criminal intent?
No, Arizona has the authority to define and assert an insanity defense as it sees fit. Additionally, many courts feel that knowledge of the nature and quality of the act is equivalent to the ability to know that the act was wrong. With regard to evidence limitations under Arizona law (the Mott Standard), criminal defendants are not prevented from offering testimony regarding mental illness under Arizona law; rather, such evidence is limited to proving an insanity defense under the appropriate standard. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court was consistent with due process. States have authority to determine presumptions and proof of defenses. The Court also concluded that Arizona could have reasonably limited use of insanity evidence to prevent defendants from having two opportunities to offer psychiatric evidence, based on two different standards, which would both necessarily compound the proceedings and entail significant risk of confusing the finder of fact.
Durham v. United States (1954)
Is the M’Naghten Rule (ability to know right from wrong) and the Irresistible Impulse Test (inability to control impulses) adequate for determining insanity.
they felt the right-wrong test supplemented by the irresistible impulse test were not satisfactory criteria for determining criminal responsibility. Specifically, they stated that the “right-wrong test is inadequate in that it does not take sufficient account of physic realities and scientific knowledge, and it is based upon one symptom and so cannot validly be applied in all circumstances.” Further, “The irresistible impulse test gives no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection and so relegates acts caused by such illness to the application of the inadequate right-wrong tests.” They argued that a broader test should be adopted. They said that the new rule should be that, “An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect.” According to the Court, a disease can either improve or deteriorate, and a defect is either congenital, the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease. When there is some evidence that the defendant suffered from a diseased or defective mental condition during the alleged offense, the trial court must provide the jury with guidelines for determining whether the accused can be held criminally responsible. In this way, the ultimate decision is left to the jury.
Edney v Smith (1976)
Were Edney’s 6th Amendment rights violated by allowing testimony from a defense retained psychiatrist? Was the testimony privileged communication?
Court discussed the issue of privilege. It determined that while the common law rules for privilege were preferred, they were not constitutionally mandated in this case. The Court held that when the insanity defense was asserted, and the defense offered evidence to establish their defense, attorney-client privilege is waived because the “Court should have adequate access to as much of the available psychiatric testimony as possible [when] the defendant’s mental state is [an] issue.” Thus, the State could call a psychiatric expert whom had examined the defendant at the request of the defense.
They can waive privilege when they enter the NGRI defense
Foucha v. Louisiana (1992)
Opined/adjudicated insane, later at hospital just had dx of ASPD but was violent so state hospital wanted to keep him committed
Court found the Louisiana statute violated the due process clause. Further, the Court determined that the state was not entitled to indefinitely confine a person solely on the basis of a diagnosis of antisocial personality. The Supreme Court held that keeping a person against his will in a mental institution required a civil commitment hearing to determine his current mental illness and dangerousness and the person was entitled to constitutionally adequate procedures to establish grounds for such confinement.
The Foucha v. Louisiana case has had significant impact in defining commitment after an insanity acquittal. Commitment cannot be an automatic, indefinite process after acquittal. The same standards used for in civilly committed individuals must be applied to involuntarily committed insanity acquittees. Dangerousness alone in the absence of mental illness does not satisfy the standards for a civil commitment. Thus, an antisocial personality and perceived dangerousness is not an acceptable reason to hold an insanity acquittee.
Frendak v. United States (1979)
Can a judge impose the insanity defense on an unwilling (but competent) defendant?
No. A judge cannot impose an insanity defense on a defendant found competent to stand trial if the individual intelligently and voluntarily decides to forgo the defense. The court concluded that, the respect for a defendant’s freedom as a person mandates that he or she be able to make fundamental decisions about the course of the proceedings.
They also listed disadvantages to choosing the insanity defense: an insanity acquittal may increase the period of confinement over a prison sentence; the risk of civil commitment could be substantial (particularly for violent offenses). Better treatment may be received in a prison than a mental hospital (court cited overcrowding, inadequate staffing, poor maintenance, and unsanitary conditions). Hospitalization also interferes with privacy. The defendant may want to avoid stigma associated with a mental disorder/insanity acquittal. Commitment may result in loss of other rights such as obtaining a driver’s license, voting, and the ability to serve on a jury. Lastly, defendant may regard the crime as a political or religious protest, which a finding of insanity would denigrate. The defendant bears the ultimate consequences of any decision. They also added that judges do, however, still have the, “discretion to raise an insanity defense, sua sponte when the defendant does not have the capacity to reject the defense.”
Given the defendant gives up important safeguards when they forgo an insanity defense, the trial judge must seek assurance when a defendant chooses to reject it. The court needs to ensure that the defendant understands the consequences of his or her choices and makes the decision voluntarily. Because the court had doubts that Frendak made an intelligent and voluntary decision, the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Beverly Ibn-Tamas v. U.S. (1979)
Did the trial court err in excluding expert testimony from a clinical psychologist proffered as a defense expert on the subject of “battered woman syndrome?”
Yes. The trial court erred in excluding Dr. Walker’s testimony and saying that Dr. Walker’s methodology fell short. The D.C. Court of Appeals clarified the third prong of the Dyas Standard by specifying that there does not have to be acceptance of the results based on Dr. Walker’s testimony, only that the methodology itself is generally accepted in the scientific community. The court concluded that Dr. Walker’s testimony was “highly probative” and directly related to the appellant’s perceptions of the killing, which was central to her self-defense claim. The case was remanded to the trial court.
In order to pass an admissibility test, testimony must meet the Dyas Standard, which posits: 1. The testimony’s subject matter “must be so distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman;” 2. The “witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that the opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth;” and 3. Expert testimony is inadmissible if “the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion t
U.S. v. Jones (1983)
Does the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard comport with due process for the indefinite commitment of insanity acquittees? Does an NGRI finding provide an adequate basis for involuntary commitment?
Yes. When a criminal defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity, the due process clause permits the Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to a mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society. A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness. These constitute an adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous and mentally ill person. He can also be confined to a mental hospital for a period longer than he could have been incarcerated had he been convicted. Insanity acquittees are not entitled to release merely because they have been hospitalized for a period longer than they could have been incarcerated had they been convicted.
Kansas v. Cheever (2013)
Does the prosecution’s introduction of psychiatric testimony about the defendant after the defendant has already introduced such testimony violate the 5th Amendment?
NO. When “a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit an offense, the prosecution may present psychiatric evidence in rebuttal.” Not allowing this would “undermine the adversarial process” and permit a defendant to provide “a one-sided and potentially inaccurate view of his mental state” at the time of the crime, through an expert. The Fifth Amendment does not permit a defendant who chooses to testify to refuse to submit to cross-examination.
McDonald v. U.S. (1962)
Did the court err in not giving the Lyles instructions? Did the court err in not instructing the jury that one of the alternative verdicts was not NGRI?
Yes. The court should have given the Lyles instruction and should have instructed the jury that a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict was an option. The conviction was reversed and the case was remanded.
In considering the testimony of the experts, the Court clarified that the jury is not bound by psychiatric conclusions about what is a disease or defect. They clarified that it is for the jury alone, considering all lay and expert testimony to determine if the defendant was sufficiently disabled to have a mental disease or defect. To guide their considerations, the Court ruled that the jury should be told “a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls.”
Montana v. Egelhoff (1996)
Whether the Due Process Clause is violated by Montana Code, which provides, in part, that voluntary intoxication “may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of [a criminal] offense.”
The Due Process Clause is not violated.
Although voluntary intoxication cannot negate a mental state, it can be shown to the jury to help them assess whether a defendant acted in premeditation or if the murder was done only in the heat of passion.
Although a rule allowing a jury to consider evidence of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication where relevant to mens rea has gained considerable acceptance, it is of too recent vintage and not fundamental to constitute the prohibition of allowing evidence of voluntary intoxication is not a violation of a defendant’s 14th Amendment rights
People v. Patterson (1976)
Does placing the burden on defendant to show extreme emotional disturbance violate his due process rights?
No. The court held that putting the burden on the defendant did not violate due process since extreme emotional disturbance was merely a mitigating circumstance that did not alter the prosecution’s burden to prove intent, which was not negated by such disturbance. The death, intent to kill, and causation are the facts that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The Due Process Clause does require New York to abandon those defenses or undertake the cause of disproving their existence in order to convict a person of a crime which is otherwise is otherwise within its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment.
People v. Saille (1991)
Whether, in California, evidence of voluntary intoxication may be used as a defense to reduce murder to involuntary manslaughter if the defendant sufficiently shows that the intoxication prevented him from forming the specific intent to commit murder.
Yes. The court of appeals’ ruling is affirmed. In California, evidence of voluntary intoxication may be used as a defense to reduce murder to involuntary manslaughter if the defendant sufficiently shows that the intoxication prevented him from forming the specific intent to commit murder.
Powel v. Texas (1989)
Was the defendant deprived his sixth amendment right to counsel when psychiatric examinations were performed by state experts, without notice to him or his attorney that the examinations would encompass the issue of future dangerousness?
Yes. The evidence of future dangerousness was taken in deprivation of Powell’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Under Estelle v. Smith, and Satterwhite v. Texas, once a defendant is formally charged, the right to counsel precludes a psychiatric examination concerning future dangerousness without notice to counsel. The lower court’s holding that Powell waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination provides no basis for concluding that he waived this separate Sixth Amendment right, and the court erred in conflating the two Amendments’ analyses. Thus, the introduction of psychiatric testimony in support of a defense of insanity did not waive his sixth amendment right to notification.
Rex v. Arnold (1724)
Was Arnold “deprived of his reason” and thus not culpable for his actions?
To be exempt from culpability in this case, the Judge instructed the jury that Arnold had to be so “totally deprived of his understanding and memory” that he did “not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast.” If they determined he was “sensible and had the use of reason, and understood what he did, than he is not within the exemptions of the law, but is subject to punishment as any other person.” Arnold was found guilty and sentenced to death, although he ended up living the rest of his life in prison.
