Competence to Stand Trial Flashcards
Ake v Oklahoma (1985)
Ake v Oklahoma (1985)
Topic: Defendant’s right to a psychiatric evaluation in capital cases when cannot provide one themselves
Issue: Does the state have to provide access to a psychiatric evaluation for
an indigent defendant in a case where legal insanity is at issue?
Finding: YES
Summary & Rationale:
* Killed a couple people, acting bizarre in court, Found ITP — went to psych hospital, found restored, tried to raise sanity, court denied this since he couldn’t afford his own psychiatrist.
* If there is a preliminary showing that sanity may be a factor the state needs to provide an evaluation for those who cannot afford it themselves. Per 14th amendment due process.
* Questions to determine if expert witness necessary:
1. Private interests affected by action of the state
2. Governmental interests will be affected if the safeguard is provided
3. Probable value of additional procedural safeguards and erroneous deprivation
* Capital case = private interests were deemed extremely important
* Value of psych eval is extremely important
Cooper v Oklahoma (1996)
Topic: Burden of proof clear and convincing vs. preponderance of the evidence in CST cases
Issue: Is preponderance of the evidence the appropriate standard for deciding a defendant is competent to stand trial
Finding: YES
Summary and Rationale: 86-yr old several CST evals with varying results. Judge decides to go forward with trial. CST raised again and eval indicates ITP. Judge goes forward with trial anyway citing that there is not “clear and convincing evidence.” Guy gets sentenced to death. SCOTUS said no way you idiots you are violating due process.
Rationale: UNANIMOUS – Cited Medina in that preponderance of evidence is proper allocation for comp cases. Clear and convincing is too high a burden. Imposes a significant risk of erroneous determination” and threatens the “basic fairness of the trial itself”
Drope v Missouri (1975)
Topic: Pausing criminal proceedings re: possible incompetence
Issue: Should a judge interrupt criminal proceedings if a defendant appears to be incompetent.
Finding: YES
Summary and Rationale: indicted for rape of his wife. Several motions filed for psychiatric exam all denied. Wife testified to bizarre behaviors as well. After wifes testimony, drope shot himself in abdomen and didn’t show up next day. Attorney’s motions were all denied. Trial continued and sentenced to life in prison.
Rationale: UNANIMOUS – constitutional rights were violated. SCOTUS said RECONSIDER COMPETENCE AT ANY POINT IN TRIAL where circumstances change that could raise issue of competence. Sufficient evidence to question Drope’s competency.
Dusky v US (1960)
Topic: Standards of Competence to Stand Trial
Issue: is basic knowledge about one’s charges enough to be competent to stand trial?
Finding: NO
Summary and Rationale: diagnosed with schizophrenia, charged with abducting and rape of teenager. Hospitalized for 4 months. Comp report said cannot understand legal proceedings and assist counsel. TRIAL JUDGE found him competent saying “he was oriented to time and place, had recollecton of events, and appeared to be able to assist. Sentenced to 45 years. SCOTUS reversed
Rationale: not able to assist counsel due to psychosis. Only understood basic elements of cort proceedings. Gave us our standard for competence 2 prongs
- Whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”
ESTELLE V. SMITH (1981)
Did the trial court (and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals) violate the defendant’s constitutional rights by permitting psychiatric testimony to be used at the sentencing phase when it never alerted the defendant, or his counsel, about how the information obtained during the competency evaluation would be used to assess future risk?
Several constitutional issues were addressed by the District Court and the Court of Appeals: 1. Admission of Dr. Grigson’s testimony at the penalty phase and whether that violated defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination because defendant was not advised he had a right to remain silent and that any statement made could be used against him at a sentencing proceeding. Response by Supreme Court: “When faced while in custody with a court-ordered psychiatric inquiry, respondent’s statements to Dr. Grigson were not given “freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences” and, as such, could be used as the State did at the penalty phase only if respondent had been apprised of his rights and had knowingly decided to waive them.” 2. Whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is abridged when the defendant is not given prior opportunity to consult with counsel about his participation in the psychiatric examination. Response by Supreme Court: “The death penalty was improperly imposed on respondent because the psychiatric examination on which Dr. Grigson testified at the penalty phase proceeded in violation of respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Conclusion: Respondent’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were abridged by the State’s introduction of Dr. Grigson’s testimony at the penalty phase. It is a violation of one’s constitutional rights to have previous psychiatric testimony used at the sentencing phase of one’s capital murder trial to establish future dangerousness.
Jackson v. Indiana (1972)
Did the Supreme Court of Washington err in declaring a Washington state policy unconstitutional because it did not provide a judicial hearing for inmates prior to administration of involuntary medication?
Appellant was subject to a more lenient commitment standard but a more stringent standard for release from commitment than others not charged with an offense and thus violated Appellant’s right to equal protection.
A person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain the capacity in the foreseeable future.
If it is determined that a defendant will never be deemed competent to stand trial, the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen or release a defendant.
Medina v. California (1992)
Is a defendant’s right to due process violated by placing the burden of proof on them to establish they are not competent? And/or, is a defendant’s right to due process violated by establishing a presumption that the defendant is competent unless proven otherwise?
Due Process Clause only requires “the most basic procedural safeguards,” and if the state provides the defendant access to procedures for making a competency evaluation, due process does not require the state to assume the burden of proving competency. In evaluating whether state law violated a defendant’s due process, the Court should consider basic fundamental principles of fairness. Placing the burden of proof on the defendant does not “offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” The court notes that allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant should not affect competency determinations, unless there is equally weighted evidence on both sides. Further, the defense raised the issue of incompetence, and had better access to evidence/information to establish a defense, stating, “Defense counsel will often have the best informed view of the defendant’s ability to participate in his defense.”
Pate v. Robinson (1966)
Is it a violation of due process to try a defendant who is suspected to be incompetent?
Under Illinois law, a trial judge must conduct a competency hearing when the evidence presents a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s sanity. The state had asserted that since Robinson did not demand a competency hearing that he knowingly waived his right to an insanity defense. However, if he was indeed incompetent, then he could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived the defense of insanity. The Illinois supreme court had concluded that his conduct during the trial did not present sufficient evidence of insanity to require a competency hearing. His conduct at trial may have been relevant to the ultimate determination of sanity, but his trial conduct alone cannot determine the right to a competency hearing. Evidence of his history of behaviors should have warranted a competency hearing. The write of habeas corpus must be granted and he must be released unless the state affords him a new trial within a reasonable amount of time. Remanded for further proceedings.
Riggins v. Nevada (1992)
Is forced administration of antipsychotic medication during trial a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Due process allows a mentally ill inmate to be treated involuntarily with antipsychotic drugs when a determination is made that the inmate is dangerous to himself or others, and the treatment is in the inmate’s best interest. The State was obligated to establish the need for Mellaril and the medical appropriateness of the drug once Riggins moved to terminate its administration, but the State failed to meet this obligation. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment and stated that the Due Process Clause prohibits the State from administering unwanted psychotic drugs to a defendant simply to make him competent to stand trial. He argued that drugs can prejudice the accused in two principal ways: 1. By altering his demeanor in a manner that will prejudice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom, and 2. By rendering him unable or unwilling to assist counsel. Kennedy equated this to the State manipulating material evidence. The State must show that the side effects will not alter the defendant’s reactions or diminish his capacity to assist counsel before the drugs can be administered.
Sell vs United States (2003)
Can the Federal Government order the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medication to a mentally ill criminal defendant (who committed a serious but non-violent crime) in order to render them competent to stand trial?
The constitution allows the Federal Government to order the involuntarily administration of anti-psychotic medications under certain circumstances. These are: 1. Demonstrate that important governmental interests are at stake in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime, 2. Involuntary medication will significantly further government interests by being “substantially likely” to render the individual competent and substantially unlikely to have side effects that would interfere significantly with their ability to assist counsel, 3. Involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests and less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results, and 4. Drug administration is medically appropriate.
SEILING V. EYMAN (1973)
Did the trial court do enough in terms of evaluation when trying to determine whether Seiling was competent to waive his constitutional rights and plead guilty? In other words, was the competency evaluation and the brief meeting held by defense counsel enough to determine this issue of competency to waive one’s constitutional rights?
Reversed and remanded to the District Court to grant the writ. Several constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial: 1. Privilege against self-incrimination; 2. Right to trial by jury; 3. Right to confront one’s accuser. Also, “When a substantial question of a defendant’s mental capacity has arisen in a criminal proceeding, it is logically inconsistent to suggest that this waiver can be examined by mere reference to those criteria we examine in cases where the defendant is presumed competent, since in the latter cases no inquiry into the defendant’s mental capacity to make the waiver is made.” Additionally, “Where a defendant’s competency has been put in issue, the trial court must look further than to the usual “objective” criteria in determining the adequacy of a constitutional waiver.” A determination of competency to stand trial to gauge a defendant’s ability to waive his constitutional rights is “inadequate because it does not measure the defendant’s capacity by a high enough standard.”
United States v. Duhon (2000)
Did FCI Butner’s certification of competency from social worker, based on Duhon’s participation and performance in a competency restoration group, satisfy the Daubert standards of reliability?
No. The hospital’s certification of competency failed to meet the minimum standards of reliability under Daubert, and must therefore be rejected. The FCI report provides no scientific or other support for the conclusion that repeating factual information to a mentally retarded criminal defendant so that he learns to retain it has any relevance to the issue of competency. Further, citing the testimony of court-appointed forensic evaluators, Duhon remains incompetent due to mental retardation, a learning disorder, and a seizure disorder. Additionally, no further treatment or hospitalization is appropriate because 1.) Duhon’s mental disabilities were permanent and 2.) Duhon did not pose a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another (18 U.S.C. § 4246).
Wilson v. United States (1968)
Can amnestic individuals be found competent to stand trial when they have no recollection of events? Is it denial of due process or of the right to effective assistance of counsel to try a defendant suffering from retrograde amnesia?
Reversed and remanded by the US Court of Appeals, DC Circuit for more extensive post trial findings on the question of whether memory loss deprived the defendant of a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel to which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitled him.
Before imposing a sentence, the judge needs to make detailed written findings concerning the effect amnesia had on the fairness of trial. Must comment on six factors: 1) amnesia’s effect on ability to consult with counsel; 2) amnesia’s effect on ability to testify on own behalf; 3) extent to which evidence can be extrinsically reconstructed; 4) extent to which government assisted the defendant and his counsel in that reconstruction; 5) strength of the prosecution’s case; 6) additional information that would indicate whether defendant had a fair trial. If deemed fair, conviction stands.
