Juvenile Justice Flashcards
In re Gault (1967)
Issue: Are juvenile delinquents facing a loss of liberty entitled to similar procedural due process rights as adults charged with a crime?
Answer: Yes
Gault accused of making obscene call to neighbor while on probation; brought to detention facility
Mom learned hearing scheduled for next day; notice wasn’t given to Gault or his parents, no transcript of the hearing was made, no sworn testify and the complainant was not present (not present in 2nd hearing either)
Probation filed a report (nobody saw it) and sentenced to training school until 21 yo (an adult with same charge would have a fine and 2 months in jail
Superior AZ court dismissed writ of habeas corpus
AZ Supreme court affirmed decision
USSC reversed
Finding: 1.) Juveniles facing a delinquency hearing and loss of liberty are entitled to certain procedural safeguards (similar to adults), under the due process clause of 14th amendment. 2.) Safeguards include written notice, right to counsel, and right to confront witnesses.
Graham v. Florida (2010)
Issue: Does the 8th amendment permit the sentencing of a juvenile offender to life without parole for committing a nonhomicide crime?
Answer: No
On probation for a crime he committed at 16; at 17 yo believed to be part of a robbery
Minimum sentence could have been 5 but state recommended 30 yrs; probation recommended 4 yrs
Judge stated he was escalating and sentenced him to essential life without parole
Motion challenging it under 8th amendment was denied
FL DCOA affirmed
FL supreme court denied review
USSC- reversed
Finding: 1.) Cited proportionality principle (is punishment proportional to the offense) concluded 8th amendment prohibits sentences of life without parole for non-homicide defendants younger than 18 yo and states must provide defendants with meaningful opportunity to be released
Miller v. Alabama (2012)
Issue: Does the 8th amendment permit mandatory sentencing of a juvenile offender to life without parole?
Answer: No
14 yo defendants charged with and convicted for murder as adults (Arkansas and Alabama)
Both states allowed prosecutorial discretion in moving the cases to adult court and in both states, existing law required a minimum sentence of life without parole for crimes committed
Appeals courts in both states affirmed trial court findings/sentences
USSC reversed
Finding: 1.) used precedents of Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida as guidance. 2.) mandatory sentencing guidelines for murder in Al and AR, regardless of age violated 8th amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment becuase adolescents are due to developmental immaturity less culpable and therefore less deserivng of most severe punishment. 3.) Didn’t ban imposition of such a sentence but required consideration of the factors of youth in sentencing decisions.
Kent v. U.S. (SCOTUS, 1966)
Issue: Process to transfer a juvenile to adult court
Kent, 16 yo, charged with rape, robbery; juvenile authority discussed possibility his case move to DC to be tried as an adult; had an eval done and experts recommended treatment and that he would be suitable for rehabilitation and appropriate to keep in juvenile court; his case was moved to DC without discussing expert’s opinions; his transfer appeal was denied; found competent and NGRI for rape and guilty on other charges; sentenced to 30-90 years on guilty charges and committed to St. E’s on other charges
Question: Was the process to move him to adult court valid?
Answer: No. SCOTUS reversed. The waiver was invalid and he should not have been tried as an adult
Finding: 1.) There was not sufficient investigation before the waiver; he didn’t get a hearing, access to counsel or access to his record 2.) Because juvenile courts are acting under parens patriae, does not mean they can act with procedural arbitrariness 3.) Juvenile defendants are entitled to a hearing for a waiver into adult court, that they are entitled to records which are being considered by the court and to a statement of reasons for the transfer
Implications: Required the application of certain due process rights in juvenile transfer cases
In re Winship (SCOTUS, 1970)
Issue: Burden of proof in juvenile court
Gault, 12 yo, accused of stealing $112 from a purse; found delinquent- court rejected the need to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt noting juvenile standards only required preponderance of the evidence
Ordered to a training school with potential for up to 6 years; NY Sup. Crt and COA affirmed; SCOTUS granted cert
Question: Can the burden of proof be less stringent for juvenile court
Answer: No. SCOTUS reversed. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required by due process in criminal trials when a juvenile is charged with an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult
Finding: 1.) BaRD must be applied for adults and juveniles 2.) Using a preponderance standard, as in civil proceedings, ran the risk of someone being incorrectly determined guilty 3.) Mere variation in ages does not warrant different burdens of proof so long as they all face loss of liberty as a possible sentence
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (SCOTUS, 1971)
Issue: jury trials in juvenile court
McKeiver, 16 yo) charged with robbery, et al; no prior crim hx; represented by counsel in juvenile court, denied a jury hearing and was tried with a judge; court found him delinquent and put on probation; PA Superior Court affirmed; PA sup Court granted review to see if there was a constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court- stated no; SCOTUS granted cert (with other similar cases)
Question: Are jury trials a constitutional right in juvenile court?
Answer: No. trial by jury is not constitutionally required in adjudicative phase of juvenile court delinquency proceedings
Finding: 1.) Due process must be provided to juveniles in “fundamental fairness” but a jury trial was not a necessary component of accurate fact finding (other rights given to juveniles like right to counsel and cross examination were essential to accurate fact finding) 2.) Because juvenile prosecution is not considered either civil or criminal, the whole of 6th amendment does not necessarily apply
Implication: 1.) difference in the adult and juvenile courts (equating adjudicative phase of a juvenile proceeding with a criminal trial ignores fairness, sympathy and paternal attention inherent in juvenile system)
Breed v. Jones (SCOTUS, 1975)
Issue: Double jeopardy in juvenile cases
Jones, 17 yo, found guilty in juvenile court for robbery- at sentencing court found him to not be amenable for treatment as a juvenile and prosecution petitioned for him to be charged as an adult; he appealed citing double jeopardy but CA Sup. Court denied
Found guilty in CA Superior court and sentenced to CA Youth Authority
US DC said no double jeopardy
US COA reversed and said it was; state appealed to SCOTUS saying not double jeopardy because he hasn’t been sentenced
Question: if a juvenile is found guilty in juvenile court but deemed unfit for punishment through the rehab system, can they be tried in adult court? Is this double jeopardy?
Answer: Yes. SCOTUS said it was double jeopardy and his adult conviction should be vacated
Finding: 1.) jeopardy began during the adjudicative phase of juvenile court due to the potential consequences (stigma inherent in that finding and deprivation of liberty for many years 2.) no merit to argument double jeopardy only relates to sentencing 3.). Consideration of transfer to adult court should be held before adjudicatory hearings
Fare v. Michael (SCOTUS, 1979)
Issue:
Michael, 16 yo, arrested for murder and asked for his parole officer after being given Miranda rights; PO wasn’t available and when police offered him an attorney he refused; he made incriminating statements linking him to the murder during questioning
At trial, moved to suppress statements noting his request for a PO was him invoking his 5th amend rights; TC denied motion
Sup. Court of CA reversed, noting PO held the position of a “trusted guardian” for the juvenile (exercises authority of parens patriae) and demonstrated an unwillingness to talk; state appealed to SCOTUS
Question: 1.) Is requesting a PO equivalent to requesting an attorney for purposes of Miranda/5th amendment aka does a juvenile’s request for a probation officer trigger 5th amendment against self-incrimination 2.) How should one determine if a juvenile’s waiver of Miranda was knowing and voluntary (thus ok to proceed with questioning)?
Answer Question 1: 1.) No. SCOTUS said a juvenile’s request for a PO does not invoke 5th amendment protection against self-incrimination 2.) Miranda recognized unique role of attorneys and PO cannot offer that type of legal assistance necessary to protect 5th amendment rights- not trained in law so not in a position to advise or advocate on legal rights, communications aren’t privileged, and attorney and PO might also have different interests.
Answer Question 2: 1.) A court must look at the totality of the circumstances in each case to determine if a juvenile waived that right and because of his age and hx of involvement in CJS he should have known to stay silent
Schall v. Martin (SCOTUS, 1984)
Court granted detention of Martin, 14 yo, prior to fact finding hearing- started a class action lawsuit saying pretrial detention of juveniles was unconstitutional because served as a punishment before a trial
Question: Is pretrial detention of a juvenile delinquent a violation of the right to Due Process under 14th amendment if there is a “serious risk” that the juvenile will commit an act that would be constituted as a crime(if committed as an adult)?
Answer: No. Pretrial detention of a juvenile does not violate Due Process.
Findings: 1.) Pretrial detention serves a legitimate purpose of protecting the state and juvenile from further crimes (state has more responsibilities in a case of a juvenile than that of an adult and pretrial detention not only protects society but also the potential physical and psychological harm that could come from a juvenile engaging in a crime. 2.) Also still granted other procedural protections (notice, hearing, statement of facts, etc).
Thompson v. Oklahoma (SCOTUS, 1988)
Thompson, age 15, accused of murder; underwent an evaluation to see if could stand trial as an adult and found competent; found guilty by a jury and sentenced to death; OK COA affirmed; appealed to SCOTUS saying his death sentence was cruel and unusual punishment
Question: Can a juvenile be sentenced to death?
Answer: No. SCOTUS said cannot execute a juvenile because that violates 8th. DP constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in those under age 16.
Findings: 1.) Evolving standards of decency (other states require defendant be at least 16 for DP)
Implications: Expanded evolving standards of decency in Roper to include those under 18 yo
G.J.I. v. State (OK COA, 1989)
Issue: Must all custodial parents be legally notified of juvenile delinquency proceedings?
GJ, 13 yo, in and out of treatment and mom found him attempting to rape 2 yo sister; found guilty of being a “delinquent” and committed a second degree rape
He appealed claiming ISt and not afforded a trial to determine competency, he should have been allowed to defend himself with a “claim of infancy” since he was under 14, and all appropriate parties had not been notified since his father was absent from proceedings.
Question: If a custodial parent was not notified of their child’s hearing in juvenile court, does that negate any findings of guilt?
Answer: Yes. OK COA found his third appeal was valid- father should have been notified and his conviction was vacated
Finding: 1.) cited case law that dealt with lack of notifying a father in a certification hearing and stated they did not differentiate between certification and delinquency. 2.) His conviction was voiced because the father was not served or present during legal proceedings.
Roper v. Simmons (SCOTUS, 2005)
Issue: Can minors be sentenced to death?
Simmons was 17 yo when he committed murder, tried and convicted as an adult; sentenced to death
MO Sup. Court affirmed conviction and sentence
Simmons filed a second appeal against Roper (superintendent of prison) citing the “evolving standards of decency” as cited in Atkins v. Virginia
MO court agreed with Simmons despite USSC precedent in Stanford v. Kentucky (minimium age for capital punishment was 16)
USSC- affirmed
Question: Does the constitution prohibit the execution of an individual who committed capital murder when under 18 yo?
Answer: Yes. SCOTUS affirmed MO Sup. Court- minors cannot be sentenced to death- doing so would violate 8th and 14th amendments and constitute cruel and unusual punishment (because of their developmental immaturity)
Finding: 1.) Agreed with MO (and Mr. Simmons) that holding an execution of an individual for a crime committed before 18 yo was a violation of 8th and 14th amendments. 2.) Similar to Atkins, the court stated that the majority of states (and international law) did not permit the execution of juveniles. 3.) Scientific community viewed adolescence as a period of poor decision making, developmental immaturity, and susceptibility to peer pressure, all of which rendered adolescents less capable than adults and therefore not deserving of the ultimate penalty (death).
Implications: 1.) Adult crimes don’t imply adult punishment 2.) Three general differences between adolescents and adults: Immaturity reflected in tendency toward recklessness, vulnerability to negative influences/outside pressures, and lack of fully formed personality 3.) Given these factors their culpability is reduced
J.D.B. v North Carolina (SCOTUS, 2011)
Issue: juvenile offenders and consideration of in custody status for Miranda warning notifications
Questioned about break ins at school by a uniformed officer (took from classroom to a closed door conference room) where he was questioned for 30 min. No Miranda warnings or opportunity to call his grandmother, nor told that he was free to leave; eventually urged to tell the truth and told about prospect of detention; he confessed and was then told that he could refuse to answer questions and was free to leave; he gave more incriminating information and was charged
Defense argued the statement should be suppressed because he had been interrogated in a custodial setting without being afforded Miranda warnings and that his statements were involuntary; convicted
NC COA and Sup. Court affirmed, noting his age was not relevant to the determination of if he was in police custody; SCOTUS granted cert
Question: Can a minor’s age be considered when determining if a minor believes he is in custody and therefore deserves to be read his rights?
Answer: Yes. SCOTUS reversed/remanded. A child’s age is a relevant factor to consider in determining if a child is in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona
Finding: 1.) Court had previously held that to determine if a suspect was in custody, they should look at if the reasonable or average suspect would think they are free to leave 2.) Court recognized the inherent coercive nature of interviews and that can produce false confessions, and that juveniles are at an even greater risk of this during custodial interrogation than adults 3.) “common sense reality” that a kid may feel bound to stay when an adult in same circumstance would feel free to leave
Implications: 1.) Created a “reasonable child” standard to be used when determining if the average child would believe they were in police custody and therefore police required to give Miranda 2.) Age and mental status are important components when determining police custody for Miranda purposes
