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philosophy paper 1 > Perception as a source of knowledge > Flashcards

Perception as a source of knowledge Flashcards

1
Q

what is empiricism

A

our fundamental knowledge comes from the sense+experience

and all knowledge is known posteriori

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2
Q

what is rationalism?

A

knowledge comes from reason

and all knowledge is known a priori

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3
Q

what is a priori?

A

knowledge doesnt depend on expereince

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4
Q

what is posteriori?

A

knowledge depends on expereince

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5
Q

definition of perception

A

expereince using our 5 senses

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6
Q

what is realism

(about the external world)

A

the view that the world outsid our minds is real.

we experience the world directly, unmediated by anything

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7
Q

definition of direct realism (DR)

A

the qualities we experince in objects are possessed by the objects themselves

so, appearence and reality should be idientical

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8
Q

what do realists claim

A

what we percieve are physical objects which exist independently of our minds

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9
Q

what is sense experinece

A

awareness of physical objects through senses

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10
Q

What is verdical perception

A

matching with reality

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11
Q

strengths of naive DR

A

common sense, simplicity, Ockams razor

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12
Q

what is Ockams razor

A

do not multiply entities beyond necessity

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13
Q

criticism of DR

illusions

A
  1. objectively, the world can only be one way at one time
  2. DR says that we percieve the world directly
  3. if so, we percieve the world as it is- nothing ‘gets in the way’ to stop it appearing as it is
  4. illusions show that the world is not percieved as it is

McGurk effect- facial expression clashes with what we hear therefore creating an auditory illusion

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14
Q

criticism of DR

perceptual variation

A
  1. what i see changes
  2. the object itself cant be supposed to change
  3. therefore what i see is not the object

Bertrand Russel’s table

properties physical objects have and the properties they appear to have are not always identical

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15
Q

criticism of DR

time lag

A
  1. all perception is a process which takes time (e.g the sun)
  2. therfore we see things as they were in the past
  3. but the past no longer exists- it isnt reality
  4. so we cannot percieve reality directly
  5. so we must percieve something else e.g sense data
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16
Q

criticism of DR

hallucinations

A
  1. some sense experinece is of hallucinations
  2. but in any experince something is being percieved
  3. therfore hallucinations dont exist in reality but in our heads
  4. hallucinations are perceptions of sense data
  5. some hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable from verdical perceptions
  6. suggests all perception is sense data and not objects themselves

leads to indirect realism

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17
Q

what is sense data

A

a mental image

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18
Q

what is indirect realism (IDR)

A

we view the world through sense data, perception is indirect

we always directly perceve sense data

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19
Q

IDR

what is the phenomenal principle

A
  1. i must be seeing somehting in order to have an experinece
  2. it must be something mental that i see, if its not reality
  3. therefore im not perceiving a mental image
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20
Q

defintiion of subjectively indistinguishable

A

feels the same

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21
Q

qualities of sense data

5 points

A
  • mental- mind dependent
  • private to each person
  • therefore seeing them slightly differently
  • subjective
  • temporary (transient)
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22
Q

qualities of physical objects

6 points

A
  • material
  • exists in the external world so mind-independent
  • public to everyone
  • an object in reality that possesses characteristics
  • objective
  • permanent
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23
Q

what are primary qualities

A

qualities that physical objects themselves have

an object must have these qualities to exist

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24
Q

examples of primary qualities

A
  • mass
  • solidity
  • height
  • density
  • depth
  • weight
  • width
  • figure
  • mobility

Primary qualities are measureable

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25
Q

what are secondary qualities

A

qualities that are subjective

dependent on the person perceiving them

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26
Q

examples of secondary qualities

A
  • colour
  • taste
  • texture
  • smell
  • sound

secondary qualities are not measurable

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27
Q

veil of perception criticism

weaker version

A
  1. if we only perceive sense data directly,how do we know what reality is like
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28
Q

response to veil of perception criticism (weaker version)

A

Primary+Secondary qualities:
1. we cna know we are experincing something so something exists in reality
2. we experince PQ via our sensedata
3. this resembles what the object is like in reality
4. so we can know about the nature of reality i.e. the PQ’s of the object

THIS IS LOCKE’S RESPONSE

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29
Q

veil of perception criticism

stronger version

A

if we only percieve sense data directly, how do we know there is an external world causing this. We dont know the exdternal world exists

leads to skeptism about the existence of mind independent objects

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30
Q

response to veil of perception criticism (stronger version)

involuntary nature of perception

A
  1. we have no choice over our perceptual experinces (unlike imagination)
  2. if i write on paper, i cant not see it
  3. this shows that there is a mind independent external world
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31
Q

response to veil of perception criticism (stronger version)

coherence of the senses

A
  1. our sense data is caused by mind-independent objects
  2. locke’s flame- if you see a bonfore, you shoukd be able to hear, feel it etc
    Trotter-Cockburn develops this:
  3. we learn which visual experinecs go with which auditory experinece e.g seeing a dog and hearing a dog bark
  4. we know what sound it will make
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32
Q

issue with responses to veil of perception criticism (stronger version)

involuntary nature of perception AND coherence of the senses

A

neither of these responses are decisive.
both of them could be explained by a demon, simulation etc

these are weaker responses

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33
Q

response to veil of perception criticism (stronger version)

best hypothesis

A
  1. the external world exists because its a simple and powerful explanation of our perceptual experinces (sense data)
  2. it is SIMPLE because it matches our instinctive belief in the existnec of the ext. world
  3. it is powerful because it can say why we experince things as bahvaing in regular+predictable ways

russell’s cat -moves from one place to another - it exists

this is the strongest response

34
Q

who’s response is ‘involuntary experinces’

A

Locke

35
Q

who’s response is ‘coherence of the senses’

A

locke + trotter-cockburn

36
Q

who’s response is ‘the best hypothesis’

A

Bertrand Russell

37
Q

what does berkeley say about sense data to criticise it

idealism

A

sense data and the ext. world are too different to give us knowledge

so sense-data cannot represent the external world

38
Q

ideas cant be like material objects

explain.

A
  1. all sense data, including those of so called PQ’s, depend on the mind
  2. therefore we requre a perceiving mind to exist
  3. since matter is said to be unperceiving, it cant have such properties
39
Q

what is the likeness principle

A
  1. the idea that ideas (or sense data) can only resemble other ideas and therefore we can make no sense of the claim that our ideas could be like or resemble the primary qualities of objects
40
Q

what does berkeley say about PQ’S and SQ’s

A

both are perceiver dependent

41
Q

berkeleys arg against locke

size arg

A
  1. size is supposed to be a primary quality
  2. but it appears to vary from perceiveer to perceiver
  3. so, size is perceiver dependent
42
Q

berkeleys arg against locke

dependency

A
  1. perception of so-called PQ’s, like shape, depends on perceiving something on perceiving SQ’s like colour
  2. we need colour to distinguish shapes visually, or else where are the edges
  3. we need texture to distinguish shapes tactually
  4. therefore, the so-called PQ’s must also be perceiver dependnet
43
Q

how successful is Berkeleys PQ/SQ arg?

does the fcat that PQ are subject to perceptual variation show that there is no real difference between PQ and SQ?

A

NO- berkely is wrong. Our ideas of PQ can vary, but remember that the ideas are not the same thing as the qualites

44
Q

how successful is Berkeleys PQ/SQ arg?

does the fact that we cant access PQ except through SQ show that there is no real difference between them/

A

locke claimed that there were qualities objects had in themselves independent of us perceiving them- but if we can only perceive them through SQ, how can we know this? so is there really a distinction between PQ and SQ/

45
Q

what is idealism

A

that the immediate objects of perception are physical objects, and all physical objects are mind dependent, so theres no external world

an anti-realist theory

the eorld is mind-dependent, the physical world is composed of ideas not matter

46
Q

the basics of idealism

the world is physical, but mental not material

A
  • we perceive physical objects directly
  • but we only perceive ideas directly
  • so physical objects are ideas (i.e sense data)
47
Q

the basics of idealism

why are all qualities ideas

A
  • because all qualities are perceiver dependent
  • no such thing as the PQ/SQ distinction
48
Q

the basics of idealism

the master arg. (simple)

A
  • we cant even think of something existing unperceived (let alone experinence it)
  • so there is no external world
49
Q

what is sense data

in realtion to idealism

A
  1. sense data are the ideas that make up physical objects
  2. more vivid than other ideas, they seem to be outside the mind- very real
  3. no conscious control, sense data doesnt arrive or disappear because we will them too
50
Q

what are concepts

in realtion to idealism

A
  1. concepts are the ideas that make up our thoughts e.g beliefs
  2. less vivid than sense-experince
  3. some conscious control, we can think of concepts when we want to
51
Q

what are physical objects

in realtion to idealism

A

an object with properties such as shape,size,location,colour etc

these properties are sensible properties i.e. properties of sense data

52
Q

what is berkeleys strongest arg.

idealism

A

all qualities are ideas—– arg from perceptual variation AND arg that PQ depends on SQ

53
Q

issue with ‘all qualities are ideas’

A
  1. it isnt obvious that he has established the claim that mind-independdent objects do not exist (THE ANTI-REALISM PART)
  2. even if the PQ and SQ distinction does not hold, he hasnt distinguished betweehn our ideas of qualities (sense-data), and the qualities themselves (whichy are properties of the object itself)
  3. furthermore there could still be an underlying foundation that causes our perception of physical objects
54
Q

what is Berkeleys master arg

A
  1. when we think of something, we think of it being percieved
  2. therefore no one can think of anything that exists unperce4ived
  3. what is perceived is in the mind
  4. therefore what is thought of is also in the mind
  5. therefore no one can think of anything existing outsude the mind (you cant think of an external world as this is defined as independnet of mind)
  6. therefore idealism is true- everything is ideas and there is no external world
55
Q

difference between imagination and perceiving

master arg

A

we cant think of something without imagining perceiving it eg a room in your house

56
Q

evaluating the master arg

A
  • berkeley mixes up perception, conception and imagination
  • only perception requires a picture from a perceivers perspective
  • conception is a way of thinking about someting without a pciture- without seeing a perceivers perspective- e.g referring to it or reasoning with it
57
Q

how can ID explain why hallucinations and illusions are not physical objects, if all of them are just ideas

issues with idealism

A
  1. according to ID, physical objects are ideas
  2. however, illusions and hallucinations are also ideas in expeerince but they arent physical objects
  3. ID fails to explain the difference between illusions and hallucinations and physical objects, so it implies that hallucinations and illusions are physical objects
58
Q

response ONE to ‘how can ID explain why hallucinations and illusions are not physical objects, if all of them are just ideas’

vivid

A

illusions and hallucinations are less vivid than experince of real objects e.g the stick in the water looks bent but feels straight

59
Q

compare to other experinces

response TWO to ‘how can ID explain why hallucinations and illusions are not physical objects, if all of them are just ideas’

A

I+H are inconsistnet with our other expereinces e.g elephants in the past looked grey and couldnt fly But now theyre pink and can fly

60
Q

berkely argues reality is the ideas we percieve. what problem, in realtion to illusions, does this lead to?

A

leads to implying that illusions are physical objects and therefore that is how they truly exist in the physical world

61
Q

what is berkely response to ‘berkely argues reality is the ideas we percieve. what problem, in realtion to illusions, does this lead to?’.

A

claims the issue is with language - pencil in water, he claims the pencil ‘looks’ bent instead of the pencil ‘is’ bent

62
Q

how does berkely [IDEALISM] attempt to explain hallucinations

A

explains that hallucinations are not as vivid or clear compared to perception - and they’re not consistent with our past experinces

63
Q

how can berkeley explain that objects continue to exist when no one percieves them

A

god

ideas we percive arent just caused by god, but exist as they are percieved by god

64
Q

where do our ideas (i.e sense data or impressions) come from if not an external world?

idealism

A

god

65
Q

simple crit.

critiscim of berkeley use of god

idealism

A

its ad hoc

meaning its used to solve a problem with no independnt justification for the solution

66
Q

berkeleys response to his use of god being ad hoc

A

his theory is an arg. for the existnece of god
1. the only possible cause of the order, regularity, and predictability of our experinces is divine intelligence
2. god is divine intelligence (omniscient)
3. so, god exists

67
Q

problem with the role of god

idealism

A
  1. idealism says that physical objects which i percieve exist as ideas in the mind of god
  2. but god cant have perceptual experinces like i have - e.g god doesnt feel sesnations such as pain
  3. the objects i perceive change and cease to exist, but gods mind is said to be unchanging
  4. therefore, what i percieve and feel cant be part of gods mind
  5. so idealism is incorrect
68
Q

berkeleys response to the problem with the role of god

idealism

A

our experinces are copies of gods ideas

69
Q

what is solipism

A

the claim that you only know youe own mind

70
Q

why does idealism lead to solipism

A

everything we know is from experince, which is just sense data. and we have no experinces of other peoples minds

71
Q

berkeleys response to why does idealism lead to solipism

A

idealism allos us to know that the mind of god exists as well as our own

72
Q

progression of theories of perception

A

naive direct realism TO indirect realism TO idealism TO philosophical direct realism

73
Q

how can illusiosn be accounted for by philosiphical direct realism

A

it turns out that ‘looking a particular way’ can be a property of an object, even when the way it looks doesnt reflect what the object truly looks like

e.g pen looks bent in water

74
Q

defintion of intrinsic properties

philosiphical DR

A

belongs to the thing in-itslef

e.g im 5’4

these properties exist in the external world

75
Q

definition of relational properties

philosiphical DR

A

belong to the thing but depends on its relationship to another thing

eg ‘im taller than a child’ OR ‘im smaller compared to somone who is 6’3

these properties exist in the external world

76
Q

how do intrinsic and relational properties apply to the pen example

A

the pen looking bent in water is a relational property - due to reflection

77
Q

response to perceptual variarion

philosiphical DR

A

appearances are relational properties
* e.g a property of a rectangular table is to appear rectangular but depending on their relation to the perceiver it’ll be different

78
Q

sense data, verdical perception

response to hallucination crit

DR

A

only in hallucinations do we percive sense data, we dont in verdical pereption
* meaning DR should deny that experinces which cannot be told apart by the perceiver are the same kind of process
* despite hallucinations being able to be subjectively indistinguishable from verdical experinces, one is a direct perception of the external world and the other is direct perception of mental image

79
Q

form of perception

response to hallucination crit

DR

A

deny that hallucinations are a form of perception at all
* perhaps when we hallucinate we do not have an experinces but rather we mistakenly imagine that we have an experince
* hallucinations are a kind of disorder or delusion where we think imagination is perception

80
Q

response to time-lag

philosphical DR

A
  • can are that this response confuses what we percive with how we perceive it
  • what we are perceiving is still a mind-independnt object but we’re perceiving it as it was moments ago rather than how it is now

philosophy paper 1 (9 decks)

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