Applied ethics

Question 1

what is stealing

Answer 1

to frame it in a philosophical way, people often say that individuals have property rights – i.e. that they have rights over certain things. To steal is to violate these property rights.

Question 2

util oponion on stealing

overall

Answer 2

whether or not it is acceptable to steal something will depend on the situation. There is no moral right to property over and above its utilitarian benefits and so if an act of stealing results in a greater good then it would be morally acceptable to steal

Question 3

act util opinion on stealing

Answer 3

act utilitarianism would say it is acceptable for a starving person to steal food if it saves their life, because the victim’s loss is outweighed by the thief’s benefit. Similarly, an act utilitarian could argue that it’s morally acceptable for very poor people to steal from very rich people (like Robin Hood), because the rich person’s loss is insignificant compared to the thief’s gain.

Question 4

rule util opinion on stealing

Answer 4

However, rule utilitarianism could argue that although there may be individual instances where stealing leads to greater happiness, having a** rule of “don’t steal” leads to greater happiness overall**

e,g a society that permitted stealing would be one in which no one could trust anyone. Everyone would live in constant fear of being robbed by someone who had convinced himself that stealing from them would lead to greater happiness. This distrust and fear would lead to a less happy society than one in which stealing isn’t allowed, and so a rule utilitarian could argue that we should follow the “don’t steal” rule.

Question 5

kantian ethics on stealing

Answer 5

Kant would argue that a maxim/rule that allowed stealing would fail the first test of the categorical imperative because it would lead to a contradiction in conception:

Question 6

why does kant say stealing leads to a contradiction in conception

Answer 6

1. The categorical imperative says: “act only according to maxims you can will would become a universal law“
2. My maxim is: “I want to steal this thing”
3. If I will stealing to be a universal law, then anyone could steal whenever they wanted
4. But if anyone could steal whenever they wanted, the very concept of personal property wouldn’t exist (because if anyone is entitled to just take my property from me in what sense is it mine?)
5. And if there is no such thing as personal property, the very concept of stealing doesn’t make sense (because you can’t steal something from someone if it isn’t theirs to begin with)
6. Therefore, willing that “I want to steal this thing” leads to a contradiction in conception
7. Therefore, stealing violates the categorical imperative
8. Therefore, stealing is wrong

Question 7

virtue ethics opinion on stealing

Answer 7

According to Aristotle, stealing is an injustice because it deprives a person what is justly and fairly theirs.
* The reason for this is that Aristotle distinguishes between unjust actions and unjust states of affairs. A starving child may very well be an unjust state of affairs – an unfortunate situation – but that’s just the way the world is sometimes. According to Aristotle, it is much worse to deliberately and freely choose to commit unjust actions – even if you are committing these unjust actions to counteract unjust states of affairs.

Question 8

naturalism view on stealing

Answer 8

“Stealing is wrong” is true if stealing has the natural property of wrongness (e.g. because it causes sadness, and sadness is a natural property)

Question 9

non-naturalism view on stealing

Answer 9

“Stealing is wrong” is true if stealing has the non-natural property of wrongness

Question 10

error theory view on stealing

Answer 10

“Stealing is wrong” is false because the property of wrongness doesn’t exist

Question 11

emotivism view on stealing

Answer 11

“Stealing is wrong” just means “Boo! Stealing!” and so is not capable of being true or false

Question 12

prescriptivism view on stealing

Answer 12

“Stealing is wrong” means “Don’t steal!” and so is not capable of being true or false

Question 13

what is stimulkated killing

Answer 13

Simulated killing is about fictional death and murder, such as in video games and films. It’s not about actually killing people (which is more obviously wrong).

Question 14

util view on stimulated killing

Answer 14

The obvious response of act utilitarianism would be that simulated killing is morally acceptable. After all, the person watching the film or playing the video game gets some enjoyment from the simulated killing, and the person being killed doesn’t actually suffer because it’s only fictional. In this situation, simulated killing results in a net gain of happiness.

But from a wider perspective, there are ways simulated killing could possibly decrease happiness. For example, if exposure to simulated killing makes a person more likely to kill someone for real, then maybe this pain would outweigh the happiness

Question 15

kantain ethics view on stimulated killing

Answer 15

most likely have no major objection to simulated killing. Murdering people in video games does not lead to a contradiction in conception, or a contradiction in will, or violate the humanity formula. In other words, simulated killing does not go against the categorical imperative.

However, Kant’s remarks on animal cruelty may be relevant here: He argues we have an imperfect duty to develop morally, which means cultivating feelings of compassion towards others. Simulated killing, like being cruel to animals, may weaken these feelings of compassion and so Kant could potentially argue we have a duty not to engage in simulated killing.

Question 16

virtue theory view on stimulated killing

Answer 16

Aristotle might argue that if someone spends a lot of time playing video games that involve simulated killing then they may develop bad habits (or at least not develop good habits/virtues). For example, repeatedly killing fictional innocent people in a game may make someone increasingly unkind or unjust. On the other hand, Aristotle might argue that killing fictional people is not actually unjust or unkind. After all, they’re not real, and so there’s no real injustice. Doing unjust acts develops the vice of injustice, but simulated killing is technically not an unjust act.

Question 17

naturalism view on stimulated killing

Answer 17

“Simulated killing is wrong” is true if simulated killing has the natural property of wrongness

Question 18

non-naturalism view on stimulated killing

Answer 18

“Simulated killing is wrong” is true if simulated killing has the non-natural property of wrongness

Question 19

error theory view on stimulated killing

Answer 19

“Simulated killing is wrong” is false because the property of wrongness doesn’t exist

Question 20

emotivisim view on stimulated killing

Answer 20

“Simulated killing is wrong” just means “Boo! Simulated killing!” and so is not capable of being true or false

Question 21

prescriptivism view on stimulated killing

Answer 21

“Simulated killing is wrong” means “Don’t do simulated killing!” and so is not capable of being true or false

Question 22

util view on eating animals

Answer 22

to privilege human pain and pleasure over animals is speciesist, so wrong to eats animals
* HOWEVER According to utilitarianism, an action is good if it results in maximises pleasure and minimises pain. And you could argue that, if it wasn’t for farming animals for food, many animals would never have existed and so would never have been able to experience pleasure and pain in the first place. So, if the animals farmed for food have an overall happy life and a painless death, then eating animals is morally justifiable because it results in a net increase of pleasure.

Question 23

Kantian ethics on eating animals

Answer 23

Kant would say there is no contradiction in conception and no contradiction in will that results from the maxim “to eat animals”. And the humanity formula only says don’t treat humanity as a means to an end. Humans have a rational will and so are ends in themselves and should be treated as such. But animals, Kant would say, do not have a rational will and so can be treated solely as means. We thus do not have any duties towards animals.

However, Kant does argue that being cruel to animals violates a duty we have towards ourselves – the duty to develop morally:** Kant might morally object to cruel farming practices but would not object to eating animals in principle.**

Question 24

virtue ethics on eating animals

Answer 24

**Aristotle’s discussion of eudaimonia is concerned with the good life for human beings specifically. **Animals, unlike humans, are not capable of reason and so eudaimonia doesn’t apply to them. So, Aristotle would likely not see any issue with eating animals.
* HOWEVER Diamond argues that animals are a different kind of being to humans and so we shouldn’t treat their happiness as equal (as Singer says above). However, animals are nevertheless living beings that can have good and bad lives. To completely ignore this, as some factory farming practices do, demonstrates the vices of callousness and selfishness. In contrast, rearing your own chickens and treating them humanely – even if you do ultimately eat them – demonstrates the virtues of sympathy and respect.

Question 25

naturalism on eating animals

Answer 25

“Eating animals is wrong” is true if eating animals has the natural property of wrongness (e.g. because wrongness is a natural property such as pain)

Question 26

non-naturalism on not eating animals

Answer 26

“Eating animals is wrong” is true if eating animals has the non-natural property of wrongness

Question 27

error theory on eating animals

Answer 27

“Eating animals is wrong” is false because the property of wrongness doesn’t exist

Question 28

emotivism on eating animals

Answer 28

“Eating animals is wrong” just means “Boo! Eating animals!” and so is not capable of being true or false

Question 29

prescriptivism on eating animals

Answer 29

“Eating animals is wrong” means “Don’t eat animals!” and so is not capable of being true or false

Question 30

act util on telling lies

Answer 30

As always, whether or not act utilitarianism would say it’s morally acceptable to lie will depend on the situation. If telling a lie leads to greater happiness, then act utilitarianism would say you should lie. For example, if someone asks you whether they look good and they don’t, the utilitarian thing to do is to lie and say “yes”.

Question 31

rule util on telling lies

Answer 31

But rule utilitarianism could argue that a rule to “never lie” would lead to greater happiness than a rule that allows everyone to lie. For example, if everyone was an act utilitarian and always lied to increase happiness/reduce pain, then nobody could trust anything anyone said. And the rule utilitarian could argue that such a society – where no one can trust anyone else’s word – would be less happy overall.

Question 32

kantian ethics on telling lies

Answer 32

The point of telling a lie is to get the other person to believe something false. But if everyone always told lies, then people wouldn’t believe each other.
contradiction in conception

Question 33

virtue ethics on telling lies

Answer 33

Falsehood is in itself bad and reprehensible, while the truth is a fine and praiseworthy thing
* Aristotle is talking about lying about oneself: On one side boasting is a vice of excess, and on the other false modesty is a vice of deficiency.
* Telling the truth – i.e. “the sincere man” – is in the middle (i.e. the golden mean) and so is the virtuous action.
* When Aristotle says “falsehood is in itself bad”, he appears to be saying that lying is always wrong.
* However, Aristotle later describes degrees to which telling lies is bad: Lying to protect your reputation, for example, is not as bad as lying to gain money. Given this, you could potentially argue that there may be situations where it is morally acceptable to lie, such as in the example of saving a life above.

Question 34

naturalism on telling lies

Answer 34

“Telling lies is wrong” is true if telling lies has the natural property of wrongness

Question 35

non-naturalism on telling lies

Answer 35

“Telling lies is wrong” is true if telling lies has the non-natural property of wrongness

Question 36

error theory on telling lies

Answer 36

“Telling lies is wrong” is false because the property of wrongness doesn’t exist

Question 37

emotivism on telling lies

Answer 37

“Telling lies is wrong” just means “Boo! Telling lies!” and so is not capable of being true or false

Question 38

prescriptivism on telling lie

Answer 38

“Telling lies is wrong” means “Don’t tell lies!” and so is not capable of being true or false