non-cognitivist theories Flashcards
what do non-cognitivists believe
Non-cognitivists believe that moral judgements such as “murder is wrong” express non-cognitive mental states. Non-cognitive statements do not aim to describe reality and so are not supposed to be taken as either true or false. Non-cognitivists do not believe in the existence of moral properties that would make moral statements true or false and so all non-cognitivist metaethical theories are also anti-realist theories.
what are the two non-cog theories
- emotivism
- prescriptivism
what is emotivism
Emotivism says that **moral judgements express **(non-cognitive) feelings of approval or disapproval.
So, according to emotivism, when someone says “murder is wrong!”, what they really mean is “boo! murder!”
Notice how none of these attitudes are capable of being true or false. They are just expressions of approval or disapproval – not beliefs. Hence, emotivism is a non-cognitivist theory.
what two args does hume give to say that moral judgements aren’t judgements of reason
- motivation arg
- hume’s fork
hume’s motivation arg
judgements of reason – e.g. a belief that grass is green – don’t motivate us to act in any way. Instead, it’s emotions and desires that motivate us to act. For example, my desire to drink beer might motivate me to seek out beer.
1. Moral judgements can motivate action
2. Judgements of reason cannot motivate action
3. Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason
(In other words, moral judgements are non-cognitive)
Hume’s fork applied to moral judgements
- Moral judgements are not relations of ideas
- Moral judgements are not matters of fact
- Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason
* (Again, in other words, moral judgements are non-cognitive)
what is Hume’s is-ought prob
Hume argues that there is a gap between the two kinds of claim: You cannot logically derive ought statements like ‘you ought not torture’ from statements about what is, such as ‘that is an act of torture’. We can argue that this is evidence for non-cognitivism: the reason we cannot derive ‘ought’ statements from ‘is’ statements is
because ‘ought’ statements are non-cognitive while the latter is cognitive.
‘is’ statements are factual claims about what is the claim
‘ought’ statements are value claims about what should be the case
what is the verification principle
a statement only has meaning if it is either:
- An analytic truth (e.g. “a triangle has 3 sides”)
- Empirically verifiable (e.g. “water boils at 100c”)
why does Ayer say MJ’s fail the verification principle
Ayer argues that moral judgements fail the verification principle. Firstly, “murder is wrong” is clearly not an analytic truth. Ayer also argues that “murder is wrong” is not empirically verifiable either – both on the naturalist and non-naturalist interpretations
why does Ayer reject Naturalism
Naturalism would argue that we could prove that murder causes pain, anger, etc. However, Ayer argues that this is not the same as proving murder is wrong. Hence, Ayer rejects naturalism: We can empirically verify that murder causes pain, say, but we cannot empirically verify that murder is wrong.
why does Ayer argue that there is no way to empirically verify the presence of non-natural properties
Even if “murder is wrong” did possess the non-natural property of wrongness, how could we ever prove this? It’s not empirically verifiable, nor is it an analytic truth. Hence, Ayer also argues against non-naturalism: The existence of non-natural properties cannot be empirically proven.
who are emotivists
Hume and Ayer
what is prescriptivism
Prescriptivism says that moral judgements express (non-cognitive) instructions that aim to guide behaviour.
So, according to prescriptivism, when someone says “murder is wrong!”, what they really mean is something like “don’t murder people!”
When you instruct someone to do something – e.g. “shut the door” – you are not expressing a belief that is capable of being true or false. Hence, emotivism is a non-cognitivist theory.
Hare on MJ’s
Hare agrees with emotivism that** moral judgements express (non-cognitive) attitudes**. But Hare argues this isn’t main point of moral judgements: The main point of moral judgements is to guide conduct. For example, “stealing is wrong” implies the imperative “don’t steal”.
As well as the above analysis of moral judgements, Hare provides an analysis of general value terms such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’. Hare argues that the meaning of these terms is not simply to describe but mainly to commend or criticise.
But in order to commend (or criticise) something, we must assume a certain set of standards. In the example above, the standards against which I commended the strawberry were ‘sweet and juicy’. However, these standards are not objective and there are no facts that can determine one set of standards as correct or incorrect.
Returning back to moral value judgements, these work in a similar way to the strawberry: When I say “she is a good person” I am assuming a certain set of moral standards and commending that person against those standards. This commendation is the primary meaning of ‘good’ and provides (imperative) guidance on how others should act.
what analogy does Hare give to explain his view on MJ’s
Hare uses an** example of a ‘good’ strawberry to illustrate how value judgements work: A purely descriptive analysis of ‘good strawberry’ might reduce its meaning to ‘sweet and juicy strawberry’. But description is clearly not the only thing I mean when I say “this is a good strawberry”** because there are ways in which we use language that conflict with this analysis. For example, I might say “this is a good strawberry because it is sweet and juicy” – and this statement doesn’t make sense on the purely descriptive analysis because it would be like saying “this is a sweet and juicy strawberry because it is sweet and juicy”. So, according to Hare, ‘good strawberry’ does not simply describe, it also commends the strawberry.
