Moral realism

Question 1

what do realist theories argue

Answer 1

mind-independent moral properties – such as ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘good’, and ‘bad’ – exist.

Question 2

what is ethical naturalism

Answer 2

says moral properties are natural properties

Question 3

what is ethical non-naturalism

Answer 3

says moral properties are non-natural properties

Question 4

most obvious example of a naturalist ethical theory

Answer 4

utilitarianism

Question 5

what metaethical arg does Mill provide for util

[moral realism - naturalism]

Answer 5

1. The only proof that something is desirable is that people desire it
2. No proof can be given why the general happiness is desirable other than that each person desires their own happiness
3. This desirability is “all the proof the case admits of” that happiness is a good thing
4. All our other values (e.g. truth, freedom, dignity) constitute what makes us happy
5. In other words, the reason we value these things is because they make us happy
6. So, not only is happiness good, it is the only good

Question 6

alongside util, what is another naturalistic ethocal theory

Answer 6

virtue ethics

Question 7

why is virtue ethics a naturalistic theory

Answer 7

Aristotle’s discussion of ergon/function can be interpreted as a discussion of natural facts about human beings. We might argue that it is a natural fact that the function of human beings is to use reason – in the same way it is a natural fact that the function of a knife is to cut things. There is nothing spooky or non-natural about claiming that the function of a knife is to cut things and likewise there is nothing spooky or non-natural about claiming that the function of human beings is to use reason.

So, on this reading, ‘good’ reduces to a set of natural facts about function and performing that function well. For example, being courageous is good because being courageous helps humans act correctly according to reason.

Question 8

problems faced by ethical naturalism

Answer 8

1. the naturalistic fallacy
2. the is-ought problem
3. the verification problem

Question 9

the naturalistic fallacy [moore]

problems faced by ethical naturalism

Answer 9

the term ‘naturalistic fallacy’ to describe the fallacy (i.e. bad reasoning) of equating goodness with some natural property (such as pleasure or pain). For example, Moore would say it is a fallacy to conclude that drinking beer is good from the fact that drinking beer is pleasurable because they are two completely different kinds of properties – one moral, one natural. Even if pleasure and goodness are closely correlated, it doesn’t and could not follow that they are the same thing. So, Moore would argue that Mill’s proof of utilitarianism is invalid: To conclude that happiness (a natural property) is good (a moral property) commits the naturalistic fallacy

Question 10

the is-ought prob

problems faced by ethical naturalism

Answer 10

Hume argues that there is a gap between the two kinds of claim: You cannot logically derive ought statements like ‘you ought not torture’ from statements about what is, such as ‘that is an act of torture’. We can argue that this is evidence for non-cognitivism: the reason we cannot derive ‘ought’ statements from ‘is’ statements is because the former type of statement is non-cognitive while the latter is cognitive.

‘is’ statements are factual claims about what is the case
‘ought’ statementsare value judgements about what should be the case

Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judged of

Question 11

what is the verification principle

problems faced by ethical naturalism

Answer 11

a statement only has meaning if its either:
1. an analytic truth
2. empirically verifiable

Question 12

the verification principle applied to moral judgements

Answer 12

Firstly, “murder is wrong” is clearly not an analytic truth. Ayer also argues that “murder is wrong” is not empirically verifiable either – both on the naturalist and non-naturalist interpretations:

Question 13

naturalism response to the verification principle +ayer’s response to this

Answer 13

Naturalism would argue that we could prove that murder causes pain, anger, etc. However, Ayer argues that this is not the same as proving murder is wrong. Hence, Ayer rejects naturalism: We can empirically verify that murder causes pain, say, but we cannot empirically verify that murder is wrong.

Question 14

ayer against naturalism

can’t empirically verify the presence of non-natural properties

Answer 14

Ayer also argues that there is no way to empirically verify the presence of non-natural properties. Even if “murder is wrong” did possess the non-natural property of wrongness, how could we ever prove this? It’s not empirically verifiable, nor is it an analytic truth. Hence, Ayer also argues against non-naturalism: The existence of non-natural properties cannot be empirically proven.

Question 15

what is ethical non-naturalism

Answer 15

Ethical non-naturalism says that moral judgements are beliefs that are intended to be true or false (cognitivism) and that moral properties exist (realism) but are non-natural properties.

Question 16

moore’s criticism of ethical naturalism

fallacy

Answer 16

He invents the term ‘naturalistic fallacy’ to describe the fallacy (i.e. bad reasoning) of equating goodness with some natural property (such as pleasure or pain). For example, Moore would say it is a fallacy to conclude that drinking beer is good from the fact that drinking beer is pleasurable because they are two completely different kinds of properties – one moral, one natural. Even if pleasure and goodness are closely correlated, it doesn’t and could not follow that they are the same thing.** So, Moore would argue that Mill’s proof of utilitarianism is invalid**: To conclude that happiness (a natural property) is good (a moral property) commits the naturalistic fallacy.

Moore’s argument here – that you can’t logically jump from natural to moral – is very similar to Hume’s is/ought gap.

Question 17

moore’s open question arg against naturalism

Answer 17

Moore further argues that it is an open question whether ‘pleasure’ and ‘good’ are the same thing:

Closed question: “Is good good?” or “is pleasure pleasure?”
Open question: “Is pleasure good?

But Moore argues that if goodness and pleasure really were the same thing (as naturalism claims), it would be a closed question to ask “is pleasure good?”. In other words, Moore is arguing that if naturalism was true and ‘good’ meant the same thing as ‘pleasure’, it wouldn’t make sense to ask “is pleasure good?” because it would be like asking “is pleasure pleasure?”.

Question 18

reply to the open question arg

Answer 18

It doesn’t seem to follow that because “is pleasure good?” is an open question, pleasure and good cannot be the same thing. After all, there are plenty of examples where two things are in fact the same thing but it is still an open question whether they are.

For example, ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ refer to the same thing, but it is** still an open question to ask “is water H2O?**” So, it’s possible that ‘pleasure’ and ‘good’ could refer to the same thing and yet it still be an open question to ask “is pleasure good?”

Question 19

what is moore’s ethical non-naturalism theory

Answer 19

intuitionism

Question 20

how does moore answer ‘if moral properties are non-natural properties, how do we know about them?’

Answer 20

response to this problem is intuition. He argues that, via the faculty of rational intuition, we can directly reflect on the truth of moral judgements such as “murder is wrong”. The truth/falsehood of such moral judgements is said to be self evident.

Question 21

problems for ethical non-naturalism

Answer 21

1. arg from queerness [error theory]
2. the verification principle

Question 22

two part of arg from queerness

Answer 22

1. epistemically queer
2. metaphysically queer

Question 23

arg from queerness

epistemically queer

Answer 23

If mind-independent moral properties exist, then it is** a total mystery how we would acquire knowledge of them**. Whereas natural knowledge can be explained naturally, moral knowledge can’t be explained in the same way and instead requires spooky hypotheses such as Moore’s intuitionism

Question 24

arg from queerness

metaphysically queer

Answer 24

If mind-independent moral properties exist, they must be metaphysically unlike anything else we have experience of. For example, ‘good’ things would need to somehow have ‘to be done-ness’ built into them and ‘bad’ things would have ‘not to be done-ness’ built into them. Like, the act of stealing itself would have to have the property of ‘don’t do this!’ built into it, which doesn’t make sense. It’s not possible for objective, physical, objects to relate to human motivations in this way (scientifically, metaphysically, or otherwise).