Oxford - Suggested Flashcards

1
Q

Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) (AER)

Choi et al (2007)

A

[Time Preferences]

Experimental discount rates usually higher than what seems plausible, often explained by present bias.

Measures of risk aversion to identify concavity attempt to fix another well known bias: Linear consumption utility

Result:

  • Reasonable discounting, curvature and dynamically consistent time preferences.
  • No evidence of hyperbolic discounting or present bias.

[Risk Preferences]

  • Diagram from Choi et al 2007 –> Risk averse move towards 45 degree, diversifying asset investments
  • AB = budget constraint, Convex curves if risk averse
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2
Q

DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006)

A

Paying not to go to the Gym

Membership: cost per visit $17

Pay as you go: $10

People will pay for commitment device. 3 Lareg US health club datasets.

Procrastination in cancelling.

Lag between last use and cancellation is + correlated with initial month overpayment

Model of beta-delta discounting explains this.

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3
Q

Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein and Thaler (1997)

A

New York Cab Drivers

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4
Q

McClure et. al (2007)

A

Juice now or 2x Juice in 5 minutes –> 60% now
Juice in 20mins or 2x Juice in 25 minutes –> 70% later

Limbic system of brain for immediate rewards, prefrontal cortex for delayed rewards.

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5
Q

Gruber and Koszegi (2004)

A

Taxation on cigarettes can be significantly welfare improving if smokers are present biased.

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6
Q

Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006)

A

Commitment device to commit to savings. Phillipine banks.

28.4% take up rate of commitment, savings balances 12m laters increased by 81% for those in treatment group.

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7
Q

Gine, Karlan and ZInman (2009)

A

Voluntary commitment product for smoking cessation. Savings test linked to urine tests.

11% take up, 3% points more likely to pass the tests adn very persistent effects after 12 months.

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8
Q

Thaler and Benartzi (2004)

A

Saving for retirement with a SMarT program:

  1. (1): Lag between sign up and start, mitigate present bias
  2. (2): Rising contribution rates: alters reference points
  3. (3): Automatic increase in rate: avoid status quo bias
  4. (4): Opt out any time: high enrollment and retention
    • 78% joined, and 80% stayed in the program through 4 pay rises.
    • 3.5-13.6% higher saving rates over 40 months
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9
Q

Gruber (2001)

A

Net cost of smoking 0, taxation shouldnt be as severe. Focus on informational policy to allow consumers to make informed decisions.

Positive externalities: die early, release pressure on healthcare systems

Distributional effects too, impaccting low income people.

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10
Q

Loomes and Sugden (1982)

A

Regret theory: post choice, we think about lost options

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11
Q

[Reversed]

[Time Preferences]

Experimental discount rates usually higher than what seems plausible, often explained by present bias.

Measures of risk aversion to identify concavity attempt to fix another well known bias: Linear consumption utility

Result:

  • Reasonable discounting, curvature and dynamically consistent time preferences.
  • No evidence of hyperbolic discounting or present bias.

[Risk Preferences]

  • Diagram from Choi et al 2007 –> Risk averse move towards 45 degree, diversifying asset investments
  • AB = budget constraint, Convex curves if risk averse
A

Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) (AER)

Choi et al (2007)

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12
Q

[Reversed]

Paying not to go to the Gym

Membership: cost per visit $17

Pay as you go: $10

People will pay for commitment device. 3 Lareg US health club datasets.

Procrastination in cancelling.

Lag between last use and cancellation is + correlated with initial month overpayment

Model of beta-delta discounting explains this.

A

DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006)

How well did you know this?
1
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2
3
4
5
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13
Q

[Reversed]

New York Cab Drivers

A

Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein and Thaler (1997)

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14
Q

[Reversed]

Juice now or 2x Juice in 5 minutes –> 60% now
Juice in 20mins or 2x Juice in 25 minutes –> 70% later

Limbic system of brain for immediate rewards, prefrontal cortex for delayed rewards.

A

McClure et. al (2007)

How well did you know this?
1
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2
3
4
5
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15
Q

[Reversed]

Taxation on cigarettes can be significantly welfare improving if smokers are present biased.

A

Gruber and Koszegi (2004)

How well did you know this?
1
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2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

[Reversed]

Commitment device to commit to savings. Phillipine banks.

28.4% take up rate of commitment, savings balances 12m laters increased by 81% for those in treatment group.

A

Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006)

17
Q

[Reversed]

Voluntary commitment product for smoking cessation. Savings test linked to urine tests.

11% take up, 3% points more likely to pass the tests adn very persistent effects after 12 months.

A

Gine, Karlan and ZInman (2009)

18
Q

[Reversed]

Saving for retirement with a SMarT program:

  1. (1): Lag between sign up and start, mitigate present bias
  2. (2): Rising contribution rates: alters reference points
  3. (3): Automatic increase in rate: avoid status quo bias
  4. (4): Opt out any time: high enrollment and retention
    • 78% joined, and 80% stayed in the program through 4 pay rises.
    • 3.5-13.6% higher saving rates over 40 months
A

Thaler and Benartzi (2004)

19
Q

[Reversed]

Net cost of smoking 0, taxation shouldnt be as severe. Focus on informational policy to allow consumers to make informed decisions.

Positive externalities: die early, release pressure on healthcare systems

Distributional effects too, impaccting low income people.

A

Gruber (2001)

20
Q

[Reversed]

Regret theory: post choice, we think about lost options

A

Loomes and Sugden (1982)