Behavioural Game Theory and Social Preferences Flashcards
Kagel & Wolfe (1999)
Questions inequality in Pareto damaging behaviour
Kube et. al (2012)
Non-Monetary gifts more powerful Currency of reciprocity has an impact Examples include bottle and origami of cash notes to highlight effort
Cash =+5% effort, insignificant
Bottle = +15% effort, significant
Choice = Bottle Equivalent despite chooisng cash
Origami = +20% effort, significant
Andreoni & Miller (2000)
Inequality increasing sacrifices to help others
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
Show difference aversion in Public Goods and Ultimatum games We dislike unfairness but more so when we are behind, kinked Utility curve as a function of xj Steeper if xj > xi
Key for use in making a distinction between Ultimatum and Dictator games, removes the positive offers in fear of rejection.
Conlin, Lynn & O’Donoghue (2003)
Tipping increase if business setting or 1st Date
List et. al (2004)
Anonymity decreases cooperation
Gneezy, Haruvy & Yafe (2004)
Reluctant to impose negative externalises on others
Haley and Fessler (2005)
Images of eyes increase generosity, eg. Checkouts and Church Collection Baskets
Andreoni & Bernheim (2009)
Scrutiny increases fairness
Falk, Fehr & Firschbacher (2003)
Choice set matters, ultimatum games see a variety of rejection rates
Idential outcomes are rejcted at different rates in the ultimatum game, depends upon the choice set that was available and provides evidence of reciprocity.
£8, £2 vs. £5, £5 (Rejected) but £10, £0 (Accepted)
DellaVigna, List & Malmendier (2012)
Charity contributions increasing utility….or do we just dislike saying no? Social pressure is a key factor
Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (1998)
Choices converge after learning
Bandiera et. al (2005)
Relative incentives decrease productivity, workers partially internalise the externality - not wanting to hurt others UK fruit farm: productivity increases under piece rate despite lower pay of 70-80%, presence of friends also increases productivity particularly among small groups Impacts disappear when they can not monitor each other, reciprocity more prevalent here
Vanberg (2008)
People like to stick to their word, don’t like to break promises Guilt Aversion + Lying Aversion…greater evidence for lying aversion
Mini dictator game but with random dictatorship
Goeree & Holt (2001)
Traveller’s dilemma: pick an integer from 180-300, paid the lowest plus some transfer R from the higher to lower. NE consistent when R is high…despite irrelevance strategically Minimum effort coordination game, pick an effort level between 110-170; effort is not independent of costs! Higher costs lead to lower efforts despite NE predictions
Ross & Ward (1996)
Language can swing the % of deviations in Prisoner’s Dilemma despite strictly dominant strategy, context matters
Levitt & List (2007)
Actions are influenced by: i. Morals ii. Scrutiny iii. Stakes iv. Context v. Self-Selection
Charness & Rabin (2002)
Construct formal games to test Self Interest Social Preferences Difference Aversion Competitive Preferences Reciprocity (+ and -)
- 1 in 3 subjects opt for the inquity averse choice even when completely costless
- 1 in 2 opt to sacrifice even when behind and increasing inequality
Wilkinson & Klaes (2012)
Are humans able to randomise effectively..playing a MSNE? Significant MSNE departures, particularly for inexperienced players - too much alternation, too much balance and too many runs
We tend to recognise only 2-4 rounds of iteration
Centipede Game:
4 Rounds -> 6-8% take at Round 1
6 Rounds -> 1 % take at Round 1
Camerer (2003)
One-shot, no reputation games: Ultimatum and Dictator games: 40-50% offers of splitting rarely rejected Average around 30-40% Hardly any >50%, 1 in 10 offer 0% Offers <20% rejected half the time
Blount (1995)
Less likely to reject computer based outcomes over human choices
Levine (2012)
Altruism is very small in magnitude, social preferences result in externalities
Charness & Dufwnberg (2006)
“Guilt aversion” - people may act honestly to try and live up to expectations Importance of “second order beliefs” in sequential games even with hidden actions and equality
Gino et al. (2011)
Impulsive cheating increases when depleted of self control or moral awareness - unhealthy food choices
Axelrod (1984; 2006)
Repeated game prisoners dilemma has no pure strategy stable Equilibria Quick learning
Reversed:
Questions inequality in Pareto damaging behaviour
Kagel & Wolfe (1999)
Reversed:
Non-Monetary gifts more powerful Currency of reciprocity has an impact Examples include bottle and origami of cash notes to highlight effort
Cash =+5% effort, insignificant
Bottle = +15% effort, significant
Choice = Bottle Equivalent despite chooisng cash
Origami = +20% effort, significant
Kube et. al (2012)
Reversed:
Inequality increasing sacrifices to help others
Andreoni & Miller (2000)
Reversed:
Show difference aversion in Public Goods and Ultimatum games We dislike unfairness but more so when we are behind, kinked Utility curve as a function of xj Steeper if xj > xi
Key for use in making a distinction between Ultimatum and Dictator games, removes the positive offers in fear of rejection.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
Reversed:
Tipping increase if business setting or 1st Date
Conlin, Lynn & O’Donoghue (2003)
Reversed:
Anonymity decreases cooperation
List et. al (2004)
Reversed:
Reluctant to impose negative externalises on others
Gneezy, Haruvy & Yafe (2004)
Reversed:
Images of eyes increase generosity, eg. Checkouts and Church Collection Baskets
Haley and Fessler (2005)
Reversed:
Scrutiny increases fairness
Andreoni & Bernheim (2009)
Reversed:
Choice set matters, ultimatum games see a variety of rejection rates
Idential outcomes are rejcted at different rates in the ultimatum game, depends upon the choice set that was available and provides evidence of reciprocity.
£8, £2 vs. £5, £5 (Rejected) but £10, £0 (Accepted)
Falk, Fehr & FIrschbacher (2003)
Reversed:
Charity contributions increasing utility….or do we just dislike saying no? Social pressure is a key factor
DellaVigna, List & Malmendier (2012)
Reversed:
Choices converge after learning
Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (1998)
Reversed:
Relative incentives decrease productivity, workers partially internalise the externality - not wanting to hurt others UK fruit farm: productivity increases under piece rate despite lower pay of 70-80%, presence of friends also increases productivity particularly among small groups Impacts disappear when they can not monitor each other, reciprocity more prevalent here
Bandiera et. al (2005)
Reversed:
People like to stick to their word, don’t like to break promises Guilt Aversion + Lying Aversion…greater evidence for lying aversion
Mini dictator game but with random dictatorship
Vanberg (2008)
Reversed:
Traveller’s dilemma: pick an integer from 180-300, paid the lowest plus some transfer R from the higher to lower. NE consistent when R is high…despite irrelevance strategically Minimum effort coordination game, pick an effort level between 110-170; effort is not independent of costs! Higher costs lead to lower efforts despite NE predictions
Goeree & Holt (2001)
Reversed:
Language can swing the % of deviations in Prisoner’s Dilemma despite strictly dominant strategy, context matters
Ross & Ward (1996)
Reversed:
Actions are influenced by: i. Morals ii. Scrutiny iii. Stakes iv. Context v. Self-Selection
Levitt & List (2007)
Reversed:
Construct formal games to test Self Interest Social Preferences Difference Aversion Competitive Preferences Reciprocity (+ and -)
- 1 in 3 subjects opt for the inquity averse choice even when completely costless
- 1 in 2 opt to sacrifice even when behind and increasing inequality
Charness & Rabin (2002)
Reversed:
Are humans able to randomise effectively..playing a MSNE? Significant MSNE departures, particularly for inexperienced players - too much alternation, too much balance and too many runs
We tend to recognise only 2-4 rounds of iteration
Centipede Game:
4 Rounds -> 6-8% take at Round 1
6 Rounds -> 1 % take at Round 1
Wilkinson & Klaes (2012)
Reversed:
One-shot, no reputation games: Ultimatum and Dictator games: 40-50% offers of splitting rarely rejected Average around 30-40% Hardly any >50%, 1 in 10 offer 0% Offers <20% rejected half the time
Camerer (2003)
Reversed:
Less likely to reject computer based outcomes over human choices
Blount (1995)
Reversed:
Altruism is very small in magnitude, social preferences result in externalities
Levine (2012)
Reversed:
“Guilt aversion” - people may act honestly to try and live up to expectations Importance of “second order beliefs” in sequential games even with hidden actions and equality
Charness & Dufwnberg (2006)
Reversed:
Impulsive cheating increases when depleted of self control or moral awareness - unhealthy food choices
Gino et al. (2011)
Reversed:
Repeated game prisoners dilemma has no pure strategy stable Equilibria Quick learning
Axelrod (1984; 2006)
List (2006)
Gift exchange experiments, look at sports card fairs with local vs. non-local buyers who have subective values
People exhibit “reputational concerns” as prices are only compenstated with quality in local markets
Reversed:
Gift exchange experiments, look at sports card fairs with local vs. non-local buyers who have subective values
People exhibit “reputational concerns” as prices are only compenstated with quality in local markets
List (2006)
Henrich et. al (2004)
Average offer in ultimatum game varies significantly, can be due to
- ) Market Integration, Social Cooperation
- ) Cooperation Importance, frequency of local engagemtn and settlement size
Reversed:
Average offer in ultimatum game varies significantly, can be due to
- ) Market Integration, Social Cooperation
- ) Cooperation Importance, frequency of local engagemtn and settlement size
Henrich et. al (2004)
