Moral Realism Flashcards
What is the distinction between cognitivism and non cognitivism about ethical language.
A cognitivist view on ethical language believe that ethical language such as the statement ‘killing is wrong’ are propositions that are truth-apt (are either true of false). A non-cognitivist view states that ethical language cannot be truth-apt.
what is the distinction between realism and anti-realism about ethical language
A realist on ethical language believes that when we refer to moral concepts, there are actually moral properties such as ‘good’ that exist in the external world independent on our minds. The moral antirealist believes that no such properties exist and that moral terms refer to something else, E.g, an expression of emotion.
Whats the difference between moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism
Both are realist and cognitivist theories that believe moral properties exists in a mind independent external world and that ethical language is truth apt (can be true/false).
However, moral naturalism believes that moral properties can be reduced to natural properties of the real world which can be discovered through experience and science.
Moral non naturalism believes that moral properties cannot be reduced to natural properties and that they are their own special property distinct from the natural world.
Explain Moore’s open question argument for moral non-naturalism
Moore believes that it is impossible to define moral properties. And therefore moral naturalism failed by defining it in natural terms.
Moore believes that things can either be defined or not defined. If something can be defined then it is reduced to some natural property. To check this one can simply check the definition. For instance, ‘is a married man really a bachelor’. If it leads to a close question (can be answered yes/no) then it is a closed question.
Therefore, for Moore, if we could really reduce good to a property of the natural world such as X, then asking ‘is X really good” would lead to a closed question. However, these question always leads to open questions - “is maximising utility really good” is open ended. Therefore Naturalism is wrong because we cannot reduce a moral term to a natural one.
Explain Moores naturalistic fallacy for moral non-naturalism
Moore in his open question argument concluded that “good” cannot be defined. From this, Moore believes that moral naturalism commits to a special form of a more general fallacy. A general fallacy is that when a term in indefinable, any attempt to define it would be fallacious. When applied to naturalism it is as so:
1) Good is indefinable
2) moral naturalist such as utilitarianism attempt to define it in natural terms
3) hence moral naturalism is guilty of the naturalistic fallacy
How does Hume’s Fork pose an issue for moral realism
Humes fork asserts that there are two types of knowledge in the world. There are matter of fact which are known through reason alone and are a tautology and therefore necessary truths. There are relations of ideas that are known through sense experience and product contingent truths. The knowledge produced by the two ways have a truth value and therefore for moral judgements to have a truth value they must originate from one of these.
Moral judgements were not a tautology (true by definition). So. Moral judgements cannot be known through a relation of ideas as they are clearly not necessarily true. We have many debates on what is moral and we can deny moral claims without making any contradictions.
Moral claims cannot be know through matters of fact as we cannot through experience learn some truth about moral judgement - we cannot ‘see’ that killing is wrong
Therefore is Hume is right then Moral judgements cannot be either wrong or right, and therefore moral realism collapses as morality bust be non-cogitivitst.
How does Ayer’s verification principle pose an issue for moral realism
Ayer focuses on whether moral judgements have meaning or not. His verification principle states that a sentence is meaningful if and only if it is a tautology (true by definition) or if it is verifiable through sense experience.
Ayer stated that moral judgments are clearly not a tautology as statements such as ‘stealing is wrong’ is no true by definition and you could agree with it without reaching a logical contradiction.
Moral judgements can also not be verified through sense experience because we cannot see ‘wrongness’.
Therefore Ayer concludes that moral judgements are meaningless and therefore have no truth value (non cognotisvsit) and since they are meaningless and simply just sounds, they also do not refer to any mind-in dependent properties.
Hume’s argument against moral realism that moral judgements are not beliefs since beliefs alone could not
motivate us
Moral realism argues that sentences concerning morality are truth-apt and refer to something mind independent in the external world. Therefore, these sentences can be beliefs.
Hume points out that beliefs do not have any motivating factor. Leaning on Humes fork, knowing something as a reaction of ideas such as mathematical truths does not drive us into action, and knowing as true or false of the world as matter of fact through experience does not either. Reason and belief therefore gives us a sense of what the world is like but has no motivating factor.
On the other hand, morality does seem to hold motivation. The moral claim that ‘helping is good’ gives the desire for thousands to give to charity. For instance, knowing that jam is in the fridge doesn’t make us go get it, while a desire does.
Therefore, morality cannot be reason or beliefs as it contains motivation. And if it isn’t a reason or belief then it cannot contain a truth value. Therefore moral realism is wrong because morality is non-cognitivist. Furthermore, since desires are of some falculty within us (emotions), moral judgements must not represent some mind independent of us. In which case moral realism is wrong.
How does Hume’s is-ought gap pose an issue for moral realism
Hume’s law dictates that we cannot form an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. This is because they judgements of reason describe what ‘is’ the case while judgements of value describe what ‘ought’ to be the case. These two are therefore entirely different from another. Therefore there is a gap when we form an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.
In Humes opinion, all moral theories commit such an error - Utilitarianism observes that it is the case that everyone desires their own happiness and concludes that everyone’s happiness ‘ought’ to be desired.
Therefore if moral realism believes moral judgements are truth apt, then they are a judgement of reason on what ‘is’ the case. therefore moral realist cannot then say what ‘ought’ to be the case. However, moral judgments such as in utilitarianism often give an ‘ought’ - you ought to tell the truth. And therefore morality cannot be cognitive. And therefore, moral realism is wrong.
How does Mackie’s argument form relativity pose an issue for moral realism
Mackie tries to defeat moral realism by showing that morality is subjective rather than objective and therefore there are no mind independent moral properties in the world. Mackie poses this adductive argument (best explanation)
1) there are different moral codes in different societies
2) therefore there are disagreements in moral code
3) disagreements occur when: A) there is an objective truth but people perceive it differently or B) there is no objective truth
4) therefore there is either A) objective moral truth that people perceive differently or B) no moral truths
5) The best explanation for moral truths is that there are no objective moral truths.
Therefore moral judgments are not truth apt and do not refer to something mind independent. therefore moral realism is wrong
How does Mackie’s argument from queerness pose an issue for moral realism
Mackie claims that if moral realism is right, the theory that moral judgements are truth apt and refer to some mind independent property, then two things must exist in the world:
1) Metaphysical queerness: there must be some moral moral property in the world that provide us the motivation to act (as moral judgements give us motivation to act). Mackie says that this is an absurd position to take, it’s some kind of uniquely strange property - it is much more likely that it is our mind depedent emotions and desires that make us act.
2) Epistemological queerness: the moral realism must also commit that we have some faculty within us that makes us sense these mind independent properties. We would seem to have some strange moral sense in us that we can’t even explain - it is much simpler to explain that there are no mind independent moral properties so no need for this special faculty.
