Substance dualism Flashcards
phenomenal properties of the mental state
the phenomenal properties of our mental state is our qualia - our subjective experiences of what it is like to experience something. everyone has different qualia.
intentional properties of mental states
the intentional properties of our mental states can be regarded as their ‘aboutness’. this means what the mental states are directed towards. for instance when I have a desire for a fly to buzz of, my mental state is directed at the fly
what is substance dualism
descartes regarded the world to be made up of two substances - physical substances which had the property of extension (redness) and non-physical substances which had the property of thought (belief). substance dualists believe that our mind and body are distinct - our mind is a non-physical entity while our bodies are physica.
the divisibility argument
1) the body is divisible
2) the mind is not divisible
3) therefore the body is not the mind
the body is physically extended
Leibniz’s law - if two things have a property which they do not share with each other, they cannot be identical
response to the divisibility argument
the mind can be divided into sections. for instance, when we feel conflicted desires (the desire to scream and the desire to not seem weird). Frued postulates that these two desires must be from different parts of the mind.
descartes is wrong to consider the mind as something which can be divided - he has committed a category mistake. much like to say digestion can be divided would be wrong as its a bodily process, not something that is divisible or indivisible. Descartes makes the same mistake with the mind
the conceivability argument
1) I can conceive of the mind without the body
2) conceivability entails possibility
3) it is possible for my mind to not be the body
4) identity is necessary
5) therefore the mind is not the body
premise one uses clear and distinct ideas, whatever is the case is true of that case
metaphysical possibility
mind without the body is inconceivable (against the the conceivability argument)
Frege distinguishes between sense and reference. the reference is the definition but it can have different senses
E.g batman and bruce wayne
saying that the mind is not the body is like saying batman isn’t brucewayne
the mind and body are the same thing but with different senses
not all things conceivable are metaphysically possible (against the the conceivability argument)
we can conceive of a time traveller going back in time and killing himself. this is a paradox and therefore is not possible
what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world (against the the conceivability argument)
to say that something is metaphysically possible means to say it is true of at least one possible world. but there is no guarantee that the world is ours.
Pigs are metaphysically possible yet a zoologist wouldn’t contemplate it as it would tell us nothing about the pigs in our world
so the fact that the mind is not the body is metaphysically possible tells us nothing of the topic in our world
