Mind-Brain Identity Theory Flashcards
Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory
All mental states are identical to brain states (‘ontological’ reduction) — mental state terms and brain state terms refer to the same thing, but the terms are not synonymous (‘not an analytic reduction’).
Dualist Arguments Against Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory
Dualist arguments (like the knowledge argument, conceivability argument, and zombies) challenge the idea that mental states can be fully explained as physical brain states.
Multiple Realisability Problem for Type Identity Theory
A single mental state can be realised by different physical brain states in different species or individuals, challenging the idea of one-to-one identity between mental states and brain states.
Eliminative Materialism (Patricia and Paul Churchland)
Some or all common-sense (‘folk-psychological’) mental states do not actually exist and our everyday understanding of the mind is radically mistaken.
Issue: Certainty of Mental States
Our direct, first-person certainty about the existence of mental states takes priority over any scientific theory that denies them.
Issue: Folk-Psychology’s Predictive and Explanatory Power
Folk-psychology is successful in explaining and predicting human behaviour, making it a strong hypothesis for the existence of mental states.
Issue: Self-Refutation of Eliminative Materialism
Eliminative materialism uses beliefs and reasoning to argue that beliefs do not exist, which makes the theory self-refuting.
What is the Multiple Realisability Argument against the Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory?
The argument suggests that mental states can be realized in different physical systems (e.g., human brains, animal brains, or AI). If this is true, mental states cannot be identical to a specific brain state, undermining the theory.
How does Putnam’s argument challenge Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory?
Putnam argues that mental states are multiply realizable and can be realized in various physical systems, meaning they are not identical to a single type of brain state.
How does the concept of qualia challenge Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory?
Qualia, the subjective experience of consciousness (e.g., the experience of the color red), cannot be fully explained by brain states, suggesting that mental states are not identical to physical brain states.
What is Jackson’s Knowledge Argument against physicalism?
Jackson’s thought experiment about Mary, a scientist who knows all physical facts but has never experienced color, shows that knowledge of brain states does not equate to knowledge of subjective experience, challenging the idea that mental states are identical to brain states.
How does the explanatory power of folk psychology challenge Eliminative Materialism?
Folk psychology has predictive and explanatory power in everyday life (e.g., predicting behavior), and its dismissal by Eliminative Materialism could undermine this useful framework, as it suggests mental states are illusory.
How does scientific progress challenge the Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory?
Critics argue that while brain states may correlate with mental states, this does not mean mental states are reducible to brain states. Neuroscience may reveal correlations, but mental states could be more than just physical brain activity.
How does Functionalism differ from Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory?
Functionalism suggests that mental states are defined by their functional roles (what they do), rather than by their physical composition, offering a different approach to understanding the mind-body relationship.
What is the problem of personal vs. physical level explanation in Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory?
Mental states are often explained at the personal, subjective level (e.g., beliefs and desires), whereas brain states are described at the physical, neurological level. Critics argue that reducing mental states to physical brain states ignores this difference.
