Meta-Ethics Flashcards

1
Q

the concerns of meta-ethics

A

• what is the meaning of moral terms of judgments:what it means to define something as good, or to say that something is good or that good is something

• what is the nature of moral judgements: what happens when we say something is good. do we mean it is functionally or morally good? are we recommending or commanding an action? are moral judgements objective or subjective? are they relative or absolute?

• how may moral judgements be supported or defended: the grounds on which ethical claims are made - whether they can be supported by factual evidence or whether they are shared by others, either universally or in special circumstances. how can we know whether and when an action is right or wrong

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2
Q

What is meant by good?

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• saying ‘i have a good job’ is descriptive because it is factually based
• saying ‘giving to charity is good’ is realist because it can be empirically tested
• saying ‘a good train service’ is functional because it fulfils a purpose
• saying ‘running makes me feel good’ is non-realist because it cannot be empirically verified
• Aristotle identified ‘good’ by claiming that something was good if it fulfilled its telos or purpose

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3
Q

Meta-ethics

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from Greek ‘meta’ (meaning beyond) and ‘ethikos’ (meaning character or custom). Meta ethics s the study of underlying ethical ideas or ethical language. Can be contrasted with normative ethics (the attempt to workout which actions are right/wrong) and descriptive ethics (the attempt to compare and describe moral behaviours). In summary, meta-ethics is concerned with the question of what is the meaning of goodness.

Instead of asking, “is stealing wrong?”, the meta-ethical philosopher asks: “what is meant by saying stealing is wrong?”. so a theory of meta ethics is a theory of meaning.

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4
Q

Is morality subjective or objective?

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• if a moral opinion is independent of external facts then it is essentially internal, and is to do with how we feel about an ethical issue. It is therefore subjective.
-however, such a view negates ethical debate, since everything becomes a ‘matter of opinion’ in its hard form it denies the validity of ethical arguments and theories.

• an objective fact is related to how things actually are in the real world. This is true irrespective of how I feel about it, or even whether I exist at all, and is true for everyone. If moral values are objective then they are similarly true for everyone.
-however, objective moral judgements are often criticised as being illusory (not real). Empiricists argue hat there is no objective authority- there is nothing that can be tested or experimented on.

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5
Q

Cognitivism

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if morality is objective, then it is cognitive or realist and its language deals with making claims about things that can be known and can be held to be true or false.

In other words, it suggests the possible existence of moral knowledge that can be discovered/known. This suggests an ultimate moral truth exists.

Statements of opinion are based on observations or experience

Cognitivist theories include naturalism and intuitionism

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6
Q

Realism/Naturalism (under cognitivism)

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sense perceptions and logical faculty are what we use to find moral truths

moral truths are facts deductible from non-moral premises (observation and analysis)

moral facts are never opinions and there is an absolutist moral code which is a fact of the natural world

ethical statements can be verified (for example, ‘murder is wrong’ is verifiable by the fact that someone has died and the negative impacts of their death)

links to natural moral law

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7
Q

Non-cognitivism

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if morality is subjective, then it is non-cognitive or anti-realist and deals with matters that cannot be empirically proved to be true or false. This is a non-propositional view, which holds that there are no objective values. This view comes in different forms.

emotivism is a non-cognitivist theory, as it holds that ethical statements express feelings/opinions

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8
Q

Descriptive and Normative statements

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• stealing hurts people
• stealing is wrong
• you ought not to steal

first is a description, we could test whether it’s true or false by asking how it feels to have something stolen. This is a naturalistic statement, as it describes a natural feature of stealing, that it causes pain.

second and third are normative rather than descriptive, as they have a value judgement. the third statement is also a prescriptive statement, prescribing or advising a course of action

the second is just an expression of a strong feeling A.J. Ayer suggests, equivalent to grunting in disproval

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9
Q

Strengths of Cognitivism

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• no room for confusion
• humans have a natural instinct for good, corresponding with Christian belief
• Divine command ethics: points to someone (God) who commands what is right
• argues morality to be too important to be a matter of personal opinion
• makes morality objective rather than subjective Morals must be approved by society and people to whom it applies
• asserts that these moral truths can be tested by human reason and logic. Human beings do not simply observe the universe; their minds test their experiences
• Non-cognitivists state their own theory is flexible but cognitivist would argue that this flexibility could be chaotic in reality in which truths do not exist and moral absolute change from day to day

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10
Q

Strengths of Non-cognitivism

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• is difficult to object to
• has no burden of proof
• these subjective opinions are still valuable
• cognitivist strengths are a misunderstanding of ethics, to deny the difference between facts and opinions is a fundamental flaw
• Non-cognitivist go on to argue that this flaw undermines the other supposed strengths of cognitivism, opinions can not be tested or subject to empirical research they are simply matters of personal choice, the non-cognitivists argue that this down not devalue moral statements but recognises that they are valuable opinions
• non-cognitivists argue that their primary strength is that it accepts the world as it is, morality is a matter f personal choice which society then formulates into laws for the advancement of the majority’s personal references
• it is not a rigid code but allows for moral flexibility as opinions develop and change

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11
Q

Naturalism

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the view that morals can be defined or explained in natural terns, or supported through the observation of the world in science. Naturalists develop their ideas with non-moral evidence. If we define goodness as pleasure, we may look at evidence of pleasure and pain in actions. If we say that goodness is whatever God desires, we will look for evidence of God’s purpose in the natural world.
• good is something that can defined and has al existence
• good is something that is provable, using empirical evidence
• e.g. this pen is good because it fulfils its purpose by writing properly
• we can use ethical statements and say that they are accurate using empirical evidence

“Tony Blair as once the Prime Minister of the UK” —> This can be proved using empirical data

“Genetic research is right” —> This statement is just as valid because you can use evidence to support or criticise it. Genetic research saves lives by curing disease, therefore it is right.

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12
Q

Ethical naturalism (under cognitivism)

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good is a natural property in the world that can be discovered empirically. Concerned with the value of facts rather than the evaluation, their significance rather than imposing opinions on facts. A cognitive and realist argument, is empiricist in nature
• Good is a natural property of the world. A natural property can be physical or psychological. We can infer from those properties what the good is
• Our moral judgements derived from or experience of the world; a moral term, such as ‘good’ can be understood in natural terms, which means we can explain what the term ‘good means with reference to things that are not moral

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13
Q

Empiricism

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the theory that all knowledge is based on sense-experience

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14
Q

Theological Naturalism

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our sense of morality comes from God, influenced by biblical teaching

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15
Q

Strengths of Ethical Naturalism

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•Scientific approach
-favours scientific investigation of moral questions
-people use observations and science to depict and establish whether something is good or bad
-an example might be coming to a judgement based on the effects an action had on someone’s emotions

• support of philosophers
-Aristotle, Bentham and Mill provided arguments grounding goodness in natural ends like eudaimonia or pleasure/happiness toward which human nature aims
-it avoids the is-ought gap by grounding moral conclusions in empirical premises of human nature and what we observe people aiming toward (pleasure, flourishing etc)

• accounts for our moral feelings
• accounts for disagreements
• acceptable to most people

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16
Q

Weaknesses of Ethical Naturalism 1

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• Moore’s naturalistic fallacy: you cannot jump from a natural property to them deeming that you should do it. E.g. charity is good because it helps other people then we ought to do charitable works.
-we can’t impose moral obligation to partake in charitable works
-implications which may not seem prevalent, e.g. is everyone deserving of charitable works/ if someone does a charitable work once do they have to again

• reductionism: reduces good to a natural property

• The is-ought problem- David Hume
-hard to move from facts to ethical statements because you cannot compare something that ‘is’ to something that you ‘ought’ to do. you cannot move from a factual statement like ‘he stole’ to ‘you ought not to steal’
-Hume proposed two types of factual statements: synthetic (factual experience), analytical (self evident from the definition)

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17
Q

Weaknesses of Ethical Naturalism 2

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• X is good- R.B Perry
-suggests that “good” means “being an object of favourable interest” and “right” means “being conducive to harmonious happiness”
-x being good means that is the object of desire while y being right means it is conducive to harmonious happiness
-it is all from a human perspective

• Moral Disagreement
-Ethical naturalism does not allow for moral dispute
-if ‘mother Teresa was good’ simply refers to how the majority feels, then the judgement cannot be wrong or disputed by another person
-we might change our opinion
-but it is still correct as the statement is an expression of differing attitudes at a particular time

• Not significant outside religion
-Bradley’s suggestion that morals were a feature of the concrete universe no longer carries much weight outside of religious groups
-doesn’t stand in light of scientific development
-quantum physics challenges traditional mechanistic approaches to the universe, for example, by chaos theory

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18
Q

Weaknesses of Ethical Naturalism 3

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• Is goodness actually a natural property
-for naturalists, ‘good’ doesn’t really exist on its own
-it can be reduced to pleasure, happiness or God’s will
-Charles R. Pigden writes: “Naturalists, in short, resort to all sorts of supposed facts- sociological, psychological, scientific, even metaphysical or supernatural.”
• Other weaknesses
-does not allow for cultural differences
-simplistic
-can you evidence claims about ethical/moral situations?

19
Q

F.H Bradley

A

• moral perspective was determined from self-realisation and observing one’s position in society
• rejected hedonism (claiming pleasure provides no final self-understanding) and Kant’s idea of duty for the sake of duty (it provides no guide in morality or give human satisfaction)
• “…we have found the end, we have found self realisation, duty and happiness in one- yes, we have found ourselves, when we have found our station and its duties, our function as an organ of the social organism”
• the values of our society, family and community are where we learn our true selves
• we should accept sound criticisms of other societies
• the good of society is about hard work and obedience

20
Q

Bradley and naturalism

A

• ethics can be explained by the concrete world, our place in society
• our duty is universal, concrete, objective and with real identity

21
Q

Objections to Bradley

A

• is it correct to interpret social order as a fact?
• social orders change, for example, roles of men and women in the West during the 20th century
• however, social orders fixed to ideas of right and wrong seem to remain a feature of the rest of the world
• breakdowns in western social orders could be seen as moral breakdowns

22
Q

Intuitionism

A

The idea that ethical terms cannot be defined, since good and ought can be defined in non-ethical terms
• ethical values do not need defining because they are self-evident
• they can be known only directly by intuition
• good is not a mater of opinion, but something that we can all ascertain through reason
• an inner sense directs humans to know what s right or wrong, as GE Moore claimed, ‘If I am asked, “what is good?” my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter”

23
Q

G.E. Moore and Yellow

A

Moore used the example of yellow to describe what good is. We struggle to define yellow in the same way we struggle to define good.
• “We know what yellow is and can recognise it where it is seen, but we cannot actually define yellow. In the same way we know what good is. But that we cannot define it?”

24
Q

Strengths of Intuitionism

A

• allows for objective moral value to be identified and therefore proposes a form of moral realism. It is not a question of dismissing the possibility of any moral facts
• does not propose a subjective or emotive approach to ethics but it does avoid the problems identifying ethics with a natural property
• whilst we might recognise the wrongness of some actions, it is difficult to specify exactly why they are wrong. Rather we interpret it through a moral sense, not a list of moral definitions
• allows us to identify a moral sense in the same way as a sense of beauty
• allows for moral duties and obligations apply to all
• points to the existence of a considerable common consensus on moral issues, such as the value of human life, as evidence of a common intuition of morality
• links with the of conscience as a moral guide

25
Q

Weaknesses of Intuitionism

A

• J.L. Mackie: moral values are relative not absolute
-there is a difference between good and bad actions
-actions themselves are part of the material world
-the values ascribed to the acts are not part of the world, they cannot be absolute because they are relative

• A.J. Ayer: there is nothing factual about ethical language, it is symbolic
-moral laws are symbols in that they establish conventions on how to live
-not derived from a factual truth, but emotions
-“The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content”

• Intuition can be considered to be a meaningless concept as it is non-verifiable

• there is no explanation for why good is self evident. intuitions could conflict, for example, in the case of a nazi soldier who feels that killing other humans is wrong but also felt an inherent sense of duty

26
Q

Harold Arthur Pritchard

A

-shared Moore’s view that good cannot be defined but it can be recognised through our intuition.

-identified reason and intuition as two kinds of thinking
-reason looks at the facts of the situation while intuition uses these to make decisions

-intuitions vary because of how developed people’s moral thinking is

27
Q

W.D. Ross

A

(institutionalist)

-took a different approach from Pritchard and Moore, being a deontologist instead of a consequentialist

-intuition identifies what our duty is
-our duty is self evident, prima facie (at first appearance)

-prima facie duties may conflict but the most important one will be clear in the situation

28
Q

Non-cognitivism: Emotivism

A

Non Cognitivism: ethical language makes subjective claims,non-factual claims about reality which cannot be objectively true or false

Emotivism: Ethical language expresses feelings, not objectively true or false facts

29
Q

Vienna Circle

A

Vienna Circle: roots of emotivism in this 20th century group of philosophers and scientists who met regularly in Vienna.
Advocates of logical positivism,which considered science and logic to be the only legitimate sources of knowledge, holding that something must be meaningful to be called knowledge.
Key to this is the verification principle, which set out a criterion for deciding what statements could be considered meaningful or meaningless:
• analytic statements: are true by definition
• synthetic statements: statements which can be proved/verified according to empirical sense evidence. Synthetic statements cannot be proved a priori, only a posteriori, through observation

30
Q

Emotivism (in detail)

A

colloquially, ‘hurrah-boo’ theory. Argues that if we make a claim such as ‘stealing is wrong’ then we are not making a value judgement based on an objective point of reference, but rather we are simply saying ‘I don’t like stealing’.
• the language is used in ethical terms as an expression of feeling or opinion, rather than fact
• such ethical claims are seen as subjective and non-factual or verifiable, but express an opinion that means something to the speaker and provokes the listener. e.g. ‘Adultery is wrong and faithfulness is right’
• the verification principle rejects such ethical claims as meaningless because they cannot be empirically tested. However, ethical language can serve another function, to convey what people feel about something.
• AJ Ayer disapproved, saying that wha is true for the speaker is different to being true for everyone

31
Q

Ayer’s emotivism

A

English Philosopher 1910-1989 developed his emotivism in his 1936 ‘The Foundations of Ethics, Language, Truth and Logic’

-ethical language is not tautological (murder and wrongness are not synonyms) so ethical language cannot be analytically true or false
-to call an ethical statement true or false would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy, so ethical statements are meaningless

-ethical language only expresses approval or disproval
-Ayer was a logical positivist: language is meaningless unless empirically verifiable
-“we say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person if…he knows ow to verify the proposition”

-supported verification principle

-Moral judgements simply share emotions

32
Q

The Verification Principle

A

states that a proposition is meaningful if it is either true by definition or empirically verifiable

its focus is not whether its true, but whether it is meaningful

33
Q

Strengths of Ayers emotivism

A

-Naturalistic fallacy is avoided as it doesn’t attempt to empirically determine the truth of ethical statements

-maintains that ethical language has a purpose, being and expression of approval/disapproval (this is appealing)

-acknowledges moral diversity

34
Q

Weaknesses of Ayer’s emotivism

A

-argues that opinions are formed in order to gain the approval of others

-it is not helpful in judging moral opinions, especially when needing to decide between two differing ones

-James Rachels: emotivism removes reason from moral judgements

-Alasdair MacIntyre: “Emotivism rests upon a claim that…rational justification for an objective morality has in fact failed”

35
Q

C.L. Stevenson

A

developed ideas similar to Ayer
• unlike Ayer, claimed that there are such things as real disagreements in attitudes, rather than just different emotions
• Stevenson did not just emphasis the persuasive side of ethics but also the view that attitudes are based on beliefs
• disagreements are not different emotions, but also issues of different underlying convictions- what life is, its value etc
• Stevenson’s views thus give more meaning to moral disagreement, whereas Ayer only sees these as conflicts of feelings

36
Q

Stevenson’s criteria for an ethical statement

A

1.One must be able to disagree
2.The thing must have a magnetism, i.e. you must want to do something when told it’s good or vice versa
3.The presence or absence of ‘goodness’ must not be able to be verified by any scientific method

Only the emotive understanding of ‘good’ met these criteria
This is synthetic as goodness can be either right or wrong; it is an interest theory because of magnetism

When we call something good, we may give reasons, so empirical justification isn’t ruled out
however, when we say good we are attempting to persuade others

ethical predicates can only be used for avoidable conduct, actions that are chosen

good has no factual content itself but cruel, just and generous can do

ethical agreements can be resolved if there is a shared definition of terms like cruel or kind (second order ethical terms)

37
Q

Strengths of Stevenson’s emotivism

A

-includes differences in attitudes rather than just different emotions
-disagreements are not just different feelings, but different convictions
-gives meaning to disagreements
-gives hope for resolving disputes

38
Q

Weaknesses of Stevenson’s emotivism

A

-Ethical statements are not usually judged according to the response of the listener
-ing carried by a weight of public emotion does not make a statement right

39
Q

Moore’s criticism of Ethical Naturalism

A

Moore’s intuitionism is also cognitivist, but he argues that good is not a property of nature

he points out two assumptions of the naturalist argument:
-good can be defined as a natural property (Mill: happiness or pleasure)
-it is possible to infer what is moral from these

if good were pleasure, then questions of morality would always be closed questions, whereas we know by intuition that this is not the case

40
Q

The Naturalistic Fallacy

A

Moore: the naturalistic fallacy is when a non-natural object is given natural properties

natural properties include pleasure and pain

when people associate good with natural terms, they reduce moral properties

goodness and pleasure are not the same

41
Q

Prescriptivism (R.M. Hare)

A

comes under non-cognitivism

Hare agrees with emotivism in that there is no such thing as moral fact, but disagrees on the purpose of moral values

moral statements are not just approval or disapproval, but are also guidance

moral judgement, being recommendations or prescriptions, are meaningful when applicable to everyone in a similar situation

places emphasis on reason rather than on emotion; we use logical processes to come to moral judgements

42
Q

Hare: universalisability and overridingness

A

universalisability: first used by Kant, when we say ‘ought’ we say that a course of action is right for everyone in similar circumstances
-Hare argued that if circumstances are broadly similar then the same thing would be right

Moral judgements override non-moral judgements. The desire to act morally should override any other.

Goodness is not a property. While we use criteria to determine if something is good, this doesn’t define goodness itself

43
Q

Criticisms of prescriptivism

A

-doesn’t account for clashes in moral principles (for example, if an abortion is to save the mother’s life). Hare argues one principle needs to be abandoned or the principles must adapt to the situation

-while the principle of universalisability allows for similar situations to be considered equivalent, every situation is unique

-doesn’t account for rational but bad decisions, like killing an irritating fly

-if we cannot differentiate between moral and non-moral uses of ‘should’, how can moral considerations override others