LIT 6 - Prakash/Potoski: dysfunctional institutions Flashcards
Prakash/Potoski: What is the widespread perception regarding institutions in important social, political, and economic areas?
There is a widespread perception among academics and commentators that institutional dysfunction has become increasingly common in important social, political, and economic areas. This is supported by opinion polls showing a decline in trust in major actors and institutions.
Prakash/Potoski: According to the authors, what is the core function of research on governance?
Research on governance examines the initiation, maintenance, and efficacy of collective action to fulfil some political, economic, or social purpose. Institutions, understood as rule structures, are the means for undertaking these collective efforts.
Prakash/Potoski: What are some fundamental questions that scholars in regulation and governance areas grapple with regarding institutions?
Key questions include: Do institutions always work as intended? and How might one judge institutional performance? Additionally, the conditions under which an institution effective in one context might be effective in others are unclear.
Prakash/Potoski: What are some of the challenges in measuring institutional dysfunction?
Measuring institutional dysfunction poses substantial conceptual and empirical challenges. While some ‘objective’ measures exist (e.g., economic growth for government success, profits for firms), there are debates about their objectivity and precision. In other cases, we may need to rely on perception-based measures, such as Transparency International’s corruption rankings.
Prakash/Potoski: What are two ways of conceptually defining institutional dysfunctionalities?
First, from a cost–benefit perspective, institutional effectiveness can be assessed in terms of social welfare. Second, a specific yardstick can be identified for a particular institution’s performance or dysfunction, such as using national inflation rates to measure the performance of Central Banks.
Prakash/Potoski: Why is it important to address the theoretical and empirical challenges of institutional dysfunction?
Addressing these challenges is important because of the widespread view that so many institutions are underperforming. This perception goes beyond mere rhetoric and is evidenced by corporate scandals, international crises, and political issues.
Prakash/Potoski: What is a ‘design failure’ as a potential cause of institutional dysfunctionality?
Design failures occur when institutions, intended to channel private interests toward collective ends, have flawed rules due to compromises during design negotiations or when creators lack information. Institutions might also create perverse incentives, undermining their intended goals.
Prakash/Potoski: Explain ‘institutional mismatch and obsolescence’ as a driver of institutional failure.
Institutions may fail due to institutional mismatch and obsolescence when regulated actors gain new capabilities, new actors can circumvent rules, or new challenges emerge that existing institutions cannot handle. Rule structures effective in one context may not work in others, and circumstances can change to undermine once effective institutions.
Prakash/Potoski: What is ‘adaptation failure’ in the context of institutional performance?
Adaptation failure refers to an institution’s inability to adjust to changing circumstances. While effective institutions need flexibility, relying on specific ‘messiah’ leaders to facilitate adaptation can be risky.
Prakash/Potoski: How does ‘capture’ lead to institutional underperformance?
Institutions can underperform when captured by narrow interests that use the institution to serve particular agendas at the expense of the broader collective good. This can occur through influence on state policy or by regulatees influencing the regulatory system.
Prakash/Potoski: According to Sunstein, how should the effectiveness of regulatory interventions be assessed?
Sunstein argues that the effectiveness of regulatory interventions should be assessed on how well they allow citizens to live good lives, focusing on policy impacts (e.g., longevity, health, educational attainment, wealth) rather than policy inputs or outputs.
Prakash/Potoski: What is the central argument of Vining and Weimer regarding public-private hybrid organisations and institutional dysfunctionality?
Vining and Weimer argue that the fractionalized property rights inherent in public-private hybrid organisations are likely to undermine their performance by creating conflicting goals for managers and causing confusion due to competing signals from different owners.
Prakash/Potoski: What do Lewallen, Theriault, and Jones suggest as a key contributor to dysfunction in the US Congress?
They suggest that poor information processing through the Congressional committee system contributes to dysfunction. Committees increasingly receive positional information (stance) instead of exploratory information (purpose), and hearings focus on problem identification over solutions.
Prakash/Potoski: What alternative to accountability does Barnett propose for evaluating international humanitarian institutions? Why?
Barnett proposes paternalism as a guiding principle because these organisations were often established when people were unable to act in their own best interests. He argues that excessive focus on accountability can make organisations overly cautious and favour politically defensible actions over more effective ones.
Prakash/Potoski: What is the main argument of Borzel and Risse regarding the assessment of governance failure?
Borzel and Risse argue for looking beyond state institutions when assessing governance failure. They suggest that non-state, informal institutions grounded in social trust can function effectively, even in areas of limited statehood, and can serve as ‘functional equivalents’ of state institutions in providing governance services.
