Lent - Lecture 4 - Monetary Policy Rules Flashcards
Explain the terms in the Taylor rule: R = r̅ + mπ(π - πt) + mY(Y - Y̅)
- R: real interest rate set by the CB
- r̅: neutral real interest rate, the interest rate during times of no economic shocks
- mπ: policy feedback parameter on inflation
- mY: policy feedback parameter on income
What is the value of mY and mπ?
they are greater than 0
When R feeds back on Y, what happens to the MP curve?
it becomes upward sloping
With the Taylor rule: R = r̅ + mπ(π - πt) + mY(Y - Y̅), what does the slope of the MP equal?
slope= mY
What are the two types of policy lags discussed in literature? Briefly describe each one
- inside lag: time from shock hitting economy to change in policy
- outside lag: time from change in policy to being felt
What was Friedman’s justification for a passive approach to monetary policy?
If the largest effect from monetary policy is felt 18 months after rates are cut, how can we know the effects will be desirable?
Friedman went further than just proposing ‘constant growth in M’. Show that if gY is exogenous, gM can be used to fix the long-run rate of inflation, π*. From this, what was the optimal value of π⃰ according to Friedman, the ‘Friedman rule’
- based on the quantity theory
- MV = PY
- assuming fixed V:
- gM = π* + gY
- if gY exogenous, use gM to fix long-run rate of inflation, π*
- from the Fisher equation in the long run:
- i = r̅ + π*
- choice of π* ⇒ choice of i
- ‘i is a tax on choice to hold cash → efficient to have i = 0’
- ‘Grow M so that π* = -r̅’ ,→ the ‘Friedman rule’
Give 2 arguments against Friedman’s view that monetary policy should take a passive approach
- disputes about policy lags: very hard to estimate cleanly
- successes of policy activism - especially ‘Great Moderation’
The Friedman rule seems counter-intuitive because it suggests CBs should actively try to hit the ZLB. Why did Friedman think they should do this, when the ZLB makes monetary policy impotent?
For Friedman active policy was counter-productive anyway
What is the current consensus among macroeconomists regarding policy activism?
Large consensus among macroeconomists today in favour of monetary policy activism – especially post-crisis