Lecture 8: The War in Ukraine Flashcards
2 main points of Mearsheimer’s argument regarding the war in Ukraine
- NATO policy toward Ukraine and other former soviet countries pushed Russia to the attack because as a great power, they felt threatened by other great powers and want to ensure their survival
- NATO affected by “liberal delusions” that their policy would not create pressure on Russia and wouldn’t naturally lead them to act out
Mearsheimer claim: no Russian imperialism toward Ukraine
Russia didn’t want conquest or domination (are reactive, not proactive player), but were pushed by NATO to conquer Ukraine because Ukraine sought closer ties with NATO and EU without reason
Professor debunk: no Russian imperialism toward Ukraine (3 points)
- Russian policy toward Ukraine pre-2014 did interfere with Ukraine in presidential elections and to get favorable policy concessions from them, despite Ukraine not considering NATO membership yet. Ukraine acted mostly in accordance with Russian interests in all spheres
- Russian policy 2014-2022 had violent conflict, and Zelensky tried to find common ground with Russia but was unsuccessful and thus tried to gain international support to regain Crimea and Donbas
- The invasion itself - if you enter into military blackmail, your alliance is over
Mearsheimer: what happened in Kyiv in 2014?
An illegitimate coup sponsored by the West who supported anti-government protests in Ukraine against democratically elected Yanukovych (no legitimacy as not a mass revolution). This backed Russia up into a corner and made them afraid
Professor debunk: why is what happened in Kyiv in 2014 not an illegitimate coup, sponsored by the West, including Ukrainian fascists? 5 points
- Yanukovych’s policies increasingly copied Russian authoritarian system and caused a lot of dissatisfaction in Ukraine -> extra-legal revolution (government overthrown by population without following established procedures)
- Broad, centrist support for revolution
- Elections quickly followed the revolution in all parts of Ukraine not under Russian occupation, and fascist parties lost almost all support
- Western powers wanted Yanokovych to stay in power until reelections happened, but Ukrainians did not
- Russia refused to be part of stabilization talk
Mearsheimer: the role of NATO
Needless and avoidable NATO polices make Russian policy toward Ukraine strategically sound - aggressions are justified
Professor debunk: the role of NATO
- NATO and EU wanted to stabilize Eastern Europe with democracy and individual rights to avoid conflicts - they couldn’t have done anything else
- In Bucharest summit, Russia and Georgia were declared nato prospective, and Russia later invaded Russia but never specifically requested a withdrawal of this policy to avoid the invasion
- Russian elite perception was that NATO was threatening, but their policy was not intended to be threatening
Has Russian elite risk acceptance grown?
Case to test this: use of military force against other sovereign states (Georgia, Crimea, hybrid war with Ukraine, invasion)
Long-term growth in risk acceptance in Russian elite, but risk avoidance is still present (e.g. no total mobilization of troops, do not want Russian society to perceive too many casualties or negative harm to economy)
How did Germany contribute to deterrence failure against Russia in early 2022?
There is a gap between what they could have done and what they did (e.g. they could have done more):
- Germany never publicly committed to cancel Nordstream 2 in case of invasion
- Did not send weapons to Ukraine or allow other states to send German manufactured weapons before the invasion
Why did Germany fail to do all they could to deter the war in Ukraine? (4 points)
- Civilian culture of national security is very hesitant to employ military means
- German elites pushed by two sides and trying to find the sweet spot between: Ukrainian allies and German domestic discourse
- 3-part government coalition newly created which requires a lot of coordination
- German constitution needs a lot of parties to agree on offensive war
EU dependence on Russian gas - 3 points
- German dependence is overstated - Germany has halted Nordstream 2 and adopted foreign policy against Russia
- Russian gas policy toward Europe is mostly motivated by economic interests as the West has a lot of money and can afford to buy high-priced gas from pipelines
- EU needs to be competitive with US for energy-rich products, so getting gas from Ukraine is convenient but not necessarily dependence
3 paths to peace in Ukraine
- Military victory of one side (highly unlikely)
- Peace through drastic changes in domestic policies on one side (unlikely for Ukraine, unpredictable for Russia as moderate sign of elite defection but none from core elite)
- Victory through exhaustion (both sides feel they cannot win, regime support is falling -> unilateral scaling down violence, formal arrangements to maintain it)
Hypocrisy in German response to Ukraine vs. delivering war to Saudi Arabia
German government playing two-level game, and the public does not care or pay attention very much to Saudi Arabia -> but shows that German elites are less driven by genuine convictions about weapons delivery
Reading: How We Got Putin so Wrong: Taking Putin at His Word - Kalyvas, Stathis
Realists could not predict the invasion of the Ukraine because they tend to dismiss
1) Leaders’ preferences - Putin published essay saying Russian and Ukrainian nation was one and he will restore the Soviet Union’s legacy
2) people’s demands - Ukrainians desire for democracy and closer ties to the West mattered in 2014 and 2022
= we should take Putin at his word, instead of our own biases and worldviews
Reading: Can Realism Explain the War in Ukraine? - Daniel Drezner
Realists overlook the power of domestic politics, ideology, ideas, norms, and identity in international politics. The war in Ukraine is not only a quest for power and self-interest, but also driven by cultural and historical facts such as protecting Russian speakers and portraying Russia as a global power, Putin maintaining his popularity in Russia etc.
