lecture 7 Flashcards
Trust
■ Defining and measuring trust
■ Types of trust
■ The concept of the culture of trust (Sztompka)
To define; trust is a bet on The future contingent actions of Others (Sztompka, 1995, 1996a, 1996b). How do people arrive at such
bets? What are the factors influencing their decisions to deploy trust?
People are rational and thus most often they make bets on the basis of calculations. Actions that involve the investment of trust toward others are based on
some estimate of their credibility; on the ‘reflected trusrworthiness’ of the targets.
For example we consider their reputation, performance, appearance etc. The
dominant theme in the contemporary theory of trust is the unravelling of the
complex logic involvcd in such rational estimates (Coleman, 1990; Hardin,
1993).
But the measure of trust we are willing to deploy — the amount Of risk We are
ready to take — is not exclusively dependent on the qualities Of the target toward
which our actions are directed, on the estimated trustworthiness Of the trusted.
It also depends on our Own predictions to trust, on the trustfullness of the truster.
The pool of trust people command, as well as the propensity to spend it, is vari-
ab e. The multidimensional theory Of trust must move beyond the rational
dimension, and take the endowment of actors into due account.
Part Of the explanarion of trustfulness may be found in the personaliry of the
trusting agent. Trustfulness may be treated as a psyehological trait — basic
trust’, or trusting impulse, usually credited to the caring family climate during
early socialization (Wilson, 1993; Giddens, 1991), and also to later personal
history of rewarding experiences in relationships With others. The basic trust is a
sort of personal Capital we accumulate, if we are lucky, during our life-course.
Trustfulness of this psychological sort is obviously a modifiying factor in the Calcu-
lations of trustworthiness. ln the extreme case it may oren preempt any rational
estimates, provoking an exccessively generous attitude toward Other people or
institutions: blind or naive trust.
Defining trust
■ A working definition of trust by Newton
– „the belief that others will not deliberately or knowigly do us harm, if
they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible
[Newton 2009: 343]
■ A concept of Piotr Sztompka
– „trust is a bet on the future contingent actions of others” [Sztompka
1998: 20]
To define; trust is a bet on The future contingent actions of Others (Sztompka, 1995, 1996a, 1996b). How do people arrive at such
bets? What are the factors influencing their decisions to deploy trust?
People are rational and thus most often they make bets on the basis of calculations. Actions that involve the investment of trust toward others are based on
some estimate of their credibility; on the ‘reflected trusrworthiness’ of the targets.
For example we consider their reputation, performance, appearance etc. The
dominant theme in the contemporary theory of trust is the unravelling of the
complex logic involvcd in such rational estimates (Coleman, 1990; Hardin,
1993).
But the measure of trust we are willing to deploy — the amount Of risk We are
ready to take — is not exclusively dependent on the qualities Of the target toward
which our actions are directed, on the estimated trustworthiness Of the trusted.
It also depends on our Own predictions to trust, on the trustfullness of the truster.
The pool of trust people command, as well as the propensity to spend it, is vari-
ab e. The multidimensional theory Of trust must move beyond the rational
dimension, and take the endowment of actors into due account.
Part Of the explanarion of trustfulness may be found in the personaliry of the
trusting agent. Trustfulness may be treated as a psyehological trait — basic
trust’, or trusting impulse, usually credited to the caring family climate during
early socialization (Wilson, 1993; Giddens, 1991), and also to later personal
history of rewarding experiences in relationships With others. The basic trust is a
sort of personal Capital we accumulate, if we are lucky, during our life-course.
Trustfulness of this psychological sort is obviously a modifiying factor in the Calcu-
lations of trustworthiness. ln the extreme case it may oren preempt any rational
estimates, provoking an exccessively generous attitude toward Other people or
institutions: blind or naive trust.
But trustfulness may be considered as something more than an individual atti-
tude, namely, as a typical orientation, shared by a number of individuals, socially
objectified, and hence exerting some normative pressure or constraint on each
individual actor. In this sense trustfulness becomes a trait Of human collectivities,
pooled cultural capital from which individuals can draw in their actions. It IS no
longer a psychological, individual attitude, but rather a cultural, ‘social fact’
(Durkheim, 1895), a social rule, a pervasive expectation to trust others. Trust-
fulness of this cultural type is another modifying factor in the calculations Of
trustworthiness. In the extreme case it, too, may pre-empt any rational estimates
or hesitant orientations, forcing people to follow cultural demands for granting
trust, ev•en to untrustworthy targets.
This is especially true when the targets of trust are of an abstract, rather than
concrete type: firms, teams, institutions, organizations, markets, nations, regimes,
rather than personal friends or acquaintances. In a modern, complex society such
abstract objects make the crucial part of our life-world (Giddens, 1990). Their
trustworthiness may be very hard or even impossible to estimate for common
actors who lack requisite information or evaluative competence. In such cases
generalized, cultural orientations become of paramount importance.
Thus the comprehensive model of trust must include at least three dimen-
Sions: ‘reflected trustworthiness’, ‘basic trustfulness’ and culturally generated
trust. In this article I Will focus exclusively on trustfulness as a cultural trait,
brackctlng thc considcratlons of rcflcctcd trustworthincss, and basic trust, Obvi-
ously important for the full picture.
The Cultures of Trust and Distrust
When trustfulness as a cultural orientatlon is found to be pervasive in a society,
I propose to speak of the culture of trust. This concept describes a condition when,
apart from any rational calculations of trusrworthiness, or individual psycho-
logical predilections, people not only routinely tend to, but are culturally encour-
aged to express a trustful orientation toward their society, its regime,
organizations and institutions, fellow citizens, as well as thelr own life-chances
and biographical perspectives. The culture of trust is a sort of social resource, or
‘cultural capital’ we use in making bets on the contingent actions of othcrs, Thc
larger the pool Of trust, the more bets and the higher bids We are prepared to
make, and the larger risks we are willlng to accept.
The culture of trust takes various forms, depending on the strength of posi-
tive expectations. People may merely expect instrumental effciency (competence,
rationality, effectiveness), for instance they trust that the government Will stim-
ulate economic growth, or suppress crime. But they may also expect high moral
standards, e.g. they trust that the government Will safeguard justice, fairness,
equality of opportunities. The strongest expectations refer to altruistic dlsinter-
estedness, or fiduciary care (Barber, 1983). For example, people may trust the
government to represent their interests, to provide help, medical services, jobs,
social security, welfare provisions, etc. Obviously, the stronger the expectation
and the deeper the commitment, the more risky the bet of trust and the higher
the chance of disappointment.
But th1S is the price of the highly beneficial consequences that the culture of
trust usually has for social life. Francis Fukuyama makes a bold claim that ‘a
nation’s well-being, as Well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by a single,
pervasive Cultural characteristic: the level Of trust inherent in a socie
(Fukuyama, 1995: 7). To be more specific, we may list a number of functions
that the culture of trust usually performs.
First of all, the culture of trust liberates and mobilizes human agency, releas-
ing creative, uninhibited, innovative, entrepreneurial activism (Luhmann, 1979:
8). This works on both sides Of the relationship, once it is pervaded With trust.
Giving trust, endowing others With trust, evokes positive actions toward them.
Interactions With those whom we endow With trust are liberated from anxiety,
suspicion, watchfulness; they are initiated more easily and allow for more spon-
taneity and openness. We are released from the necessity to monitor and control
every move of Others; we do not need constantly to ‘look at their hands’. But trust
has positive consequences not Only for its givers, but for the recipients as well
(Gambetta, 1988: 221). Being endowed with trust provides a temporary suspen-
sion of normal social constraints: organizations and institutions which obtain a
‘credit of trust’ are temporarily released from immediate social monitoring and
social control. This leaves a wide margin for non-conformity, innovation, origi-
nality, or to put it briefly — for more freedom of action. Second, the culture of
trust encourages sociability, participation with others in various forms of associ-
ations, and in this way enriches the network of interpersonal ties, enlarges the
field of interactions and allows for greater intimacy of interpersonal contacts. In
Other words it increases what Emile Durkheim called the ‘moral density’ (Cladis,
1992: 196), and what modern authors describe as ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 1995),
‘spontaneous sociability’ (Fukuyama, 1995), or ‘civic engagement’ (Almond and
Verba, 1963: 228). Third, the culture of trust encourages tolerance, acceptance
of strangers, recognition of cultural or political differences as legitimate — because
it allows them to be perceived in a non-threatening manner. Trust bridles expres-
sions of inter-group hostility and xenophobia and civilizes disputes (Parry, 1976:
129). Fourth, the culture of trust strengthens the bond of an individual with the
community (the family, the nation, the church, etc.), contributes to the feelings
of identity, and generates strong collective solidarities leading to cooperation,
reciprocal help and even the readiness to make sacrifices on behalf of others. Fifth,
when the culture of trust is present the transaction costs are significantly lowered
and the chances for cooperation increased (Offe, 1996: 10).
To perceive those beneficial effects even more clearly, it is helpful to contrast
them With the consequences of distrust. The pervasive, generalized climate of
suspicion characteristic for the ‘syndrome of distrust’ (Sztompka, 1995, 1996a),
or the ‘culture of cynicism’ (Stivers, 1994) hampers the functioning of society in
several ways. First, it paralyses human agency, inducing routinized, conformist,
adaptive conduct, or even outrl
‘ght passivism. Second, it erodes social capital,
leading to isolation, atomization, the breakdown of associations and the decay of
interpersonal networks. T hird, it mobilizes defensive attitudes, hostile stereo-
types, rurnors and prejudices, as Well as downright xenophobia. Fourth, it alien-
ates and uproots the individual, inciting the search for alternative, often illicit
identities (in the gangs, mafia, deviant subcultures, etc.). Fifth, through a sort of
halo-effect the diffuse culture of distrust is apt to expand toward interpersonal
dealings as well as relations With outsiders. In both cases the transaction costs due
to the necessity of constant vigilance are significantly raised and the chances of
cooperation hindered.
The Social Contexts and Genealogies of Trust and Distrust
Both historical and contemporary evidence indicates that some societies develop
robust cultures Of trust, whereas Others are pervaded With endemic distrust. There
are also some societies which evolve from the culture of trust toward the malaise
of diffuse, generalized distrust (e.g. the US in the last three decades; see Putnam,
1995, 1996; Bok, 1979; Stivers, 1994), and there are others which slowly leave
behind the pervasive culture of distrust, acquiring growing measures of diffuse,
generalized trust (e.g. the post-communist societies of East—Central Europe; see
Rose, 1994; Sztompka, 1995, 1996a). The search for causal factors explaining
those phenomena must proceed in a structural direction With due recognition Of
the historieal dimension. We must atternpt to speclfy the Wider social ContextS
conducive to the culture Of trust, or conversely the culture Of distrust, and see
how their impact accurnulates in time establishing lasting traditions Of general-
ized trust or distrust.
The hypothetical model I propose includes seven contextual conditions which
are presumed to engender the generalized, diffuse trust, With their opposites
expected to produce the culture of distrust. The first condition IS normative
certainty and its opposite — normative chaos, or anomie. If the system Of social
rules prescribing the goals and means of human action — whatever their content
— is well articulated, unambiguous, consistent and endowed With legitimacy, it
produces the feeling of orderliness, predictability, regularity and existential
security. This is enough to engender trust Of the instrumental type, expectations
Of efficient Operation Of the social order. But if the content Of the rules — legal,
moral, customary — also safeguards justice, fairness, equality, social security,
cltizen protection, Civil rights, etc. — then it also engenders the more demanding,
axlological and fiduciary trust. It is easy to imagme how the reverse conditions
operate. The chaouc, ambiguous, inconsistent, weakly legitimated patchwork of
rules leaves the people Without guidance, makes their conduct haphazard and
unpredictable, creates the climate Of anarchy and insecurity. The expectations of
instrumental effciency are not met, and the Culture Of distrust is apt to emerge.
Then it spreads even more ifthe rules, such as they are, do not reflect moral or
fiduciary considerations, and are widely perceived as unjust, exploitative, biased.
The second condition is the transparency ofsocial organization, and its opposite
— opaqueness and secrecy. Familiarity breeds trust; this observation from the field
of interpersonal relations applies equally to the sphere of institutions. If their
architecture, raison d’étre, principles of operation, competences, actual func-
tioning are highly visible — openly reported, accessible to inspection, easy to
understand — they engender the culture Of trust. On the Other hand, if their
structure and operation are vague, hard to comprehend, hidden from view,
surrounded by a veil of secrecy — the diffuse, generalized distrust Will be a natural
response. For example, it has been observed that the simplicity of the tax system
IS crucially important for generalized trust (Przeworski et al., 1995: 88).
The third condition is the stability of the social order, and its opposite — fluid-
ity and transience. If the SOCIal organization, the structure of institutions, and the
civilizational and technical environment of everyday life are persistent and stable,
and in the case Of change, they proceed only in a gradual, regular fashion, in a
predictable direction — the culture of trust 1s likely to appear. On the Other hand,
in a situation Of rapid and radical social change, occurring suddenly and seem-
ingly at random, without perceivable logic and direction — the existential security
is lost, and pervasive, generalized distrust is apt to spread. The corroboration of
this tendency may be found m the history of all revolutions, and particularly their
immediate aftermath, usually accompanied by deep breakdowns of trust
(Sorokin, 1967).
The fourth condition is the accountability of power, and its opposite — arbi-
trariness and irresponsibility. If the institutions wielding power — whatever the
content Of their binding decisions — are limited in their competences and open
to the scrutiny and control Of Other institutions or organizations, the danger of
abuse is diminished, and the regularity of procedures safeguarded. As a result,
those Who are subjected to rule, experience more security, With the culture of trust
becoming a natural outcome. Even more so, if the content Of binding decisions
is perceived to take into account the moral or fiduciary considerations, repre-
senting the interests of the ruled, the culture of trust becomes strongly rooted.
On the Other hand, if power is entirely arbitrary, unconstrained, unlimited,
whimsical and irresponsible — those subjected to its rule are at its mercy, experi-
encing profound unpredictability and insecurity. The culture of distrust is a
natural response. This is even more grave if the content of binding decisions is
seen as purely egoistic and immoral, guarding the interests of the ruling elite, and
ignoring the public good.
The fifth condition is the enactment of rights and obligations, and its opposite
— helplessness. If there exist dependable institutions arbitrating the rules of the
social game, to which people can resort when their rights are not recognized, or
the obligations Of Others toward them not respected, then they have a kind of
insurance, a backup option, and therefore feel safe and Secure. The culture Of
trust is likely to emerge. The effect is even stronger when those arbitrating insti-
tutions are perceived to follow high moral or fiduciary standards, defending
justice, giving fair, unbiased verdicts and taking into account my founded claims
and interests. Conversely, if the only guarantee Of my rights rests in my Own
hands — because dependable arbiters do not exist, or are inaccessible, or are
notoriously partial and unfair — I feel helpless. Such an experience engenders the
diffuse, generalized distrust.
The sixth condition is the enforcement of’ duties and responsibilities, and its
opposite — permissiveness. If citizens know chat the governmental or adminis-
trative agencies are able and ready to sanction the violations Of binding rules, they
feel protected and Secure, and the level Of diffuse and generalized trust is raised
accordingly (Hardin, 1996: 32). Notice that even those Who violate the rules
usually accept their validity and would generally prefer that they were obeyed and
enforced (Merton, 1996: 135). It is rare that a deviant act is accompanied by a
principled renunciation of enforcement. Thieves would cry for police protection
If something was stolen from them. Speeding drivers would rather see Other
drivers paying the tickets and obeying speed limits, for the sake Of their own
safety. Tax evaders would recognize the need for tax collection for public services,
as long as it is the Others Who Pay. An even stronger effect of enforcement on the
culture of trust IS to be expected when the enforcing institutions are not merely
effcient but operate according to some moral standards. On the Other hand,
when enforcement agencies operate in a Iax and permissive manner, or act in a
biased, particularistic fashion, i.e. when violations go unpunished, deviance is
tolerated, or — even worse — when some villains are punished while others are
excused, citizens feel threatened and the culture of distrust is bound to spread.
The seventh condition is of a different order from the other six. It does not
relate to the structural context, but rather to the style of operation of govern-
mental or administrative institutions, the style Of policy (Przeworski et al., 1995:
76). The crucial factor is the recognition and safeguarding of the dignity, integrity
and autonomy of each societal member. If the institutions treat me as a subject
rather than an object, protect me as a person, accept my individuality, specific
preferences and idiosyncrasies, prevent me from manipulation, reification, abuse
— then I feel secure and trustful. One special case of such an orientation is giving
the citizens the credit Of trust, and abstaining from permanent scrutiny, invigila-
tion, control as long as there are no credible reasons for suspicion. Trust breeds
trust; trust received is usually reciprocated. On the other hand, when I am treated
as an Object, when my personal dignity and uniqueness is violated, when I meet
with discrimination, intolerance, neglect — then the diffuse, generalized distrust
is easily born. The special case of this condition is denying the citizens any credit
of trust and approaching them indiscriminately as potential violators of rules,
with permanent checks and controls, demands of certificates and alibis, harsh
penalties for minor infractions. Distrust breeds distrust; hence the culture of
distrust will certainly arise.
It may be hypothetically assumed that the continuous presence of contextual,
structural conditions evoking trust will result in the more embedded tradition of
trust. Similarly, the prolonged absence of a trust-generating context will lead to
the embedded tradition of distrust. Both kinds of traditions possess a certain
inertia; they seem able to outlive the conditions which originally produced them,
to persist in spite of the structural, contextual change (Banfield, 1967: 160). A
typical case of the persistent tradition of trust surviving the vicissitudes of
modernization, and even post-industrialism, may be found in Japan (Hechter and
Kanazawa, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995). An opposite case of the persistent tradition
of distrust, surviving in spite of fundamental democratic transformations and
promising economic developments, is to be found in the post-communist
societies of East—Central Europe (Rose, 1994; Sztompka, 1995, 1996a). Thus
any existing measure Of trust is path-dependent; its meaning, strength, durability,
the direction of future evolution depend to a large extent on its origins — whether
it is a simple continuation Of an earlier trend (Of trust or distrust), or the break-
down of pre-existing trust, or the overcoming of the pre-existing distrust.
Three factors
■ Reflected trustworthiness
■ Basic trustfulness
■ Culturally generated trust
Types of trust
■ Social/horizontal trust vs. political/vertical
trust
■ Trust in people vs. confidence in institutions
■ Specific, thick, particularized trust vs.
generalized, thin or abstract trust
Measuring trust
-
The concept of the culture of trust
■ „ a condition when (…) people (…) are culturally
encouraged to express a trustful orientation toward their
society, its regime, organizations and institutions, fellow
citizens, as well as their own life-chances and
biographical perspectives” [Sztompka 1998: 21]
Creating the Culture of Trust
If we are correct in the claim chat the culture of trust is fundamentally beneficial
for the social system, then it would be good to know how it can be shaped. At
the close of our analytical discussion I WISh to venture some suggestions concern-
ing policies which follow from the presented model of trust.
Obviously the culture of trust would flourish in the world of universal trust-
worthiness (Hardin, 1996: 29). In the perfect society where all actions of the Citi-
reasonable, effective, predictable, fair,
zens as well as institutions were r
just, disinterested, cooperative, supportive, helpful — there would be no initial
risk in trustlng Others, and as trust would not be breached it would be constantly
repleted and rooted, Of course no society like this exists, except in the fantasies
of the utopians. But we may have more limited aspirations: Simply to enhance
notoriously limited trustworthlness. There is only one conceivable indirect
measure: making people and institutions accountable and raising the costs of
breaching trust. Trustworthy conduct would then become self-interested and
rational, and therefore could be expected more often. People would be more
trustworthy because it would pay to be so. We have argued that it is precisely
democratic organization that provides for manifold accountability, horizontal
and vertical, by the citizens and by other institutions. Hence democratic design
seems to raise the stimuli for trustworthiness for the people and organizations
alike.
Another hypothetical condition where the culture of trust would flourish is
the universal presence of basic trust, the psychological propensity to trust others
a priori, independent of the calculus of trustworthiness. This personality trait,
supposedly shaped by intimate and warm socializing milieux, as well as fortunate
life-experiences in tight communities, could be enhanced only by radical
improvements of the family, educational institutions, and communal milieux.
This is neither easy nor likely in the present industrial society.
Thus the only area open to purposeful, political efforts directed at raising trust
are the structural, contextual conditions Ofa society. Each of the Seven trust-gener-
ating conditions we singled out — normative certainty, transparency, stability, etc.
— can become a target of specific policies. But there is one general direction of
policy which, as we have argued, is of paramount importance. This is insti-
tutionalizing and implementing democratic institutions. The democratic design
was shown to encourage the culture of trust, generalized and diffuse trust applied
a priori, apart from any calculation of trustworthiness or personal propensities to
trust.
Thus for the sake Of rasing generalized trust, or fighting historically ingrained
distrust, the most conduclve policy is building democratic institutions and safe-
guarding thelr consistent, but also sparing operation. This would influence trust
from both sides: from the side of the trusted, raising their accountabllity and
hence their Interest ln trustworthmess; and from the side of the trusters, provid-
ing them With insurance against breaches of trust, and hence raising their readi-
ness to risk trust in courageous bets. It may be said that democratic institutions
have double ‘teaching effects’ With respect to trust.
Once the lessons are learned and democraric design succeeds in producing the
culture of trust, it starts to feed back into democratic institutions, helping the
viable functioning of democracy, which in turn enhances the culture of trust. The
virtuous loop of mutually amplifying trust and democracy can begin to function.
Two paradoxes of democracy
I. „The greater the extent of institutionalized distrust,
the more spontaneous trust becomes (…)
II. Institutionalized distrust breeds spontaneous trust
most effectively as long as it remains latent” [or]
„the extensive, potential availability of democratic checks
and controls must be matched by their very limited
actualization”
[Sztompka 1998: 26-29]
Two paradoxes of democracy
I. „The greater the extent of institutionalized distrust,
the more spontaneous trust becomes (…)
II. Institutionalized distrust breeds spontaneous trust
most effectively as long as it remains latent” [or]
„the extensive, potential availability of democratic checks
and controls must be matched by their very limited
actualization”
[Sztompka 1998: 26-29]
The First Paradox of Democracy: Institutionalizing Distrust
for the Sake of Trust
There are many factors which may produce a conducive structural Context for
trust, as described earlier. Among those I wish to focus on IS the constitution of
the political system, arguing that the democratic order has a significant
trust-generating force. All other things being equal, the culture of trust is more
likely to appear in democracy than in any other type of political system. Let us
trace the mechanism through which this effect is produced.
This is a paradoxical mechanism. Namely, the democratic culture Of trust is
due precisely to the institutionalization of distrust in the architecture Of demo-
cracy. Most of the principles constitutive of democratic order assume the insti-
tutionalization of distrust, which provides a kind of backup or insurance for those
who would be ready to risk trust, a disincentive for those who would contem-
plate breaches of trust, as well as a corrective of the actual violations of trust, if
they occur. In effect, the spontaneous, generalized culture of trust is likely to
emerge. In brief: the greater the extent of institutionalized distrust, the more spon-
taneous trust becomes. I refer to this as the first paradox Of democracy.
Let us examine some of the constitutive principles of democracy and see how
they imply institutionalized distrust. Perhaps the most important is the principle
Of legitimacy. Democracy requires justification Of all power which per se is seen
as suspect (Holmes, 1993:24). It is only when the authority is shown to emanate
from the popular will, through elections, and when the elected representatives
realize the interests Of the people, that the government is recognized as legitimate.
And even here there are still institutions of civil disobedience or revocation Of
representatives, which assume the possibility of the breach of trust, and provide
the corrective mechanism for such contingencies.
Another is the principle of periodic elections and terms of offce. This shows
distrust in the willingness Of the rulers to surrender their power voluntarily and
to subject their performance to periodic scrutiny. It is assumed that they will bend
to the temptation to petrify their privilege, and this tendency is institutionally
prevented by the mechanism of the turnover of power. It is also the existence of
the opposition contesting for power that guarantees the critical monitoring and
the prevention of abuses by those in power.
Then there is the principle of division ofpowers, checks and balances, and limited
competence of institutions. This clearly implies the suspicion that institutions will
tend to expand, monopolize decisions, abuse their powers. The mechanism of
mutual controls is explicitly constructed and sanctioned among different insti-
tutions, branches Of government, etc.
There is the principle Of the rule of law and independent courts. This implies
distrust in the spontaneous good will of the citizens and institutions alike. To
prevent arbitrariness, abuses, deviant acts, both must be subjected to the
common, universally binding framework oflaw. Law is situated above individuals
and institutions, including governmental agencies. They are all equally bound by
law, and equally responsible before the law. Various safeguards Of the autonomy
of courts are intended to guarantee that laws will be impartially enforced
(Holmes, 1993: 47).
The fifth is the principle of constitutionalism and judicial review. It implies
distrust in the integrity Of legislating bodies, which may be tempted to bend the
laws to their particularistic interests, or to change the laws in an opportunistic
way. Hence the need for the ‘basic law’ above all specific regulations, pre-empting
the easy possibility of its change and making a sort of pre-commitment for the
future (Przeworski et al., 1995: 50), and establishing autonomous constitutional
tribunals to enforce its precepts.
The sixth is the principle of due process. Some measure of distrust extends even
to the law-enforcing and arbitrating institutions themselves. Even the courts are
not beyond suspicion of partiality or negligence. Hence the need for the insti-
tution of appeal, and sometimes several grades of appeal, before the rulings
become valid and binding.
The seventh is the principle of civic rights. This implies distrust in the spon-
taneous good will of authorities in satisfying the needs and interests of the citi-
zens. It also implies that the citizens may be subjected to abuse by the authorities.
Such possibilities require a mechanism through which the citizens must have
measures to demand such satisfaction, and protect themselves against abuse. Safe-
guarding the civic rights in the constitution, opening the possibility of suits
against public institutions, establishing the office of the Ombudsman, or in some
countries even allowing the direct ‘constitutional suit’ against the state, are meant
to meet this need.
The eighth is the principle Of law enforcement. This implies distrust in the
spontaneous following of laws by the citizens. At least some of them may be
suspected of disobeying. Hence there must be mechanisms for checking whether
the citizens’ duties are fulfilled, and for enforcing them if necessary. Those who
choose not to meet their obligations toward the State must be made to do so. The
establishment Of such institutions as the police, public prosecutors, tax collectors,
etc. serves this purpose.
The ninth is the principle of open communication. Neither all people nor all
institutions can be trusted to be truthful, open to argumentation, willing to
recognize the views of others. There is the need to counter censorship; indoctri-
nation; limitation of free expression of opinions; dogmatism; and outright
deception — in both authorities and citizens. The defense of tolerance, open
debate, pluralistic and independent media is necessary to safeguard the funda-
mental operational principle of democracy which is the search for truth, compro-
mise or consensus. The existence of the ‘fourth power’ of the media, and
protection of its autonomy, proude a powerful check against abuses of power,
biases and prejudices.
These constitutive principles of democracy obviously relate to the structural,
contextual conditions conducive for the culture of trust. They help to establish
normative certainty, transparency of social organization, stability of the social
order, accountability of power, enactment of rights and obligations, enforcement
Of duties and responsibilities, personal dignity, integrity and autonomy Of the
people. To put it briefly: people are more prepared to trust Institutions and other
people if the social organization in which they operate insures them against
potential breaches of trust. Democratic organization provides this kind of insur-
ance.
The Second Paradox of Democracy: Applying the Checks
and Controls Sparingly
So far our discussion has been at the ideal-typical level. We have reconstructed
the normative model of democracy. And it was shown to be a potentially power-
ful factor in generating the culture of trust. But the actual emergence or decay of
trust is contingent on the manner in which democratic principles are imple-
mented, the way in which they operate in social and political life. It seems that
in order to evoke a strong culture of trust, two operational conditions must be
met. On the one hand, democratic principles must be dependable, i.e. applied
consistently, invariably, and universally. But, on the other hand, the checks and
controls they involve must be applied sparingly, as a kind of last resort or backup
option.
For the undermining of trust and the spreading of cynicism nothing is more
effective than the violation and abuse of democratic principles. When people live
in a democracy, they develop a kind of meta-trust, trust in democracy itself as
the ultimate insurance of other kinds of trust they may venture. Once this meta-
trust is breached, and the insurance defaults, they feel cheated. This is immedi-
ately reflected in all other relationships where they invested trust; the culture of
trust is shattered (Offe, 1996: 34). It may perhaps be argued that the failure of
democracy is more destructive to the culture of trust than the outright autocratic
regime. In the latter case people at least know what to expect, they have no
illusions, whereas in the earlier case their hopes are disappointed, their expec-
tations violated, producing even stronger disenchantment.
The typical failures of ‘democracy in action’ (as departing from ‘democracy in
codes’) may be listed in the order of nine constitutive principles of a democratic
system and their possible violations. First, the legitimacy of the authorities may
be fragile. A typical case occurs when low electoral participation and proportional
electoral laws produce the effect that large segments of society feel unrepresented
and the authorities are in fact elected only by a minority Of the population.
Another case is the deficiency of the procedures leading to the revocation of repre-
sentatives and public officials, when in spite of their manifest failures in office
they are not deposed. Second, the turnover of power may be impeded, as in the
manipulation of electoral law in a way which raises the chances of re-election for
ruling groups. Another example is the prolongation of the term of office (e.g. the
president for life), even if it is done in a formally correct fashion, through the
earlier change of laws. Third, some branches of power (e.g. the executive, the
military, the secret police) may acquire preponderance over others, undermining
the mechanism of mutual checks and balances. Fourth, equality before the law
may be violated by the use of double standards, depending on the political clout
of the villain, leading to the immunity of bureaucracy, unpunished breaches of
law by public officials, etc. Fifth, the constitution may be interpreted or even
changed in an arbitrary manner, retroactive legislation practiced, the verdicts of
the constitutional tribunal overruled by the legislature. Sixth, the opportunities
for appeal may be limited, the period of custody prolonged, the conditions of
serving prison terms inhuman, the parole unattainable. Seventh, civic rights may
be purely declarative, due to the lack of resources for their implementation, or
the means of effective claiming. Eighth, law enforcement may be lax, the enforc-
ing agencies inefficient or corrupt, with a permissive atmosphere emerging.
Ninth, the pressure on the media may lead to more or less masked forms of
censorship, selective bias, curbs on critical messages.
The impact of these and similar abuses of democracy on the culture of trust
depends on their scale: whether they are sporadic or permanent, incidental or
common. It also depends on their visibility: the awareness of abuses by large
segments of the population. Usually the existence of vigilant opposition as well
as pluralistic and autonomous media provides for such visibility. If the failure of
democracy is widely perceived, generalized trust is replaced by pervasive distrust.
On the other hand, if the abuses of democracy are hidden from view, and the
people keep faith in a democratic facade, their trust is blind or naive. It is also
very fragile, as the shock of disclosure is sooner or later inevitable, with a devas-
tating effect on trust.
For the generalized culture of trust to develop and persist, democratic prin-
ciples must not only be implemented consistently, but also applied sparingly.
Democratic principles institutionalize distrust because they assume that trust can
potentially be breached and they provide correctives for such contingency. The
fact that the principles are put to use, that the corrective mechanisms are acti-
vated, that controls are actually applied, indicates that trust has in fact been
breached. As long as this happens sporadically, exceptionally, as a last resort, the
culture of trust is not undermined, but rather enhanced by the confirmation of
effective accountability. But there is a certain threshold where this may backfire
and the trend reverses itself. Hyperactivity of correctives and controls indicates
that there is perhaps too much to correct. For example, if the citizens constantly
resort to litigation and the courts are flooded with suits, if the Ombudsman is
overloaded with claims, if the police are overworked and prisons overcrowded, if
the media constantly detect and censure political corruption, and citizens
denounce or revoke their compromised representatives — then obviously some-
thing is wrong with the system and the culture of trust may easily break down.
To be pervasive and lasting, generalized trust cannot be due merely to efficient
controls. Rather, it must see in the potentiality of controls only the ultimate
defense against unlikely and rare abuses of trust. Institutionalized distrust breeds
spontaneous trust most effectively as long as it remains latent, at the level of
normative institutionalization, and does not turn into actual, routine practice.
This I would label as the second paradox of democracy: the extensive, potential
availability of democratic checks and controls must be matched by their very
limited actualization. Institutionalized distrust must remain in the shadows, as a
distant protective framework for spontaneous trustful actions.
Depending on the ways in which democratic corrective mechanisms are actu-
ally implemented, two alternative loops of self-amplifying causality may be initi-
ated — the vicious or the virtuous. When the culture Of distrust prevails, the
apparatus of enforcement, enactment and control is mobilized. Its hyperactive
operation seems to signal to the people that their distrust was warranted, that the
breaches of trust are pervasive, and such perceptions only enhance and deepen
the culture Of distrust. This is the viclous circle. On the Other hand, when the
culture Of trust prevails, the apparatus Of enforcement, enactment and control is
resorted to only occasionally. 1ts subdued operation suggests to the people that
their initial trust warranted, that the breaches Of trust are rare, and Such
perceptions Obviously enhance and deepen the Culture Of trust. This is the virtuous circle.
The constitutive principles of democracy
- the principle of democracy – justification of all power
- Periodic elections and terms of office
- Division of powers, checks and balances
- The rule of law and independent courts
- The principle of constitutionalism and judicial review
- The principle of due proces
- The principle of civic rights
- The principle of law enforcement
- The principle of open communication
