lecture 3

Question 1

The concept of political system

Answer 1

Draw picture David Easton’s concept

• This ambitious model sets out to explain the entire political process, as well as the function of major political actors, through the application of what is called
  systems analysis.
• A system is an organized or complex whole, a set of interrelated and interdependent parts that form a collective entity.
• In the case of the political system, a linkage exists between what Easton calls ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’. Inputs into the political system consist of demands and supports from the general public.
• Demands can range from pressure for higher living standards, improved employment prospects, and more generous welfare payments to greater protection for minority and individual rights.
• Supports, on the other hand, are ways in which the public contributes to the political system by paying taxes, offering compliance, and being willing to participate in public life.
• Outputs consist of the decisions and actions of government, including the making of policy, the passing
  of laws, the imposition of taxes, and the allocation of public funds. Clearly, these outputs generate ‘feedback’ which, in turn, shapes further demands and supports. The key insight offered by Easton’s model is that the political system tends towards long-term equilibrium or political stability, as its survival depends on outputs being brought into line with inputs.
• However, it is vital to remember that conceptual models are at best simplifications of the reality they seek to explain. They are merely devices for drawing
  out understanding; they are not reliable knowledge.
• In the case of Easton’s model, for example, political parties and interest groups are portrayed as ‘gatekeepers’, the central function of which is to regulate the flow of inputs into the political system.
• Although this may be one of their significant functions, parties and interest groups also manage public perceptions, and thereby help to shape the nature of public demands. In short, these are more interesting and more complex institutions in reality than the systems model suggests. In the same way, Easton’s model is more effective in explaining how and why political systems respond to popular pressures than it is in explaining why they employ repression and coercion, as, to some degree, all do.

Question 2

The interest in classifying

Answer 2

■ Comparison leads to understanding

■ Comparison leads to evaluation

Question 3

Classification criteria

Answer 3

Draw Aristotle’s typology

Question 4

Key regime features

Answer 4

Political factors
Economic factors
Cultural factors

Question 5

Totalitarianism

Answer 5

■ All-encompassing system of political rule
■ A six-point syndrome (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1963)
1. An official ideology
2. A one-party state, usually led by an all-powerful leader
3. A system of terroristic policing
4. A monopoly of the means of mass communication
5. A monopoly of the means of armed combat
6. State control of all aspects of economic life

Question 6

Authoritarianism

Answer 6

■ Authority exercised regardless of popular consent
■ Individual liberties suppressed

Authoritarianism is a
belief in, or practice of,
government ‘from above’,
in which authority is
exercised regardless of
popular consent.
Authoritarianism thus
differs from authority, as
the latter rests on
legitimacy, and so arises
‘from below’.
Authoritarian regimes
emphazise the claims of
authority over those of
individual liberty.
However,
authoritarianism is
usually distinguished
from totalitarianism.
Authoritarianism,
associated with
monarchical absolutism,
traditional dictatorships,
and most forms of
military rule, seeks to
exclude the masses from
politics rather than
abolish civil society.

Question 7

Democracy

Answer 7

The origins of the term ‘democracy’ can be traced back to Ancient Greece. Like other
words ending in ‘cracy’ (for example, autocracy, aristocracy and bureaucracy),
demo cracy is derived from the Greek word kratos, meaning power, or rule.
Democracy thus means ‘rule by the demos’ (the demos referring to ‘the people’,
although the Greeks originally used this to mean ‘the poor’ or ‘the many’).
However, the simple notion of ‘rule by the people’ does not get us very far. The
problem with democracy has been its very popularity, a popularity that has
threatened the term’s undoing as a meaningful political concept.

Amongst the meanings that
have been attached to the word ‘democracy’ are the following:
a system of rule by the poor and disadvantaged
a form of government in which the people rule themselves directly and
con tinuously, without the need for professional politicians or public offi-
cials
a society based on equal opportunity and individual merit, rather than hierarchy
and privilege
a system of welfare and redistribution aimed at narrowing social inequalities
a system of decision-making based on the principle of majority rule
a system of rule that secures the rights and interests of minorities by placing
checks upon the power of the majority
a means of filling public offices through a competitive struggle for the
popular vote
a system of government that serves the interests of the people regardless of
their participation in political life.
the people’.

Question 8

How far should popular extend?

Answer 8

■ The issue of boundaries between the public and private realm
Models of democracy that have been
constructed on the basis of liberal individualism have usually proposed that
democracy be restricted to political life, with politics being narrowly defined.
From this perspective, the purpose of democracy is to establish, through some
process of popular participation, a framework of laws within which individuals
can conduct their own affairs and pursue their private interests. Democratic
solutions, then, are appropriate only for matters that specifically relate to the community; used in other circumstances, democracy amounts to an infringement
of liberty. Not uncommonly, this fear of democracy is most acute in the
case of direct or participatory democracy.
However, an alternative view of democracy is often developed by, for example,
socialists and radical democrats. In radical democracy, democracy is seen not as
a means of laying down a framework within which individuals can go about their
own business but, rather, as a general principle that is applicable to all areas of
social exist ence. People are seen as having a basic right to participate in the
making of any de cisions that affect their lives, with democracy simply being the
collective process through which this is done. This position is evident in socialist
demands for the collectivization of wealth and the introduction of workers’ selfmanagement,
both of which are seen as ways of democratizing economic life.
Instead of endorsing mere political democracy, socialists have therefore called for
‘social democracy’ or ‘economic democracy’. Feminists, similarly, have
demanded the democratization of family life, understood as the right of all to participate in the making of decisions in the domestic or private sphere. From this
perspective, democracy is regarded as a friend of liberty, not as its enemy. Only
when such principles are ignored can oppression and exploitation flourish.

Question 9

How should the people rule?

Answer 9

Most conceptions of democracy are based on the principle of ‘government by the
people’. This implies that, in effect, people govern themselves – that they participate
in making the crucial decisions that structure their lives and determine the
fate of their society. This participation can take a number of forms. In
the case of direct democracy, popular participation entails direct and continuous
involvement in decision-making, through devices such as referendums (see p.
201), mass meetings, or even interactive television. The alternative and more
common form of democratic participation is the act of voting, which is the
central feature of what is usually called ‘representative democracy’. When citizens
vote, they do not so much make the decisions that structure their own lives as
choose who will make those decisions on their behalf. What gives voting its
democratic character, however, is that, provided that the election is competitive,
it empowers the public to ‘kick the devils out’, and it thus makes politicians
publicly accountable.
There are also models of democracy that are built on the principle of
‘government for the people’, and that allow little possibility for public participation
of any kind, direct or in direct. The most grotesque example of this was found
in the so-called ‘totalitarian democracies’ that developed under fascist dictators
such as Mussolini and Hitler. The democratic credentials of such regimes
were based on the claim that the ‘leader’, and the leader alone, articulated the
genuine interests of the people, thus implying that a ‘true’ democracy can be
equated with an absolute dictatorship. In such cases, popular rule meant
nothing more than ritualized submission to the will of an all-powerful leader,
orchestrated through rallies, marches and demonstrations. This was sometimes
portrayed as plebiscitary democracy. Although totalitarian democracies have
proved to be a travesty of the conventional notion of democratic rule, they
demonstrate the tension that can exist between ‘government by the people’ (or
popular participation), and ‘government for the people’ (rule in the public
interest). Advocates of representative democracy, for example, have wished to
confine popular participation in politics to the act of voting, precisely because
they fear that the general public lack the wisdom, education and experience to
rule wisely on their own behalf.

Question 10

Who are the people?

Answer 10

One of the core features of democracy is the principle of political equality, the
notion that political power should be distributed as widely and as evenly as
possible. the answer is simple: ‘the people’, surely refers to all the people; that is, the entire population of the country. In practice, however, every democratic system has restricted
political participation, sometimes severely.
As noted, early Greek writers usually used demos to refer to ‘the many’: that
is, the disadvantaged and usually propertyless masses. Democracy therefore
implied not political equality, but a bias towards the poor. In Greek city-states,
political participation was restricted to a tiny proportion of the population, male
citizens over the age of 20, thereby excluding all women, slaves and foreigners.
Strict restrictions on voting also existed in most western states until well into the
twentieth century, usually in the form of a property qualification or the exclusion
of women. Universal suffrage was not established in the UK until 1928,
when women gained full voting rights. In the USA, it was not achieved until the
early 1960s, when African-American people in many Southern states were able
to vote for the first time, and in Switzerland universal suffrage was established in
1971 when women were eventually enfranchised. Nevertheless, an important
restriction continues to be practised in all democratic systems in the form of the
exclusion of children from political participation, although the age of majority
ranges from 21 down to as low as 15.
Technical restrictions are also often placed on, for example, the certifiably
insane and imprisoned criminals. Although ‘the people’ is now accepted as meaning virtually all adult citizens, the term can be construed in a number of different ways. The people, for
instance, can be viewed as a single, cohesive body, bound together by a common
or collective interest: in this sense, the people are one and indivisible. Such a view
tends to generate a model of democracy that, like Rousseau’s (see p. 97) theory,
examined in the next main section, focuses upon the ‘general will’ or collective
will, rather than the ‘private will’ of each individual. Alternatively, as division and
disagreement exist within all communities, ‘the people’ may in practice be taken
to mean ‘the majority’. In this case, democracy comes to mean the strict application
of the principle of majority rule. This can, nevertheless, mean that democracy
degenerates into the ‘tyranny of the majority’. Finally, there is the issue of
the body of people within which democratic politics should operate. Where
should be the location or ‘site’ of democracy? Although, thanks to the potency of
political nationalism, the definition ‘the people’ is usually understood in national
terms, the ideas of local democracy and, in the light of globalization (see p. 142),
cosmopolitan democracy (discussed in the final section of the chapter) have
also been advanced

Question 11

Direct democracy

Answer 11

Direct democracy (sometimes ‘classical’, ‘participatory’,
or ‘radical’ democracy) is based on the direct, unmediated
and continuous participation of citizens in the
tasks of government. Direct democracy thus obliterates
the distinction between government and the governed,
and between the state and civil society; it is a system
of popular self-government. It was achieved in ancient
Athens through a form of government by mass
meeting; its most common modern manifestation is
the use of the referendum (see p. 201). The merits of
direct democracy include the following:
It heightens the control that citizens can exercise
over their own destinies, as it is the only pure form
of democracy.
It creates a better-informed and more politically
sophisticated citizenry, and thus it has educational
benefits.
It enables the public to express their own views and
interests without having to rely on self-serving
politicians.
It ensures that rule is legitimate, in the sense that
people are more likely to accept decisions that they
have made themselves.

Question 12

Representative democracy

Answer 12

Representative democracy is a limited and indirect
form of democracy. It is limited in that popular participation
in government is infrequent and brief, being
restricted to the act of voting every few years. It is indirect
in that the public do not exercise power themselves;
they merely select those who will rule on their
behalf. This form of rule is democratic only insofar as
representation (see p. 197) establishes a reliable and
effective link between the government and the
governed. This is sometimes expressed in the notion of
an electoral mandate (see p. 200). The strengths of
representative democracy include the following:
It offers a practicable form of democracy (direct
popular participation is achievable only in small
communities).
It relieves ordinary citizens of the burden of
decision-making, thus making possible a division
of labour in politics.
It allows government to be placed in the hands of
those with better education, expert knowledge and
greater experience.
It maintains stability by distancing ordinary citizens
from politics, thereby encouraging them to accept
compromise.

Question 13

Models of democracy

Answer 13

Four contrasting models of democracy
can be identified as follows:
 classical democracy
 protective democracy
 developmental democracy
 people’s democracy.

Question 14

classical democracy

Answer 14

The classical model of democracy is based on the polis, or city-state, of Ancient
Greece, and particularly on the system of rule that developed in the largest and
most powerful Greek city-state, Athens. The form of direct democracy that operated
in Athens during the fourth and fifth centuries BCE is often portrayed as the
only pure or ideal system of popular participation. Nevertheless, although the
model had considerable impact on later thinkers such as Rousseau and Marx (see
p. 41), Athenian democracy (see p. 95) developed a very particular kind of direct
popular rule, one that has only a very limited application in the modern world.
Athenian democracy amounted to a form of government by mass meeting.
What made Athenian democracy so remarkable was the level of political
activity of its citizens. Not only did they participate in regular meetings of the
Assembly, but they were also, in large numbers, prepared to shoulder the responsibility
of public office and decision-making. The most influential contemporaneous
critic of this form of democracy was the philosopher Plato (see p. 13).
Plato attacked the principle of political equality on the grounds that the mass of
the people possess neither the wisdom nor the experience to rule wisely on their
own behalf. His solution, advanced in The Republic, was that government be
placed in the hands of a class of philosopher kings, Guardians, whose rule would
amount to a kind of enlightened dictatorship. On a practical level, however, the
principal drawback of Athenian democracy was that it could operate only by
excluding the mass of the population from political activity. Participation was
restricted to Athenian-born males who were over 20 years of age. Slaves (the
majority of the population), women and foreigners had no political rights whatsoever. Indeed, Athenian citizens were able to devote so much of their lives
to politics only because slavery relieved them of the need to engage in arduous
labour, and the confinement of women to the private realm freed men from
domestic responsibilities. Nevertheless, the classical model of direct and continuous
popular participation in political life has been kept alive in, for instance, the
township meetings of New England in the USA, the communal assemblies that
operate in the smaller Swiss cantons and in the wider use of referendums.

Question 15

protective democracy

Answer 15

When democratic ideas were revived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
they appeared in a form that was very different from the classical democracy of
Ancient Greece. In particular, democracy was seen less as a mechanism through
which the public could participate in political life, and more as a device through
which citizens could protect themselves from the encroachments of government,
hence ‘protective democracy’. This view appealed particularly to early liberal
thinkers whose concern was, above all, to create the widest realm of individual
liberty. The desire to protect the individual from over-mighty government was
expressed in perhaps the earliest of all democratic sentiments, Aristotle’s response
to Plato: ‘who will guard the Guardians?’.
This same concern with unchecked power was taken up in the seventeenth
century by John Locke (see p. 31), who argued that the right to vote was based
on the existence of natural rights and, in particular, on the right to property. If
government, through taxation, possessed the power to expropriate property, citizens
were entitled to protect themselves by controlling the composition of the
tax-setting body: the legislature. In other words, democracy came to mean a
system of ‘government by consent’ operating through a representative assembly.
However, Locke himself was not a democrat by modern standards, as he believed
that only property owners should vote, on the basis that only they had natural
rights that could be infringed by government. The more radical notion of
universal suffrage was advanced from the late eighteenth century onwards by
utilitarian theorists such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill (1773–1836). The
utilitarian (see p. 353) case for democracy is also based on the need to protect or
advance individual interests. Bentham came to believe that, since all individuals
seek pleasure and the avoidance of pain, a universal franchise (conceived in his
day as manhood suffrage) was the only way of promoting ‘the greatest happiness
for the greatest number’.
However, to justify democracy on protective grounds is to provide only a
qualified endorsement of democratic rule. In short, protective democracy is but
a limited and indirect form of democracy. In practice, the consent of the
governed is exercised through voting in regular and competitive elections. This
thereby ensures the accountability of those who govern. Political equality is thus
understood in strictly technical terms to mean equal voting rights. Moreover,
this is, above all, a system of con stitutional democracy that operates within a set
of formal or informal rules that check the exercise of government power. If the
right to vote is a means of defending individual liberty, liberty must also be guaranteed
by a strictly enforced separation of powers via the creation of a separate
executive, legislature and judiciary, and by the maintenance of basic rights and
freedoms, such as freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. Ultimately, protective democracy aims to give citizens the
widest possible scope to live their lives as they choose. It is therefore compatible
with laissez-faire capitalism (see p. 132) and the belief that individuals should be
entirely responsible for their economic and social circumstances. Protective
democracy has therefore particularly appealed to classical liberals and, in
modern politics, to supporters of the New Right.

Question 16

developmental democracy

Answer 16

Although early democratic theory focused on the need to protect individual
rights and interests, it soon developed an alternative focus: a concern with the
develop ment of the human individual and the community. This gave rise to
quite new models of democratic rule that can broadly be referred to as systems
of developmental dem o cracy. The most novel, and radical, such model was
developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In many respects, Rousseau’s ideas mark a
departure from the dominant, liberal conception of democracy, and they came
to have an impact on the Marxist and anarchist traditions as well as, later, on the
New Left. For Rousseau, democracy was ultimately a means through which
human beings could achieve freedom (see p. 339) or autonomy, in the sense of
‘obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself’. In other words, citizens are ‘free’
only when they participate directly and continuously in shaping the life of their
community. This is an idea that moves well beyond the conventional notion of
electoral democracy and offers support for the more radical ideal of direct
democracy. Indeed, Rousseau was a strenuous critic of the practice of elections
used in England, arguing in The Social Contract ([1762] 1913) as follows:
The English people believes itself to be free, it is gravely mistaken; it is only
free when it elects its member of parliament; as soon as they are elected, the
people are enslaved; it is nothing. In the brief moment of its freedom, the
English people makes such use of its freedom that it deserves to lose it.
However, what gives Rousseau’s model its novel character is his insistence that
freedom ultimately means obedience to the general will. Rousseau believed the general will to be the ‘true’ will of each citizen, in contrast to his or her ‘private’
or selfish will. By obeying the general will, citizens are therefore doing nothing
more than obeying their own ‘true’ natures, the general will being what individuals
would will if they were to act selflessly. In Rousseau’s view, such a system of
radical developmental democracy required not merely political equality, but a
relatively high level of economic equality. Although not a supporter of common
ownership, Rousseau nevertheless proposed that ‘no citizen shall be rich enough
to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself ’ ([1762] 1913).
Rousseau’s theories have helped to shape the modern idea of participatory
democracy taken up by New Left thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s. This extols the
virtues of a ‘participatory society’, a society in which each and every citizen is
able to achieve self-development by participating in the decisions that shape his
or her life. This goal can be achieved only through the promotion of openness,
accountability and decentralization within all the key institutions of society:
within the family, the workplace and the local community just as much as within
‘political’ institutions such as parties, interest groups and legislative bodies. At
the heart of this model is the notion of ‘grass-roots democracy’; that is, the belief
that political power should be exercised at the lowest possible level. Nevertheless,
Rousseau’s own theories have been criticized for distinguishing between citizens’
‘true’ wills and their ‘felt’ or subjective wills. The danger of this is that, if the
general will cannot be established by simply asking citizens what they want
(because they may be blinded by selfishness), there is scope for the general will
to be defined from above, perhaps by a dictator claiming to act in the ‘true’ interests
of society. Rousseau is therefore sometimes seen as the architect of so-called
‘totalitarian democracy’ (Talmon, 1952).
However, a more modest form of developmental democracy has also been
advanced that is compatible with the liberal model of representative government.
This view of developmental democracy is rooted in the writings of John
Stuart Mill (see p. 198). For Mill, the central virtue of democracy was that it
promotes the ‘highest and harmonious’ development of individual capacities. By
participating in political life, citizens enhance their understanding, strengthen
their sensibilities and achieve a higher level of personal development. In short,
democracy is essentially an educational experience. As a result, Mill proposed the broadening of popular par ticipation, arguing that the franchise should be
extended to all but those who are illiterate. In the process, he suggested (radically,
for his time) that suffrage should also be extended to women. In addition, he
advocated strong and independent local authorities in the belief that this would
broaden the opportunities available for holding public office.
On the other hand, Mill, in common with all liberals, was also aware of the
dangers of democracy. Indeed, Mill’s views are out of step with mainstream
liberal thought in that he rejected the idea of formal political equality. Following
Plato, Mill did not believe that all political opinions are of equal value.
Consequently, he proposed a system of plural voting: unskilled workers would
have a single vote, skilled workers two votes, and graduates and members of the
learned professions five or six votes. However, his principal reservation about
democracy was derived from the more typical liberal fear of what Alexis de
Tocqueville (see p. 245) famously described as ‘the tyranny of the majority’. In
other words, democracy always contains the threat that individual liberty and
minority rights may be crushed in the name of the people. Mill’s particular
concern was that democracy would undermine debate, criticism and intellectual
life in general by encouraging people to accept the will of the majority, thereby
promoting uniformity and dull conformism. Quite simply, the majority is not
always right; wisdom cannot be determined by the simple device of a show of
hands. Mill’s ideas therefore support the idea of deliberative democracy or
parliamentary democracy.

Question 17

people’s democracy

Answer 17

The term ‘people’s democracy’ is derived from the orthodox communist regimes
that sprang up on the Soviet model in the aftermath of World War II. It is here
used, however, to refer broadly to the various democratic models that the
Marxist tradition has generated. Although they differ, these models offer a clear
contrast to the more familiar liberal democratic ones. Marxists have tended to be
dismissive of liberal or parliamentary democracy, seeing it as a form of ‘bourgeois’
or ‘capitalist’ democracy. Nevertheless, Marxists were drawn to the concept
or ideal of democracy because of its clear egalitarian implications. The term was
used, in particular, to designate the goal of social equality brought about through
the common ownership of wealth (‘social democracy’ in its original sense), in
contrast to ‘political’ democracy, which establishes only a facade of equality.
Marx believed that the overthrow of capitalism would be a trigger that would
allow genuine democracy to flourish. In his view, a fully communist society
would come into existence only after a transitionary period characterized by ‘the
revo lutionary dictatorship of the proletariat’. In effect, a system of ‘bourgeois’
democracy would be replaced by a very different system of ‘proletarian’ democracy.
Although Marx refused to describe in detail how this transitionary society
would be organized, its broad shape can be discerned from his admiration for
the Paris Commune of 1871, which was a short-lived experiment in what
approximated to direct democracy.
The form of democracy that was developed in twentieth-century communist
states, however, owed more to the ideas of V. I. Lenin (see p. 99) than it did to
those of Marx. Although Lenin’s 1917 slogan ‘All power to the Soviets’ (the
workers’ and soldiers’ and sailors’ councils) had kept alive the notion of commune democracy, in reality power in Soviet Russia quickly fell into the
hands of the Bolshevik party (soon renamed the ‘Communist Party’). In Lenin’s
view, this party was nothing less than ‘the vanguard of the working class’. Armed
with Marxism, the party claimed that it was able to perceive the genuine interests
of the proletariat and thus guide it to the realization of its revolutionary potential.
This theory became the cornerstone of ‘Leninist democracy’, and it was
accepted by all other orthodox communist regimes as one of the core features of
Marxism–Leninism. However, the weakness of this model is that Lenin failed to
build into it any mechanism for checking the power of the Communist Party
(and, particularly, its leaders), and for ensuring that it remained sensitive and
accountable to the proletarian class. To rephrase Aristotle, ‘who will guard the
Communist Party?’

Question 18

Developmental democracy

Mill vs. Rousseau

Answer 18

Draw picture

Question 19

Liberal democracy

Answer 19

Although there continues to be controversy about which is the most desirable
form of democracy, much of contemporary debate revolves around how democracy
works in practice and what ‘democratization’ (see p. 272) implies. This reflects the
fact that there is broad, even worldwide, accept ance of a particular model of
demo cracy, generally termed liberal democracy. Despite the existence of competing
tendencies within this broad category, certain central features are clear:
Liberal democracy is an indirect and representative form of democracy, in
that political office is gained through success in regular elections that are
conducted on the basis of formal political equality.
It is based on competition and electoral choice. These are achieved through
political pluralism, tolerance of a wide range of contending beliefs, and the
existence of conflicting social philosophies and rival political movements
and parties.
It is characterized by a clear distinction between the state and civil society.
This is maintained through the existence of autonomous groups and interests,
and the market or capitalist organization of economic life.
It provides protection for minorites and individuals, particularly through
the allocation of basic rights that safeguard them from the will of the
majority.
Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of disagreement about the
meaning and significance of liberal democracy. Does it, for instance, ensure a
genuine and healthy dispersal of political power? Do democratic processes
genuinely promote long-term benefits, or are they self-defeating? Can political
equality coexist with economic inequality? In short, this form of democracy is
interpreted in different ways by different theorists. The most important of these
interpretations are advanced by:
pluralism
elitism
corporatism
the New Right
Marxism.

Question 20

Pluralist view

Answer 20

Pluralist ideas can be traced back to early liberal political philosophy, and notably
to the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu (see p. 312). Their first systematic development,
however, is found in the contributions of James Madison (see p. 319) to
The Federalist Papers (Hamilton et al., [1787–89] 1961). In considering the trans -
formation of America from a loose confederation of states into the federal USA,
Madison’s particular fear was the ‘problem of factions’. In common with most
liberals, Madison argued that unchecked democratic rule might simply lead to
majoritarianism, to the crushing of individual rights and to the expropriation of
property in the name of the people. What made Madison’s work notable,
however, was his stress upon the multiplicity of interests and groups in society,
and his insistence that, unless each such group possessed a political voice, stability
and order would be impossible. He therefore proposed a system of divided
government based on the separation of powers (see p. 313), bicameralism and
federalism (see p. 382), that offered a variety of access points to competing groups
and interests. The resulting system of rule by multiple minorities is often referred
to as ‘Madisonian democracy’. Insofar as it recognizes both the exist ence of diversity
or multiplicity in society, and the fact that such multiplicity is desirable,
Madison’s model is the first developed statement of pluralist principles.
The most influential modern exponent of pluralist theory is Robert Dahl (see
p. 250). As described in Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City
(1961), Dahl carried out an empirical study of the distribution of power in New
Haven, Connecticut, USA. He concluded that, although the politically privileged
and economic ally powerful exerted greater power than ordinary citizens, no
ruling or perman ent elite was able to dominate the political process. His conclusion
was that ‘New Haven is an example of a democratic system, warts and all’.
Dahl recognized that modern democratic systems differ markedly from the classical
democracies of Ancient Greece. With Charles Lindblom, he coined the term
‘poly archy’ (see p. 273) to mean rule by the many, as distinct from rule by all citizens.
The key feature of such a system of pluralist democracy (see p. 101) is that competition between parties at election time, and the ability of interest or pressure
groups to articulate their views freely, establishes a reliable link between the
government and the governed, and creates a channel of communication between
the two. While this may fall a long way short of the ideal of popular self-government,
its supporters nevertheless argue that it ensures a sufficient level of
accountability and popular responsiveness for it to be regarded as democratic.
However, the relationship between pluralism and democracy may not be a
secure one. For instance, one of the purposes of the Madisonian system was,
arguably, to constrain democracy in the hope of safeguarding property. In other
words, the system of rule by multiple minorities may simply have been a device
to prevent the majority (the propertyless masses) from exercising political power.
A further problem is the danger of what has been called ‘pluralist stagnation’. This
occurs as organized groups and economic interests become so powerful that they
create a log jam, resulting in the problem of government ‘overload’. In such
circumstances, a pluralist system may simply become ungovernable. Finally, there
is the problem identified by Dahl in later works, such as A Preface to Economic
Democracy (1985); notably, that the unequal ownership of economic resources
tends to concentrate political power in the hands of the few, and deprive the many
of it. This line of argument runs parallel to the conventional Marxist critique of
pluralist democracy, and has given rise to neopluralism (see p. 63).

Question 21

Elitist view

Answer 21

Elitism (see p. 102) developed as a critique of egalitarian ideas such as democracy
and socialism. It draws attention to the fact of elite rule, either as an
inevitable and desirable feature of social existence, or as a remediable and regrettable
one. Classical elitists, such as Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Gaetano Mosca
(1857–1941) and Robert Michels (1876–1936), tended to take the former position.
For them, democracy was no more than a foolish delusion, because political
power is always exercised by a privileged minority: an elite. For example, in The
Ruling Class ([1896] 1939), Mosca proclaimed that, in all societies, ‘two classes of
people appear – a class that rules and a class that is ruled’. In his view, the
resources or attributes that are necessary for rule are always unequally distributed,
and, further, a cohesive minority will always be able to manipulate and
control the masses, even in a parliamentary democracy. Pareto suggested that the
qualities needed to rule conforms to one of two psychological types: ‘foxes’ (who
rule by cunning and are able to manipulate the consent of the masses), and
‘lions’ (whose domination is typically achieved through coercion and violence).
Michels developed an alternative line of argument based on the tendency within
all organizations, however democratic they might appear, for power to be
concentrated in the hands of a small group of dominant figures who can organize
and make decisions. He termed this ‘the iron law of oligarchy’ (see p. 232).
Whereas classical elitists strove to prove that democracy was always a myth,
modern elitist theorists have tended to highlight how far particular political
systems fall short of the democratic ideal. An example of this can be found in C.
Wright Mills’ influential account of the power structure in the USA. In contrast
to the pluralist notion of a wide and broadly democratic dispersal of power,
Mills, in The Power Elite (1956), offered a portrait of a USA dominated by a
nexus of leading groups. In his view, this ‘power elite’ comprised a triumvirate of
DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY 101
CONCEPT
Pluralist
democracy
The term pluralist
democracy is sometimes
used interchangeably
with liberal democracy.
More specifically, it refers
to a form of democracy
that operates through
the capacity of organized
groups and interests to
articulate popular
demands and ensure
responsive government.
The conditions for a
healthy pluralist
democracy include: (1) a
wide dispersal of political
power amongst
competing groups,
specifically the absence
of elite groups; (2) a high
degree of internal
responsiveness, group
leaders being accountable
to members; and (3) a
neutral governmental
machine that is
sufficiently fragmented
to offer groups a number
of points of access.
big business (particularly defence-related industries), the US military and political
cliques surrounding the President. Drawing on a combin ation of economic
power, bureaucratic control and access to the highest levels of the executive
branch of government, the power elite is able to shape key ‘history-making’ decisions,
especially in the fields of defence and foreign policy, as well as strategic
economic policy. The power-elite model suggests that liberal democracy in the
USA is largely a sham. Elitists have, moreover, argued that empirical studies have
supported pluralist conclusions only because Dahl and others have ignored the
importance of non-decision-making as a manifestation of power (see p. 9).
Certain elite theorists have nevertheless argued that a measure of democratic
accountability is consistent with elite rule. Whereas the power-elite model
portrays the elite as a cohesive body, bound together by common or overlapping
interests, competitive elitism (sometimes called ‘democratic elitism’) highlights
the significance of elite rivalry (see Figure 4.1). In other words, the elite, consisting
of the leading figures from a number of competing groups and interests, is fractured.
This view is often associated with Joseph Schumpeter’s (see p. 141) ‘realistic’
model of democracy outlined in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942):
The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. The electorate can decide which elite rules, but cannot change the fact that
power is always exercised by an elite. This model of competitive elitism was
developed by Anthony Downs (1957) into the ‘economic theory of democracy’.
In effect, electoral competition creates a political market in which politicians act
as entrepreneurs bent upon achieving government power, and individual voters
behave like consumers, voting for the party with the policies that most closely
reflect their own preferences. Downs argued that a system of open and competitive
elections guarantees democratic rule because it places government in the
hands of the party whose philosophy, values and policies correspond most
closely to the preferences of the largest group of voters. As Schumpeter put it,
‘democracy is the rule of the politician’. As a model of democratic politics,
competitive elitism at least has the virtue that it corresponds closely to the workings
of the liberal-democratic political system. Indeed, it emerged more as an
attempt to describe how the democratic process works than through a desire to
prescribe certain values and principles – political equality, popular participation,
freedom or whatever.

Question 22

Corporatist view

Answer 22

The origins of corporatism (see p. 251) date back to the attempt in Fascist Italy
to construct a so-called ‘corporate state’ by integrating both managers and
workers into the processes of government. Corporatist theorists, however, have
drawn attention to parallel developments in the world’s major industrialized
states. In the form of neocorporatism, or liberal corporatism, this gave rise to
the spectre of ‘tripartite government’, in which government is conducted
through organizations that allow state officials, employers’ groups and unions to
deal directly with one another. To a large extent, this tendency to integrate
economic interests into government (which was common in the post-1945
period, and particularly prominent in, for example, Sweden, Norway, the
Netherlands and Austria) was a consequence of the drift towards economic
management and intervention. As government sought to manage economic life
and deliver an increasingly broad range of public services, it recognized the need
for institutional arrangements designed to secure the cooperation and support
of major economic interests. Where attempts have been made to shift economic
policy away from state intervention and towards the free market (as in the UK
since 1979), the impact of corporatism has markedly diminished.
The significance of corporatism in terms of democratic processes is clearly
considerable. There are those who, like the British guild socialists, argue that cor -
poratism makes possible a form of functional representation, in that individuals’
views and interests are articulated more by the groups to which they belong than
through the mechanism of competitive elections. What is called ‘corporate
pluralism’ thus portrays tripartism as a mechanism through which the major
groups and interests in society compete to shape government policy. Some
commentators, however, see corporatism as a threat to democracy. In the first
place, cor poratism only advantages groups that are accorded privileged access to
government. ‘Insider’ groups therefore possess a political voice, while ‘outsider’
groups are denied one. Second, corporatism can work to the benefit of the state,
rather than major eco nomic interests, in that the peak associations that the
government chooses to deal with can be used to exert discipline over their
members and to filter out radical demands. Finally, corporatism threatens to
subvert the processes of electoral or parliamentary democracy. Policy is made
through negotiations between government officials and leaders of powerful
economic interests, rather than through the de liberations of a representative
assembly. Interest-group leaders may thus exert considerable political power,
even though they are in no way publicly accountable and their influence is not
subject to public scrutiny.

Question 23

New Right view

Answer 23

The emergence of the New Right from the 1970s onwards has generated a very
particular critique of democratic politics. This has focused on the danger of what
has been called ‘democratic overload’: the paralysis of a political system that is
subject to unrestrained group and electoral pressures. One aspect of this critique
has highlighted the unsavoury face of corporatism. New Right theorists are keen
advocates of the free market, believing that economies work best when left alone
by government. The danger of corporatism from this perspective is that it
empowers sectional groups and economic interests, enabling them to make
demands on govern ment for increased pay, public investment, subsidies, state
protection and so on. In effect, corporatism allows well-placed interest groups to
dominate and dictate to government. The result of this, according to the New
Right, is an irresistible drift towards state intervention and economic stagnation
(Olson, 1982).
Government ‘overload’ can also be seen to be a consequence of the electoral
process. This was what Brittan (1977) referred to as ‘the economic consequences
of democracy’. In this view, electoral politics amounts to a self-defeating process
in which politicians are encouraged to compete for power by offering increasingly
unrealistic promises to the electorate. Both voters and politicians are held
to blame here. Voters are attracted by promises of higher public spending
because they calculate that the cost (an increased tax burden) will be spread over
the entire population. Politicians, consumed by the desire to win power, attempt
to outbid one another by making ever more generous spending pledges to the
electorate. According to Brittan, the economic consequences of unrestrained
democracy are high levels of inflation fuelled by public borrowing, and a tax
burden that destroys enterprise and undermines growth. As characterized by
Marquand (1988), the New Right view is that ‘democracy is to adults what
chocolate is to children: endlessly tempting; harmless in small doses; sickening in
excess’. New Right theorists therefore tend to see democracy in strictly protective
terms, regarding it essentially as a defence against arbitrary government, rather
than a means of bringing about social transformation.

Question 24

Marxist view

Answer 24

As pointed out in relation to people’s democracy, the Marxist view of democratic
politics is rooted in class analysis. In this view, political power cannot be understood
narrowly in terms of electoral rights, or in terms of the ability of groups to
articulate their interests by lobbying and campaigning. Rather, at a deeper level,
political power reflects the distribution of economic power and, in particular, the
unequal ownership of productive wealth. The Marxist critique of liberal democ
104 POLITICS
racy thus focuses upon the inherent tension between democracy and capitalism;
that is, between the political equality that liberal democracy proclaims and the
social inequality that a capitalist economy inevitably generates. Liberal democracies
are thus seen as ‘capitalist’ or ‘bourgeois’ democracies that are manipulated
and controlled by the entrenched power of a ruling class.
Marxism thus offers a distinctive critique of pluralist democracy. Power
cannot be widely and evenly dispersed in society as long as class power is
unequally distributed. Indeed, in many respects, the Marxist view parallels the
elitist critique of pluralism. Both views suggest that power is ultimately concentrated
in the hands of the few, the main difference being whether the few is
conceived of as a ‘power elite’ or as a ‘ruling class’. However, significant differences
can also be identified. For instance, whereas elitists suggest that power
derive from a variety of sources (education, social status, bureaucratic position,
political connections, wealth and so on), Marxists emphasize the decisive importance
of economic factors; notably, the ownership and control of the means of
production. Modern Marxists, however, have been less willing to dismiss electoral
democracy as nothing more than a sham. Eurocommunists, for example,
abandoned the idea of revolution, embracing instead the notion of a peaceful,
legal and democratic ‘road to socialism’