lecture 5 Flashcards
How do modern democracies function completly rationally?
Logically, step by step, towards democratically
legitimate governance
- Mandate theory: voters > parliament > government >
governance/interventions/policies - “This should lead to that, that to this, and this to…”
- “If X, then Y”
- This is the line of thought explained in lecture 3:
mechanisms
How are basic goverance of mechanisms supoes to work?
like a welll-olied machine
> Checks and balances state how the apparatus works
Laws state what is done and what is not-done, like
programming a computer (if… then…)
Civil servants should do as they are told
Not supposed to think for themselves (like your
computer…)
Impartiality
assuming we can think of public
administration (PA) as something fully rational
How is governace of democracies supposed to work?
Like laws of nature
An apple falling from a tree inevitably falls down, not up
> And likewise…
> Democratic system X should inevitably lead to outcome Y
> Via checks and balances, mandates, etc.
-PA as logical sequence: if X, then Y
Can we really regard governance as mechanically, as
scientifically and as rationally as this?
s a societal problem simply a bug in the system?
> A malfunction of the democratic machine?
> Is dealing with a societal problem by issuing governance
comparable with fixing a malfunctioning machine, like an
airplane?
> Can we govern nations like we run mechanical processes in
factories?
Why is there no science of public admin?
- if the machine works here, it should work
anywhere. .. - An aircraft works here as well as anywhere on earth
If public administration – the organization and
management of individual public agencies – is a science,
then presumably it can be transferred to developing
countries much like knowledge of how to maintain jet
aircraft or operate a factory. ‘ten bright technocrats’ be air-dropped into a
developing country and bring about massive changes for
the better in public policy”? Fukuyma
Can we export our smart democratic mechanisms to anywhere on earth?
No. Public administration and governance
clearly are not to be viewed scientifically, that is, as a
machine that should work anywhere and anytime
What is The fundamental reason for the democratic governance
machinery failing?
e problem of delegated discretion
within public administration organizations = the principal-agent problem
What are the three reasons why the principel agent problem can’t be solved?
- The unclarity of the goals of many public organizations
- The lack of specificity of the underlying activity of these
public organizations - The appropriate degree of delegated discretion depends
on conditions that change over time
What is delegation?
The handing over of power to act to an agent, on behalf of the
principal. The principal delegates to agent(s)
What is the delegation of discretion?
the handing over of power & authority to decide what is best by the principal to the agent
> Making the agent autonomous
> E.g. Presidentialization: more delegation of discretion from the
legislative branch to the executive branch
Why delegate discretion altogether?
Well, national/supranational government (i.e. principals)
cannot oversee all (necessary!) local governance (agents)
So: local governments should have a say> See also C&R Ch. 11 (Lecture 4)
What are the effects of discretion?
- The meaningfulness of a policy for clients
- The willingness to implement policy by street-level
bureaucrats
in other words:
If a teacher has more to say in how and what he/she
teaches, he/she:
1. Can be more meaningful to students
2. Is more willing to implement central policies
- Discretion makes governance more effective, because less
resistance to it - Discretion makes governance more democratically
legitimate
What is the unclarity of goals of many public?
Do principals know exactly what they should aim for?
> Is it clear what the principal wants from the agents?
> (e.g. mandate theory)
> Do agents adhere to roughly the same goals?
Many of the conflicts that occur between principals and agents
are the result of differing interpretations of how best to achieve
common goals
a) in which the principal may not always be right, or
b) in which there are conflicting interpretations of what
constitutes the principal’s best interests.” EG migration
What is The lack of specificity of the underlying activity of these
public organizations?
If you want to fully align principal and agent (mandate theory), you
should know what the agent does in very exact terms
> Like in aircraft maintenance, computer chip building
> You just want a working airplane, or a working computer
How do you align principal & agent in a very exact way?
> By monitoring the agent’s work
> & by measuring output of the agent
> In terms of how much money he/she makes
> Quantity of delivered services, etc.
> Fukuyama p. 193: “Specificity refers precisely to the monitorability
of a service output.”
> + If a service is “specific”, it will be clear which agent did what…
But… are public services well suited for strict monitoring &
measuring of output?
> = Are they “specific”?
> Fukuyama: no!
> E.g.: how can a good education be measured?
> We would have to monitor a lot…
> Plus: could you hold a single educator (a single agent)
responsible for someone’s complete education?
What is The appropriate degree of delegated discretion depends
on conditions that change over time?
Fukuyama: how much discretion do we delegate exactly, and..
> To what levels of government? (Lecture 4, ch 11!)
> Should we organise ourselves decentrally, or centrally?
