Lecture 11 - evolution of stable biparental care Flashcards

1
Q

why is the evolution of biparental care problematic ?

A

Parental care is costly and life history theory predicts that current investment should be traded off against future survival and reproduction. In systems with biparental care, each parent bears the costs of their own investment individually, while the benefits of their investment (i.e. offspring fitness) are shared= “A TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS” (Hardin 1968)

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2
Q

what are 2 theoretical solutions to the investment game?

A

1) ‘sealed bid model’ (Houston and Davies 1985)

2) ‘negotiation model’ (McNamaara 1999)

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3
Q

describe the ‘sealed bid model’

A
  • parents’ effort evolves through time
  • Each parent has an optimal response to partner’s effort and an ESS may be reached at which there is stable investment by both parents
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4
Q

what are the other 3 possible outcomes of the sealed bid model?

A

1) Only female care
2) Only male care
3) The point when both parents provide care is unstable

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5
Q

describe sexual conflict over care in the penduline tit

A

male builds nest to attract female and she lays her eggs in it
- she may leave after laying eggs to leave male to do all the care
- or when she’s laying the eggs the male might leave
One or both parents desert during egg-laying:
- 50-70% female only care
- 5-20% male only care
- 30-40% both parents desert

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6
Q

for the penduline tit how is the strategy decided?

A

the best strategy depends on what the other options are e.g. if there is spare males the female will leave and vice versa - in this case both parents thing the best ESS is to abandon and find another mate
- biparental care in this system is very unstable

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7
Q

when thinking about the sealed bid model is an individual’s effort fixed? e.g. an individual’s effort may be repeatable across different breeding attempts and in a couple of cases has been shown to be heritable, i.e. partly genetically determined

A
NO – in most species, 
parents vary their effort 
in relation to:
	- nestling age
	- brood size
	- food supply
	- number of carers, etc
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8
Q

because the sealed bid is unrealistic due to individual efforts not being fixed, what new model did they come up with?

A

‘negotiation’ model

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9
Q

what is the ‘negotiation’ model

A

parents respond to each other in real time

- more inclusive of potential influences on parental effort

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10
Q

critically both the negotiation model and the sealed bid model predict what?

A

Stable biparental care evolves only when one parent compensates incompletely for reduced effort by partner

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11
Q

The general prediction of incomplete compensation has been empirically tested many times- what are the 4 types of studies?

A

(a) Removal experiments
(b) Handicapping experiments
(c) Testosterone experiments
(d) Meta-analysis

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12
Q

describe removal experiments

A

remove one parent, does other compensate incompletely by increasing their effort but not enough to make up for the shortfall?

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13
Q

describe a removal experiment study and what was the outcome?

A

Orange-tufted sunbirds

  • remove male from nest
  • ‘widowed’ female increases effort
  • compensation incomplete
  • total reduction in effort had a consequence for the chicks - reduction in body mass
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14
Q

does mate removal fulfil the negotiation theory?

A

doesnt fully

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15
Q

describe handicapping experiments?

A

reduce effort of one parent, does other compensate incompletely?

  • put some weights on one of the parents making a handicapped parent - therefore reducing their effort
  • or tie some wings together
  • both only have short term effects
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16
Q

what were the results of a meta analysis of 54 experimental studies on handicappping?

A

Empirical support for theoretical prediction of incomplete compensation
BUT, results of experiments are variable

17
Q

describe testosterone experiments?

A

Males treated with testosterone reduce their care; do females compensate? Again, yes, in some cases, although compensation may again be complete, e.g. dark-eyed juncos.

18
Q

what are 2 reasons of inconsistent results in handicapping studies?

A

i) Experimental methodology

ii) Information

19
Q

describe the problem with experiment methodology in the handicapping studies

A

removal of a parent does not allow for negotiation, the partner being effectively ‘widowed’. Handicapping and testosterone experiments may change a partner’s perception of the quality of the manipulated parent so the response may be influenced by that change in perception, rather than the change in their effort. Finally, if an individual is already working at full capacity, they may be unable to increase their effort further

20
Q

describe the problem with information in the handicapping studies

A

the models described above assume that parents have perfect information about their partner’s effort and the needs of the brood. This may not be true.

21
Q

Johnstone & Hinde (2006) proposed the ‘information model’ describe it

A

a version of the negotiation model, which recognizes that parental information about brood need may be incomplete. Here, a parent may rely on cues provided by their partner to assess the effort required, or they may integrate information from the brood and their partner. This could explain the variability observed in responses to experimental manipulations.

22
Q

what is the information model supported by?

A

nestling playback experiments

23
Q

what is a playback experiment

A

When one partner is asked to work harder by playing back extra begging calls to them - what is the response of the other partner

24
Q

describe the response of great tits to nestling playback experiments

A

when one parent comes back they play chick noises so the parent increases effort to feed it

  • instead of reducing effort parent matches increased effort of partner
  • opposite result to predicted compensation
25
Q

what are the differing responses of partners to the response to the brood and the response to the partner?

A

If parents respond to the needs of the brood, then you should get incomplete compensation, as predicted
If parents respond to partner, then no compensation is predicted

26
Q

describe negotiation via conditional cooperation

A
  • Negotiation via ‘tit-for-tat’ feeds
  • Parents should alternate their visits to the nest more than expected by chance
  • This is exactly what happens in great tits - alternating more than you would expect from random care (Johnstone et al. 2014)