lecture 11: Collective Action Flashcards
Free-Riding
Each person can benefit without contributing
“The maximization of short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off”
Rationally, no-one contributes!
Free-riding prevents cooperatio
it prevents coordinated action by large groups of people.
Collective action is easier where:
- The group is smaller Communication and monitoring is easier
- Coercion is used: that’s why centralised states are crucial
Taxation solves many public goods problems - Selective incentives are used: only benefit when you have worked for it
Handing out t-shirts, food, money to participants,Entertainment - Informal Institutions: Social norms Where there are repeated interactions
The Paradox of Collective Action
Cooperation Rates in Practice: In lab experiments, cooperation is 20-50%, not 0% (Sally, 1995). People do protest and vote out bad leaders at times.
Irrational Cooperation: Humans tend to cooperate more than expected, leading to the paradox of collective action – we still achieve collective goals despite the issues.
Public Goods & Free-Riding:
Non-excludable benefits: Free-riding occurs because people can benefit from things like defence, infrastructure, or public health without contributing.
Examples: Climate change mitigation, electoral accountability (voting against bad leaders, not taking bribes, etc.)
Public Goods & Development: Even if people don’t pay taxes, they still require protection, highlighting the importance of public goods for development.
Solidary Groups and Social Accountability
Solidary Groups: Civil society groups that strengthen social accountability by offering rewards or punishments through community-based mechanisms.
Embedding: Politicians and bureaucrats are members of the group, creating incentives to reward public goods and ensure accountability.
Encompassing: The group covers the entire political community, incentivizing politicians to provide public goods to all citizens, not just a select few.
Example:
The church as a solidary group can be used to reward or punish people based on their actions, holding individuals accountable through a shared social institution.
Split Groups:
Only benefit a small community, often not encouraging broader accountability.
Village Temples:
Example of a solidary group where informal accountability works for everyone. Even without electoral accountability or widespread protests, the temple serves as a platform for holding local elites accountable and reinforcing community-based governance.
Key Insight:
Solidary groups like temples or community organizations can play a crucial role in creating social accountability in places where formal systems are weak or lacking.
Collective Action
Multiple people coordinating their actions to overcome a free-riding problem and secure a collective benefit
Improving Accountability with Collective Action
Anti-Corruption Laws in Africa: Most African countries have strong anti-corruption laws, but enforcement remains weak.
The Principal-Agent Problem:
Bureaucrats ignore corruption to protect their jobs.
Politicians steal to finance elections.
Voters prioritize ethnicity and clientelism over holding leaders accountable.
Result: When no one plays the role of the principal (who holds others accountable), accountability doesn’t improve.
Cultural Corruption:
Corruption is normalized in many systems. Honest people are seen as “suckers”.
If everyone is corrupt, why should someone be honest? Myrdal (1968): “Well, if everybody seems corrupt, why shouldn’t I be corrupt?”
Free-Riding and Social Punishment:
Reporting corruption is costly, and punishing corruption isn’t incentivized.
Social punishment for being honest: People fear losing their jobs or being socially ostracized for not participating in the system.
Failed Reforms Create Cynicism:
Anti-corruption reforms can backfire, strengthening cynicism and expectations that corruption will continue.
Example: John Githongo (Kenya, 2003-2005) reported corruption but faced death threats and eventually fled the country.
Norms Against Corruption & Informal Accountability
Social Norms Strengthen Accountability:
Bureaucrats gain respect for blowing the whistle on corruption.
Judges reject bribes to maintain their social status as “clean” (e.g., Botswana’s judiciary is more respected).
Voters’ Role in Accountability:
In some countries (Brazil), voters see themselves as responsible for punishing corrupt politicians.
In India, ethnic and clientelist voting weakens accountability.
Protests and Collective Action:
Citizens protest poor services not only for personal gain but also to feel part of their community.
Social norms and community participation are vital to improving accountability.
Informal Accountability in Authoritarian Systems:
In China, informal accountability exists through local elites facing social sanctions if they fail to deliver public goods.
Moral standing is awarded for good performance, as seen with Party Secretaries being honored in village temples.
Example: Investment rises from 61 to 99 yuan per person when local leaders are recognized positively (Tsai, 2007).
Key to Development:
Social norms around community interactions and accountability drive higher investment and development outcomes.
Shifting Equilibria in Development
Shifting Equilibria:
There are two potential equilibria: one that’s good (higher outcomes) and one that’s bad (stuck in low development).
Success depends on expectations—if people believe others will act, they’re more likely to contribute, shifting the equilibrium in a positive direction.
Key Example: Lagos:
The Lagos government first focused on delivering public services, which raised trust in government.
As people saw the government delivering, they started to believe others were paying taxes, creating a social contract where tax payment became the norm.
How to Shift Equilibria:
Build on latent social norms (e.g., Rwanda’s Imihigo).
Deliver first: Provide services or incentives to show the benefits of change and build trust.
Lead from the top: Leaders can shape expectations and create momentum for change.
Use shocks/events: Turning pivotal events or shocks into opportunities for reform or new norms.
Create common knowledge: Make information about what others expect and think public to adjust behavior.
Example: In Saudi Arabia, people have more progressive views on women’s rights than they believe others do.
Policy Feedback:
Creating social contracts helps to shift public expectations and norms, leading to better outcomes over time.
Rwanda’s Accountability Mechanisms & Social Norms
Imihigo:
Public pledges made by the President and Mayors.
Failure to fulfill pledges leads to community judgment (breaking a pledge is a serious issue).
Accountability embedded in Rwandan social norms for centuries, making it culturally effective. Citizens check progress as part of their civic duty.
Ubudehe:
Self-help system where locals address and solve local problems together.
Relies on the idea that depending on outsiders for help is seen as lazy, encouraging community-driven solutions.
Umuganda:
Communal work where community participation is expected.
Cultural expectation that everyone should participate, making it rude not to contribute.
Facilitates community-based coordination and collective action.
Key Insight:
Rwanda used traditional informal institutions and social norms to combat free-riding and establish effective accountability mechanisms.
Development as a Principal-Agent Problem: Conflicting objectives need incentivizing actors to change their behavior.
Development as a Collective Action Problem: Shared goals are hindered by the lack of coordination. Rwanda used collective action mechanisms to break this trap and foster development.
