Lecture 11: Collective Action Flashcards
Definition: free-riding
Each person can benefit from collective action without contributing, even though the maximization of short-term self-interests leaves all participants worse off in the long term
How can public goods create free-riding problems?
Public goods are non-excludable (each person can benefit without contributing) - e.g. defense, infrastructure, public health, climate change mitigation, social and electoral accountability
The paradox of collective action
People are too cooperative in practice (cooperation rates are 20-50% in lab experiments) -> people do protest and vote out bad leaders
Definition: collective action
Multiple people coordinating their actions to overcome a free-riding problem and secure a collective benefit
Collective action is easier under these 4 circumstances
- The group is smaller (communication and monitoring is easier)
- Coercion is used (taxation, the threat of violence)
- Selective incentives are used (personal incentives, money for participation, entertainment during protests)
- Informal institutions/social norms encourage participation, e.g. social costs to not participate, (voting “as a duty”, community clean up days)
Why are accountability measures failing?
Increasing the punishment does not increase enforcement, and principals are not always good
How is there free-riding in reporting and punishing corruption?
Everyone would benefit with a less corrupt society, but there are hard costs to reporting it if there’s a culture of corruption (e.g. talking to police, witness in court, your life or job in danger, social punishment from not taking corruption), and the benefit is not personal
Failed anti-corruption reforms create
More cynicism and stronger expectations that corruption will continue -> trap of corruption where it just makes everyone even more corrupt or willing to accept it
How can we change so that it’s not rational to be corrupt?
Change social norms and expectations around corruption so people want to sanction others for wrong-doing
Norms against corruption would strengthen accountability (e.g. bureaucrats get respect for blowing the whistle, judges reject bribes to be seen as clean, voters punish politicians as duty)
How do we get accountability where the bureaucracy is weak, there are no elections, and citizens have few social rights (e.g. China)?
Through informal accountability: local elites face social sanctions if they fail to deliver public goods and moral standing rewards when they perform well
In China, members of the temple can punish and reward elites on part of the community, by denying access to temples or naming them as donors
When does informal accountability work?
In solidary groups, meaning societal groups that are:
1. Embedding (politicians and bureaucrats are members)
2. Encompassing (the group covers the whole political community, so politicians are incentivized to provide public goods for all)
Why has enforcement of accountability regarding maternal mortality been more effective in Rwanda’s health system? (3 points=
Social norms!
1. Imihigo: public pledges by the President and Mayors, citizens checking on progress of these
- Ubudehe: self-help to solve local problems (reliance on outsiders is lazy)
- Umuganda: communal work, expectation for all to participate
How did Rwanda use collective action to make accountability mechanisms work?
Their traditional informal institutions and social norms stopped free-riding and made accountability measures successful
Development as a principal-agent problem vs. collective action problem
Principal-agent: objectives of actors are in conflict, we need to incentivize people to change their behavior and create accountability
Collective action: objectives of actors are the same, it’s the context that prevents them from realizing objectives (they are stuck in a trap), we need to help people coordinate
Assurance game
Two equilibria; whichever you end up in is by chance and it can be hard to change from one to the other, but it is possible since there is two equilibria rather than 1
