Lecture 10: Accountability

Question 1

How can we change why development initiatives often fail?

Answer 1

By holding people accountable, rewarding them for effective implementation of the rules and punishing them for breaking the rules

Question 2

Why do development initiatives often fail? (short train of thought)

Answer 2

Institutions and the state are weak -> investments are risky -> development initiatives fail

Question 3

Principal agent model in development

Answer 3

Principal employs agents to help achieve development, but cannot see everything the agent is doing. Principal therefore sets contract with incentives (rewards and punishment) which the agent responds to

Question 4

Contracts and hierarchy are central to

Answer 4

Bureaucracies and development

Question 5

Horizontal accountability

Answer 5

Holding other institutions accountable, e.g. by establishing agency to monitor politicians and pass laws with large punishment, thus acting as a principal holding politicians accountable

Question 6

What is the problem with horizontal accountability?

Answer 6

It needs political support from the people at the top to be successful, e.g. International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala started to question the president and was banished

Question 7

Two other examples of accountability mechanisms

Answer 7

1. Performance-related pay (but does not improve student learning)
2. Cash on delivery for countries achieving progress in development (e.g. the country that reduces death by malaria gets 1 million euro) (but if countries lack cash, how can they make achievements in the first place=

Question 8

5 reasons why accountability mechanisms often fail?

Answer 8

1. Multiple tasks encourages a bias to whichever task is easier to measure (e.g. if professor is paid by exam performance, they will only teach the exam, not other skills)
2. Multiple principals, e.g. bureaucrats responding to multiple politicians creates confusion and discourages supervision (In India, number of people able to access employment is 9% higher when bureaucrats respond to a single politician)
3. Moral hazard: agents take excessive risks knowing they will be bailed out by the principal
4. The principal’s objectives might not always be development, and then the agent won’t make development happen
5. Incentives compete with informal institutions/norms (informal institutions adapt to formal rules, e.g. fines for picking up children late turned to normalizing paying more for childcare; pay reductions for absent nurses turned to exemptions or broken time-stamp machines)

Question 9

In electoral accountability, who is the principal and who is the agent?

Answer 9

Principal are the voters, agent are the politicians

Question 10

How can voters use accountability?

Answer 10

Being the principal, voters can use elections to reward or sanction politicians, e.g. president of Malawi kicked out because of fraud or Brazilian voters punishing corrupt mayors

Question 11

Can we boost electoral accountability by providing true information to voters?

Answer 11

No, in field experiment in 6 countries, information about politicians’ performance had zero impact on voter behavior = no accountability

Question 12

8 reasons why electoral accountability is a blunt tool/too simplistic

Answer 12

1. Political skills are needed to interpret information (cannot vote out politicians responsible for healthcare if you don’t know who provides healthcare)
2. Ethnic voting (rewarding co-ethnics, punishing others)
3. Clientelism short-circuits accountability (one vote won’t make a difference, but determines whether you get money or a job)
4. Lobbying and corruption (one dollar, one vote)
5. Lack of social contract (without taxes, voters feel less stake in punishing bad politicians)
6. Lack of voter coordination/collective action (accountability only works if many voters react)
7. Backfire (in Laos, anti-corruption messages make citizens more willing to pay a bribe; why should I be honest if no one else is?)
8. Backlash (politicians react with competing or mis-information)

Question 13

How is electoral accountability a “long route”?

Answer 13

Relies on politicians responding to voters and politicians being able to enforce changes through the state

Question 14

Definition: Social accountability

Answer 14

Accountability through direct citizen engagement outside of elections

Question 15

Examples of social accountability

Answer 15

Led by civil society or one part of the state against another:
- Complaints
- Writing letters
- Reporting in the media
- NGO or citizen monitoring of services
- Protests

Question 16

How did civil society solve the problem of only 20% of government spending reaching schools in Uganda

Answer 16

School provided information about lack of grants in newspaper to inform parents and teachers -> teachers became aware of grants and could pressure the government to provide them -> grants received increased to 80% and a +6% improvement in text scores

Question 17

How did civil society solve the issue of high infant mortality rates due to poor attendance and care at health clinics in Ugenda?

Answer 17

Setting up community monitoring by NGOs -> 33% reduction in under-5 mortality

Question 18

How did civil society solve the issue of abandoned infrastructure projects in Nigeria?

Answer 18

An online portal where citizens and NGOs can track and upload progress and photos of government projects

Question 19

5 reasons why social accountability often fails?

Answer 19

1. Citizens lack information, skills, and confidence for attributing responsibility
2. Dependent on allies in the state for success (sharing information and listening to citizens)
3. Backlash where elites punish citizens who speak out, citizens made passive by the state
4. The rich exit to the private sector, reducing pressure to improve public services
5. Pressure depends on collective action, and there is a problem of free-riding