Lecture 11&12&13 - Decision Making Flashcards

1
Q

homo economicus

A

= rational own-payoff maximizer
- sophisticated rational beliefs, stable preferences, maximizes own payoff, disregards other peoples well-being
-> factoring out each potential bias (ex. time pressure, stress, …)
therefore, not real-life applicable …

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2
Q

decision making - processes

A
  • goal-directed behavior
  • reward learning & memory
  • executive control
  • inferece to establish causal links
  • often in a social context
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3
Q

economic vs psychological decision making model

A

economic: rational (but choice bias)
psychological: context dependent choices (social, cultural, moral)

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4
Q

idea of neuroeconomics

A

= combination of psychology, economics and neuroscience
-> including social context of decision making, evaluates underlying circuits in value-based decision making, investigates which brain chemicals are involved

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5
Q

why studying decision making?

A
  • phylosophically (value of decisions)
  • economically (consumer decisions; nudging (leading decision making))
  • clinical (maladaptove decisions)
    + gambling disorder, impulsive traits, anto-social or norm disregarding decisions
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6
Q

expected value

A

multiplication of objective value times probability (magnitude, times itr probability)

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7
Q

risk vs ambiguity

A
risk = known variance of distribution (gamble effect) 
ambiguity = unknown variance (outcomes); unknown probabilites, need to infer about those
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8
Q

reference effects

A

utility is a subjective value, everyone has own starting/reference point (= marginal utility)

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9
Q

risk aversion

A

preferring lower certain reward over risky higher (on average) reward
-> valuing certainty over gamble (everyone has own subjective treshold about that)
[certainty equivalent shows risk aversion level]
[for gains, the mean utility of the win and loss gamble is worse than the utility of the (mean) certain outcome]

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10
Q

when do people become risk seeking? (reflection effect)

A

in the loss domain
-> the curve in the loss domain is much steeper than in the gains domain (loss is waited much more heavily)
[for gains, the mean utility of the win and loss gamble is better than the utility of the (mean) certain outcome]
-> losses loom larger than wins
- less losses required to offset pros -> utility gains
- implications for framing

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11
Q

ambiguity aversion

A

preference for known risks over unknown risks

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12
Q

probability weighting

A
  • people overestimate small chances

- people underestimate large probabilites

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13
Q

purpose of rewards

A

reinforce behavior
-> primary or secondary reinforcers
[remember law of effects, William James]

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14
Q

role of dopamine (+ where it is produced)

A

associated with rewards

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15
Q

dopamine - basics

A
  • > produced in midbrain and basal ganglia (substania nigra) [also adrenaline], its a catecholamines
  • > innervation of large parts of the cortex
  • > changes firing probabiliy of neurons (motor and cognitive effects, therewith effects decision making)
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16
Q

dopamine & reinforcement learning

A

dopamine as teaching signal:

  1. reward as expected = no dopamine firing rate change
  2. reward better = increased dopamine firing rate
  3. reward worse = decreased dopamine firing
    - > learning from (un)expected outcomes
    - > basis of associative learning
17
Q

Rescolra-Wagner learning rule & prediciton errors

A

associative learning is strongest when difference between prediciton and outcome is the largest (surprise effect, positive or negative)
[outcome - expectation = prediciton error]

18
Q

meaning of undermining motivation

A
  • intrinsically motivated group; reatied rewards signals
  • incentivized group (externally motivated); lost reward signals [when external reward is gone, there is also no internal rewards anymore]
  • > differential Dopamine releases
19
Q

Dopamine as prediciton error signal

A
  • unexpected reward occuring -> firing increases
  • cue predicts reward fully -> firing increases
  • oucome lower than expected -> firing rate decreases
  • > information
20
Q

dopamine drives learning

A

-> biases choice behavior towards cues where more dopamine neurons were active (dopamine coactivating receptors leading to enjoyment)

21
Q

temporal difference learning

A

reward calculation; increase in signal when known that reward will come
-> reward signals influence processing in whole brain

22
Q

which brain area is activated in the cause of unexpected events?

A

the basal ganglia

23
Q

risk (considering ongoings in the brain)

A

risk activates network of regions

- insula; potential role in negative outcomes, interoceptive signal, for risk aversion (affecting decision making)

24
Q

ambiguity - when information is missing (brain areas, ongoings)

A
  • lateral and orbitofrontal cortex (higher oder areas); infering about range of outcomes -> executive planning (more active for ambiguity-seeking individuals)
  • > requires strategizing (more than simple risk analysis)
25
Q
delay discounting 
(hyperbolic delay discounting)
A

future rewards less values than rewards nearby
-> wating for reward incurs opportunity costs (cost of not doing anything else)
Hyperbolic DD: preference of which reward to take depends on large, delayed rewards magnitude and amount of delay
-> preference reversal; preference in small early rewards on small time scales and reversal when brought to larger timescales
-> the steeper the discount curve in the future, the less likely it is waited for the reward

26
Q

pro-social behavior (its drive) - reciprocity

A

-> human tend to be pro-social even in a one-shot situation
stabalizes long-term social bounds (best genes survive), increases group fitness (reputation tracking)
-> benefiting from social engagements (direct or indirect (ex. donating) activates ventral stratium, just like for self-rewards)

27
Q

cooperation

A

activates reward centers; mutual cooperation giving best results
-> same activation when reward given to oneself as when given to others (social context)

28
Q

learning whom to trust

A
  • reputation matters (update trust based on feedback)
    -> capacity (ability grows with development (getting older)
    Influences on trust:
  • vignettes: fictional background stories
  • fixed trustworthiness
29
Q

social discounting

A

generosity towards others decreases accross social dustance between actor and recipient (more generous to people we feel close to than to strangers)

  • > generosity declines hyperbolically across social distance
  • > TPJ, VMPFC, insula frame effect on social discounting
30
Q

involved brain areas in social discounting

A

junction of VMPFC and TPJ

  • > temporary deactivation of TPJ increases social discounting
  • > can be influenced (ex. by giving noradrenaline), but also depends on the progestrone levels accross females mentrual cycle
31
Q

gain vs loss frame (neural processes?)

A

they are different for both frames and can therfore be mapped on distinct neural networks
-> motives underlying generostiy are different

32
Q
gain frame (neural mechanims and "feeling")
- strong decline in generostiy across social distance
A

TPJ upregulates vicarious reward value signlas in VMPFC in a social-distance dependent fashion -> increase the value of generous option
-> being generous is rewarding: VMPFC and TPJ

33
Q
loss frame (neural mechanisms and "feeling")
-> independent of social distance
A

insula downregulates onw-reward value signals in VMPFC in a social-distance dependent fashion -> decrease the value of selfish option
[motivatd by social norms]
-> generosity is motivated by guilt aversion: anterior insula and VMPFC

34
Q

effect of stress in social discounting

A

-> dampens framing effect
stressed participants are much less generous towards starngers in the loss frame, but generosity towards family/friends increases
-> increased fight or flight behavior (seeking comfort and help in stress situation)
-> stress counteract social discounting
-> insula activation; harm avoidance

35
Q

5 cooperation rules - Nowak

A
  1. kin selection: when related to person with percentage r, there is incentive to promote genes
  2. direct reciprocity: helping each other
  3. indirect reciptrocity: helping someone, which helps someone else (no direct return)
  4. network reciprocity: find trustworthy group
  5. group selection: starts own group found in network reciprocity
36
Q

value-based decision making brain areas

A
  • ventro-meidal PFC; codes abstract rewards signals

- lateral PFC; executive control

37
Q

heuristics

A

when there are too many choice dimesniosn implied, heuristics are used; using smaller sets of decision features (amount which can be evaluated)
-> bounded rationality, shortcuts (anchoring discounts and endowment effects)

38
Q

choice influences

A
  • risk/ambiguity
  • social contexts
  • trust and norms
  • > humans are biased and make use of heuristics