Leadership Flashcards

1
Q

What is development determined by? (Structurally)

A
  • Geography
  • History
  • Geopolitics
  • Formal institutions
  • Informal institutions
  • The State
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2
Q

How are history and institutions path dependent?

A
  • Winners from current institutions are powerful and veto changes
  • Informal institutions depend on expectations - stuck in equilibrium/trap
  • Agreeing new institutions is a collective action problem itself - which new institutions?
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3
Q

How does path dependency prevent easy policy solutions?

A
  • Accountability
    – Once I’m in power, why help citizens and voters hold me accountable?
  • Collective action
    – Why report corruption if it leads to social shaming and everyone else is corrupt?
  • Representation
    – Why change the rules by which I was elected?
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4
Q

Definition of agency

A

The capacity of agents to shape their environment

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5
Q

What is the scope for agency to promote development?

A
  • The ability to:
    – Change institutions
    – Enforce institutions
    – Make institutions legitimate/respected
  • Less about the individual personalities of “great men/women” which are hard to replicate
  • More about the set of strategies that leaders use
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6
Q

Definition of critical junctures

A

Moments in time when the constraints of path dependency are alleviated and agency has broader scope to alter institutional rules and outcomes in the future

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7
Q

What can cause critical junctures?

A
  • External imposition/threats
    – eg. the Japanese post-war constitution
  • Revolutions, eg. after war
    – eg. the RPS’s victory after the Rwandan genocide
  • Economic shocks
    – eg. oil shocks and debt crises forced neoliberal reform in the 1980s
  • Shifting ideas about institutions
    – eg. fall of Berlin Wall led to democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa
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8
Q

How do leaders use agency?

A

Not by:
- Being smarter
- Working harder
- Being more honest
- Being more ideologically committed
BUT by forming coalitions

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9
Q

How is forming coalitions collective action?

A
  • Common goal to win and stay in power
  • Each potential member wants to free-ride on the concessions of others
  • Leaders must get enough potential members to compromise and agree
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10
Q

Benefits of coalitions

A
  • Institutional rules reward coalition members
    – In 2018, 6 Indian airports were privatized
    – All won by Guatam Adani’s Adani Group
    – Privatization rules changed to allow firms without direct experience of running an airport
    – A supporter of PM Modi’s since 2003
  • Coalition benefits include corruption
    – Brazil’s Mensalao (“big monthly payment”) scandal
    – $12,000 per month to vote for the government in congress
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11
Q

What is needed for a coalition to be pro-development?

A

Country-specific; depends on the relationship between political and economic elites

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12
Q

Definition of developmental coalition

A

A broad coalition with concentrated enforcement power that directs rents to invest in development

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13
Q

Pro-development coalition characteristics

A
  • Broad coalitions
  • Concentrated power
  • Rents directed to investment
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14
Q

Broad coalitions (pro-development coalition characteristics)

A
  • Key economic and political elites are part of the coalition
    – So institutions are inclusive, not extractive
    – So more people have a stake in development
    – So losers are credibly compensated and don’t resist
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15
Q

Concentrated power (pro-development coalition characteristics)

A
  • The leader can discipline members of the coalition
    – So institutions are enforced
    – Autonomy of bureaucrats is protected
    – Accountability limits (but not eliminates) corruption and clientelism
    – Leaders can stimulate collective action
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16
Q

Rents directed to investment (pro-development coalition characteristics)

A
  • Not eliminating rents (neoliberalism)
  • A Developmental state
    – Centralizing the management of economic rents
  • “Embedded” autonomy protects investments
  • Not eliminating corruption
  • Ensuring corruption/favoritism “buys” development
17
Q

In what ways do development coalitions not avoid politics

A
  • They make development politically successful
  • Unlike other coalitions that make development politically unattractive
18
Q

How do development coalitions make development politically successful?

A
  • Business elites get favorable terms and investment opportunities
  • Politicians get electoral financing from business elites
  • Bureaucrats earn social praise form developmental success, not corruption
  • Voters reward politicians for development
19
Q

What is it about other coalitions that make development unattractive?

A
  • Narrow coalitions
  • Extractive
  • Benefit from keeping competing groups poor
20
Q

How do development coalitions use policy feedback?

A

Using policy feedback to promote development
- Policies designed not just for development
- But to raise the political pressure for future development
– Accountability
– Collective action
– Representation

21
Q

Example of policy using policy feedback

A

Bolsa Familia cash transfers in Brazil have created a strong vested interest in defending the program
- Accountability
– A programmatic policy empowering voters to reject clientelism
- Collective action
– A collective identity among poor beneficiaries
- Representation
– Benefits go to mothers, strengthening their domestic and political power
- People that received Bolsa Familia benefits are more likely to vote for the party that created the policy
- All political parties now compete to extend the program
- The “inclusion of outsiders”

22
Q

What are Rwanda’s structural restraints to development?

A
  • Geography
    – Landlocked, tropical
  • History and culture
    – Legacy of colonialism, slavery, and genocide must damage trust
  • Institution
    – Authoritarian political institutions
23
Q

How has Rwanda successfully developed?

A
  • Institutional rules have been strengthened
  • The state has been centralized and given autonomy
  • External aid has been absorbed successfully
  • Low corruption, low clientelism
  • Limited resistance to change by losers/winners
24
Q

A development coalition in Rwanda

A
  • Broad coalition
    – Politicians
    – Business, military elites
    – Tutsis and moderate Hutus
    – Women
  • Concentrated power
    – The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is a dominant party
    – Grounded in the military
  • Directing rents to investment
    – Tri-Star Investments / Crystal Ventures (100% RPF controlled)
    – >3% GDP; 9% of national revenue
    – Political protection from the RPF
25
Q

Rwanda as a “developmental patrimonial” state

A
  • Developmental
    – Directing and disciplining resources for investment
  • Patrimonialism
    – Centralized and personalized power
    – Surprising, what guarantees Kagame won’t change his mind?
26
Q

What conditions permitted the emergence of a developmental coalition in Rwanda?

A

The agency of Kagame in forming a coalition
- Forging a broad coalition
- Using concentrated power
- Enforcing accountability
- Initiating collective action
- Increasing representation for pro-development groups
- Insisting aid must follow the government agenda

27
Q

Forging a broad coalition (agency of Kagame in forming a coalition)

A
  • inviting Hutu moderates into the government
  • Convening private sector investors, exiles, diaspora
28
Q

Using concentrated power (agency of Kagame in forming a coalition)

A
  • A steady stream of officials at all levels of government have been criminally or administratively sanctioned
  • Human rights violations, arrest of journalists, and assassinations of opponents to retain power
29
Q

Enforcing accountability (agency of Kagame in forming a coalition)

A

Punishments for parents whose children are not in school

30
Q

Initiating collective action (agency of Kagame in forming a coalition)

A
  • Social norms eg. Imihigo, Ubudehe, Umuganda
  • A national civic (non-ethnic) identity
31
Q

Increasing representation for pro-development groups (agency of Kagame in forming a coalition)

A

30% quotas for women since 2003

32
Q

Insisting aid must follow the government agenda (agency of Kagame in forming a coalition)

A
  • One of only two countries receiving an “A” in the OECD 2010 evaluation of the Paris Agenda for Action
  • Many funds as direct budget support
33
Q

Why is the sustainability of Kagame’s regime unclear?

A
  • Dependent on Kagame
  • Economic crisis may undermine the coalition
  • Reciprocal financing can easily become corruption
  • Dominant parties lack credibility
  • Violence discourages investment
34
Q

What does the role of agency of coalitions imply for the role of donors and external aid?

A
  • Understand the motivations of leaders and the nature of coalitions
    – Do political science!
  • If the coalition is not development, limit support
    – At best, finance civil society instead
    – Try to stimulate developmental coalitions
  • If the coalition is developmental, support it with very few conditionalities
    – Local actors are already motivated to enforce the rules and accountability
    – The risks of aid (corruption, lack of ownership, isomorphic mimicry) are less of a concern