Breaking the Rules - Clientelism and Corruption Flashcards

1
Q

How does democracy promote broader development?

A
  • Accountability for politicians in enforcing the rules and delivering development
  • Credibility for the protection of (property) rights
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2
Q

Problems of democracy for development

A
  • A short-term bias
  • An electoral cycle
  • A “concrete” bias
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3
Q

A short-term bias (problems of democracy for development)

A
  • Even well-meaning politicians need to worry about re-election in 4 years’ time
  • Less attention to climate change, pensions for aging populations
  • Commitment problems: why invest now if my successor might cancel it?
    – Especially as successors prefer to claim credit for their own ideas
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4
Q

An electoral cycle (problems of democracy for development)

A
  • Voters remember recent events more sharply
  • So politicians concentrate their investments and stimulate the economy just before an election
  • Unpaid electricity bills spike by 3% in election years in Uttar Pradesh, India
    – Favors (forbearance) to consumers and businesses for electoral support
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5
Q

A “concrete” bias (problems of democracy for development)

A
  • Development requires many “hidden” inputs, eg. teacher training, management, oversight, maintenance
  • But politicians invest only in what voters can see and reward: concrete buildings, ribbon-cutting events
  • Democratization in Africa led to the abolition of school fees and many more children in schools, but no investment in quality
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6
Q

Definition of clientelism

A

The contingent exchange of material benefit for political support

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7
Q

How does clientelism work?

A
  • Rules for neutral distribution exist on paper
    – eg. everyone has a right to healthcare
  • But are broken/twisted in practice
    – Bureaucrats, politicians use discretion to control access
    – Access to healthcare depends on who you vote for
  • A “quid pro quo” between patron and client; an unequal exchange
  • Local brokers monitor who you support/vote for
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8
Q

Varieties of clientelism

A
  • Patronage
    – Distributing public jobs (the opposite of autonomy/meritocracy)
  • Vote-buying
    – Gifts, cash, or services for votes
  • Relational
    – Long-term ties of trust between parties and voters
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9
Q

How does clientelism harm public services?

A
  • Private goods over more efficient public goods
    – Handouts instead of infrastructure
  • A patronage bureaucracy has less autonomy
    – In Brazil, students’ scores get worse when a new party replaces temporary teachers
  • A lack of accountability
    – Voters must vote for their patron, not the best candidate
    – Inverts democratic accountability
  • Property rights protection is less credible
    – In Cote d’Ivoire, land rights depended on who you voted for
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10
Q

Are voters to blame for clientelism?

A

Voters often demand clientelism
- So are voters to blame?
- Where’s my money for my vote?
- I’m going to go pressure the politician to help me with my hospital bill

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11
Q

Why is it that voters may prefer clientelism?

A

Politicians often break their promises so voters are almost smarter/safer to accept the money as it’s more certain

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12
Q

What is the opposite of clientelism?

A

The opposite of clientelism is “programmatic” politics

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13
Q

What is programmatic politics?

A
  • Politicians offer distinct programs: policies and public goods
  • Can target groups of citizens, eg. women, the poor
    – Based on the objective socioeconomic characteristics
    – Not their political behavior
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14
Q

Comparison of Mexico’s social development programs

A

Pronasol
- 1989-1996
- Clientelist
- Did not benefit the poor
- Won many votes for the incumbent
Progresa
- 1997-
- Not clientelist
- Does benefit the poor
- Does not win the incumbent many votes

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15
Q

How does democracy affect clientelism?

A
  • Democracy encourages programmatic parties and broad appeals using public goods
    – eg. the PAN in Mexico
    – eg. the Workers’ Party in Brazil
    OR
  • Democracy creates “competitive clientelism”
    – eg. Nigeria, Kenya
    – An incumbency advantage in resources for clientelism
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16
Q

How did democracy affect clientelism in Mexico?

A

In Mexico democratization led to more programmatic social policies
- The state had the capacity to deliver and monitor (Progresa/Opportunidades)
- Threat of violence if clientelism continued (Zapatista rebellion)
- The opposition controlled the legislature so could constrain the government’s discretion

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17
Q

Definition of corruption

A

The misuse of public power for personal gain

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18
Q

Examples of corruption

A
  • Bribery
  • Extortion
  • Fraud
  • Kickbacks
  • Collusion
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19
Q

Petty corruption

A
  • Bribes to police to pass a roadblock
  • Bribes to get a driving license faster
    – Average payment is twice the official price in India
    – Drivers don’t really take the exam -> unsafe drivers
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20
Q

Grand corruption (examples)

A
  • Carwash (Lava Jato) in Brazil
    – Contractors for Petrobras colluded on how much to bid, raising prices and channeling >$2bn to politicians
  • Goldenberg in Kenya
    – Fake importing of $1bn of gold and diamonds paid for by Central Bank to finance election campaign
  • Anglo-Leasing in Kenya
    – $740m in up-front payments for security services never delivered; redirected to politicians
  • 1MDB in Malaysia
    – $4.5bn laundered from government development corporations, channeled to Prime Minister Najib Razak and his party UMNO
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21
Q

How does corruption harm development?

A
  • Wasting scarce resources
    – $3.6tr per year, 5% of global GDP
    – Uganda 1991-1995: only 13% of budgeted funds reach schools
  • Discouraging investment and merit
    – Corruption demands prevent construction being completed (or started)
    – Bureaucrats pay for jobs where they can be corrupt
  • Weakening institutions
    – By definition, corruption is rule-breaking
    – How you’re financed -> how you govern
  • eg. Kenya’s government blackmailed into giving more favors to its financers
  • Undermining trust
    – eg. Barcenas scandal, Spain (2013)
22
Q

What could corruption be instead of a cause of poor development?

A

Corruption may be a symptom of weak institutions and a weak state rather than a root cause

23
Q

How can corruption be useful?

A

Corruption is useful for citizens in developing countries to address systemic problems
- Corruption can help protect property rights
– Paying off the police secures your investment
- Corrupt politicians have more power for enforcement
– Being tough/corrupt can help deliver projects where there’s no embedded autonomy
– Voters support corrupt candidates
– If 10% of budget is stolen, what happens to the 90%?
- Corruption in electoral campaign financing
– Essential to political competition where there’s no public funding
– Goldenberg scandal: financed food distribution to voters and cars to bribe politicians
- Corruption is an informal institution that becomes normalized
– More than a third of people in Mexico and Nigeria say that other people believe it is ok to pay a bribe

24
Q

What happens if corruption is systemic and a system of deeper problems?

A
  • Anti-corruption efforts mostly will not work
    – Strict formal rules don’t change systemic norms/incentives
    – Can a corrupt system reform itself?
    – Strong incentives for isomorphic mimicry
  • Targeting corruption may do nothing to strengthen the underlying institution/state
25
Q

Why may corruption not matter?

A
  • “Corrupt” countries can develop quickly, eg. China, the West
  • If investment happens despite corruption
  • If the weakness of the state and institutions is being gradually addressed by deeper political processes
26
Q

Does democracy cause corruption in transnational democracies with weak institutions?

A
  • Transnational democracies have weak institutions
    – More competition -> more electoral financing needed -> more corruption
  • Authoritarian Kenya was less corrupt because leaders limited corruption to “enlarge the pie”
    – Democracy makes corruption “visible”: NGOs and Free Media
    —> undermining legitimacy
27
Q

Does democracy cause corruption in consolidated democracies?

A
  • In consolidated democracies
    – Active anti-corruption with autonomy
    – Institutions and rule of law are strengthened with a rich state
    – Free media, free speech, civil society are effective
    – Informal institutions (social norms) against corruption
28
Q

Why can development produce losers (in the short term)?

A
  • “Creative destruction” of old industries - textiles, coal mines, drivers
  • Enforcement instead of forbearance
  • Monopoly rents or corruption
  • Losses can also be relative, eg. teachers, traditional villages chiefs, men
29
Q

How can losses be political instead of economic?

A
  • Dictators may not care if the middle class get rich
  • But they may care if they start to demand democracy and threaten revolution
30
Q

Definition of vested interests

A

Actors with an interest in preserving existing institutions

31
Q

How can resistance impact policy implementation?

A
  • Resistance raises the economic/political cost of policy implementation
32
Q

Examples for resistance that can increase the cost of policy implementation

A
  • Protests
  • Sabotage
  • Lobbying
  • Bribery/corruption
  • Veto power
33
Q

When is it easier for losers to resist development?

A
  • It is easier to resist when the losses are concentrated on a specific group
  • Losers are often powerful - they benefited from the “old” system
    – Concentrated wealth allows them to organize against reform
  • Inequality can harm development when the rich oppose change and have the resources to block it
34
Q

How can we overcome resistance from losers?

A
  • Insulating the state from the political pressures of losers
    – Autonomy/discipline (the developmental state)
    – Repression
    – Authoritarianism/dominant parties
  • Strengthening winners
  • Compensating losers
35
Q

Why can’t we always compensate losers for their losses?

A

If development “grows the pie” then the collective gains can be distributed to everyone
- Compensation may not be credible
– Promises of future benefits are hard to make
– The newly-powerful can just take everything in the future
– Social welfare systems can help make compensation credible
- Compensation may not be equivalent
– Would you accept money to give up your career?

36
Q

Who are the winners of development?

A
  • Workers benefiting from investments in physical capital -> higher productivity -> higher salaries
  • Households benefitting from cheaper food (more productive agriculture)
  • Children benefitting from better teaching (human capital)
  • Consumers benefitting from smartphones (new technologies)
37
Q

Definition of policy feedback

A

Policies and institutional reforms change future politics
- Winners often support continued reform:
- But diffuse winners struggle to achieve collective action to push for more reform

38
Q

Why do winners often support continued reform?

A
  • Motive to extend their gains
  • Means from the newly-acquired resources
39
Q

What happens when the winners are diffuse?

A

Diffuse winners struggle to achieve collective action to push for more reform
- Lots of consumers with a small stake
- And difficulties in communicating and organizing

40
Q

Who are concentrated winners and what happens when winners are concentrated?

A
  • Investors can be concentrated winners
  • They can gain form partial reform
    – Opportunities created by the transition from old to new institutions
    – eg. privatization without an effective competition regulator
    – eg. liberalizing consumer prices but not exchange rates
  • So partial reform creates new rents
    – Monopolies, uneven subsidies
    – Lack of regulation, weak police/judiciary
41
Q

What happened in Eastern Europe with development/reform?

A

The countries in Eastern Europe that carried out “intermediate” reforms seem to have suffered the greatest increases in inequality, and opposition to further reform
– eg. inequality doubled in Russia

42
Q

How can you overcome resistance from partial reform winners?

A
  • Insulating the state from the political pressures of winners
    – Autonomy/discipline (the developmental state)
    – Repression
    – Authoritarianism/dominant parties
  • Strengthening losers
    – More democracy/competition
  • Tax the winners
43
Q

Who are the winners and who are the losers of development?

A

Subject to political debate/manipulation
- Resistance to vaccination
– Personal and community benefits
– But strongly correlated with trust in government
- Misinformation creates “a seed of doubt”
– About government intentions
– About who is a winner
- Misinformation is often disinformation circulated by elites opposed to reform

44
Q

What other interest except economic and political can be considered in the development process?

A

Identity
- Behavior is also a question of identity
– Shared beliefs and practices

45
Q

How do the interests of identity clash with modernization theory?

A

Modernization theory: from traditional “ethnic” identities to modern secular “post-materialist” identities
- Ethnic identities are strong at the start of development
- And threatened by development
- eg. Triqui in Mexico protesting against displacement as a group (even those who were not affected)

46
Q

What is the effect of ethnic diversity on investment in public goods?

A

Ethnic diversity reduces investment in public goods
- The challenge of cooperation across identities
- Differences in preferences
- Lack of information about others
- Harder to use social sanctioning to enforce informal institutions
- eg. diverse parts of Western Kenya receive less money per pupil
- eg. diverse parts of Indonesia suffer greater deforestation

47
Q

What is the caveat with ethnic diversity reducing investment in public goods?

A
  • Applies only to “politically-relevant” ethnic groups
  • Ethnic groups are divided by politicians to form majorities
  • The Chewa and Tumbuka cooperate in Zambia but oppose each other in Malawi
48
Q

How does ethnic discrimination affect investment in public goods?

A

Ethnic discrimination reduces investment in public goods
- Biased against the less powerful ethnic groups

49
Q

Why do dominant identities discriminate?

A

Discrimination by dominant identities:
- As pure discrimination
- As political strategy to mobilize allies
- As a side-effect of being more socially connected among themselves

50
Q

How can we distinguish the diversity and discrimination hypotheses (of public good provision) (India)

A
  • Diversity: villages with more diversity do NOT get fewer public goods
  • Discrimination: villages with more upper castes do get more public goods
    – 4 more hours of electricity
    – From 77% to 97% chance of having a primary school
51
Q

Definition of constructivism

A

Identities are not fixed but created by social interactions and political manipulation

52
Q

How can we twist identities to promote development?

A
  • If people of the same identity trust each other and are more willing to invest together, we need more inclusive identities
  • Overlaying ethnic identities with civic identities
  • eg. in Tanzania, nation-building” has promoted inter-ethnic cooperation
    – A common language (Swahili)
    – National identity in the school curriculum
    – Village councils replace tribes
    – Tanzania provides more public goods than Kenya in diverse communities