L8 - distortions for votes Flashcards
conclusion
electoral distortions
- even if democracy boosts social services overall
- short-termism, electoral cycles and a ‘concrete’ bias harm the quality and sustainability of development
clientelism
- buying votes harms accountability and weakens public services
- programmatic politics reduces poverty but relies on specific types of democratic competition
corruption
- discourages investments and weakens institutions
- but may just be a symptom of weak institutions and a weak state
- eliminating corruption is not necessary or sufficient for development
- corruption as survival mechanism in a rigged system
- corruption can be solved/managed without getting rid of ALL corruption
how does democracy promote broader development?
- accountability: for politicians in enforcing the rules and delivering development
- credibility for the proptection of (property) rights
e.g. democracy benefits health:
- increased life expectancy
- greater calorie consumption
- longer democracies reduce infant mortality
Q: are there any developmental tasks that democracies are particularly bad at?
class:
- sustainable long term commitments, bc you care about elections (in decades you are no longer a politician, thus you don’t care about climate change, that is a problem for politicians then)
- low speed of reaction: less decisive + lot of institutional checks and balances to be crossed
proff:
- long term challenge problem: short-term bias
- electoral cycle: within the 4y election period
- concrete bias
electoral distortions
- short-term bias:
- all politicians (incl well-meaning) need to worry about re-election
- less attention to climate change, pensions for ageing populations
- commitment problems: why invest now if my successor might cancel it? - esp as successors prefer to claim credit for their own ideas
- it is an investment: cost now for benefit later
- politicians will only do stuff that is beneficial for them when there are elections
- electoral cycle:
- voters remember recent events more sharply: things that were recently in the news
- so politicians concentrate their investments and stimulate the econ just before an election
- e.g. forbearance to consumers and businesses for electoral support (Uttar Pradesh: unpaid electricity bills spike by 3% in election years)
- spending is lower when there are no elections near
- volatility is not good -> developmental consequences
- a ‘concrete’ bias:
- dev requires many ‘hidden’ inputs, e.g. teacher training, management, oversight, maintenance
- politicians invest only in what voters can see and reward: buildings, ribbon-cutting events
- democratization in Africa led to the abolition of school fees and many more children in schools BUT no investment in quality
definition: clientelism
= contingent exchange of material benefit for political support
rules for neutral distribution exit on paper (e.g. everyone has right to healthcare)
= universal rights, not conditioned on political support
but are broken/twisted in practice:
- bureaucrats, politicians use discretion/control/power/choice to control access
- local brokers monitor who you support/vote for (e.g. if you vote for a person you see a pic -> broker asks what the color of the tie was to check if you voted for the “correct” candidate)
-> a ‘quid pro quo’ between patron and client: an unequal exchange
varieties of clientelism
- patronage = distributing public jobs (the opposite of autonomy/meritocracy)
- vote-buying = gifts, cash or services for votes (usually 20-30$)
- relational = long-term ties of trust between parties/politicians and voters (e.g. if there is a problem, i can always go to him, and he will help me -> i will always vote for him)
how does clientelism affect development?
(clientelism can benefit development, but in general:)
clientelism harms public services:
- private goods over more efficient public goods
- handouts instead of infrastructure - a patronage bureaucracy has less autonomy
- in Brazil students’ test scores get worse when a new party replaces temporary teachers (new teachers not qualified but chosen by patronage) - lack of accountability:
- voters must vote for their patron, not the best candidate
- inverts democratic accountability (Stokes 2005)
- accountability is reversed: voters are accountable to the politicians, who check if they voted for them - property rights protection is less credible
- in Côte d’Ivoire, land rights depended on who you voted for
- people in the opposition will not invest bc their property rights are not guaranteed/respected
clientelism - who is to blame?
bureaucrats?
- donors often use aid to do ‘capacity building’ to reduce clientelism: training for bureaucrats, new IT system, revising institutional rules, new organizations
- but capacity building just makes bureaucracies more efficient at clientelism : political incentives haven’t changed
are voters to blame?
- voters do demand clientelism
- people ask for favors
- politicians are the first to call when the state is not helpful
- well yes maybe voters are doing this, but it is bc the system is not good
it depends on the alternative:
“voters are right to ask for rice”: voters know if you promise good governance, better education, infrastructure, they can’t deliver bc the resources aren’t there
clientelism is the opposite of:
programmatic politics
(like in Europe)
- politicians offer distinct programs: policies and public goods
- can target groups of citizens based on objective socioeconomic characteristics rather than political behavior (e.g. women, the poor)
- aim for general policies, people will benefit no matter who they vote for, who people support
- independent of who you are voting for
reading shows importance moving from clientelism to programmatic politics in Mexico:
- Pronasol (was going to the middle class, good for winning votes) = before democratization = clientelist
- progresa (program of education, health and nutrition) = you get benefit no matter if you voted for a certain party
how does democracy affect clientelism?
either
democracy encourages programmatic parties and broad appeals using public goods
- e.g. the PAN in Mexico, the Workers’ Party (PT) in Brazil
or
democracy creates ‘competitive clientelism’
- e.g. Nigeria, Kenya
- an incumbency advantage in resources for clientelism
- places with a lot of money/recourses
- we’re not entirely sure yet why this is the case
(16.29 rewatch)
clientelism affect clientelism - Mexico
democratization -> more programmatic social policies:
bc state already had capacity so was able to implement developmental programs + bc Zapatista Rebellion (rebellion bc they did not benefit from clientelism)
- state had the capacity to deliver and monitor Progresa/Opportunidades
- threat of violence if clientelism continued - Zapatista Rebellion
- the opposition controlled the legislature, so could constrain the gov’s discretion
haven’t seen much of such effects in African countries
don’t worry too much about the details of mexico, just know that programmetic politics is better than clientelism, but how to get it is diffcult, democracy is not enough
definition: corruption
= the misuse of political power for personal gain (money or votes)
- bribery
- extortion
- fraud
- kickbacks
- collusion
petty corruption vs grand corruption
petty corruption
- bribes to police to pass a roadblock
- bribes to get a driving license faster (e.g. average payment 2x official price in India)(drivers don’t really take exam -> unsafe drivers)
- very common in many countries, just bc they can (e.g. have to pay police money to pass road, they have a weapon bc it is monopolized)
grand corruption
= also widespread
- millions/billions of dollars stolen from the centralized politicians, the highest functions
= get money out of the government and to your pocket
- ‘Carwash’ (‘Lava Jato’) in Brazil: contractors for Petrobras colluded on how much to bid, raising prices and channeling >US$2bn to politicians
- Goldenberg in Kenya: Fake importing of US$1bnof gold and diamonds paid for by Central Bank to finance election campaign (paid for diamonds that were never delivered)
- Anglo-Leasing in Kenya: $740m in Up-front payments for security services never delivered; redirected to politicians
- 1MDB in Malaysia: US$4.5bn laundered from government development corporation, channeled to Prime Minister Najib Razak and his party, UMNO (looks like development but was used as front to launder money with support from European and Western banks)
- Truong My Lan in Vietnam: US$44bn of loans,93% of Saigon Commercial Bank’s lending, to its main owner to buy real estate (commercial banker did this, politicians didn’t do anything bc they got some money)
corruption harms development:
-
wasting scarce resources
- e.g. Uganda 1991-95: only 13% budgeted funds reach schools)
- = wasting investment opportunities -
discouraging investment and merit:
- corruption demands prevent construction being completed/started (why build somewhere where suddenly someone will come and bribe you)
- bureaucrats pay for jobs where they can be corrupt -
weakening institutions: corruption is by definition rule-breaking
- how you’re financed -> how you govern
- e.g. Bangladesh Rana Plaza collapse 2013: corruption led to safety standards being violated
- e.g. donor-funded mayors in Colombia have doubled the rate of deforestation due to not enforcing environmental rules (forbearance) -
undermining trust
- e.g. Barcenas scandal Spain 2013: corruption scandal reduced trust in politicians
2 is bigger consequence than 1
rewatch 1635
corruption - cause or symptom of weak institutions and weak state
it may be a symptom rather than a root cause
- it is not about bad people, it is about weak institutions, bad situations
- corruption is the consequence of bigger underlying problems
stopping corruption may not induce development, the underlying stuff needs to be addressed
corruption is USEFUL for citizens in developing countries to address systemic problems:
- corruption can help protect property rights (paying off the police secures your investments)
- corrupt politicians have more power for enforcement
- being tough/corrupt can help deliver projects where there’s no embedded autonomy
- voters support corrupt candidates: corrupt politicians get things done, that not-corrupt politicians struggle with: they know how the system works (how to get stuff done, to bribe) + can use violence to force investment etc.
- if 10% is stolen, what happens to the 90%? can never be spent, but can also be used for investment, for development - corruption is electoral campaign financing (essential to political competition where there’s no public funding (aka most developing countries))
- Goldenberg scandal: financed food distribution to voters and cars to bribe politicians
- !!there will always be incentive for corruption if there’s no public funding for campaigns - corruption is an informal institution that becomes normalized
- paying a bribe is not seen as bad, it is normalized as something you have to do
- more than 1/3 of people in Mexico and Nigeria say that other people believe it is okay to pay a bribe
-> anticorruption strategies need to take this into account
e.g. Bangladesh Rana Plaza collapse 2013, the Plaza itself wouldn’t have been there, there wouldn’t have been investment if there wasn’t corruption, if they weren’t bribed
will anti-corruption efforts work?
if corruption is systemic, a social norm, and a symptom of deeper problems:
anti-corruption efforts mostly will not work
weak institutions and weak states push people into circumstances where corruption is beneficial
- strict formal rules don’t change systemic norms/incentives
- can a corrupt system reform itself?
- strong incentives for isomorphic mimicry
targeting corruption may do nothing to strengthen the underlying institution/state
- despite decades of anti-corruption projects in Sub-Saharan Africa: average CPI declined from 36%-29% since 1998
if you put a new institution in, it will not fix it, bc the whole system is rigged, the institution will go corrupt
corrupt countries can develop quickly
- if investment happens despite corruption (the corrupt have their investments protected)
not everyone had property rights, but those who did did invest + corruption could increase property rights protection (i pay you so you protect my property) - if the weakness of the state and institutions is addressed by deeper political processes
in e.g. China and the West
- China: many examples of high level corruption
- West got rich by violence, corruption: in industrialization process people doing the investment, getting rich, are gangsters
protecting the property rights of some can be good for investment, still many lose out
does democracy increase corruption?
(next class?)
New democracies have weak institutions:
- More competition -> More electoral financing needed -> More corruption
- Authoritarian Kenya was less corrupt because leaders limited corruption to ‘enlarge the pie’ (Mwangi 2008)
- Democracy makes corruption ‘visible’: NGOs and Free Media = Undermining legitimacy
In consolidated democracies:
- Active anti-corruption agencies with autonomy
- Institutions and the rule of la w are strengthened with a rich state
- Free media, free speech, civil society are effective
- Informal institutions (social norms) against corruption
