L11: collective action Flashcards
conclusion
collective action
- achieving collective gains means overcoming free riding
- by selective incentives, coercion or social norms
improving accountability with collective action
- corruption persists bc everyone else is corrupt; it’s costly and futile to be honest
- reporting and punishing corruption as a social norm
- informal accountability through solidary groups increases investment
development as collective action
- traditional social norms can encourage collective action for investment (e.g. ‘Imihigo’ in Rwanda)
shifting equilibria
- switching to a ‘pro-development’ equilibrium means changing EXPECTATIONS and SOCIAL NORMS
definition: free-riding
= each person can benefit without contributing
- “The maximization of short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off” (Ostrom 1998)
- Rationally, no-one contributes!
- Free-riding prevents cooperation
collective action / free riding with
public goods: benefits are non-excludable -> free riding possible as each person can benefit without contributing
- defence, infrastructure, public health, property rights
- climate change mitigation (rationally you shouldn’t invest, you should free ride)
- electoral accountability
- if you want to keep someone accountable, hundreds need to do so with you + you don’t get e.g. the 10$ of the vote buying - social accountability (boring/expensive to do, better to let others do it)
= you can’t keep people from benefitting from them if they haven’t contributed
paradox of collective action
rational behavior = do not cooperate, don’t protest, don’t invest in public goods, don’t do social accountability
paradox = people are too cooperative in practice
- in lab experiments, cooperation rates are 20-50% not 0%
- people DO protest in large nr (sometimes)
- voters DO kick out bad leaders (sometimes)
*e.g. Botswana kicked out corrupt leaders after years
definition: collective action
= multiple people coordinating their actions to overcome a free-riding problem and secure a collective benefit
collective action is easier where:
- the group is SMALLER
- communication and monitoring is easier - COERCION is used
- taxation solves many public goods problems: if you don’t pay you get punished, you get forced -> this is how we pay for public goods - SELECTIVE INCENTIVES are used
- handing out t-shirts, food, money to participants, entertainment
- you only get a benefit if you contribute - informal institutions: SOCIAL NORMS
- where there are repeated interactions
- and social costs to not participating
- voting as a duty
- community clean-up days
- e.g. voting buttons: if you don’t have one you’re judged
!4 is most important + often used
improving accountability with collective action
- how it fails
= anti-corruption projects try to increase accountability
- most African countries have ‘very strong’ anti-corruption law
but increased monitoring, or strict punishment does not increase ENFORCEMENT
because each principal does not do their job:
- bureaucrats look the other way to protect their jobs
- politicians steal to finance elections
- voters prioritize ethnicity, clientelism over voting out bad leaders
- voters say they don’t want corruption, but often demand/request it
= proff fears we’ll finish IRO and start anti-corruption efforts
how might collective action approach to tackling corruption work?
free-riding in reporting and punishing corruption
- monitoring and reporting is costly
- less corruption benefits everyone in society (a public good, making investment safer)
stricter enforcement does not help because CORRUPTION IS THE NORM
- an informal institution (‘culture’) of corruption
- “if i don’t take it, it is going to be taken by someone else”
- “well, if everybody seems corrupt, why shouldn’t i be corrupt”
even worse BEING HONEST can bring social punishment and shaming
- “if you have an office but have not stolen - if you haven’t helped your family - they are actually gin to curse you”
- “[people do not report because] they fear losing their jobs… the reporting system is corrupt itself
FAILED anti-corruption reforms just create more cynicism and stronger expectations that corruption will continue
John Githongo example
= permanent secretary in charge of governance and ethics Kenya 2003-5
- reported the Anglo-Leasing corruption scandal
- allegedly received deaths threats from the head of Kenya’s anti-corruption commission
- fled the country
EVERYONE wants a less corrupt society
- but no individual’s action can take us there
- being corrupt is rational when everyone else is corrupt
WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE?
- we need to change SOCIAL NORMS AND EXPECTATIONS
- informal institutions!
- so people WANT to sanction for wrong-doing
improving accountability with collective action - norms against corruption
- bureaucrats get respect for blowing the whistle (e.g. in some Western countries)
- judges reject bribes to maintain social status as ‘clean’
- voters see their role as punishing corrupt politicians (Brazil, not India)
- citizens collectively protests against bad services to be a part of the community
how do we get accountability under authoritarianism?
= where judges are not independent, there are no elections and citizens have few social rights (e.g. China)
‘informal accountability’ = local elites face SOCIAL SANCTIONS, if they fail to deliver public goods
- and ‘MORAL STANDING’ rewards where they perform well
- e.g. party secretary named on the donor wall in the temple
- where there are VILLAGE TEMPLES, investment rises from 61 to 99 yuan per person (village temples provide village level social accountability)
SOLIDARY GROUPS are civil society groups that are:
- EMBEDDING: politicians and bureaucrats are member
- so politicians can be rewarded - ENCOMPASSING: the group covers the whole political community
- so politicians are incentivized to provide public goods to all
both encompassing and embedding are necessary
e.g. churches: are encompassing but not embedding (e.g. communists/atheists don’t go there) -> can’t use the church to punish and reward politicians
development as collective action
- Why is maternal mortality improving faster in Rwanda than in Malawi, Uganda or Niger?
(reading)
institutional rules and policies are the same across countries
all 4 countries tried to improve accountability using the PRINCIPAL-AGENT model
- making traditional birth attendants ILLEGAL
- performance BONUSES for health workers
- ‘Health MONITORING’ units
- ‘voluntary health committees’ to SUPERVISE clinics
Niger
- the state provided ambulances but still no fuel for drivrs
- nurses still unmotivated as they were appointed by patronage
- nobody cleans up the clinic
the accountability mechanisms only worked in Rwanda!
- ‘Imihigo’ public pledges by the president and mayors
- breaking a pledge lets down your community
- checking on progress is a citizen’s obligation - ‘Ubudehe’ self-help to solve local problems
- reliance on outsiders is lazy - ‘Umuganda’ communal work
- rude not to participate
- you expect others to participate
Rwanda used COLLECTIVE action to make ACCOUNTABILITY mechanisms work
- traditional informal institutions and social norms stopped free-riding
development as a principal-agent problem vs as collective action problem
development as a principal-agent problem
= what economists, political logic, WB officials etc. will lead development workers to believe
- the OBJECTIVES of actors are IN CONFLICT
- we have to INCENTIVIZE SOME PEOPLE to change their behavior
- we need to generate ACCOUNTABILITY
development as a collective action problem
- the OBJECTIVES of actors are THE SAME
- the CONTEXT prevents them realizing these objectives - they are STUCK IN A TRAP
- we need to help people
COORDINATE - not the good holding the bad accountable, we all in the same situation -> how do we collectively fix it
shifting equilibria - the prisoner’s dilemma
- everyon else no protest + you no protest -> 0,0
- everyone else protest, you no protest -> 50, -10
- everyone no protest + you protest -> -10,50
- you and everyone protest -> 40,40
40,40 is the best outcome
but we are trapped in the equilibrium, in 0,0
if the ‘protest, protest’ payoff is increased to reflect the social rewards of cooperation
- if everyone protests, i don’t want to miss out
- not just policy benefit, introduces a personal benefit
=> make it an assurance game
shifting equilibria - assurance game
if the ‘protest, protest’ payoff is increased to reflect the social rewards of cooperation
- if everyone protests, i don’t want to miss out
- not just policy benefit, introduces a personal benefit
=> make it an assurance game
- everyone else no protest + you no protest -> 0,0
- everyone else protest, you no protest -> 50, -10
- everyone no protest + you protest -> -10,50
- you and everyone protest -> 60,60
it becomes better for you to be part of the protest
in this situation, there are 2 equilibria: 0,0 and 60,60
protesting for you only beneficial if everyone protests
-> what is going to happen? it depends on if you think others will protest
assurance game is a coordination game: i only participate if everyone else does
single equilibrium vs multiple equilibrium game
single equilibrium prisoner’s dilemma
multiple equilibrium assurance game
solution = get social norms to work, to move out of a bad equilibrium, to cross the threshold to move to the better equilibrium
Italy + Lagos example
Italy: North pays taxes, South doesn’t (it is socially rewarded, accepted)
- diff social norms
- need to change social norms to make sure they start to pay taxes, don’t just need to change incentives
e.g. Nigerian cities have diff levels of ‘tax morale’: people in Lagos more willing to pay tax than in other cities, this is reflected in tax collection
- how did this happen?
- national gov was ran by diff party, national gov cut regional gov off from oil revenues -> regional gov had incentive to get people to pay taxes
- tax paying in bad equilibrium is hard -> why would you pay taxes -> they didn’t
- now incredibly high tax revenues: PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY CREATED A NORM OF TAX PAYMENT
- see gov is diff, they deliver -> i see the diff already, i am willing to pay taxes bc it will create results
Lagos state gov STARTED DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES FIRST
- raising trust in government
- raising expectations others are paying taxes
- PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY CREATED A NORM OF TAX PAYMENT
- ‘policy feedback’: creating a social contract
how can we shift equilibria?
build on latent SOCIAL NORMS and TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS e.g. ‘Imihigo’ in Rwanda
- don’t throw away traditions, social norms and traditional trust -> make accountability work
- people will only fight corruption if they believe it is bad
‘deliver first’ to build a new SOCIAL CONTRACT
- deliver something so people start to trust the gov
- prove you’re not corrupt e.g.
lead from the top to change EXPECTATIONS
- use shocks/events as opportunities (e.g. Rwanda genocide)
- leadership is not enough: not just an honest person on the top, need to convince the rest to change as well
more than just sharing factual information with individuals:
- make information public and common knowledge
- information about what others’ think/expect (e.g. in Saudi Arabia attitudes to women are more progressive than people think others’ attitudes are)
- change people’s expectation: make people think the rest of society is also changing, that we’re all jumping/protesting
- with taxes what people think is more important than the facts, if we update people’s expectations, their true expectations are actually more pro-taxes
so answer to practice question 2 = a
