L13: leadership Flashcards
summary how to get development
- accountability
- but how do we get the principals to demand development?
- collective action required to encourage participation/enforcement
- collective action
- but how do we all simultaneously move out of a bad equilibrium?
- leadership and a big push to change expectations required (top-down process)
- representation
- but identity quotas and party systems change require institutional changes
- some parties/people better capable of collective action and accountability
-> how do we change the rules: need someone with the political will
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT: where does the political will for enforcing accountability, stimulating collective action and changing representation come from?
conclusion
structure and agency
- structural constraints and path dependence mean change is hard
- comprehensive institutional change relies on critical junctures
- leaders can use agency to build coalitions
developmental coalitions
- broad coalitions to ensure elites support development
- concentrated power for enforcing the rules
- directing rents to investment
- using policy feedback to sustain process
fundamental problem politics of development
where does the political will for enforcing accountability, stimulating collective action and changing representation come from?
- structure vs agency
- developmental coalitions
structure vs agency
- structural arguments
development is determined by:
- geography
- history: slavery, colonialism
- geopolitics: pressure to open markets
- formal institutions: authoritarianism
- informal institutions: corruption
- the state: predatory
structural factors can be stacked against you, e.g. in Chad (landlocked, desert, resource trap, colonialism, slave trade, authoritarianism, fighting neighbors, no trust in state, neoliberal state)
history and institutions are path dependent (lock-in of initial choices that limits future changes)
- winners from current institutions are powerful and veto changes
- system is working for them -> why change the system
- e.g. president Deby, Chad (in power bc his dad was) - informal institutions depend on expectations
- e.g. idea that girls don’t go to school
- stuck in an equilibrium/trap - agreeing new institutions is a collective action problem itself
- which new institutions?
- e.g. Deby called national dialogue (new set of institutions), but no collective action to get change: everyone wanted diff things
- second order collective action problem: have to agree to one specific model (compromise)(rather than just have to cooperate/meet)
path dependency prevents easy reform solutions:
yes these things are nice, but they only happen if the leaders want them to -> crucial to understand actors and their interests
- accountability: once i am in power, why help citizens and voters hold me accountable?
- collective action: why report corruption if it leads to social shaming and everyone else is corrupt?
- representation: why change the rules by which i was elected?
path dependency restricts the scope/opportunity for change
definition: agency
= the capacity of agents to shape their environment
(changing the structure, getting out of the path dependent trap)
ability to :
- change and enforce institutions
- make institutions legitimate/respected
- coordinate collective actions (charisma, media coverage)
- alter social norms
(e.g. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf president Liberia 2006-18 won prize for African leadership) - but Liberia still 177th on the HDI (2022)
- strong structural constraints: civil war legacy, ebola, corruption, debt
- path dependency can be strong
(e.g. Nelson Mandela) - 1980s/90s, remade South African society: glue people together in the rainbow nation
definition: critical juncture
= moment in time (shock) where the constraints of path dependency are alleviated (less severe) and agency has broader scope to alter institutional rules and outcomes in the future
- break path dependency, opportunity for change
- doesn’t mean it gets better, can get worse or same, but there’s opportunity for change
- shocks that open up new opportunities
- external imposition/threats
- e.g. Japanese post-war constitution (imposed by the US)
- after the Korean war (bc consistent threat Norht Korean invasion) - revolutions
- e.g. after war (RPF’s victory after Rwandan genocide: new constitution: central system with local social norms, but not democratic)
- e.g. democratization (Brazil 1988 constitution incl broad social rights) - economic shocks
- oil shocks and debt crises forced neoliberal reform in the 1980s (force by int’l community) + diff choices about what public services to fund - shifting ideas about institutions
- fall of Berlin wall led to democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa (bc communist idea collapsed)
- Arab spring
- ideas inspire elsewhere
how do leaders use agency?
by forming coalitions
(not by being smarter, working harder, being more honest or more ideological committed)
forming coalitions is collective action
- common goal = win and stay in power
- each potential member wants to ‘free ride’ on the concessions of others
- leaders must get enough potential members to COMPROMISE and agree
coalitions can be formal (governing coalitions) and informal
- informal e.g. elites part of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi informal coalition = formal coalition of 24 parties + Hindu nationalist organizations (RSS, provides public goods, social mobilization wing of the BJP, offers in return policies that reflect Hindu nationalism) + billionaires (to finance elections)
coalitions benefits
being in a coalition is an exchange
institutional rules reward coalition members
- 2018 6 Indian airports were privatized
- privatization rules changed to allow firms without direct experience of running an airport
- all won by Gautam Adani’s Adani Group
- a supporter of PM Modi’s since 2003
- = clearly beneficial to be in the coalition
coalition benefits can include CORRUPTION
- Brazil’s Mensalao (big monthly payment) scandal
- US$12.000 per month to vote for the gov in congress
definition: developmental coalition
= a broad coalition with concentrated enforcement power that directs rents to invest in development
- depends on the relationship between POLITICAL and ECONOMIC elites
- broad coalitions: key eco and political elites are part of the coalition
- so institutions are inclusive, not extractive
- so there’s EMBEDDEDNESS between the bureaucracy and private sector
- so losers are credibly compensated
- so collective action is able to shift the equilibrium (civil society sectors etc.)(the broader the coalition, the easier it is to make a change in norms and expectations)
- the more people have a stake in the coalition, the more has to be accomodated, the more beneficial it needs to be
- concentrated power: the leader can discipline members of the coalition
- within the broad coalition power is concentrated, so it doesn’t get out of hand and become paralyzed
- so institutions are enforced
- accountability limits corruption and clientelism (otherwise everyone would take piece of the pie)(focus on growing the pie rather than sharing the pie)
- autonomy of bureaucrats is protected
- not eliminating corruption
- ensuring corruption/favoritism ‘buys’ development by protecting investments and compensating the losers
- e.g. Lula (Brazil) did not get majority -> couldn’t pass any laws -> created coalition with money, allowed them to pass regulation = corruption kickstarted dev., it enables legislation to be passed/enforced
- rents directed to investment
- a developmental state: centralizing the management of econ rents
- ‘embedded’ autonomy coordinates and protects investments
developmental coalitions and politics
development coalitions don’t avoid politics
(dev is not a technical exercise, it is a political proces of providing investment incentives)
they make development politically successful
- business elites get INVESTMENT opportunities and protection if they provide ELECTORAL FINANCING
- bureaucrats earn PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL PRAISE from delivering services, not corruption
- voters REWARD politicians for development
unlike other coalitions that make dev politically unattractive
- narrow coalitions (rely on small group for power, eg. the military) -> only represent narrow interests
- extractive
- benefit from keeping competing groups poor
developmental coalitions need to be politically successful:
- structural constraints still exist; critica juncture is only temporary
- how do they change politics?
- how do they escape the bad equilibrium?
policy design is not a question of technical cost-benefit analysis
- or measuring pro-poor impact
but ANTICIPATING how policies can raise the POLITICAL PRESSURE FOR FUTURE DEV through:
- accountability
- collective action
- representation
!!!use policy feedback: change the politics for the better (in a way that makes more good policies in the future)
Bolsa Familia example
Bolsa Familia cash transfers in Brazil created strong VESTED INTEREST defending the policy
- accountability: a programmatic policy giving voters the econ security to reject clientelism
- collective action: a new collective identity and pride among poor beneficiaries
- !!representation: benefits go to mothers, strengthening their political power (not head of the household)
!!don’t think about cost-benefit analysis, think about politics, will it support or undermine the dev coalition?
people that received Bolsa Familia benefits are more likely to vote for the party that created the policy
-> all political parties now compete to extend the program
- the inclusion of outsiders
- transformative policy: it has become irreplaceable
(it changed how voters thought about politics: the got money -> eco security to vote for good politicians, punish the bad ones, not rely on clientelism)
(more people connected -> push for new policies together)
developmental coalitions in Rwanda - Rwanda achieved rapid development
Rwanda faces many structural constraints
- geography: landlocked, tropical
- history and culture: legacy of colonialism, slavery and genocide damage trust
- institutions: authoritarian political institutions
and yet it has succeeded in implementing dev where others have failed:
- institutional rules have been strengthened
- the state has been centralized and given autonomy
- external aid has been absorbed successfully
- low corruption, low clientelism
- limited resistance to change by losers/winners
how has Rwanda achieved rapid dev?
a developmental coalition
- broad coalition
- politicians
- business, military elites
- Tutsis and moderate Hutus
- women
- concentrated power
- the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is a dominant party
- grounded in the military
- directing rents to investment
- Tri-Star Investments / Crystal Ventures (100% RPF controlled)
- > 3% GDP; 9% national revenue
- political protection from the RPF
development is politically beneficial:
- RPF electoral CAMPAIGNS FINANCED by Tri-Star/Crystal profits (50% of 2010 campaign)
a ‘DEVELOPMENTAL PATRIMONIAL STATE’
- developmental: directing and disciplining resources for investment
- patrimonialism: centralized and personalized power
- reflects the agency of Kagame
- surprising and risky!
- what guarantees Kagame won’t change his mind?
what conditions permitted the emergence of a developmental coalition in Rwanda?
structural conditions:
- a history of Weberian bureaucracy and indigenous state-building
- disempowerment of large landowners
- a dominant, cohesive, elite
- external threats that align elite interests with development
critical juncture = 1994 genocide and RPF victory
+ agency of Kagame in forming a coalition
- forging a broad coalition
- inviting Hutu moderates into the gov
- convening private sector investors, exiles, diaspora
- using concentrated power
- a steady stream of officials at all levels of gov have been criminally or administratively sanctioned
- human rights violations, arrest of journalists, and assassinations of opponents to retain power
- enforcing accountability
- strict punishment for corruption
- fines for parents whose children are not in school
- initiating collective action
- social norms, e.g. Imihigo, Ubudehe, Umuganda
- a national civic (non-ethnic) identity
- increasing representation for pro-development groups (30% for women since 2003)
BUT sustainability of the regime is unclear
-> depends on policy feedback
- dependent on Kagame
- eco crisis may undermine the coalition
- reciprocal financing can easily become corruption
- dominant parties lack credibility
- violence/invasion discourages investment.
he skipped this: what does the role of agency and coalitions imply for the role of donors and external aid?
- understand the motivations of leaders and the nature of coalitions
- do polsci - if the coalition is not developmental, limit support
- at best, finance civil society instead
- try to stimulate developmental coalitions - if the coalition is developmental, support it with very few conditionalities
- local actors
