GS2 Flashcards
I. Constitution-fundamental rights
justiciable civil and political rights
necessary for fullest development of individual and personality, preserving his/her dignity
state Reasonaby performed well in FR
role of legislature
does not pass legislations that violate FR.
any excesses of the executive is made accountable in the floor of the house.
Role of executive
during policy making and implementation, it is ensured FR not violated
encounter killing, army made answerable.
Eg: When controversial films release, maintain law and order so that freedom of speech and expression not curtailed.
role of judiciary
ultimate custodian of FR
Writ jurisdiction to secure FR
Expand scope of FR via broad interpretation
eg: right to life expanded.
democratising FR through PILs
eg : Olga tellis case: right to shelter.
weaknesses of institutions
violation of individual rights like
freedom of expression
perumal murugan case
vishwaroopam
right to life
lynching
encounter killings
freedom of movement
right to priavcy
aadhar bill as money bill
cultural rights of minorities
food habits
why ?
guaranteeing social economic and political rights is the cornerstone of a modern liberal democracy
non fulfilment of these rights prevent the individual from rising to his/her fullest potential and prevent us from realising our goal of an inclusive society
so state machinery must perform their respective roles and exercise necessary checks and balances to make these rights a reality for our citizenry
DPSP
rights perspective -keep equal to both DPSP and FR.
non justiciable social and economic rights. guidance in policy making
state not adequate in DPSP
LEgislature
recent trends of rights based legislations, attempts to materialise DPSP
guiding light in law making
RTE, MGNREGA, RTI. debate on right to health. LARR.
Executive
NFSM. PDS. PC, NITI ayog
redistributive and inclusive policies are inspired by principles of DPSP.
judiciary
elaborate interpretation of FR, from DPSP , domain of non-justiciability to legality
right to clean air, RTI
Separation of Powers-Office of profit
article 102 and 191 of the Indian constitution bars members of the legislature (both central and states) from holding an office of profit (OOP) under the executive.
current context :decision of the President to disqualify 20 MLA’s of AAP has brought back demands to unambiguosly define OOP so that separation of powers(SOP) is preserved intact.
OOP and SOP
if a legislator enjoys an office of profit , he/she cant perform their functions independently of the executive of which they are now made a part.
Might not be able to make executive accountable at the floor of the house, during motions, question hours etc, thus violating the checks and balances that are intrinsic to the separation of powers doctrine.
So OOP exists as a disqualification criteria to preserve SOP
this is the link
but neither the constitution nor the representation of people act has defined what an office of profit is.
moreover the parliament keep exempting offices from the list of OOP offices every now and then, violating the spirit of idea.
eg: Parliament (prevention of disqualification ) act, 1959, amendment bill/oop bill controversy
eg : sonia gandhi nac issue
issues with the present criteria
by SC
the court in Guru Gobind Basu case ruled that the decisive test for determining whether a person holds any office of profit under the government is the test of appointment
question of appointing authority wont even settle the issue because most of the appointments may be in advisory capacities
for utilising the experience
In jaya bachchan case , if capable of yielding a pecuniary gain.
real criteria should be whether executive authority is exercised by legislators in terms of decision making or do they directly involve in deployment of public funds ie whether legislators enjoy real executive powers and not whether they receive a pecuniary gain.
So OOP as it works now do not help in ensuring the necessary checks and balances.
2nd ARC recommendations
all offices in purely advisory bodies where the experience , insights and expertise of a legislator would be inputs in governmental policy , shall not be treated as offices of profit, irrespective of the remuneration and perks associated with such an office (opposite of jaya bhachan judgement )
all offices involving executive decision making and control of public funds, including positions on the governing boards of public undertakings and statutory and non-statutory authorities directly deciding policy or managing institutions or authorizing or approving expenditure shall be treated as offices of profit, and no legislator shall hold such offices.
use of discretionary funds at the disposal of legislators , the power to determine specific projects and schemes , or select the beneficiaries or authorize expenditure shall constitute discharge of executive functions and will invite disqualification under article 102 and 191 , irrespective of whether or not a new office is notified and held (against guru gobind case judgement
if a serving minister, by virtue of office , is a member or head of certain organizations like the planning commission, where close coordination and integration between the council of ministers and the organization or authority or committee is vital for the day to day functioning of government , it shall not be treated as office of profit.
Judicial law making, judicial activism , judicial overreach
while judicial lawmaking and judicial activism does advance democratic interests and public welfare, its transgressions into other two organs of government can upset the much needed checks and balances
seperation of powers is part of basic structure
Judicial law making
when judiciary by way of interpretation keeps the law dynamic to the changing societal needs, it is termed judical law making. it is necessary because no legislature can foresee all the contingencies which a particular law seeks to address
eg: what comprises right to life and personal liberty within the scope of article 21 or what amounts to procedure established by law within the meaning of the article
right to clean environment being held as part of right to life
so judiciary fills the gaps in laws by way of progressive interpretation
judicial activism
similarly judicial activism implies an active use of judicial power for the realisation of social justice
here judiciary tries to ensure social justice to the poorest of the poor and aims to create an egalitarian society that is not exploitative
eg: developed the idea of public interest litigation and took up the causes of under trial prisoneres, ensured just compensation to bhopal gas tragedy victims, etc, tajmahal, rehabilitation of vrindavan widows
both judicial lawmaking and activism find constitutional support in
art 13 : judicial review to invalidate laws violative of fundamental rights
art 142 : the supreme court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it
not locus standi
judicial overreach
when courts exceed their mandate of judicial interpretation and becomes a super legislative or a super executive , it is termed judicial overreach . without expertise.
eg : cancellation of coal block allocation licenses without hearing the licenses
roadside liquor ban purpotedly in the interest of road safety without considering its negative impact on livelihood, tourism and state’s revenues
drunken driving only 4 % road deaths, 44 % because of overspeeding.
consequences of judicial over reach for the democratic polity
undermining separation of powers doctrine thus violating the checks and balances between the three organs of government
will result in laws and policies being made without holistic understanding of an issue and the far reaching consequences it might have
shifts the legislative balance of power from an elected parliament to an unelected judiciary, who are far removed from the grassroot realities of the nation
conflicts between different branches of government
scenario
if legislature and executive do not respond to a judicial overreach into their domain, courts might initiate contempt proceedings.
judiciary overreacting to deter parliament’s constitutional powers in the name of judicial independence . eg: Declaring NJAC bill as unconstitutional
over active judiciary falling prey to the misuse of the PIL’s for private interests , political rivalry etc thus wasting judiciary’s precious time and resources
eg: Cleaning BCCI
way forward
judiciary as an institution must exercise must self restraint rather than overreach because
in a democracy, the remedy for a malfunctioning legislature and executive must come from the people, not the judiciary. the people must do so through electoral franchise, democratic protests or through public criticism via media
while exercise of powers by the legislature and executive is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on judiciary’s own exercise of power is the self imposed discipline of judicial restraint
similarly cases invoking art 142 can be entrusted to a constitutional bench of minimum 5 SC judges so that discretion is used with judicial prudence and restraint.
Secularism
secularism and citizenship
As a concept arrived with British colonialism (though perhaps not the practice )
associated with modern nation states
Indian state has not defined secularism per se
Separation of religion from politics
equal distance from all religions
In the preamble and in FRs- basic structure.
42nd amendment in preamble.
citizenship in modern india
equal right bearing subject in the constitution
against the pre-republic subject of a ruler
has rights which can be claimed against the state
liberty and equality being fundamental
secularism and citizenship
secularism as necessary for civic citizen
all religions treated equally -all customs and cultures are recognised, accommodated-citizens treated equally
cultural nationalism
nationalism not defined along constitutional values but nationalism along one culture/ religion/ ethnicity
eg: nazist germany
recognition of the other as necessarily unequal and hence inferior
everyone could be equal but there is one group which is the first among the equals and hence enjoy privilege
nation as the end and citizens as the means to promote national cause.
is cultural nationalism a deviation from modern citizenship
movement from civic virtues to ethnic virtues.
one can only be born with ethnic virtues and cannot be educated into, unlike civic virtues.
rejects secualarism as a western import
re-imagination of citizenship and a deviation from basic structure of the constitution
treatment of minorities as inferior and exclusion from public sphere and democratic participation.
conclusion
cultural nationalism and fear of the other across globe
mention global context too
many didnt survive
electoral politics and rhetoric of past glory
importance of maintainign democratic institutions as per the constitution and rule of law
affects the constitutional dream of inclusive india
d46-fundamental rights : community vs individual rights
Fundamental rights in India
forms the corner stone and basic structure of the Indian constitution
not absolute rights, but can be reasonably restricted
FRs are mostly against arbitrary invasion by the state, but some are also against private individuals.
It is mostly aimed at preservation of individual rights- equality , liberty and social justice forms the foundation of these rights
but community rights are also part of it -in case of minorities , to protect their culture.
this tension has always existed since India became a republic.
individual v/s group rights
provision of managing internal affairs of the religion (art 26(b)) in conflict with individual rights
triple-talaq-right of muslim women as individuals v/s civil code of islam
female genital mutilation -right of bohra women v/s cultural practise
padmavati issue - freedom of expression of an individual v/s hurting religious sentiments
parsi temple entry case- freedom to perform last rites v/s community rights to excommunicate a member.
naga election issue- right of individual woman to contest elections v/s customs of community
courts have given opposing judgements over decades
1962 SC judgements in Sardar Saiffudin Sahib V/s State of Bombay- community rights overpower individual right-later critiqued as having colonial hangover (where individual rights was assumed to be protected through group rights and through proportional representation and reservations )
Indian constitution gives primacy to individual rights
Article 26, though appears to be favouring community over individual rights, is meant to protect minorities against cultural assimilation and state intervention- hence aimed at forces external to minorities and not internal matters affecting rights of members
another example of constitution favouring individual right is the measures taken to abolish practices like untouchability and child marriages thus favouring individual rights based on social reformation over cultural or social practices
social and community rights are hence aimed at protecting individual rights and secure liberty of its members.
conclusion
contemporary context of group rights
increasing majoritarian tendencies , atrocities against minorities , globalisation and erosion of cultural grounds etc are making communities cling on to identify based arguments
finding a balance is necessary to secure the confidence of the minorities
arbitrary and outside force-state legislation in this case- in securing individual rights might make the communities closed towards reform and internal reforms within communities will take a back seat.
d48- basic structure good or bad
Intro
basic structure doctrine was propounded by supreme court in the Keshavananda Bharati case of 1973
it stated that ‘Parliament could amend any part of the constitution so long as it did not alter or amend ‘the basic structure or essential features of the constitution ‘
it put a limit to the amending power of parliament under ART 368
How it altered the balance of power
brought about constitutional supremacy
by limiting power to amend the cosnstitution
pre-empted the scope of altering the constitution by a government with a ruthless majority
minerva mills case struck down government’s effort to bring unlimited amending powers to parliament.
supreme court became the custodian of the constitution
all amendments after the date on which keshavananda judgement was delivered will have to pass thee basic structure filter created by the supreme court
enhanced scope of judicial review to scrutinise all constitutional amendments and not just those concerning fundamental rights
along with the parliament power to amend the constitution, the supreme court gained a coextensive power to review and invalidate any amendment that destroyed its basic structure
eg: created the collegium system of judges appointing judges in this backdrop of enhanced judicial review
judicial independence raised to an end in itself
striking down of NJAC as unconstitutional , effectively nullifying the mandate of parliament and 2/3rd of state legislatures
it’s impact on democracy
hailed as the case that saved indian democracy
protected the indian state from collapsing like many of its south asian counterparts , whether through totalitarian rule, military coups or other extra-constitutional means
eg: in raj narain case, court struck down amendments to shield election of Prime Minister beyond courts scrutiny-thus safeguarding free and fair elections and rule of law
ninth schedule cannot be exploited as a black hole in the constitution
any 9th schedule entry after keshavananda judgement will be tested for conforming with basic structure
causes a democratic imbalance by vesting amending power in judges
supreme court an unelected and self appointed body vested with inordinate power over constituional amendments
eg: striking down NJAC as unconstitutional
personal preference of judges inform the basic structure due to ambiguity in it.
conclusion
the basic structure doctrine clearly qualifies as judicial innovation , where the judiciary went beyond its constitutional mandate of judicial interpretation
the undemocratic balance of power in favour of judiciary vis a vis the other two organs of state is not in the interests of a democratic polity
but even when we speculate the possible evils of the doctrine , it has not stalled any beneficial constitutional amendment so far and Indian courts have invoked it sparingly (like NJAC)
even the sceptics of the doctrine today admit that it was the judiciary’s rescue operation that saved Indian democracy.
d50-CAG and CEC integrity
Introduction
Institutional integrity of CAG and CEC stems from maintaining the independence and impartiality of these agencies from the executive
The CAG acts as the guardian of public purse and aid PAC in making executive accountable to the parliament. while CEC helps in the conduct of free and fair elections to parliament and state legislatures.
so if these agencies do not maintain their impartiality and independence from the executive , these constitutional roles can be undermined by vested poltical interests, affecting our democractic credentials.
to safeguard institutional integrity, in addition to guaranteeing.
security of tenure of the incumbents
providing a rigorous procedure for removal.
we need to have a fair, objective and transparent process for appointment to the offices of CAFG and CEC.
body
but the present system of appointment to these offices are done in an
arbitrary manner with criteria for selection shrouded in secrecy
very often appointment involve severe conflict of interest.
appointing an earlier secretary level bureaucrat , as CAG violates conflcit of interest norms as the CAG may be called upon to audit the decisions made by him/her earlier in the capacity of secretary
by leaving appointments wholly in the hands of the political executive the independence of the CEC and CAG is not well maintained.
eg: both are appointed by the President, means , in reality they are appointed by the PM and the cabinet.
the test of institutional integrity demands that incumbents to these offices must be above all suspicion and inspire confidence of the public.
so even though people of integrity and neutrality were appointed to these offices so far, lack of an objective process violates the demand of institutional integrity.
so as noted by supreme court in the CVC case (PJ thomas case)
the selection process to these high profile constitutional offices must be open and transparent
taking into account all relevant facts
so that people of impeccable integrity gets appointed.
for appointment to CAG, a high lvel committee with the Prime minister, speaeker of the lok sabha, ;leader of opposition in the lok sabha, finance minister, and chairman of PAC, as recommended by Common Cause can be looked into
similarly parliament must come up with a law as suggested by Supreme Court, to establish a collegium for the appointment of election commissioners
such a selection process will guarantee the independence and integrity of these offices and help inspire trust and confidence of the public.
II.Judi ,Exe, Legi,C-S relations,local bodies-Judiciary
eg: judicial corruption- justice shri narayan shukla
Cases coming to SC of india
politically sensitive cases
all fresh PIL
social justice matters
contempt of court matters
matters dealing with appointment of constitutional functionaries.
SC-more than 55,000 pending cases (nov 2017)
Judicial orders
2017-Pradyuman Bisht Vs Union Of India
directed all high courts to ensure CCTVs and audi and video recordings in subordinate courts.
Judicial independence without accountability (d23)
intro
judicial independence , a part of basic structure doctrine, implies
shielding judiciary from extraneous influence, both from other branches of government or from private or partisian interests
judicial accountability on the other hand implies
answerability and responsibility of judges for their decisions and actions
while judicial independence has been preserved in full spirit in India, the question of making judiciary accountable has raised itself again when 4 senior most judges raised alarms on the functioning of higher judiciary
need for judicial independence and accountability
judicial independence is necessary in the interest of checks and balances
make sure that judicial decisions are based solely on rule of law and not on any undue external influence
judiciary being the guardian of the constitution , look into constitutionality of legislative enactments and executive decisions . independence is crucial to act fearlessly and uphold justice in such instances
eg: Raj narain case, 2g scam case, naroda patiya case are examples of judiciary holding other two branches into account fearlessly
independence of judiciary has been institutionalised by giving judge’s voice in judicial appointments, security of tenure, contempt of court provisions etc
judicial accountability is a necessary corollary to judicial indpendence
promotes rule of law
as government is major litigant, executive control should be minimum
deters conduct that violate judicial impartiality and integrity
essential to promote public confidence in judges and judiciary
independence without accountability
these absolute powers without adequate checks of accountability often lead to arbitrary and unfair use of these constitutional powers, privileges and immunities. they include
quality of judges compromised due to non transparent mechanism of judicial appointments through the collegium system
violation of separation of powers through judicial overreach into other organs of government.
blatant violation of conflict of interest norms-problems of uncle judges- erodes public trust in judicial process
rampant corruption, amassing wealth disproportionate to known income sources
eg: cash for bail scam, impeachment proceedings against justice soumitra sen
misuse of contempt of court provisions as a shield to protect themselves from any kind of critcism or controversy
arundhati roy case
judiciary is amassing immense powers to itself in name of judicial independence even while allegations of misconduct and misuse of these powers are raised from within causing a credibility crisis to judiciary
balance between independence and accountability
need of the hour is to strike a fine balance between judicial independence with appropriate accountability
appointment procedure to higher judiciary must reflect this balance. consensus to be arrived bewteen judiciary and the government on NJAC
judicial standards and accountability bill to be enacted at the earliest
conduct of judiciary and judges to be guided by “restatement of values of judicial life
steps to be taken to bring judiciary under the purview of RTI act
credibility of judiciary is of utmost importance. to inspire trust and confidence among people, they must not only be fair , but also seem to be fair.
Local bodies
Trust based approach recommended by Finance commission
Intro
even though 73rd and 74th amendment has been in operation for over 25 years, the fiscal decentralisation envisaged under the act has not happened as effectively as the political decentralisation
Lack of adequate finances commensurate to the functions devolved has seriously affected the service delivery at the local level
in this context, the trust based approach,pioneered by 14th FC is expected to improve,the present scenario of fiscal federalism
trust based approach
adopted by 14th finance commission highlights the need to build trust and respect for local bodies as institutions of local self government.
following this approach , the 14th finance commission has tripled its grant allocation to LSG’s from the TFC levels based on two criteria of basic grant and performance grant.
it works out to be 2.87 lakh crore, for the term 2015-20,with PRI share at 2 lakh crore and ULB share at 87000 crores
Earlier this was not the cale until so far the fund transfers from the centre to states and from state to local bodies were based on conditionalities emerging from a logic of mistrust Transfers from centre to states for boosting local body finances were based on the devolution index (in addition to the population and area criteria ) ie the extent to which the state government devolved functions finances and functionaries to the local level similarly the state government were reluctant to transfer adequate finances to local bodies citing lack of confidence in the capacity of third tier Implications of earlier apporach this resulted in 2 negative outcomes state governments did not get adequate funds to empower the local governments local bodies never got the funds and functionaries to deliver the functions so local bodies were caught in a vicious cycle of less funds less taxation potential and unwillingness of people to pay taxes poor quality service dleivery Difference in FFC's Approach devolution to states for transfer to local bodies was based solely on the population and area criteria, giving up the devolution index this removal of devolution index for fund transfer to states will enable states to proceed with devolution of 3F's based on their specific socio-political and institutional context Subtopic 3 Implications of trust based approach similarly the states were asked to devolved to local bodies based on trust ie devolution to be based on the understanding that local bodies will discharge their statutory functions with all due care no further conditions or directions other than those indicated by FFC should be imposed either by the union or the state government for the release of funds. so this increase in fund transfers to local bodies with a majority of it directed to gram panchayats , where services are being delivered will help achieve a virtuous cycle of improved finances improved taxation potential and better willingness of citizen to pay taxes better quality of service delivery eg: Schandinavia;High tax payment as state gives good service conclusion however care must be taken to improve the capacities of local governments by making effective use of this increased fund devolution recently launched Rashtriya Gram Swaraj Abhiyan with its specific components of capacity building and training of PRI's are a step in the right direction Proper accounting and statutory audit of LSG accounts together with social audit must be done regularly in the interest of transparency and accountability Similarly attempts must be made to improve the positions of State Finance Commissions . SFC's which are mandated with assessing the needs of local bodies within the states must be timely constituted, should be provided with both financial and human resources etc
Legislature
defamation as soiution to parliamenatry privileges
Intro
Parliamentary privileges provided under art 105 and 194 of the constitution
refers to the powers, privileges and immunities enjoyed by Houses of Parliament and their members in the performance of their duties
while defamation provisions on the other hand are provided as an exception to the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression
they are intended to preserve the reputation of individuals against reckless and irresponsible exercise of the freedom of speech
as both differ considerably in their objective and scope, defamation provisions cannot replace breach of privilege norsm. misuse of privileges has to be dealt in a different manner
Subtopic 4
Body
Privileges ensure that members of parliament are able to speak freely in debates without fear or favour and protects parliament’s internal affairs from interference from the courts
they include both privileges enjoyed by the house collectively and by the members individually such as
freedom of speech
immunity from civil and criminal proceedings
power to make rules to regulate its own procedures and adjudicate upon such matters
it can even punish its members as well as outsiders for breach of its privilege and contempt.
Potential for misuse
lack of codificaition of privileges leave too much ambiguity in interpretation of privileges which can be misused
eg: West Bengal allowed 2MLA’s to remain in assembly premises to avoid arrest under preventive detention act through a malafide interpretation of the privileges
members sensitive to criticism from media and public are using privileges as a gagging tool, with a threat of punishment
Karnataka assembly imprisoned 2 editors fora critical report on the house
question of fairness
privilege committeess while adjudicating on breach of privileges is being a judge in their own cause-which is antithetical to the basic criteria of fairness ie nobody should be judge in his. her own cause
judicial reluctance to review exercise of legislative privilege due to controversy in the domain, increase the potential for erroneous interpretation of privileges
why privileges cannot be replaced with defamation provisions
though privilges are liable to be misused they cannot be replaced with defamation provisions because
privileges are larger in scope
defamation provisions are to protect the reputation of the individual alone, while privileges has provisions to protect both dignity of the house, ensure its smooth conduct and freedom of speech of its members
to safeguard the dignity of the house and its smooth functioning. Breach of privileges have to be immediately settled
adjudication by house committees to permit this, while defamation provisions adjudicated by courts take years to settle due to judicial delays.
conclusion
while privileges cannot be replaced by defamation, it is essential that they are unambiguously spelt out leaving little scope for misues.
International examples point towards codification (with adequate flexibility )
australia codified privileges in 1987
constitution review commission headed by justice M.N Venkatachaliah had reommended that privilges should be
defined and delimited for free and independent functioning of the legislatures
provisions of parliamentary privilege and its breach should be clearly defined so that it can protect the independence of the house without taking away the liberty of its critics
d52-Unequal representation -Rajya Sabha
Intro
In Rajya Sabha, 10 Populous states make up 70 percent of seats, while 9 stattes have just one seat each. In such a context, the present system of unequal represenation of states , do not truly represetn the states as originally envisaged.
Crux of the matter
Unequal representation prevents the smaller states from making their voices heard at the centre
to better represent the states voices, many members in the constituent assembly debates even , favored the system of equal representation.It was based on following grounds
to truly represent states , all units of federation should be trated equally
conceptually dividing seats on the basis of population will be an unnecessary duplication of Loksabha
As members of rajya sabha are elected from assemblies, criteria of proportional representation based on population serves no real purpose.
smaller states take this agument further as follows, to prove how Rajya Sabha failed in it’s role to represent states , due to unequal representation of states.
a resolution requiring passage by 2/3rd of members present and voting, do not still represent the majority states view because, 2/3rd majority can be obtained by merley 7 states-UP, MP,Bihar, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Andhra PRadesh and Maharashtra
similar is the case with article 249 and article 312
but
according to sarkaria commission , the failure of rajya sabha to emerge as states voice was not due to unequal representation
it was due to
recent trend of voting on party lines, with the majority party domination the voting process
the threat of coalition politics that created different party alliances at the centre and states.
so the commission suggested creation of a special committee representing the cross section of house. it can obtain views of different sections on emergent issues and can ensure that a particular resolution under 249 will be passed only on the basis of consensus.
Conclusion
However the Punchhi Commission went a step further in recommending steps to make Rajya Sabha effective
to constitute Committee of Rajyasabha wherein the interest of concerned states will be duly incorporated during policy making.
to establish equality between states and to establish a balance of power between states, the commission recommends bringing equal representation of states, irrespetive of their population size.
III.Governance-Statutory, regulatory and various quasi judicial bodies-Regulatory bodies need to be accountable and need functional autonomy
Defn
independent regulatory commissions (IRC) were set up in India since late 1980s.
economic liberalisation ended government monopolies and led to the emergence of new private players in different sectors of the economy
so independent regulatory commission like SEBI,IRDA etc were set up under statutes to undertake regulation of these private as well as government undertakings
IRC were defined to ensure level playing field for both private and governmental agencies by retaining it as an arm’s lenght distance from the government
to simultaenously ensure regulatory independence from the executive and implementation of regulations consistent with government policies , legislative oversight was considered ideal
crux
existing parliamentary mechanism to make regulators accountable and their weaknesses
In India, parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators can take place through the following means
question hour
its applicable, as all regulators falls under administrative domain of a government department
but it is the minister and not regulator who responds to these questions
most of SEBI actions answered by finance ministry. but finance ministry fully aware of SEBI
given that regulators function independently by the department, there is a gap in the accountability of the regulator’s actions
discussions in parliament
parliament may take up the role of regulators for different roles of procedure
but during these discussions regulators cannot be summoned to explain their functioning.
parliamentary committees
departmental related standing committees
while these committees might review the working of the regulators under their departments, regulators are not required to regularly submit reports to parliamentary committees on their policies to justify their actions.
eg: RBI governor summoned but rarely like demonetisation.
submission of annual reports by regulators
suggestions to improve parliamentary oversight
2nd ARC and Damodaran committee recommendations
make parliament a ratifying authority in appointment of regulators in the UK
bring regulators under budgetary control of the parliament.
now regulators raise their own budget by relying on fees.
regular parliamentary reporting has to be done by regulators on a periodic basis.
sector specific committees (DRSC) , must undertake evaluation of regulators based on criteria agreed upon by government, parliamentary committee and regulator
committees must be equipped with adequate skills and resources to make this scrutiny effective
annual reports by the committees and their evaluation report of the regulator must be made accessible to the public
conclusion
Regulators with their specialised knowledge of the industry and by giving a level playing field for all market players , can help the competitive growth of the economic sectors they regulate
but it is necessary to strike a balance between these advantages of governance through the regulator and the apparent threat to democratic accountability by implementing these recommendations at the earliest.
Welfare schemes for vulnerable groups
Deendayal Upadhyay Antyodaya Yojana -NULM -as urban poverty multidimensional
Intro
while urbanisation continues to be a growth engine for the economy urban poor remains excluded
this exclusion makes them vulnerable in 3 ways
social vulnerability
deprivations related to factors like gender, age and social stratification, lack of social protection, inadequate voice and participation in governance structure etc.
occupational vulnerability
precarious livelihoods, dependence on informal sector for employment and earnings, lack of job security, poor working conditions etc
residential vulnerability
access to land, shelter, basic services etc
these 3 vulnerabilities are not independent but they reinforce each other.
Body
to solve problem in an integrated manner
the guiding principle of the program state that
poor are entrepreneurial in nature and they have innate desire to come out of poverty
to unleash this capabilities of the poor they have to be organised around their own institutions which will help them in building their own social, human and financial capital.
strategy
universal social mobilisation of urban poor into SHG’s and their federation with particular emphasis on vulnerable sections like SC/ST’s , minorities, female headed households differently abled persons etc.
to catalyse its formation, promote financial inclusion, impart training etc, SHG’s will be assisted by resource organisations
will strive to provide skills training to urban poor for both self employment and wage employment and help to get easy access to credit.
will address livelihood concerns of the urban street vendors by facilitating access to suitable spaces, institutional credit, social security and skill training
will establish strong rights-based linkages with other programmes which cover the right of the urban homeless to food, healthcare, education, financial inclusion, affordable housing etc
challenges
poor implementation of scheme - identified by SC appointed committee
non utilisation of funds for providing shelters to the urban homeless and non constitution of committees to oversee the implementation of the scheme
poor training and capacity building of SHG’s due to inadequate linkages with the resource organisations
most of the urban poor in India have their eyes filled with hopelessness instead of dreams for which they once migrated to these cities. to prevent further urbanisation of poverty , regular CAG audit of funds disbursed, better social mobilisation of urban poor in cooperation with NGO’s and regular oversight of implementation holds the key.
Good Governance and Gender Equality
Intro
Good Governance is equated with ‘sound development management ‘ and is defined as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development “(world Bank )
though it aims to provide public services effectively, efficiently and equitably to the citizens, achieving gender equality was never its fundamental concern.
Body
Good governance reforms initiated world over aimed at addressing poor state capacity for service delivery, problems of inefficiency, and poor accountability in state institutions.
Elements of good governance
Public sector management
downsizing public sector, making budgets work better, performance management contracts for officials.
Accountability
making governments responsible for their actions
legal framework for development
stable and predictable business environment
transparency and information
for a competitive market economy
so reforms were primarily aimed to expand market activity and all its supporting institutions , especially the establishment of private property rights.
consequences of giving up gender concerns
makes governance effective as there is no understanding of the different needs of women and men in public spending , policies and legislation
will make resource allocation inequitable and less effective
eg: putting drinking water pipe not near housing settlment, affect women most.
will result in policies that will further deepen existing gender equalities.
gender budgeting not taken
childcare not invested
retrograde gender norms will continue to inform institutional (both formal and informal ) practices and reflect in decision making.
conclusion
However in response to demands for greater gender equality in public service different approaches has been put forward by academics and activist groups in redifining good governance
good governance is nowadays being viewed as democratic governance, and therefore implies an agenda of participation, human rights and social justice
this definition suggests that a study of governance must include not only economic management but alos political participation -both formal and informal
so the understanding that should inform present and future policies should be that governance cannot be good or effective unless it is gender sensitive.