final lists Flashcards

1
Q

PP objections

A
  1. dark room problem
  2. mathematical formalization
  3. not a neurophysiological theory
  4. falsifiability
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2
Q

four neural predictions for PP (Walsh paper)

A
  1. error-signalling neural responses to sensory stimuli should scale inversely with expectation
  2. top-down signals represent sensory prediction
  3. at each level of the cortical hierarchy there are two functionally distinct subpopulations representing predictions and prediction errors
  4. prediction error minimization is achieved through repciprocal exchange of error and prediction signals across levels - a process known as ‘hierarchical inference’
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3
Q

evidence enacted perception

A
  • perception is constituted by sensorimotor knowledge
  1. experiential blindness
  2. no perception when images are stabilized on the retina
  3. self-movement is necessary for perception to develop
  4. neuroscience studies support inside-out view
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4
Q

cognitivism → enactive view

A
  • cognition is understood as computations over mental representations
  • the subject of cognition is a detached observer with a bird’s eye view of the world
  • intentionality is explained by the representational nature of mental states
  • the architecture of cognitive systems is conceived as being highly modular
  • processing in subsystems is assumed to be largely context-invariant
  • computations are considered neutral to the body or environment (functionalism)
  • models of cognition take into account only the inner states of a cognitive system, and ignores how the body or environment might affect thinking (individualism)
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5
Q

cognitivism → enactive view

A
  • cognition is understood as capacity of generating structure by action
  • the cognitive agent is immersed in his/her task domain
  • system states acquire meaning by virtue of their role in the context of action
  • the functioning of cognitive systems is thought to be inseparable from embodiment
  • a holistic view of the architecture of cognitive systems prevails, which emphasizes the dynamic nature and context-sensitivity of processing
  • models of cognition take into account the embedded and ‘extended’ nature of cognitive systems
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6
Q

4E cognition

A
  1. embodied: cognition is not isolated in the brain but the body’s structures and processes shape how we think
  2. embedded: cognition is embedded in a relevant external context
  3. enacted: actions help shape our cognitive processes, meaning cognition is partly constructed through the things we do, not just the things we think
  4. extended: cognition can be extended beyond the brain and body, into the environment
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7
Q

dynamic directives

A

dispositions for action, embodied in dynamic patterns of activity

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8
Q

pragmatic implications of enactive view

A
  1. study the relation between neural activity patterns and action contexts
  2. avoid studying passive subjects but use paradigms that involve active exploration
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9
Q

barsalou: in-between view of representations

A
  1. there is no permanent static representation of hammers in long-term memory, built from amodal symbols, that is loaded into WM identically across different occasions
  2. the representation that does reside in long-term memory results from superimposed effects of associative learning distributed across relevant sensorimotor systems, with the resultant network changing constantly after every learning episode (and overlapping considerably with networks for other categories)
  3. when this distributed network is accessed, it produces one of infinitely many hammer representations dynamically
  4. these representations serve temporary representational functions by providing useful inferences in specific situations
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10
Q

barsalou: cognition mediates between sensation and action

A
  1. cognition can represent non-present states: this implies dynamic, multimodal representations that are temporarily constructed in WM to exand our action repertoire
  2. cognition can create conceptualizations through language: allows humans to adapt behavior in novel ways by categorizing and appraising experiences
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11
Q

cognitive enhancement: current directions for future research

A
  1. take individual differences in training effectiveness into account
  2. use realistic training approaches
  3. more research testing transfer of training to real life WM performance
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12
Q

cognitive enhancement: critical design features

A
  1. active control group
  2. multiple transfer tasks
  3. multiple training tasks
  4. follow-up assessments
  5. daily life measurements
  6. large sample size
  7. preregistration
  8. double blind design
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13
Q

hype cycle phases

A
  1. technology trigger:a potential technology breakthrough kicks things off. early proof-of-concept stories and media interest trigger significant publicity. often no usable products exist and commercial viability is unproven
  2. peak of inflated expectations: early publicity produces a number of success stories — often accompanied by scores of failures. some companies take action; most don’t
  3. through of disillusionment: interest wanes as experiments and implementations fail to deliver. producers of the technology shake out or fail. investment continues only if the surviving providers improve their products to the satisfaction of early adopters
  4. slope of enlightenment: more instances of how the technology can benefit the enterprise start to crystallize and become more widely understood. second- and third- generation products appear from technology providers. more enterprises fund pilots; conservative companies remain cautious
  5. plateau of productivity: mainstream adoption starts to take off. criteria for assessing provider viability are more clearly defines. the technology’s broad market applicability and relevance are clearly paying off
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14
Q

traditional view of visual WM vs current view

A
  • traditional: WM is just for holding visual information because otherwise this information would disappear (i.e., has a fixed nature)
  • current: WM is for guiding action, facilitated through action, and as a result of moving around
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15
Q

visual WM is for action

A
  1. objects in WM can be (re)prioritized to help guide current and future action
  2. markers of visuospatial and motor-plan selection occur concurrently
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16
Q

visual WM occurs through action

A
  1. control of the overt gaze and covert attention are linked
  2. the oculomotor system controls internal attention
17
Q

visual WM is a consequence of action

A
  1. we look at item locations and its spatial mapping to preserve multiple spatial frames
  2. we hold information about past events and make future predictions to hold moving objects in wm (account for shifting spatial frames)
18
Q

improve deep learning systems

A
  1. embedding hard-code rules in DNNs (top-down learning)
  2. more variable training in richer 3D environments (interacting with and learning from environment)
  3. learning from less data (learn from prior experience)
  4. supplementing basic pattern-matching with reasoning abilities (create their own algorithms through reasoning)
  • also, active inference in AI models
19
Q

fallacies about AGI

A
  1. narrow intelligence is on a continuum with general intelligence (scaling up leads to better task specific skills but doesnt generalize)
  2. easy things are easy and hard things are hard (moravecs paradox)
  3. the lure of wishful mnemonics (can lead to misunderstandings or exaggerated expectations)
  4. intelligence is in the brain (its actually embodied)
20
Q

Chollet: why LLMs are not intelligent

A
  1. they memorize, this is only a part of intelligence
  2. they cant solve previously unseen problems
  3. they fail the ARC benchmark
21
Q

Chollet: necessary behavior that would show AGI

A
  1. the ability to synthesize new templates or adapt new ones to solve novel problems
  2. this would mean they pass the ARC benchmark
22
Q

Chollet: how to overcome LLMs intrinsic limitations

A
  1. allow them to do on-the-fly tuning to learn and adapt to new situations as they come
  • this is essentially active inference
23
Q

Phylogenetic refinement

A

behavioral and cognitive theories are progressively elaborated based on the evolutionary sequence of changes in organisms over time.

24
Q

how does phylogenic refinement make us understand brain function

A
  • behavior through the lens of interactions with the environment
  • explain brain systems as elaborations of ancestral control mechanisms
  • by tracing the evolutionary development of simpler behaviors into more complex systems in modern species, with the goal of generating biologically plausible models that reflect the actual mechanisms evolved over millions of years
25
Q

phylogenetic refinement: control of interaction

A

The brain manages interactions with the environment through feedback loops, adjusting actions (like foraging or escaping) to maintain balance in the organism’s stat

26
Q

phylogenetic control: nested feedback loop

A

Brain function is built on multiple layers of feedback systems, where simple control systems are nested within more complex ones to create adaptive behaviors​

27
Q

phylogenetic control: pragmatic representations

A

the brain represents the world in terms of actions, focusing on opportunities for interaction (affordances) rather than abstract descriptions​

28
Q

meditation: bayesian model reduction

A
  • brain’s offline process of simplifying its models of the world by reducing complexity unnecessary details while still maintaining accuracy
  • fact-free learning: the brain updates and simplifies its models even without new facts, allowing it to refine generative models
  • trade-off between accuracy and complexity: a less complex model is more parsimonious at the expense of detail at a higher level in the hierarchy
29
Q

meditation predictions

A
  1. temporal depth of mental activity decreases from FA > OM > ND
  2. if experience is reduced to the present moment, this also modulates novel prediction formation and PE signalling
30
Q

prediction 1: decrease in temporal depth

A
  • the temporal depth of mental activity reduces from FA to OM to ND meditation
  • thereby, neural activity should decrease across the temporal hierarchy across meditation styles
  • this will affect all temporally thick mental processes, including conceptualization and the sense of self
31
Q

paradigm shift

A

a fundamental change in the basic concepts and experimental practices of a scientific discipline

32
Q

4 stages of a paradigm shift

A
  1. normal science
  2. paradigm crisis
  3. adoption of new paradigm
  4. new paradigm is dominant
33
Q

current deviant observations

A
  1. action signals in primary visual cortex
  2. 10x as many feedback connections from V2 to V1 than feedforward connection from V1 to V2
  3. blurry boundaries between cognitive concepts and between cognitive and motor regions
  4. negligence of the embodied nature of the brain
  5. theories separate per cognitive function, and no overarching theory
34
Q

limits of cognitive approach (why its hard to explain certain observations)

A
  • stimulus-driven learning does not lead to generalization
  1. lack of transfer of learning in computerized cognitive training
  2. AI also learns from stimulus driven approaches and cannot transfer its knowledge
35
Q

how to induce general learning

A
  1. top-down learning
  2. naturalistic settings
36
Q
A