Deception Flashcards

1
Q

Deception

A

on the battlefield is a force multiplier whose target is the adversary’s mind as much as his technology. Deception can be countered by understanding the rules that govern suggestion or, better said, magic.
Worldwide examples:
India exploded a nuclear device under the world’s nose.
In Kosovo, the Serbs used fake tanks to drain away allied air sorties.
Artillery that the Vietnamese “did not have” at Dien Bien Phu appeared as if by magic after having been secretly delivered from the Korean peninsula.

The great Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu wrote, “All war is deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable. . . . When we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are far way. [We must] hold out baits to entice the enemy.”1 Almost every U.S. Army officer has read Sun Tzu’s words. Yet, the U.S. military is little prepared for deception operations, which comprise a significant component of information operations.

Sun Tzu uses verbs that refer to the mind, emphasizing appearance, belief, and enticement. How something seems or appears, what is believed, and enticement are activities discerned by the mind, not by technology. Deception in war deceives first the mind, then the eye.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

The difference between deception and military intelligence apparatus

A

Basic military intelligence apparatus is sensory. We use platforms to see and hear the enemy. We base assessments on what is perceived as cold, rational fact. Appearance, belief, and enticement are mental, not sensory words. The U.S. military interprets enemy activities based on what can be seen, heard, and touched.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Deception for countries

A

When a weaker country confronts a great power, the weaker knows it must employ deception to prevail.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Deception in a war

A

We all know the old adage that the hand is quicker than the eye. The magician seems to deceive the eye, but this is not true. The hand is not quicker than the eye. The magician actually beguiles the eye. In war, an opponent tries to beguile his adversary’s perception. What appears factual might actually be an artful creation with which to convince the adversary that it is real. Properly understood, these principles can be used to assess the battlefield, to assess intelligence reports, and to defeat deception attempts.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Deception of the enemy

A

Before the enemy employs deception, he must analyze the situation, because to defeat his enemy, he must first understand how the enemy thinks. He can then orchestrate the adversary’s responses. He will work to understand the enemy better than the enemy understands himself, then he will deceive the enemy’s brain, not his eye.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Preconceptions and deceptions

A

Chechen perception of what was true about individual mercenary practices was not true about the Russians’ relentless will as a group. Russian individual corruption could not be extrapolated to the entire army. We can learn from this that we can be deceived by our own preconceptions when falsely applied to known facts.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Deceptions and us

A

If we know ourselves, we have identified the first target of an adversary’s deception. We can then ask how the enemy might try to deceive us. What is he doing to exploit our beliefs? What is he doing to make us believe something? How is he making himself appear? What will he try to entice us into doing? Using these concepts to manipulate us can be powerful force multipliers to a determined enemy.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Counterdeception

A

If we apply counterdeception, which corresponds to an awareness of the principles of suggestion as used in magic, we can begin to interpret an adversary’s schemes.

Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation. Counterdeception does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations.

Kontraapgaulė yra analitinis identifikavimo ir įvertinimo procesas. priešininko apgaulės operacijos.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Perception warfare

A

is the concept of how to create occurrences that give illusions of all as winners in their own way. It is a combat of the commanders’ minds.

The assumption is that a decision-maker, commander, will avoid violence if possible and use other ways and means to achieve similar goals, if such is possible, which is a matter of humanity.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Perception and information warfare

A

the concept of information warfare are not something new, but still new technology gives new possibilities. One example is to attack the source of information with information as a weapon. In the discussion up until today the main focus of information warfare has been technology, providing solutions to create control of the information flow surrounding the crisis. Concepts or techniques like command and control warfare, intelligence based warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, hacker warfare, economic information warfare and cyber warfare were invented to show different applications of information warfare (Libicki, 1995). Other concepts are propaganda, deception warfare and misinformation. Still, the aim of all these concepts is a combat of controlling information, and using information to create an intentional output.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Creation of information by individuals

A

individuals create different ‘pictures’ of situations depending on rational and emotional influences.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

The difference between perception warfare and propaganda

A

We believe that it is the commander, the decision-maker that is the main focus of information activities. The ‘picture’ of the situation is essential for the group’s or organisation’s further actions, and that the information ‘combat’ actually is perception warfare or the creation of this picture. The public will be influenced by the leader’s statements and indirectly affected by the commander’s beliefs. This perspective is common with propaganda, but differs in terms of objective. In perception warfare the object is a particular ‘key’ individual while propaganda is directed more to public opinion.

Mao Tse Tung (“On the protracted war”, 1938) once said that “In order to win victory we must try our best to seal the eyes and the ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to create confusion in the minds of enemy commanders, driving them insane”. His statement addresses what we can regard as perception warfare.

The question of perception is traditionally seen as part of psychological warfare (PSYWAR), in terms of perception management.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

The form of perception

A

In its simplest form, perception requires a perceived object and an observer. When we say, “I see a chair” the chair is the objective reference, and “I” is the observer.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

The description of modern war

A

We could describe modern war as the battle of truths. In a battle of trust we search not only for the truth like a journey for the Holy Grail, but instead we attempt to control the truth.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

What is a perception warfare and what is happening during war with information? And how information warfare plays in this?

A

Information warfare implies clear goals that should be achieved in a relatively short period of time. War is a chaotic situation with high uncertainty. The first thing lost in war is the ability to create a view of what seems to be true. Both the observer and the norm system will be questioned. Rumours and misinformation will make it even harder to value how truthful accessible information is and the decision-maker will be forced to act on incomplete information. In this situation we still will have an opinion about what to believe or not, which is built on how we perceive the situation. What seems to be true or not will be based on individual belief structures that could change over time. Trustworthiness is a social construct and could be extended, manipulated. Perception warfare is not about damaging the truth; it is about creating the truth. In both perspectives truth is the victim.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Cracking commanders picture of the situation

A

To understand how to influence and interfere with the creation of the commander’s picture of the situation, we need to understand what the commander is doing. An abstract description is to see commanders as a cybernetic system in which he/she acts by decisions, which could be explicit in judgements, planning etc, based on his picture of the situation. The result of the action gives new (feed-back) inputs. These change the picture of the situation, which in turn necessitates new acts.

17
Q

The commanders picture of the situation: situational awareness.

A

The commander’s ‘picture’ of the situation could be described in terms of situational awareness based on his own observations and pre-understanding. His pre-understanding is unique for each commander and is contextual, which explains why the same information inputs can lead to different acts. This situational awareness is built both on rational and emotional factors. The elements of the “picture” are logical in the sense of rationality and structures, but parts seem irrational, being built on emotions. We can describe the logical part in models and thereby make predictions, but about the emotional part we just have intuitive feelings.

The real vulnerability of the commander is his own mind and how he comprehends the situation. “Capture their minds and their hearts and souls will follow”*. The mode of his mind will create a picture of how he sees the actual situation. This picture is not necessarily true, but still guides the commander how he/she will act. The commander will continue to value how well he believes he has control of the situation in terms of uncertainty and risks. Control is constructed by logical explanations of the situation, with information structured into patterns. By searching for more information he/she will attempt to limit the uncertainty.

18
Q

Perception warfare

A

In this perspective, perception warfare is the ability to influence the commander’s ‘picture’ of the situation in a controlled way, the art of influencing decisions. It is important that this influencing is a controlled process. Otherwise there is a risk of unfavourable decisions by the commander.

19
Q

Everyone wants to be a winner

A

An important note is that no commander wants to be seen as a loser. In a successful
perception attack, all participants will have the illusion that they are winners. Thus, the goal is to create a perception that everyone is a winner. It is not a zero sum game: the success of one party is the other party’s defeat. Even though in reality one wins more than the others do. The perception of the situation is the key element for how the commander will act.

If individuals are facing perception warfare activities, the mind is the centre of gravity for the attack. The ability for a commander to create a satisfactory picture of the situation is crucial for further activities. The true enemy in perception warfare will be the commander’s own mind and not primarily the adversary. The adversary will try in every way to create a ‘picture’ for the observer that suits his goals. It is in the commander’s mind that the actual picture of the situation is created.

20
Q

The key element of the perception warfare

A

Perception warfare is combat on an individual level with the commander as the ‘target’. The key element is to create uncertainty on issues that the commander values as important. Uncertainty is then created in terms of lost control. If we have lost control we have also lost the perspectives of what we are doing in the long run, and risk becoming a follower instead of being a leader. It is becoming a follower that gives the opportunity for the adversary to direct our future behaviour and decisions. The leader is often easier to identify as an object than the followers are. To be able to take control, we need to know what the commander, being the ‘observer’, finds important and how we can value this factor. For example, if he finds that being in time is important, we can stress him by delaying information. But this is not enough. How late can information be and still be seen as being on time? The question of perception is a question of attitudes, which is the basis of how we value the situation.

21
Q

The end-state of perception warfare

A

The end-state of a perception war is change of mindsets and change of manifestation of the will. Unlike traditional war, all the parties involved in a perception war could have the illusion that they are the winners.

22
Q

Strategic deception-

A

political and military communication.

Strategic deception aims to manipulate elite perceptions in order to gain competitive advantage. It is usually achieved by passage of information to national or military decision makers either directly or via a nation’s intelligence services.

23
Q

Operational deception

A

Military deception (MILDEC) is an attempt by a military unit to gain an advantage during warfare by misleading adversary decision makers into taking action or inaction that creates favorable conditions for the deceiving force.[1][2] This is usually achieved by creating or amplifying an artificial fog of war via psychological operations, information warfare, visual deception, or other methods.[3] As a form of disinformation, it overlaps with psychological warfare.

24
Q

Tactical deception

A

different military uniforms are used.

Tactical deception occurs when an individual is able to use an “honest” act from his normal repertoire in a different context to mislead familiar individuals. Although primates have a reputation for social skill, most primate groups are so intimate that any deception is likely to be subtle and infrequent.

25
Q

The fog of war

A

never know which information is real.

26
Q

Black out period

A

try not to disclose plans.

27
Q

Radio silence

A

when operation is going on military cannot operate on walkie talkies and radio.

28
Q

When the neutral term of propaganda was born?

A

Neutral term of propaganda was introduced together with the christianity.

29
Q

Psychological warfare

A

The term is used “to denote any action which is practiced mainly by psychological methods with the aim of evoking a planned psychological reaction in other people”.[2]

Various techniques are used, and are aimed at influencing a target audience’s value system, belief system, emotions, motives, reasoning, or behavior.

30
Q

Cyber warfare

A

is the use of cyber attacks against an enemy state, causing comparable harm to actual warfare and/or disrupting vital computer systems.[1] Some intended outcomes could be espionage, sabotage, propaganda, manipulation or economic warfare.