Criminal Law and Procedure Flashcards
The issue is whether Ben should be charged with burglary in connection with the incident at the neighbor’s house.
Burglary requires the (1) breaking and entering into (2) another’s dwelling (3) at night (4) with the specific intent to commit a felony therein. Breaking can be the slightest touch, such as opening a door or entering through a window. Entering means the defendant crossed the threshold into the dwelling–even partially crossing the threshold is sufficient. A dwelling is the place where a person resides. The intent to commit a felony requires specific intent, meaning it is irrelevant whether the alleged burglar actually committed a felony, so long as they intended to do so. Conversely, taking an action that would constitute a felony, without the intent to take that action, does not satisfy the element.
The issue is whether Ben should be charged with larceny or embezzlement for his actions involving the unsigned print.
Larceny is the trespassory taking and carrying away of personal property of another with the intent to permanently deprive them of their possession. The taking and carrying away element must be satisfied by a taking that was not given consensually by the property owner. When an initial taking was trespassory but there was no intent at the time to permanently deprive the person of the property, then the continuing trespass rule serves to deem the original trespass continuing so that it coincides with later-acquired criminal intent. The asportation (carrying away) element requires movement of only a slight distance.
Embezzlement is the fraudulent conversion of the property of another by a person who is in lawful possession of the property. Conversion is the inappropriate use of property, held pursuant to a trust agreement, which causes a serious interference with the owner’s rights to the property.
The issue is whether the art dealer should be charged with receiving stolen property.
To be guilty of receiving stolen property, the defendant must receive control of stolen property, know that the property is stolen, and intend to permanently deprive the owner of the property. Property that is unlawfully obtained through larceny, embezzlement, or false pretense is stolen property. The act of receiving the property must coincide with the recipient’s knowledge that the property is stolen. Some jurisdictions require that the defendant have actual, subjective knowledge that the property has been stolen. Other jurisdictions permit the defendant’s knowledge to be inferred from facts that would alert a reasonable person to unlawful acquisition of the property.
The issue is whether the court erred in denying the motion to suppress on all three grounds raised by defense counsel [Miranda].
The 5A, as incorporated to the states through the 14A, establishes the right not to incriminate oneself. To protect this right, the Supreme Court has held that individuals in custodial interrogation by the police are entitled to be warned of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel (Miranda warnings). The Miranda warnings need not be stated verbatim as the Supreme Court did; any clear and accurate summary of the rights conveyed to the individual will suffice. This 5A right applies when an individual is in custody by the police, meaning she would not feel she has the freedom to leave, and interrogaiton occurs when the police directly question or act in such a way that is likely to lead the individual in custody to make incriminating statements (direct questioning’s functional equivalent). To invoke the right to counsel, the individual must be unambiguous and unequivocal. The police have no obligation to clarify an ambiguous statement. If the right to counsel is invoked, the police may not resume questioning for the duration of that individual’s time in custody and for 14 days after her release. After that time has passed, the policy may give the individual her Miranda warnings again and reinstate the custodial interrogation. If the individual does not invoke her right to counsel or her right to remain silent, she may waive her rights so long as it is a knowing and voluntary waiver.
Individuals also have a 6A right to counsel. Unlike the 5A right to counsel, which attaches once the individual is under custodial interrogation, the 6A right to counsel applies only once formal judicial proceedings have commenced (i.e., once charges have been filed). Also, the right is offense specific, unlike the 5A. Therefore, if a defendant has been charged for one crime and her 6A right to counsel has attached, if she is then investigated for another crime, her 6A right to counsel does not remain.
The issue is whether the evidence supports the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) under the applicable state law.
In the majority of jurisdictions, the defendant has the burden of proving insanity. The level of proof required in this jurisdiction is a preponderance of the evidence. Insanity includes mental abnormalities that may affect legal responsibility. Under State A’s NGRI statute, the woman must show that (1) she suffered from a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the charged crime, and (2) as a result of that mental disease or defect, she did not know that her conduct was wrong. Unlike the MPC test and the irresistible impulse test, loss of control due to mental illness is not a defense under this test. Instead, this is very similar to the M’Naghten test. Under the M’Naghten test, a defendant is not exculpated simply because he believes his acts to be morally right.
[The two psychiatric reports support a finding that the woman suffered from schizophrenia that caused her to experience delusional beliefs. This diagnosis likely qualifies as a mental defect for State A’s NGRI statute. However, there is no evidence that the woman’s schizophrenia prevented her from knowing that it was legally or morally wrong to kidnap the man and force him at knifepoint to drive well above the speed limit on a busy highway. She even told the man to “forget the speed limit,” suggesting she was aware that speeding was illegal. There is also no evidence that the woman’s schizophrenia caused her to believe her conduct was not morally wrong.]
The issue is whether the facts support charging the man with manslaughter.
In most states, a killing that results from reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life is a depraved-heart murder. Involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional homicide that is either committed with criminal negligence or committed while the defendant is engaged in an unlawful act. Criminal negligence is a grossly negligent action that puts another person at a significant risk of serious bodily injury or death. It requires more than ordinary tort negligence, but less than the conduct required for depraved-heart murder. Under the Model Penal Code, criminal negligence is a defendant’s reckless act which is a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the defendant’s situation when the defendant was actually aware of the risk his conduct posed.
[Man’s driving did not rise to level of recklessness required for a depraved-heart, because it did not involve the type of depravity usually required. Reckless driving alone is likely sufficient to support a finding of depravity absent some aggravating factors such as intoxication. Doing 30 mph over the speed limit, causing homicide of motorcyclists, and gross deviation from standard of care a reasonable person would exercise all point to involuntary manslaughter over murder]
The issue is whether the man’s conduct was committed under the pressure of an unlawful threat that caused him to reasonably believe that the only way to avoid death or serious bodily injury to himself was to violate the law.
A defendant can claim the duress defense when a third party’s unlawful threat causes the defendant to reasonably believe that the only way to avoid death or serious bodily injury to himself or another is to violate the law, and the defendant violates the law.
Probable Cause
A proper arrest is one that is based on probable cause. Facts supporting probable cause may come from a number of different sources including a police officer’s personal observations.
Plain View Doctrine
A warrantless search is valid if it is reasonable in scope and if it is made incident to a lawful arrest. Under the plain view doctrine, if an item is in public view it may be seized without a warrant since there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for such an item. The Fourth Amendment does not require police to obtain a warrant to search a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a ciriminal activity.
Question Immediately Subsequent to Arrest
Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody. A person under arrest is, by definition, in custody and any police questioning of the person under arrest would thus be custodial interrogation. Questioning of a suspect by a police officer subsequent to an arrest must be preceded by Miranda warnings and a waiver or the suspect’s Miranda rights are violated.
Exclusionary Rule
As discussed above, Officer’s questioning of Suspect immediately after arrest was a custodial interrogation that violated Miranda. As such, Suspect’s statement during that custodial interrogaiton would be excluded from the prosecution’s case-in-chief. However, the exclusion does not necessarily apply to statements Suspect made in response to Detective’s subsequent interrogation. The Supreme Court has indicated that violations of Miranda do not necessarily support the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, at least with respect to subsequent statements by the defendant. Isolated negligence by law enforcement personnel will not trigger the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule would only be triggered here if the conduct of the police was shown to be sufficiently deliberate and a pattern of conduct that exclusion would deter.
Here, Officer’s questioning was an isolated incident. After Officer’s initial Miranda violation, Suspect was taken to the police station and booked. After an hour, Detective attempted to question Suspect only after advising him of his Miranda rights and receiving Suspect’s knowing and understanding waiver. Thus, the custodial interrogation Officer began in violation of Miranda was followed by a break and the provision of proper procedural safeguards before questioning continued. Suspect’s subsequent statements to Detective would thus be admissible.
Unambiguous Request for Counsel
Interrogation of an arrestee must stop once the arrestee invokes the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. The interrogation must stop until counsel is present. However, the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment is not automatic. In order to invoke this right, the defendant must make a specific, unambiguous statement that he wishes to have counsel present.
The issue is whether charging the defendant with both theft and burglary constituted double jeopardy.
The Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. If a defendant’s conduct may be prosecuted as two or more crimes, then the Blockburger test is applied to determine whether the crimes constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Under this test, each crime must require the proof of an element that the other does not in order for each to be considered as a separate offense. The double jeopardy clause generally bars successive prosecutions for greater and lesser included offenses. A lesser included offense is one that does not require proof of an element beyond those required by the greater offense.
The issue is whether the jury instruction violated the due process clause either by relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving the element or by shifting the burden to the defendant to disprove that element.
The Due Process Clause requires that the prosecution prove all of the elements of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. A mandatory presumption regarding an element of an offense violates the due-process requirement. This could include either a conclusive presumption that cannot be rebutted (which would relieve the prosecution of having to prove an element of their case) or a rebuttable mandatory presumption (which shifts the burden of proof regarding the element of the offense).
The issue is whether the sentence imposed in this case for the theft conviction unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of his right to a jury trial on the issue of the value of the stolen item.
Any fact, other than a prior conviction, that can be used to increase a sentence beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and established beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is considered an element of a crime, as opposed to a sentencing enhancement, when it can increase the maximum sentence imposed. The failure to abide by the above procedure is a violation of the defendant’s due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights to notice and a jury trial, both of which are incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
