Constitutional Law Flashcards
The issue is whether Private violated the man’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14A.
The EPC of the 14A applies only to government action. To trigger constitutional protections, state action is required. A private entity’s conduct must constitute state action in order for these protections to apply. State action may be considered to exist when private parties carry out traditional governmental functions or if there is significant state involvement in the activities. To be considered significantly involved, the state must act affirmatively to facilitate, authorize, or encourage the private activity or must have intertwined its actions with those of the private entity to such an extent that the state and the private party mutually benefit from the involvement (e.g., a joint venture). Simply licensing or regulating a private party does not amount to state involvement significant enough to trigger the protections of the EPC of the 14A.
The issue is whether Public violated the man’s rights under the EPC of the 14A.
Denying admission based on gender is presumed to be unconstitutional. Discrimination based on gender is discrimination based on a quasi-suspect classification and so is judged under the intermediate scrutiny standard. In applying this test, the burden is on the state to show that its different treatment of the sexes is substantially related to an important government interest and that an “exceedingly persuasive justification” exists for the distinction.
The issue is whether Public, in providing the man with the opportunity for nursing education that is inferior to that offered to female students, violated the man’s rights under the EPC of the 14A.
Different treatment of the genders by the government does not violate the equal protection guarantee if the state can show that it has an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the different treatment and that the separate facilities offered are “subustantially equivalent.”
The issue is whether AutoCo’s operation of Oakwood constitutes state action for purposes of the First Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Constitution generally protects against wrongful conduct by the government, not private parties. A private person’s conduct must constitute state action in order for these protections to apply. State action is found when a private person carries on activities that are traditionally performed exclusively by the state, such as running primary elections or governing a “company town.”
The issue is whether the son’s expulsion from school violated the First Amendment when the school policy compelled students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.
The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and protects the freedom of speech as well as the freedom not to speak. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a child in a public school has the right not to recit the Pledge of Allegiance.
The issue is whether the father’s arrest violated the First Amendment when he was distributing leaflets in a traditional public forum.
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech. Protected speech can include written, oral, and visual communication, as well as expressive conduct such as picketing and leafleting. However, expressive conduct will be upheld if (1) the regulation is within the government’s power to enact, (2) the regulation furthers an important governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of ideas, and (4) the burden on speech is no greater than necessary (i.e., narrowly tailored).
[anti-littering rule is w/in city’s power to enact rules as local gov’t; rule is unrelated to suppression of ideas; but interest in litter-free streets is likely insufficient to qualify as an important gov’t interest. Ban on all leafleting burdens speech more than necessary to address littering issues. Ban is not narrowly tailored to protect communication of information and opinion through leafleting.]
The issue is whether the Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The EPC of the 14A provides that “no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protections of the laws.” This clause applies only to states and localities. Laws that make classifications based on age are reviewed under the rational basis standard, a test of minimal scrutiny. A law satisfies the rational basis standard if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. It is not required that there actually be a link between the means selected by the state and a legitimate state objective. However, the legislature must reasonably believe there is a link. Laws are presumed valid under this standard, and the burden is on the challenger to show that a law is arbitrary or irrational.
The issue is whether Congress has authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a statute barring states from establishing a maximum age for firefighters.
The federal government may exercise only those powers specifically enumerated by the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment, Section Five Enabling Clause permits Congress to pass legislation to enforce the equal protection and due process rights guaranteed by that amendment. However, this clause does not grant Congress the authority to expand those rights or create new ones. In enforcing such rights, there must be a “congruence and proportionality” between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to achieve that end. Accordingly, though Congress may override state government action that infringes upon Fourteenth Amendment rights if the congruence and proportionality test is satisfied, its enforcement power would not stretch to prohibit a law that does not violate the Constitution. In other words, the proposed law would be both incongruent and disproportionate because there would be no constitutional injury to prevent or remedy.
The issue is whether the municipality’s regulatory actions constitute a taking.
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires just compensation for takings. Under the Constitution, a taking occurs when the government (1) permanently physically occupies an owner’s private land or (2) totally deprives the land of any economic value. A zoning ordinance does not automatically constitute a taking unless the ordinance renders the land totally economically unviable.
The issue is whether the private utility’s invasion of Parcel 2 pursuant to governmental authority constitutes a taking.
A taking occurs if the government physically occupies a citizen’s private land. Landowners have airspace rights over their land which can also be subject to the Takings Clause. A partial taking occurs when only part of a landowner’s land is taken, in which case the landowner has a right to proportional just compensation for the portion taken.
The issue is whether seizing and selling Parcel 3 to a private developer constitutes a taking.
Under the doctrine of eminent domain, a governmental entity may take private land for any public use, broadly construed, including economic development. As long as the taking is rationally related to a public benefit, the court will uphold the taking. The government must pay just compensation for seizing private land.
The issue is whether Section 11 commandeers state executive officers in violation of the sovereign immunity doctrine.
Congress may exercise only those powers specifically enumerated by the Constitution. Under the 10A, all powers not assigned by the Constitution to the federal government are reserved to the states. In theory, this gives the states expansive, exclusive power. In practice, however, the federal government has very broad power to regulate the states. As long as Congress is exercising one of its enumerated powers, Congress may regulate the states, within certain limits. However, Congress cannot commandeer state legislatures by commanding them to enact specific legislation or enforce a federal regulatory program. Congress is also prohibited from conscripting a state executive officer directly.
The issue is whether Section 15 is a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power.
Although Congress cannot command state legislatures, it can encourage state action through the use of the taxing and spending powers. The spending power has been interpreted very broadly, but is subject to five limitations. First, Congress must spend for the general welfare, which amounts to any public purpose. Second, the condition must be unambiguous. Third, the condition must relate to the federal interset in particular national projects or programs. Fourth, the condition must not induce the states to act in an unconstitutional manner. Finally, the condition may not exceed the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.
The first issue is whether Section 1 of the Green Energy Act unconstitutionally burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce.
The Dormant Commerce Clause is a doctrine that limits the power of states to legislate in ways that impact interstate commerce. If Congress has not enacted legislation in a particular area of interstate commerce, then the states are free to regulate, so long as the state or local action does not: (i) discriminate against out-of-state commerce, (ii) unduly burden interstate commerce, or (iii) purposefully regulate extraterritorial (wholly out-of-state) activity.
A state or local regulation discriminates against out-of-state commerce if it protects local economic interests at the expense of out-of-state competitors. However, the mere fact that the entire burden of a state’s regulation falls on an out-of-state business is not sufficient to constitute discrimination against interstate commerce. The Dormant Commerce Clause protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.
A state regulation that is not discriminatory may still be struck down as unconstitutional if it imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. The courts will balance, case by case, the objective and purpose of the state law against the burden on interstate commerce and evaluate whether there are less restrictive alternatives.
The next issue is whether Section 2 of the Act unconstitutionally burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce.
If a state or local regulation, on its face or in practice, is discriminatory, then the regulation may be upheld if the state or local government can establish that: (i) an important local interest is being served and (ii) no other nondiscriminatory means are available to achieve that purpose.
Here, Section 2 of the Act as applied to the public utility from State B likely discriminates against out-of-state commerce because it prevents the export of coal-produced electricity but allows an exception for the urgent energy needs of State A residents. Such an exception is discriminatory against residents of neighboring states that may have an urgent need for energy and effectively bans the export of energy from coal-burning plants to consumers outside the state.
In addition to the general discriminatory nature of Section 2, the denial of this specific permit was discriminatory. If the State B utility had identified the urgent needs of consumers in State A, the permit likely would have been granted. However, the State B utility was denied a permit because it identified the urgent needs of State B consumers. Thus, the permit was denied based on the consumers’ status as State B residents and was discriminatory.
While environmental protection is a legitimate and important local government interest, there are alternative nondiscriminatory means available to achieve that interest. For example, Section 2 could create a blanket ban on all new coal-burning facilities without providing an exception or, alternatively, the exception could apply to the urgent needs of all consumers, not just those in State A. Considering that these alternatives are available, Section 2 discriminates against interstate commerce and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.
