crim pro rules Flashcards
Probable Cause
A proper arrest is one that is based on probable cause. Facts supporting probable cause may come from a number of different sources including a police officer’s personal observations.
Here, the state law granted police officers discretion to arrest for any traffic infraction, including violation of the state’s seat belt law. The officer personally observed a violation of the seat belt law and so had probable cause to make the stop and arrest. Therefore, the stop and arrest were constitutional. The constitutionality of the stop and arrest is not affected by the relatively minor nature of the violation or by the officer’s ulterior motive for making the stop. Rather, the pertinent factors taken into consideration are whether or not there was probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred and whether or not state law authorized arrest for that particular violation. Therefore, because there was probable cause for the traffic stop and state law authorized arrest for the traffic violation, neither the stop nor the subsequent arrest violated Suspect’s constitutional rights.
Plain View Doctrine
A warrantless search is valid if it is reasonable in scope and if it is made incident to a lawful arrest. Under the plain view doctrine, if an item is in public view it may be seized without a warrant since there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for such an item. The Fourth Amendment does not require police to obtain a warrant to search a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a criminal activity.
Here, as discussed above, the officer made a lawful traffic stop and arrest. Immediately following the arrest while stopped on a public road, the officer was in a position to observe a clear plastic bag containing white powder on the front seat of Suspect’s car. Officer knew that Suspect was reputed to be a drug dealer and his suspicion that the white powder was an illegal drug was supported by the fact that Suspect said “That cocaine isn’t mine.” The officer therefore had probable cause to seize the plastic bag from the front seat of Suspect’s car. The seizure did not violate Suspect’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
Question Immediately Subsequent to Arrest
Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody. A person under arrest is, by definition, in custody and any police questioning of the person under arrest would thus be custodial interrogation. Questioning of a suspect by a police officer subsequent to an arrest must be preceded by Miranda warnings and a waiver or the suspect’s Miranda rights are violated.
Here, the facts indicate that Officer asked Suspect if the drugs the Officer observed on the front seat of Suspect’s automobile belonged to Suspect only after Officer had arrested Suspect. The Officer did not first provide Suspect with Miranda warnings. Therefore, Officer’s question amounted to custodial interrogation and violated Suspect’s Miranda rights.
Exclusionary Rule
As discussed above, Officer’s questioning of Suspect immediately after arrest was a custodial interrogation that violated Miranda. As such, Suspect’s statement during that custodial interrogation would be excluded from the prosecution’s case-in-chief. However, the exclusion does not necessarily apply to statements Suspect made in response to Detective’s subsequent interrogation. The Supreme Court has indicated that violations of Miranda do not necessarily support the “fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree” doctrine, at least with respect to subsequent statements by the defendant. Isolated negligence by law enforcement personnel will not trigger the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule would only be triggered here if the conduct of the police was shown to be sufficiently deliberate and a pattern of conduct that exclusion would deter.
Here, Officer’s questioning was an isolated incident. After Officer’s initial Miranda violation, Suspect was taken to the police station and booked. After an hour, Detective attempted to question Suspect only after advising him of his Miranda rights and receiving Suspect’s knowing and understanding waiver. Thus, the custodial interrogation Officer began in violation of Miranda was followed by a break and the provision of proper procedural safeguards before questioning continued. Suspect’s subsequent statements to Detective would thus be admissible.
Unambiguous Request for Counsel
Interrogation of an arrestee must stop once the arrestee invokes the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. The interrogation must stop until counsel is present. However, the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment is not automatic. In order to invoke this right, the defendant must make a specific, unambiguous statement that he wishes to have counsel present.
Here, Suspect made no such statement. “Maybe I need a lawyer” does not qualify as such a statement. Therefore, Detective was not required to cease his interrogation and the confession Suspect made after making the ambiguous statement regarding a lawyer should not be suppressed on this basis.
Interrogation of an arrestee must stop once the arrestee invokes the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. The interrogation must stop until counsel is present. However, the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment is not automatic. In order to invoke this right, the defendant must make a specific, unambiguous statement that he wishes to have counsel present.
Here, Suspect made no such statement. “Maybe I need a lawyer” does not qualify as such a statement. Therefore, Detective was not required to cease his interrogation and the confession Suspect made after making the ambiguous statement regarding a lawyer should not be suppressed on this basis.
Double Jeopardy
At issue is whether charging the defendant with both theft and burglary constituted double jeopardy.
The Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. If a defendant’s conduct may be prosecuted as two or more crimes, then the Blockburger test is applied to determine whether the crimes constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Under this test, each crime must require the proof of an element that the other does not in order for each to be considered as a separate offense. The double jeopardy clause generally bars successive prosecutions for greater and lesser included offenses. A lesser included offense is one that does not require proof of an element beyond those required by the greater offense.
In this case, the theft and burglary crimes each require proof of an element not required for the other crime. Under the state statute, burglary requires the entering of a dwelling of another with the specific intent to commit a felony therein. Theft requires taking and carrying away the property of another with the intent to deprive the owner of possession. The “entering” element from burglary and the “taking” element of theft are both unique to those crimes. Therefore, prosecution for both crimes does not violate double jeopardy and the court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion.
[Editor’s Note: The bar examiners may award additional points for responses noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, making a pretrial motion to dismiss these charges on double jeopardy grounds premature. However, the bar examiner’s analysis for this essay indicated that a response that does not discuss the Blockburger test would not receive full credit.]
Due Process
The issue is whether the jury instruction violated the due process clause either by relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving the element of intent or by shifting the burden to the defendant to disprove that element.
The Due Process Clause requires that the prosecution prove all of the elements of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. A mandatory presumption regarding an element of an offense violates the due-process requirement. This could include either a conclusive presumption that cannot be rebutted (which would relieve the prosecution of having to prove an element of their case) or a rebuttable mandatory presumption (which shifts the burden of proof regarding the element of the offense). In this case, the crime of burglary requires that the defendant entered another’s dwelling “with the intent to commit a felony therein.” Because this is an element of the burglary offense, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the defendant’s intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The court’s jury instruction contains a mandatory presumption that the defendant intended to commit a felony while inside the house. This instruction violates the Due Process Clause because it relieves the prosecution from proving this element. Therefore, the instruction violated the Due Process Clause.
Right to Jury Trial
At issue is whether the sentence imposed in this case for the theft conviction unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of his right to a jury trial on the issue of the value of the stolen item.
Any fact, other than a prior conviction, that can be used to increase a sentence beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and established beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is considered an element of a crime, as opposed to a sentencing enhancement, when it can increase the maximum sentence imposed. The failure to abide by the above procedure is a violation of the defendant’s due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights to notice and a jury trial, both of which are incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
In this case, the crime of theft required the property to be valued between $2,500 and $10,000. If the value was between $2,500 and $5,000, the maximum sentence is three years’ incarceration. If the value was greater than $5,000, the maximum sentence is five years’ incarceration. The jury made a proper finding that the value of the ring was greater than $2,500 in order to convict the defendant of theft. However, the trial court made a separate finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the value of the ring was greater than $5,000. This allowed the judge to sentence the defendant to four years’ incarceration under the statute. Because this fact allowed the judge to sentence the defendant beyond the statutory three years’ maximum, the defendant was entitled to have a jury decide the issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant.
Standing
At issue is whether John has standing to challenge the search of Crystal’s parents’ home and the seizure and search of the leather bag.
To have standing to challenge the admission of illegally seized evidence, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights must have been violated. A defendant cannot successfully challenge governmental conduct as a violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures unless the defendant himself has been seized or he has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the place searched or the item seized. It is not enough that the introduction as evidence of an item seized may incriminate the defendant.
Here, John has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his girlfriend’s family’s home. Additionally, John cannot challenge the seizure of his bag and search of its contents because he surrendered his reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag when he gave the bag over to Crystal and asked her to get rid of it. John no longer had any control as to who had access to his bag and how Crystal was to get rid of it. Accordingly, the trial judge correctly denied John’s motion to suppress the bag and its contents.
Elements of Robbery
At issue is whether the prosecution produced sufficient evidence to prove all of the elements of attempted armed robbery.
A court should only grant a judgment of acquittal if it finds that there is insufficient evidence for a jury reasonably to find the defendant guilty. In a criminal trial, the prosecution bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence of the alleged crime. An attempt crime requires a specific intent to commit a criminal act coupled with a substantial step taken toward the commission of the intended crime. First, the prosecution must prove that John intended to commit an armed robbery. Second, the prosecution must prove that John took a substantial step toward the commission of an armed robbery. Robbery is a larceny from the person or presence of the victim by force or intimidation. Larceny is the trespassory taking and carrying away of the personal property of another with the intent to steal.
Intent
As to John’s intent, the e-mails, testimony of the clerk, and testimony of Crystal suggest that John planned to either use a weapon or threaten the imminent use of a weapon against the clerk to compel the store clerk to turn over money. This evidence clearly shows that John intended to commit armed robbery because he intended to use force or the threat of force to steal the property of another. Thus, the prosecution met its burden of proving that John intended to commit armed robbery.
Substantial Step
As to whether John took a substantial step toward committing the offense, states use various tests for determining when a defendant’s conduct constitutes an attempt to commit a crime. Under the “substantial step” test (a subjective test), the act must be one that tends to effect the commission of a crime. Conduct does not constitute a substantial step if it is in mere preparation. Some states apply the “dangerous proximity” test, however, which requires that the defendant’s acts result in a dangerous proximity to completion of the crime.
In this case, John loaded a gun, took it into a store, and approached the store clerk. John’s actions tended to effect the commission of armed robbery and were not mere preparation. Further, John’s behavior was in dangerous proximity to completing his crime. Additionally, it appears that John would have robbed the clerk if Crystal had not started to cry and left the store. Thus, most courts would find that the prosecution’s evidence demonstrates that John took a substantial step toward armed robbery.
Accordingly, the trial judge correctly denied John’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Defenses to Attempt Crimes
The issue is whether abandonment, withdrawal, or changed mind is a defense to a charge of an attempted crime.
At common law, once the defendant has taken a substantial step toward the commission of a crime, the crime of attempt is completed; there can be no abandonment or withdrawal. As explained above, John completed a substantial step toward commission of armed robbery. Thus, the court was correct to refuse a jury instruction on the defense of abandonment because the defense does not exist.
Some jurisdictions do recognize voluntary abandonment as a defense to attempt. Abandonment is not voluntary, however, if it is motivated by a desire to avoid detection, a decision to delay commission of the crime until a more favorable time, or the selection of another similar objective or victim.
Here, John abandoned the robbery only after Crystal got scared and ran out of the store. Thus, John’s abandonment was not voluntary, and the trial judge was correct to deny an instruction on the defense of abandonment.
Attachment of Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides the accused with the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions. The right attaches at all critical stages of a prosecution after formal proceedings have begun, such as an indictment or a formal charge. However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach before the accused is formally charged, and the right is offense-specific, so it only applies to the specific offense at issue in the formal proceedings.
In this case, the suspect was not entitled to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as to the burglary offenses because the right had not attached. When the detective questioned the suspect, no formal proceedings had been initiated against the accused. Although the suspect’s right to counsel had attached to the sixth-month-old aggravated assault charge, it had not attached to the burglary offenses at the time of questioning. Because the right had not attached, the detective did not violate it.
Invoking Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides the accused with the right to consult with an attorney and have an attorney present during a custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody. Once a custodial interrogation begins, anything the defendant says is inadmissible until the defendant is informed of his Miranda rights and the defendant waives those rights. The defendant must invoke the right to counsel by making a specific, unambiguous statement asserting his right to have counsel present. Once the right to counsel is invoked, all interrogation must stop until counsel is present. However, if the defendant’s statement is ambiguous, the police are not required to end interrogation. Even if the right to counsel is successfully invoked, the defendant waives his right if he voluntarily initiates communication with the police after the right was invoked.
In this case, the suspect was subject to custodial interrogation because he was in custody and being questioned by a law enforcement officer. The detective properly informed the suspect of his Miranda rights and began questioning him. The suspect may have attempted to invoke his right to counsel by saying “I think I want my lawyer here,” but this is not sufficiently specific or unambiguous to invoke the right. Therefore, the detective was under no obligation to stop questioning him. Even if the suspect had successfully invoked his right to counsel, he waived that right moments later by reinitiating communication with the detective.
Waiver of Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides the accused with the right not to be compelled to make incriminating statements during custodial interrogation (the right to remain silent). As with the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the defendant must make a specific, unambiguous statement asserting his right to remain silent. Merely remaining silent does not invoke the privilege. If a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, the interrogator must honor that request. Once the right is invoked, a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to remain silent. The burden is on the government to show that waiver was both knowing and voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances. A statement is involuntary only if the police act to coerce the defendant into making the statement. A suspect waives his right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police. Once the right to remain silent has been waived, the police are under no obligation to inform the defendant that defense counsel is trying to reach him.
In this case, the suspect was subject to custodial interrogation and was properly read his Miranda rights. He never unambiguously invoked the right to remain silent. Although silence is not sufficient to either invoke or waive the right to remain silent, an uncoerced statement by the suspect effectively waives the right. Here, there is no evidence that police used coercive tactics to illicit an involuntary statement from the suspect. The interrogation lasted only 45 minutes; there is no evidence of threats or other improper conduct; and there are not significant factors regarding the suspect’s age, mental capacity, or other circumstances to suggest police coercion. Given these circumstances, the suspect signing the waiver and stating “I’m willing to talk to you for a while” both suggest the suspect waived his right to remain silent knowingly and voluntarily. The fact that the detective did not tell the suspect his attorney was outside does not impact the validity of the suspect’s waiver.
