con law rules Flashcards
The issue is whether AutoCo’s operation of Oakwood constitutes state action for purposes of the First Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.
he Constitution generally protects against wrongful conduct by the government, not private parties. A private person’s conduct must constitute state action in order for these protections to apply. State action is found when a private person carries on activities that are traditionally performed exclusively by the state, such as running primary elections or governing a “company town.”
In this case, AutoCo built Oakwood specifically to attract workers to its remote plant. AutoCo supplies housing, security, fire protection, and sanitation services for Oakwood’s residents. AutoCo also maintains a commercial district and streets open to the general public. In addition, AutoCo built, operates, and fully funds the only school in the region, which it provides free of charge to its employees. This is the sort of “company town” that amounts to activities traditionally performed exclusively by the state. As such, the Constitutional protections of the First Amendment likely apply to AutoCo, even though it is a private company.
The issue is whether the son’s expulsion from school violated the First Amendment when the school policy compelled students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. (
The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and protects the freedom of speech as well as the freedom not to speak. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a child in a public school has the right not to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.
As discussed above, the First Amendment applies to AutoCo as a private company carrying on activities that are traditionally performed by the State. Here, the school has a policy compelling students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance while standing and saluting an American flag. The son has politely refused to comply with this policy because it violates his own political beliefs and the political beliefs of his family. This conduct is within the son’s First Amendment right not to speak. As such, the policy and his punishment for violating the policy violate his First Amendment rights as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The issue is whether the father’s arrest violated the First Amendment when he was distributing leaflets in a traditional public forum.
he First Amendment protects freedom of speech. Protected speech can include written, oral, and visual communication, as well as activities such as picketing and leafleting. The government’s ability to regulate speech depends on the forum in which the speech takes place. A traditional public forum is one that is historically associated with expression, such as sidewalks, streets, and parks. In a traditional public forum, the government may only regulate speech if the restrictions: (i) are content-neutral as to both subject matter and viewpoint, (ii) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (iii) leave open ample alternative channels for communication. Additional restrictions, such as an absolute prohibition of a particular type of expression, will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.
As discussed above, the First Amendment protections apply to AutoCo because it is a private company carrying on activities that are traditionally performed by the state. These activities include owning and operating the commercial district in Oakwood. In this case, the father’s conduct was protected by the First Amendment because leafleting is considered protected speech. The father was in a traditional public forum because he was on a public sidewalk in a commercial area open to the public. Thus, the Oakwood restriction on leafletting must meet the above restrictions.
Here, the restriction is content-neutral because it applies to all leafletting, regardless of the content. However, the restriction fails to meet the other requirements. The ban on leafletting that might cause littering is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The Supreme Court has held that preventing littering is an insufficient governmental interest to justify banning all leafletting. In addition, the blanket ban is not narrowly tailored to serve this interest because Oakwood could prosecute only the people who litter, rather than prohibiting all leafletting that might lead to litter. Lastly, prohibiting all leafletting that might lead to littering does not leave open sufficient alternatives for communicating in this public space. Thus, the ban on leafletting likely violates the father’s First Amendment rights as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the state has a legitimate interest in promoting safety and efficiency in firefighting and there is a rational relationship between achieving this goal and lowering the age of the workforce.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” This clause applies only to states and localities. Laws classifying on the basis of age are reviewed under the rational basis standard. A law passes the rational basis standard of review if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, a test of minimal scrutiny. It is not required that there is actually a link between the means selected and a legitimate objective. However, the legislature must reasonably believe there is a link. Laws are presumed valid under this standard.
The firefighter will likely argue that forced retirement at the age of 50 violates his right to equal protection of the laws because the Act applies solely to firefighters who have reached the age of 50 and not to those under that age. However, State A will argue that the age restriction is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of promoting safety and efficiency in firefighting. The legislature held extensive hearings and heard testimony that a person’s physical conditioning and ability to work safely and effectively as a firefighter decline with age (with the most rapid declines occurring after age 50). Therefore, the legislature has reason to believe there is a link between lowering the age of its workforce and the legitimate governmental interest in safety and efficiency.
Because the Act is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, the law would pass the rational basis standard of review and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress does not have authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a statute barring states from establishing a maximum age for firefighters because setting a mandatory age limit for firefighters would not constitute a constitutional injury.
The federal government may exercise only those powers specifically enumerated by the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment, Section Five Enabling Clause permits Congress to pass legislation to enforce the equal protection and due process rights guaranteed by the amendment, but not to expand those rights or create new ones. In enforcing such rights, there must be a “congruence and proportionality” between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to achieve that end. Accordingly, though Congress may override state government action that infringes upon Fourteenth Amendment rights, its enforcement power would not stretch to prohibit a law that does not violate the Constitution. In other words, as there would be no constitutional injury to prevent or remedy, the proposed law would be both incongruent and disproportionate.
Because age is not a suspect classification and is reviewed under the rational basis standard, states would not inflict constitutional injury by establishing a maximum age for firefighters. As discussed above, reviewing the law under the rational basis standard would likely result in a finding that the maximum age was constitutional. The proposed statute barring states from establishing a maximum age for firefighters would amount to Congress barring laws that do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of the lack of a constitutional injury to prevent, the proposed law would be neither congruent nor proportional. Accordingly, Congress would not have the authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact such a statute.
The Dormant Commerce Clause
limits the power of states to legislate in ways that impact interstate commerce. If Congress has not enacted legislation in a particular area of interstate commerce, then the states are free to regulate, so long as the state or local action does not: (i) discriminate against out-of-state commerce, (ii) unduly burden interstate commerce, or (iii) regulate extraterritorial (wholly out-of-state) activity.
provision issue Section 1: Environmentally Friendly Energy Sources
A state or local regulation discriminates against out-of-state commerce if it protects local economic interests at the expense of out-of-state competitors. Section 1 of the Act is not facially discriminatory because it applies equally to in-state and out-of-state utilities. Section 1 of the Act does negatively affect a business (i.e., natural gas production) in which there are no in-state participants. However, the mere fact that entire burden of a state’s regulation falls on an out-of-state business is not sufficient to constitute discrimination against interstate commerce. The Dormant Commerce Clause protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.
A state regulation that is not discriminatory may still be struck down as unconstitutional if it imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. The courts will balance, case by case, the objective and purpose of the state law against the burden on interstate commerce and evaluate whether there are less restrictive alternatives. Here, State A has found that burning natural gas releases significant quantities of greenhouse gases and requires the use of scarce water resources. These effects can be reduced by requiring that 50% of the electricity sold in State A come from environmentally friendly energy sources. In light of these benefits, the burden on interstate commerce (i.e., discouraging the purchase of natural gas) is not significant. Thus, Section 1 does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.
issue 2: New Coal-Burning Plants
Section 2 of the Act as applied to the public utility from State B likely discriminates against out-of-state commerce because it prevents the export of coal-produced electricity, but allows an exception for the urgent energy needs of State A residents. Such an exception is discriminatory against residents of neighboring states that may have an urgent need for energy, and effectively bans the export of energy from coal-burning plants to consumers outside the state.
In addition to the general discriminatory nature of Section 2, the denial of this specific permit was discriminatory. If the State B utility had identified the urgent needs of consumers in State A, the permit likely would have been granted. However, the State B utility was denied a permit because it identified the urgent needs of State B consumers. Thus, the permit was denied based on the consumers’ status as State B residents, and was discriminatory.
If a state or local regulation, on its face or in practice, is discriminatory, then the regulation may be upheld if the state or local government can establish that: (i) an important local interest is being served, and (ii) no other nondiscriminatory means are available to achieve that purpose. In this case, environmental protection is a legitimate and important local government interest. However, there are alternative nondiscriminatory means available to achieve that purpose. For example, Section 2 could create a blanket ban on all new coal-burning facilities without providing an exception or, alternatively, the exception could apply to the urgent needs of all consumers, not just those in State A. Considering that these alternatives are available, Section 2 violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Section 3: Buying from Vendors Located within the State
A state may behave in a discriminatory fashion if it is acting as a market participant (buyer or seller), as opposed to a market regulator. If the state is a market participant, it may favor local commerce or discriminate against nonresident commerce as could any private business. Section 3 requires that State A buy goods only from environmentally friendly vendors located within State A. Because State A is buying goods, it is a market participant and may discriminate against nonresident commerce as could any private business. Thus, Section 3 does not violate the Constitution.
The issue is whether the bank can maintain a suit against State A for damages in federal court, if State A makes a claim for sovereign immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar that prohibits the citizens of one state from suing another state in federal court. It immunizes the state from suits in federal court for money damages or equitable relief when the state is a defendant in an action brought by a citizen of another state. There are a few notable exceptions, including when a state waives its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Here, the bank is a resident of State B and is suing State A for damages. While a state may waive its immunity, there is no evidence that State A has done so. Thus, this action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The issue is whether the court can hear the bank’s claim against the Superintendent, when the bank sued the Superintendent in her official capacity for injunctive relief only.
When a state official, rather than the state itself, is named as the defendant in an action brought in federal court, the state official may be enjoined from enforcing a state law that violates federal law.
Here, the bank could maintain an action in federal court against State A’s Superintendent of Banking in her official capacity to enjoin enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional law. Further, because the bank’s claim raises a federal question under the U.S. Constitution, the federal court would have jurisdiction over this action.
The issue is whether the statute is unconstitutional, as it places a significant burden on interstate commerce without substantial fraud-protection benefits.
The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that the Constitution’s grant to Congress of the power to regulate interstate commerce also limits, by implication, the right of state or local governments to adopt laws that regulate interstate commerce. This is often referred to as the “dormant Commerce Clause.” A state law that discriminates against interstate commerce is subject to strict review and is virtually per se unconstitutional. A nondiscriminatory state law that imposes an “incidental” burden on interstate commerce will nonetheless be unconstitutional if the benefits of the state law are grossly outweighed by the burdens on interstate commerce.
The State A law in this case is facially nondiscriminatory. It applies equally to local banks and to banks from other states. There are also no facts to suggest that it operates in a discriminatory fashion or that it imposes a heavier burden on out-of-state banks offering services to State A businesses than it imposes on in-state banks. However, it still may have an undue burden on interstate commerce, compared to the benefits.
State A plainly has a legitimate local public interest in protecting local businesses from the significant losses that can result from electronic funds transfer fraud. The legislature’s judgment that biometric identification is superior to other anti-fraud techniques is not a judgment that a court will normally second-guess. However, it is unclear whether the security measures required by State A produce real and substantial benefits. The bank’s own security experts do not believe the system is particularly reliable.
On the other hand, the law burdens interstate commerce by increasing the expenses of out-of-state banks that wish to offer certain electronic banking services to State A businesses. Compliance with the law would require the bank to make substantial changes to its entire electronic banking system at a cost of $50 million. This cost is substantial enough to deter the bank from offering certain services in State A at all. A court could find that this is a real and substantial burden placed on interstate commerce.
In sum, if the benefits of the security measures required by State A are substantial enough to justify the burdens, the statute is constitutional. Otherwise, it is not.
The issue is whether the city ordinance requirement that businesses install floodlights is a taking.
Per Se Taking
Generally, a governmental regulation that adversely affects a person’s property interest is not a taking. However, it is possible for a regulation to rise to the level of a taking, such as when a regulation results in a permanent physical occupation of the property by the government or a third party or when a regulation results in a permanent total loss of the property’s economic value.
Here, the ordinance does not result in a per se taking based on permanent physical occupation because the restaurant, and not a third party, is required to install flood lights. Similarly, the ordinance does not result in the total loss of the property’s economic value because it has no impact on the owner’s ability to operate a restaurant. Thus, the ordinance does not amount to a per se taking.
Regulatory Taking
Even though the ordinance does not constitute an occupation of the property by either the government or a third party, it is still subject to a three-factor balancing test to determine whether the ordinance amounts to a regulatory taking. The following factors are considered: (i) the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner, (ii) the extent to which the regulation interferes with the owner’s reasonable, investment-backed expectations regarding use of the property, and (iii) the character of the regulation, including the degree to which it will benefit society, how the regulation distributes the burdens and benefits among property owners, and whether the regulation violates any of the owner’s essential attributes of property ownership, such as the right to exclude others from the property.
Economic impact
Here, the floodlight requirement will have a minimal economic impact on the restaurant. Compliance is estimated to cost a mere $1,000 and the restaurant will likely recoup that cost in increased sales. Thus, the first factor is met.
Interference with use
The ordinance also does not interfere with the restaurant’s ability to function as a restaurant. Nor does it prevent the restaurant from expanding to meet demands, thereby satisfying the second factor.
Character of regulation
Finally, the character of the ordinance does not weigh in favor of a taking. The ordinance is meant to protect public safety and is predicted to increase traffic for all the businesses downtown. The burden of installing floodlights is evenly distributed among all business owners and does not violate the owners’ ability to operate their businesses. The benefits to society as a whole balanced against the burden on the restaurant does not weigh in favor of a taking.
Therefore, all three factors weigh against finding a taking and there is likely no violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
The issue is whether conditioning the approval of a building permit on the grant of an easement to install surveillance equipment is a taking of property.
A local government may exact promises from a developer, such as setting aside a portion of the land being developed for a park in exchange for issuing the necessary construction permits. Such exactions do not violate the Takings Clause if there is (i) an essential nexus between legitimate state interests and the conditions imposed on the property owner (i.e., the conditions substantially advance a legitimate state interest), and (ii) a rough proportionality between the burden imposed by the conditions on property owner and the impact of the proposed development. In determining whether there is rough proportionality between the burden and the impact, the government must make an individualized determination that the conditions are related both in nature and extent to the impact.
Here, the city can likely meet the nexus requirement. The legitimate state interest is preventing crime and increasing public safety. The restaurant is seeking to increase the capacity of the restaurant which will increase the economic activity in the area and might attract additional crime. The installation of video surveillance is, therefore, sufficiently related to the city’s legitimate interest.
However, the city will likely fail to meet the rough proportionality requirement because it failed to make an individualized determination that the video surveillance is related both in nature and extent to decreasing crime. The city merely speculates that increased economic activity “might” result in increased crime and that the video surveillance “might” alleviate this potential increase in crime. The city has not supported these assertions with any concrete estimates about the increase in crime or the effectiveness of video surveillance.
Therefore, the city likely cannot carry its burden of showing that the exaction is not a taking, and the permit condition likely violates the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
