crim law rules Flashcards
The issue is whether the evidence supports the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) under the applicable state law
n the majority of jurisdictions, the defendant has the burden of proving insanity. The level of proof required in this jurisdiction is a preponderance of the evidence. Insanity includes mental abnormalities that may affect legal responsibility. Under State A’s NGRI statute, the woman must show that (1) she suffered from a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the charged crime and (2) as a result of that mental disease or defect, she did not know that her conduct was wrong. Unlike the Model Penal Code test and the irresistible impulse test, loss of control due to mental illness is not a defense under this test. Instead, this is very similar to the M’Naghten test. Under the M’Naughten test, a defendant is not exculpated simply because he believes his acts to be morally right.
The two psychiatric reports support a finding that the woman suffered from schizophrenia that caused her to experience delusional beliefs. This diagnosis likely qualifies as a mental defect for State A’s NGRI statute. However, there is no evidence that the woman’s schizophrenia prevented her from knowing that it was legally or morally wrong to kidnap the man and force him at knifepoint to drive well above the speed limit on a busy highway. She even told the man to “forget the speed limit,” suggesting she was aware that speeding was illegal. There is also no evidence that the woman’s schizophrenia caused her to believe her conduct was not morally wrong.
Thus, the woman likely cannot establish the defense of NGRI based on the evidence provided.
The issue is whether the facts support charging the man with manslaughter.
n most states, a killing that results from reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life is a depraved-heart murder. Involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional homicide committed with criminal negligence or during an unlawful act. Criminal negligence is grossly negligent action that puts another person at a significant risk of serious bodily injury or death. It requires more than ordinary tort negligence, but less than the conduct required for depraved-heart murder. Under the Model Penal Code, the defendant must have acted recklessly, which is a “gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation,” and must have been actually aware of the risk his conduct posed.
In this case, the man’s driving is unlikely to rise to the level of recklessness required for a “depraved-heart,” because it did not involve the type of depravity usually required. Reckless driving alone is probably insufficient to support a finding of depravity, absent intoxication or some other aggravating factor. The facts are more likely to support a charge of involuntary manslaughter. Here, the man sped 30 mph over the posted speed limit of 55 mph and wove in and out of traffic to avoid other cars. The man’s actions caused the unintentional homicide of the motorcyclist, and despite the woman’s threats, the man’s actions were a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the same situation. Even if the court does not find that the man was criminally negligent, the man’s speeding above the posted limit was certainly an unlawful act. In some jurisdictions, his speeding may be sufficient to serve as a predicate offense for a charge of unlawful-act manslaughter.
Thus, this facts likely support an involuntary manslaughter charge.
The issue is whether the man’s conduct was committed under the pressure of an unlawful threat that caused him to reasonably believe that the only way to avoid death or serious bodily injury to himself was to violate the law.
A third party’s unlawful threat that causes a defendant to reasonably believe that the only way to avoid death or serious bodily injury to himself or another is to violate the law, and that causes the defendant to do so, allows the defendant to claim the duress defense.
Here, the man drove at an excessive rate of speed and in a reckless manner in response to the woman’s direct threat of death or serious bodily harm. Considering that the woman was holding a knife to his throat, it was reasonable for him to fear for his life. Her behavior and comments also indicated she may be mentally unbalanced, making her threat more credible. He also had no opportunity to remove himself from the threatening situation because the woman did not make any threats until she was in the car and he was driving on the highway.
Thus, the man will almost certainly succeed with an affirmative defense of duress.
Burglary against Ben
At issue is whether the elements of burglary are satisfied when the purpose of the entry was to retrieve property the defendant owns.
Common-law burglary is the breaking and entering of the dwelling of another at nighttime with the specific intent to commit a felony therein. Here, Ben was entering the dwelling of another at 10 p.m. (nighttime). “Breaking” is accomplished by using force to create an opening into a dwelling. Although the window was ajar, by fully opening the window Ben’s actions satisfy the “breaking” element. “Entering” occurs when any portion of the defendant’s body crosses into the dwelling without permission through the opening created by the breaking. Although Ben was only halfway through the window that he opened when he was is discovered by his neighbor, this is sufficient to satisfy the “entering” element.
However, because Ben did not enter his neighbor’s house with the intent to commit a felony therein, but rather to retrieve his own painting, Ben should not be charged with burglary.
Larceny or Embezzlement against Ben
Larceny is the trespassory taking and carrying away of the personal property of another with the intent to permanently deprive that person of the property.
Here, Ben’s actions involved the personal property (a print) of another (his neighbor). And, because Ben took the print from his neighbor’s house and initially displayed in his own house, he satisfied the “carrying away” element as well. Although Ben did not initially have the intent to steal his neighbor’s print, he subsequently developed that intent. This would be sufficient under the “continuing trespass” rule, which deems the original trespass to be “continuing” for the criminal act to coincide with the criminal intent, provided the original taking was trespassory. Finally, the property must be taken without the owner’s consent to constitute a trespassory taking. Here, as Ben took possession of his neighbor’s print with his neighbor’s consent, Ben’s acquisition of the print was not trespassory.
Therefore, Ben should not be charged with larceny.
Embezzlement (30%)
Embezzlement is the fraudulent conversion of the property of another by a person who is in lawful possession of the property.
Ben’s actions involved his neighbor’s print, thereby satisfying the third and fourth elements of embezzlement. In addition, Ben was lawfully in possession of the print, having obtain it with his neighbor’s consent, thereby satisfying the fifth element of embezzlement. Regarding the first element, conversion is the inappropriate use of property, held pursuant to a trust agreement, which causes a serious interference with the owner’s rights to the property. Clearly, Ben’s selling the print to the art dealer constitutes conversion. Regarding the second element, the defendant must intend to defraud the owner of the property. Ben’s selling the print also satisfies this element.
Therefore, Ben should be charged with embezzlement.
Receiving Stolen Property
The issue is whether a purchase of property commits the crime of receiving stolen property when a reasonable person should have known the property was stolen.
To be guilty of receiving stolen property, the defendant must (i) receive control of stolen property, (ii) have the knowledge that the property is stolen, and (iii) have the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. Property that is unlawfully obtained through larceny, embezzlement, or false pretense is stolen property. Knowledge that the property is stolen must coincide with the act of receiving the property. Some jurisdictions require that the defendant have actual subjective knowledge that the property has been stolen. Other jurisdictions permit the defendant’s knowledge to be inferred from facts that would alert a reasonable person to unlawful acquisition of the property.
Here, because Ben obtained the print through embezzlement, the print was indeed stolen. When the art dealer purchased the print from Ben she obtained control of it. Although the facts to not show the art dealer’s actual knowledge, there are various facts suggesting her constructive knowledge. Ben’s statement at the time of sale, “I can sell this print to you at such a good price only because I shouldn’t have it at all,” should have been a red flag to the art dealer that resulted in some kind of investigation, as was done with other transactions. In addition, the significant markup of the work the following day implies the art dealer knew the deep discount she was getting from Ben—another red flag. Further, she specifically contacted an art collector known not investigate the ownership history of art that they purchased. Therefore, a reasonable person should have known that Ben had stolen the print and the facts are likely sufficient to infer that the art dealer herself had such knowledge. Finally, the art dealer not only purchased the print from Ben, but also then sold it to a collector, clearly intending to permanently deprive the owner of the property.
Therefore, the art dealer should be charged with the crime of receiving stolen property.
Second-Degree Murder
The issue is whether Defendant acted with the mens rea sufficient to be found guilty of second-degree murder.
To be guilty of second-degree murder, Defendant must have acted with the requisite mens rea of malice aforethought. Malice aforethought includes the following mental states: the intent to kill, the intent to inflict serious bodily injury, reckless indifference to a known and unjustifiably high risk to human life (depraved heart), or the intent to commit certain felonies. In this jurisdiction, second-degree murder is “all murder that is not deliberate or premeditated.” Premeditation is the distinguishing element of first-degree murder. The premeditation requirement means the defendant reflected on the idea of killing or planned the killing.
In this case, the facts do not indicate that the defendant reflected on the idea of killing. However, Defendant probably acted with a reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life (a depraved heart). Defendant shot a gun in the general direction of Friend, while aiming at an object that was behind Friend. Defendant’s conduct carries an obvious risk to Friend because Friend could be shot and fatally injured. Defendant ran a high risk of causing serious harm to Friend for no legitimate purpose.
Therefore, a jury would likely find that Defendant’s conduct amounted to a reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life and would convict Defendant of second-degree murder.
Legal Causation (45-55%)
At issue is whether Defendant’s accidental shooting of Friend was both the actual and proximate cause of Friend’s death.
Actual Cause
If the victim would not have died but for the defendant’s act, then the defendant’s act is the actual cause of the killing. When the defendant sets in motion forces that lead to the death of the victim, the defendant is the actual cause of the victim’s death.
In this case, had Defendant not shot Friend, they would not have been driving to the hospital, the accident would not have occurred, and Friend would not have bled to death. But for Defendant’s actions, Friend would not have died.
Thus, Defendant’s act was the actual cause of Friend’s death.
Proximate Cause
Proximate cause exists only when the defendant is deemed to be legally responsible for the crime. To be legally responsible for the crime, the death must be foreseeable. A death caused by the defendant’s conduct is deemed foreseeable if death is the natural and probable result of the conduct. Actions by a force of nature that are not within the defendant’s control are generally not foreseeable. However, an act that accelerates death is a legal cause of the death.
In this case, the defendant’s conduct is foreseeable because he tried to rush Friend to the hospital after shooting him. The fact that Defendant was involved in an accident while rushing to the hospital with a wounded friend was an action within Defendant’s control and accelerated the death. Therefore, Defendant’s act of shooting Friend was the legal cause of Friend’s death.
Thus, Defendant is guilty of second-degree murder.
