cold war conflicts

Question 1

malaya causes- political

Answer 1

• The key underlying cause of the Emergency was British colonialism, which ruled the various states of British Malaya by decentralizing power to the majority Malay ethnic group, maintaining Sultans in de jure control of the provinces. This allowed the British to develop highly profitable tin mines and rubber plantations.
• British capitalization on Malaya’s natural resources increased resentment among the population, who desired independence, catalyzing the outbreak of the Emergency.
• Despite colonial rule, Malay nationalism began to rise in the 1920s as the Chinese and Indian populations grew. The British encouraged these minority groups to settle as cheap labor, providing them with little rights.
• Ethnic tensions were exacerbated by economic issues, leading to divisions among communities. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), founded in 1930, championed the rights of these marginalized groups.
• The Chinese community, particularly through the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), played a significant role in fighting against the Japanese during the occupation. By 1948, the Chinese made up 49% of the population and were agitating for more rights.
• In the post-war atmosphere, economic problems intensified these ethnic divisions. The MCP argued that only independence could ensure equality for all, but the British worsened the situation with a self-created constitutional crisis.
• To undercut calls for independence by the MCP, the British government established the Malayan Union in 1946, which centralized power and aimed to provide equal rights to Chinese and Indian settlers, diminishing the authority of the Malay Sultans.
• Many Malays opposed the Malayan Union, leading to the formation of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Their campaign forced the British to reform the state again, resulting in the 1948 Federation of Malaya, which revoked many citizenship rights for minorities and further alienated the Chinese community.
• Orthodox historians argue that it was Moscow’s instructions and the decision of the MCP to begin an armed conflict that triggered the Malayan Emergency.
• With growing labor unrest, the British government banned trade unions and outlawed the MCP, causing the MCP to flee into the jungles and begin planning attacks on the government, which catalyzed the outbreak of conflict.
• The conflict was triggered when three European labor workers were killed by a MCP hit squad. The government responded by declaring a state of emergency and establishing a police state, marking the beginning of the Malayan Emergency.

Question 2

malaya causes- economic

Answer 2

• British Malaya was an export-led economy reliant on rubber and tin, utilizing cheap Chinese and Indian labor.
• The economic crisis catalyzed support for the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).
• World War II caused a drastic drop in global demand for rubber and tin, leading to:
  
  • Mass unemployment
  • Sabotaged plantations and mines
  • A significant decrease in wages (¾ of 1939 levels)
  • Food shortages, rationing, high prices, and malnutrition
  • Rice consumption dropped from at least 570g per day in 1939 to 760g per week by 1946
• The failure of the British to improve the economic situation ignited nationwide labor unrest and increased support for the MCP.
• Labor movements grew, with the MCP helping to organize them into General Labor Unions (GLU) and orchestrate strikes.
• Notable events:
  
  • January 1946: Up to 200,000 workers went on strike in Singapore.
  • March 1946: Docks in Penang were paralyzed.
  • Between April 1946 and March 1947: Over 300 strikes in Malaya resulted in 713,000 worker days lost, while Singapore saw 1,173,000 worker days lost.
• The British government responded with repression:
  
  • Enacted trespassing laws to arrest strike organizers.
  • Police opened fire on protesters and attacked trade unionists.
  • In 1947, courts repealed protections against the dismissal of striking workers, and trade unions faced rigorous government inspections.
• The combination of economic distress, food shortages, and repressive measures from the British government fostered widespread resentment and pushed many Indians and Chinese Malaysians toward the MCP as a solution, ultimately supporting the desire for armed struggle.

Question 3

malaya causes- military

Answer 3

• The MCP feared imminent banning by the colonial government due to growing repression of left-wing activism. In May 1948, they began preparations for an armed uprising. The MCP had previously led the resistance against the Japanese during World War II, establishing a base of support.
• After the war, the British-trained Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was forced to disband, but at least 6,000 guerilla fighters concealed their weapons in jungle hideouts, forming a nucleus for a guerilla army. The refusal to surrender military weapons after the war left the MCP prepared for conflict.
• In response to escalating MCP-dominated labor unrest, the colonial government banned trade unions entirely on June 12, 1948, eliminating the MCP’s ability to organize workers against British rule. This repression left the MCP with no option but to resort to armed struggle.
• Tensions escalated until conflict erupted following the murder of three European plantation workers on June 16, 1948, in the Sungai Siput Incident, committed by an MCP hit squad. The government declared a state of emergency on June 18, imposing severe measures: death penalty for weapon possession, special police powers to arrest individuals, impose curfews, seize buildings, and question citizens. Malaya transitioned into a police state.
• On June 23, 1948, the MCP was officially outlawed. MCP leadership, including Chin Peng, retreated to the jungles, where they formed the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), initiating attacks on the government.
• The combination of government repression, the ban on trade unions, and the historical context of armed resistance led the MCP to commit to armed struggle, marking the beginning of the Malayan Emergency.
• The British government viewed the Emergency as a communist insurgency amid the Cold War, fearing foreign support for the MCP.
• Some historians suggest that the February 1948 Southeast Asian Youth Conference united communist party members to plan revolutions. From 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) supported MCP cadres with training and political education.
• Maoist literature was found in MCP hideouts, and the PRC broadcast Radio Peking into Malaya. This support strengthened the MCP’s resolve for armed rebellion, intensifying the desire for revolution against British colonial rule.

Question 4

malaya evolution - phase 1/ military strategy

Answer 4

MNLA initiative, Use of hit and run tactics to attack economic targets 1948-1950:
- MNLA forces had to consolidate and rearm quickly and shape their ultimate political aim - overthrow of British colonialism and independence for the people of Malaya under MCP
- Initial tactics: hitting economic targets e.g. rubber plantations and tin mines
- By striking the symbols of colonial rule, the MNLA hoped to inspire people to rebel
- Sought to create liberated base areas free from Malayan Police and British forces, safe areas to regroup and instigate socialist land reform
- MNLA favored using road and railway ambushes + hit-and-run attacks on British forces (17 a month in 1949 to over 100 by 1950)
- Despite an early success in killing NLA commander Lau Yew, the 10,000 strong police force took the brunt of early fighting and isolated police outposts were overrun
MNLA was supported by their People’s Mass Movement - Min Yuen
- 60,000 MCP loyalists living in squatter communities at the jungle edges supplied money, food, and intelligence to the MCP
500,000 Chinese peasants suspected of helping the MCP
- MLNA used terror & violence against resisting civilians, forcing mostly Chinese civilians to support the MCP
- New British High Commissioner 1948 Sir Henry Gurney struggled to respond: focused forces on protecting economic targets + deported over 10,000 Chinese Malays
- MNLA tactics were counterproductive, terror alienated ethnic groups, MCP began to lose popular support
- however despite MNLA being outgunned and outnumbered when focusing on colonial infrastructure and retreating to Malaya populace they were still supported by ethnic Chinese communities as they had limited civil rights no land and were poor
historiography:
- revisionist perspective developed stemmed from a re-evaluation of the war from memoirs of soldiers on both sides.
- It argued that the focus on hearts and minds was overblown, that it was the ‘bullet’ that won hearts and minds.
- the revisionist view is one articulated recently by historian Karl Hack who argued that it was military tactics by the British that enabled them to ‘screw down’ the MNLA, then the population control strategies of the Briggs Plan (including food denial operations) began to starve them of supplies.
- The Templar Plan merely intensified these policies.
- The revisionists point to the fact that the MCP issued their ‘October Resolutions’ in 1951 that relegated the military campaign in favour of increasing popular support - they needed the supplies! Clearly, the MNLA was being strangled by the Briggs Plan.

Question 5

malaya evolution- phase 2/ briggs plan/ political

Answer 5

• General Briggs assigned in second phase of the war and he recognized the importance of logistics and supply lines, led to hi trying to cut ff the MPLA from their supporters preventing them from giving them supplies and allowing them to fight a war of attrition, allowing dense jungle to wear them down
• prevented chinese populance support by capturing and forcibly rellocating more than a million malayan squatter into the “new villages”, not concentration camps but were heavily guarded, british controlled who could enter and exit making insurgents hard to make contact, then get information out of suspecter supporters, also burned villages, booby trapped food supplies and shot civillians, one particular being the batang kang massacre where 24 villages were burned
• Briggs also wanted to limit food sources therefore made it harder for them to retreat into jungle by starving them out through agent orange
• Also intended to better manage the civilian population and give them access to food, accommodation, healthcare, and education
• Government could also provide better accommodation, food and healthcare, raising morale
• Over 400,000 civilians were moved to the new villages

PART 2:
- Expand local police and defense force
Permanent Residential Defense Corps
- Creation of a intelligence-gathering branch of the Malay Police Force
- Establishment of a unified central command for civilian, police, and military systems
- Creation of a war council which coordinated anti-terrorist responses
- British launched Operation Starvation
- Limited food supplies given to new villages
- Livestock was killed and herbicide used on jungles to raze farms
- Starved MLNA forces and pushed them back deeper into the Jungle he

Question 6

malaya evolution- phase 3/ templer plan/social

Answer 6

• The Templer Plan (1952-1954) marked a significant change in the British response during the Malayan Emergency.
• Following the death of Lt General Briggs in December 1951, Lt General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed and made significant changes to the Briggs strategy.
• Under the Templer Plan, the British escalated military pressure on the MNLA (Malayan National Liberation Army) while also pursuing political talks.
• In 1952, the British government granted full citizenship to all aliens born in Malaya, including Chinese Malays, to gain local support and weaken the MNLA’s appeal.
• They also promised Malaya independence if the British succeeded in defeating the MNLA.
• In 1953, Emergency Regulation 17D was repealed, a publicly unpopular bill that led to increased local morale and support for the British, ending the arbitrary detention of 29,828 people.
• The Hearts and Minds Campaign focused on increasing civilian services to win local support, resulting in a notable rise in the surrender rate of MNLA members.
• Search and destroy operations were a key military tactic:
  
  • Utilized airpower to bomb suspected jungle bases.
  • Deployed helicopters for greater mobility, allowing special forces to be dropped close to enemy bases.
  • Established stops before assaults to prevent MNLA escape.
  • Employed defoliants like Agent Orange to deny crops to the MNLA and starve them out.
• The Federation Police Field Force set up jungle forts to relocate aboriginal groups and tribes, denying recruits and support to the MNLA.
• By 1954, only 3,000 MNLA troops remained, having retreated deep into the jungle, and the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) leadership was forced to relocate to Southern Thailand.

historiography:
- Orthodox perspectives suggest that the British strategy of hearts and minds was key as it gained the support of Chinese Malays
- orthodox perspective stems from British propaganda at the time that sought to highlight the legitimacy of British forces. Templer himself argued ‘The answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people…’’
- This view is support most recently by historian Richard Stubbs in his 1990 book ‘Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960.’ He argues that military strategy of population removal only achieved stalemate.

Question 7

malaya impact- social

Answer 7

Malaya:
- MCP failed to win support among Malays, who made up 49 per cent of the population and supported the government, or even among the 12 per cent made up by Indians.
Hearts and Minds Campaign won support - unification and pro-govt support
- Huge human cost - 5,000 civilians were killed along with 6,710 communists forces, 1,346 Malayan troops and police, and 519 British & Commonwealth troops.
- Detainment and resettlement - at least 400,000 mostly Chinese Malays that were effectively imprisoned in new villages.
Atrocities like the Batang Kali massacre were also carried out.
- The food denial campaign led to rationing for the population, along with strict police monitoring. Curfews and arbitrary arrest were common.
- However, still significant problems - e.g. race riots in 1964/1965

Foreign:
- Malaya’s “success” became a rallying point for Cold War alliances. British and U.S. media highlighted Malaya’s multi-ethnic collaboration against communism, downplaying ethnic tensions to present a united front
- Western acceptance of Malaya’s ethnic-based governance (favoring Malays over Chinese) set a precedent for supporting anti-communist regimes with discriminatory policies, such as South Vietnam
- The Emergency’s “hearts and minds” rhetoric was co-opted by U.S. strategists in Latin America, justifying military aid to authoritarian regimes under the guise of “development”

Question 8

malaya impact- economic

Answer 8

• The British response to the Malayan Emergency was ultimately successful and therefore an independent capitalist system was left.
• The defeat of communist insurgency in Malaysia enabled the newly federated Malaysia to pursue capitalist economic growth.
• Under the New Economic Policy, from 1975 to 1995 Malaysia achieved average growth of 8% GDP.
• Malaysia’s GDP nearly quadrupled from US$27 billion in 1981 to US$100 billion in 2001, while annual per capita income rose from less than US$2000 in 1981 to about US$ 4500 in 2001.
• Malaysia also reduced poverty to 7% in 2001 from around 50% in 1970.
• Previously Malaya had made 650 million USD in exports for the British
• The Emergency cost Britain £520 million (1951–1953), straining its economy. Macmillan’s fiscal pragmatism prioritized ending the conflict to reduce expenditures while safeguarding investments in Malayan plantations and mines
• Independence agreements preserved British economic dominance, with Malaya remaining a key Commonwealth trade partner
• led to formation of ASEAN which reduced tariff and trade barriers among member countries leading to increased trading volumes
• Overall, more integration of economies in Southeast Asia through trade liberalization, investment promotion, and regional trade

Question 9

malaya impact- political

Answer 9

• The Malayan Emergency could be considered a British military victory as the MCP insurgency was forced to flee to southern Thailand in 1960.
• This enabled the British to influence the political stance of the newly independent Malaysia.
• Malay elites were entrusted with power.
• Politically, the Emergency forced the British to consider their long-term position.
• The Templer Plan from 1952 extended civil rights to all ethnic groups and led to the first nationwide elections in 1955.
• The elections were won by the Alliance Party led by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Hajj, a coalition of ethnic groups:
  
  • United Malay National Organisation (UMNO)
  • Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)
  • Malayan Indian Congress (MIC)
• On 31st August 1957, the Federation of Malaya was granted independence, with Tunku Abdul Rahman becoming Prime Minister.
• Malaya became a centralised federation with a constitutional monarchy.
• PM Tunku and his Alliance Party were popular for uniting all Malayan ethnic groups in a grand political compromise, supported by an authoritarian government system.
• Many British Emergency Laws were retained.
• The Internal Security Act (1960) and the Sedition Act (1969) curtailed civil liberties.
• Left-wing groups were closely monitored, and communism was outlawed.
• This facilitated the emergence of a right-wing elite consensus in Malayan politics.
• British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957-1963) inherited a stabilized conflict due to earlier counterinsurgency measures (e.g., the Briggs Plan).
• Macmillan’s government prioritized preserving British influence in post-independence Malaya.
• He endorsed Malaya’s independence in 1957 under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, a pro-British leader, to preempt communist victories and align Malaya with Western interests.
• His administration framed the Emergency as a Cold War struggle, securing U.S. support against communist expansion in Southeast Asia.
• This aligned with Macmillan’s broader policy of managing decolonization to retain economic and strategic ties.
• An international organization for collective defense in Southeast Asia aimed at preventing communities across the region from linking up.
• For the West, Malaya was an alarm bell for fears of communist expansion in Asia.
• This led to extended containment into Asia via NSC-68 in 1950 and reluctant financial and military support against colonial forces such as the British in Malaya and the French in Indochina.

Question 10

korean war causes- role of USSR, PRC and USA

Answer 10

Stalin:
- stalin wanted world revolution, therefore wanted to capatalize on newly developed atomic bomb, USA economic difficulties and chinese civil war victory
- opportunism to advance himself in situations, japan was being turned into strongly anti communistic base due to USA
PRC:
- Mao gave Kim Il Sung his approval and support to invade the south, as both were in support of Communist ideology and wary of the American threat, although Mao was initially skeptical about the chances of success
- Mao believed he needed soviet support for invasion on taiwan, therefore worried that if he showed reservations about the invasion stalin may not provide aid for attack on taiwan
- In 1950, Mao sent the NEBDA (North Eastern Border Defence Army), a division of 1.45 million PLA troops, to the Sino-Korean border in support of North Korea. Overall around 2 million soldiers were sent to Korea over the course of the war
- Despite this, PRC forces were primitive in communications, logistics and medical infrastructure, however, PRC forces were tenacious as their tactics relied mostly on overwhelming the enemy with their numbers
- Mao’s strategic objective was to consolidate the CCP regime and prevent Korea from falling to a pro-Western system as this would have threatened the PRC’s national security
- In combination with the great internal conflict faced by the PRC, involvement in the Korean War seemed counterproductive towards a capture of Taiwan, which was another key part of Mao’s aims regarding consolidation of the PRC

USA:
- NSC-68 report produced in 1950 which warned that all communist activity everywhere could be traced back to moscow, monolithic view of communism where all forms of communist fed back to moscow
- advised US to increase military strength and spending by $35-50 billion
- significantly suggested that military and economic aid be given to any country resisting communism
- argued that these perceptions being based on false premise gave an excuse for US expansionism

historiography:
- Orthodox views blame Stalin and the USSR for causing the conflict. They argue Stalin was determined to spread his influence in the region, and thus he planned and equipped the invasion. Kim was just acting on his orders. US policy had invited this risky gamble.
- Revisionist views consider the orthodox perspective as too simplistic, and neglectful of the role of the Koreans themselves and other powers like the US and China, also highlight the role of others like Mao who’s support for Kim enabled the invasion. All major powers internationalized what was just a civil war.
- Post-revisionist views have drawn up recently opened archives to note that Stalin did indeed play a key role in the conflict. He prevented Kim from declaring war in 1949, and his support was crucial in 1950.

Question 11

korean war causes- domestic factors

Answer 11

• japan offically annexed korea in 1910 and was still in occupation of korea when WW2 ended, korean nationatists led revolution were not allowed to decide fate of korea therefore agreed by USA and USSR that the two superpowers would take joint responsiblity for repatriating the japanese forces there
• 38th parallel line of latitude taken as the dividing point
• however cold war tensions led to the two countries being less willing to cooperate
• In the South, the US military government put forward as leader the elderly Syngman Rhee, a rebel who had fought against the Japanese and spent much of his life in exile, set up the ROK, strongly anti communist
• The Soviets supported the Communists and backed a faction headed by Kim Il Sung, a young Russian-trained Korean Communist who had been a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese formed the DPRK, recognized by the communist bloc
• both were Korean nationalists, both wanted to end the division of Korea, and each saw himself as the leader of a united Korea.
• kim il sung put effort into persuading stalin that he should be backed and Kim was able to obtain approval after persistent appeals

Question 12

korean war causes- immediate causes

Answer 12

• The invasion began on June 25, 1950, when North Korean troops launched a surprise attack across the 38th parallel.
• The operation was meticulously planned by North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, aiming for a quick victory to unify Korea under communist rule.
• Approximately 135,000 North Korean soldiers, equipped with tanks and artillery, advanced southward.
• The North Korean military quickly overran South Korean defenses, exploiting their numerical and tactical advantages.
• Seoul, the capital of South Korea, was captured within three days of the invasion, on June 28, 1950.
• The South Korean military was poorly equipped and lacked effective leadership, contributing to their rapid defeat.
• Many South Korean troops were either killed or fled in disarray, leading to widespread chaos.
• The invasion drew immediate international attention and condemnation, prompting the United Nations to convene an emergency session.
• The U.S. and other nations quickly mobilized to provide military assistance to South Korea following the UN resolution.
• The invasion marked the beginning of a protracted conflict, escalating into a full-scale war involving multiple international forces.

Question 13

korean war evolution- international role

Answer 13

• The U.S. was motivated by a strong desire to contain the spread of communism, which was a core component of its foreign policy during the Cold War, as exemplified by the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment.
• The North Korean invasion of South Korea was perceived as a direct threat to U.S. interests and a potential domino effect that could lead to further communist expansion in Asia.
• The U.S. swiftly sought UN intervention to legitimize its military response, framing it as a collective effort against aggression while primarily driving the actions behind the scenes.
• The absence of the Soviet Union from the UN Security Council allowed the U.S. to push through resolutions supporting military action without opposition, indicating a strategic exploitation of the UN framework to advance U.S. anti-communist objectives.
• The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), led by General Kim Ch’aek and armed by the Soviets, consisted of 130,000 active troops and over 100,000 reservists.
• The NKPA was organized into 10 infantry divisions and 1 armored brigade, with at least five divisions well-trained from combat experience in the Chinese Civil War.
• The 105th Armored Brigade was equipped with 120 Soviet T-34 tanks.
• The air force included 180 Yak fighters and Ilyushin bombers, while the navy had 50 vessels.
• The NKPA would be supported by 300,000 Chinese forces from the Northeast Border Defense Army, organized as the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) into the 13th and 19th Army Corps, led by Peng Dehuai, with over a million soldiers in reserve.

resolution:
- By 1951, the communists had suffered almost 100,000 casualties.
- Eisenhower’s brinkmanship did hasten negotiations.
- The UN economic blockade of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was leading to major shortages.
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) wanted the war to be resolved.
- The economic damage sustained by both sides made a ceasefire a priority from 1951 onwards.

historiography:
- Orthodox perspectives on the resolution of the Korean War praise President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for their willingness to escalate the conflict militarily.
- Revisionists argue that it was not Eisenhower’s brinkmanship, but rather the general drain on resources from attritional warfare that led all sides to seek a political solution.
- Post-Revisionist views suggest that both perspectives have some validity.

Question 14

korean war evolution- course of war

Answer 14

• The North Koreans advanced deep into South Korea, leaving only a corner out of their control, pushing South Korean and American troops back to Pusan.
• General MacArthur led a UN amphibious landing at Inchon, bypassing North Korean troops, and retook Seoul within a month, driving them back to the 38th parallel.
• Encouraged by this success, the U.S. shifted from containment to a policy of roll-back, aiming to liberate North Korea and reunite the country, crossing the 38th parallel to capture Pyongyang in October.
• China’s security concerns prompted a 200,000-strong Chinese force to join 150,000 North Koreans, leading to a rapid UN retreat; Pyongyang was recaptured in December, and by the end of 1950, North Korean forces had regained territory up to the 38th parallel.
• A stalemate ensued around the 38th parallel.
• Truman recognized the need to return to containment, while MacArthur advocated for a more aggressive approach, leading to his dismissal.
• Peace talks began in 1951, focusing on the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs).
• Fighting continued for another two years, with significant casualties, and the U.S. pressured China with atomic threats.
• A military armistice was signed at Panmunjom in July 1953.

Question 15

korean war impact- economic

Answer 15

DPRK:
- The communists suffered 1,420,000 casualties, 520,000 DPRK and 900,000 Chinese, of which at least 180,000 were killed.
- In terms of economic damage, the war flattened North Korea. More than 8,700 factories, 900,000 acres of farmland, 600,000 homes, 5,000 schools, 1,000 hospitals and 260 theatres were destroyed, totaling $1,700,000 in damage.
- This was not just the result of artillery and invasion, but a result of the deliberate UNC air campaign that sought to bomb the DPRK into submission. The USAF dropped 386,037 tons of bombs, deliberately targeting cities and over 70 dams.
- The financial damage was immense. National income in 1953 was only 69.4% of 1949 levels. Industrial output declined, and electricity generation was only 17.2% of 1949 levels. This pushed them into dependency on the USSR/PRC.
- Relying heavily on international socialist solidarity for up to 80% of its reconstruction costs, the DPRK launched the Stalinist Three-Year Plan in 1954-56. It focused almost entirely on rebuilding heavy industry and fixing the countries infrastructure.
- From 1957-60, the Five-Year Plan took inspiration from Mao’s Great Leap Forward to push for more ideologically-driven development. Agriculture was collectivised and the Chollima Movement sought to use ideology to drive production output.

ROK:
- The communists suffered 1,420,000 casualties, 520,000 DPRK and 900,000 Chinese, of which at least 180,000 were killed.
- Similarly to the DPRK, the economy of the ROK was severely devastated by war to the tune of $2 billion. 17,000 factories and over 500,000 schools were destroyed. Agricultural production fell 27% and GNP declined 14%.
- Operating a capitalist economy with less ability to control production and prices, the economy suffered from hyperinflation throughout the war as goods became scarce. In 1951 alone, inflation reached 500% compared to pre-war figures.
- In the 1950s, Syngman Rhee’s government was focused on reconstruction and solving inflation, helped in part by $200 million a year in US aid.
- Still an agricultural economy, the regime undertook moderate land reforms and tried to revive the coal industry.

Question 16

korean war impact- political

Answer 16

• The end of the Korean War thus ended hostilities, but permanently divided the two Koreas. Both the ROK and DPRK merged with their respective superpower partners. In 1953, the ROK signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the US, and continued to receive aid of $200 million per year.
• In 1965, the ROK signed the Korea-Japan Treaty, normalizing relations and granting the ROK $800 million in economic compensation from WW2. In 1966, the ROK sent over 300,000 troops to support the US in Vietnam.
• The DPRK continued its hostility towards the ROK. In 1968 North Korean commandos tried to assassinate President Park. In 1983 they tried to assassinate President Chun Doo-hwan in Burma with a bomb.
• Even worse, up to 4 million Korean civilians were killed, 1 in 10 Koreans or 70% of all deaths. A further 5 million became refugees.

DPRK:
- the war helped to consolidate Kim’s power. Prior to war, the DPRK was led by the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) made up of four factions - the Partisan Group led by Kim, the Domestic Communist Group led by Pak Hon-yong, the Soviet-Korean Group, and the Yanan Group.
- In 1953, Kim Il Sung sought a scapegoat for failure in the war, blaming his main rival, Pak Hon-yong. He arrested all members of the Domestic Communist Group, accusing them of treason. Within two years they had been executed.
- Developing a Stalinist cult of personality to indoctrinate society, Kim’s setup a totalitarian regime which purged his rivals. After 1956, his Juche ideology increasingly replaced Marxism-Leninism.

ROK:
- Politically, Syngman Rhee used anti-communism as the ideological glue that held together his regime. Using the 1948 National Security Law to clamp down on political rivals, in 1954 he changed the constitution to be abolish term limits on the Presidency.
- Rhee was eventually overthrown in the April Revolution of 1960. Student protests morphed into mass protests against his rule. In 1961, the military then overthrew the government. Led by General Park Chung-hee, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) ruled South Korea as a military junta.
- Whilst criticized for its disregard of human rights, the SCNR is credited with achieving rapid economic growth known as the Miracle of the Han River. The Five-Year Plan of 1962-66 focused on boosting exports.

Question 17

korean war impact- international

Answer 17

PRC
- in China’s historical memory, the War to Resist America and Aid Korea is actively remembered as a symbol of national unity against US belligerence
- the war was also a huge economic drain costing 6.2 billion yuan. A further 3 billion yuan was owed to the USSR for the military equipment it provided. Military spending took up 50% of the 1951 annual budget. This delayed the First Five-Year Plan.
- Although the PLA could sustain the high casualties of over 900,000, it did reveal weaknesses in the army and led to modernisation led by Peng Dehuai.
- Overall war weariness but a strain on society, but the government used the heroic spirit to push for reforms in a series of mass campaigns in the 1950s.
- Whilst fighting the US did increase the prestige of the PRC in the communist world, intervention meant that the US now directly supported Taiwan with the 7th Fleet. Tensions with the USSR also rose after the war.

USSR:
- Despite encouraging Kim Il Sung to invade and prompting Mao to support him, Stalin was reluctant to commit strong USSR support, allowing the PRC and DPRK to lead the fighting.
- This strained relations with the PRC, particularly as the USSR charged China up to 3 billion yuan for military support.
- Up to 30,000 Soviet troops provided logistic support in border areas, and Soviet pilots flew MIG-15s for Chinese forces in the DPRK.
- The war was a setback for Soviet foreign policy, uniting capitalist countries, accelerating U.S.-Japan peace talks, and leading to West Germany’s rearmament and NATO membership in 1955.

USA
- The Korean War fundamentally changed the USA, solidifying its commitment to defending South Korea and confirming NSC-68’s assumptions about communist aggression, resulting in a quadrupling of the defense budget to $60 billion by 1962.
- Fearing Korea was a precursor to action in Europe, the U.S. sent six military divisions to West Germany, with NATO member military budgets rising from 5.5% to 12%.
- The war intensified U.S. foreign policy concerns in Asia, leading to strengthened containment policies.
- The Treaty of San Francisco with Japan was signed in 1951, followed by a security treaty in 1952, the ANZUS Pact with Australia and New Zealand in 1951, and the creation of SEATO in 1954.
- The Korean War significantly impacted the Cold War, mobilizing the West against Soviet expansion, galvanizing anti-communist sentiment, and enabling increased military budgets.
- It locked the U.S. into supporting anti-communist regimes in Asia, regardless of their nature, including the French in Indochina, Syngman Rhee in South Korea, Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, the British in Malaya, and the Dutch in Indonesia.
- The conflict’s intensity and the nature of the armistice permanently divided Korea and embedded anti-Americanism in the ideologies of both the PRC and DPRK.

Question 18

afghanistan causes- expansionist aims

Answer 18

• Afghanistan lay on Russia’s southern border and stood at a crossroads in Asia, making it strategically significant for the USSR.
• Despite unease within the Soviet Politburo during Afghanistan’s civil war, the USSR felt compelled to support a Marxist government within its sphere of influence.
• In December 1978, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed, leading to the deployment of military advisors to help suppress opposition.
• President Amin, who adopted more radical policies, intensified repression but struggled to manage the rising Islamic insurgency.
• The USSR initially refused to send military support and began discussions with the U.S. for assistance.
• Fearing the loss of Afghanistan to U.S. influence or Islamic revolutionaries, the Soviet Politburo felt compelled to intervene.
• On December 24, 1979, 50,000 Soviet troops were flown into Kabul; the USSR later claimed that President Kamal had invited them to protect his government.
• Soviet forces quickly occupied major cities to bolster support for the PDPA government of President Kamal.
• Following Marxist-Leninist expansionism, Afghanistan was viewed as crucial for extending the USSR’s influence and providing a secure base for advances into the Middle East and South Asia.
• An unfriendly regime in Afghanistan could encircle the USSR with hostile states, posing a significant security threat.
• An independent Afghanistan might align with the PRC, the U.S., and Pakistan, which would seriously threaten Soviet security in the region.
• After the fall of the Iranian Shah in 1979, U.S. interest in expanding influence heightened the USSR’s perception of Afghanistan’s importance.

Historiography
- Gaddis argues that the invasion was primarily strategically motivated to prevent encirclement, viewing it as a defensive action.
- Hoffmann suggests that Daoud’s anti-communist policies led the Soviets to consider deeper involvement in Afghanistan.

Question 19

afghanistan causes- economic interests

Answer 19

• Afghanistan was a neutral state during the Cold War and cultivated close economic ties with the USSR, securing over $100 million in loans.
• A military agreement included $25 million in military aid from the USSR, and Afghan army officers were trained in the USSR by the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
• Over 27,000 political prisoners were executed in 1978 under the Taraki government, contributing to instability.
• A key economic motive for the military intervention was to use control over Afghanistan as a stepping stone to gain influence over the world’s oil supplies.
• Afghanistan was geographically important for any country seeking relations with Gulf states, with President Carter viewing the Soviet occupation as the first move toward controlling oil in the Persian Gulf.
• The USSR invested heavily in Afghanistan’s projects, public works, land reform, and infrastructure development.
• This investment stemmed from a Treaty in 1921, and during Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to Kabul in December 1955, he sanctioned a loan of $100 million for infrastructure projects, including roads, irrigation facilities, and a new airport.
• The Soviet Union further strengthened its economic commitment with $437 million in economic credit in 1975 and a new trade agreement in 1976.
• These agreements increased trade by 65% by 1979, leading the USSR to decide to invade to protect its significant economic investments.

Historiography
- Hauner argues that the Soviet invasion stemmed from the desire to gain control of warm water ports and Gulf oilfields.
- Pipes contends that the intervention was meant to further Soviet ambitions to increase influence toward the Persian Gulf.

Question 20

afghan causes- political instability

Answer 20

• The USSR claimed a right to defend itself from threats within its sphere of influence, arguing that chaotic Afghanistan posed a significant danger.
• Brezhnev cited Article 51 of the UN Charter, asserting that the Soviet Union had the right to individual self-defense and that the invasion was in line with international law for strategic defense.
• Afghanistan bordered the south of the USSR, and an unfriendly regime could encircle the Soviets with hostile states, from Japan in the east to Norway in the west.
• An independent Afghanistan might have aligned with the PRC, the U.S., and Pakistan, seriously threatening Soviet security in the region.
• After the fall of the Iranian Shah in 1979, U.S. interest in expanding influence heightened the USSR’s perception of Afghanistan’s importance.
• Amin encouraged women to stop wearing veils and implemented land reforms wanted to build socialism in just 5 years led to opposition from fundamental Muslims who believed it was not in line with their religious beliefs- named the godless communists
• resisted callls to slow down his reforms and instead increased his violence with brutal oppression and campaign of terror
• USSR believe that victory would result in Mujahideen blood bath where religious zealots and feudal lords turned on each toher

historiography:
- Gaddis argues that the invasion was primarily strategically motivated to prevent encirclement, viewing it as a defensive action.
- Hoffmann suggests that Daoud’s anti-communist policies prompted the Soviets to consider deeper involvement in Afghanistan.

Question 21

afghan causes- defense of the communist revolution

Answer 21

• The USSR believed that the socialist revolution in Afghanistan was threatened, particularly as the KGB reported increasing U.S. influence in the country.
• Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin refused to heed Soviet advice to slow down his reforms and end the repression against the Mujahideen, despite having secret meetings with the CIA.
• The Soviets perceived Amin’s meetings with the CIA as a shift towards the West, a view supported by the chairman of the KGB.
• In line with the Brezhnev Doctrine, the USSR felt it necessary to counter any anti-socialist challenge in Afghanistan, asserting that once a country had become socialist, it must not be undermined or threatened by capitalist states or counter-revolution.
• Hoffman argues that there was genuine Soviet concern about the potential for an Afghan leader to use political Islam to undermine communism in Afghanistan.

Question 22

afghanistan evolution- USSR weakness

Answer 22

• The USSR planned a surprise invasion modeled on their 1968 Czechoslovakia operation, followed by extended garrison duty. They lacked an effective counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy and relied on large-scale operations and airpower.
• This approach failed to win hearts and minds, and only after 1986 did they shift to small-scale search-and-destroy missions.
• Tactically, the Soviets had short-term success in battles but caused significant civilian casualties. Airstrikes from MiG-23s and Su-17s could not distinguish between civilians and insurgents.
• Close air support from Mi-24 helicopters was effective but often harmful. T-55 tanks and BMP APCs did well initially but struggled in mountainous terrain.
• A major failure was insufficient Soviet manpower. The 40th Army had over 100,000 troops, enough for major operations but inadequate for holding rural ground. Nine major operations in the Panjshir Valley from 1980 to 1986 were successful, yet the Soviets continuously withdrew.
• The war’s economic and social costs began to affect the USSR, leading Gorbachev to seek troop withdrawals from 1985.
• However, these withdrawals emboldened the Mujahideen. The war cost over $50 million USD and resulted in 14,453 Soviet casualties, undermining morale.
• The Afghan Army proved itself inept at leading offensive operations into rural areas. Their training was poor, and most soldiers were forced conscripts.
• Officers were often corrupt, selling equipment onto the black market. Huge desertion rates meant that the army lost experienced officers.
• As a result, the Soviet 40th Army had to take on the burden of offensive operations, of which they didn’t have the language expertise or local knowledge.
• The communist government was deeply unpopular in such a traditional Islamic society. - Most problems were traced back before the war, but the lack of development and security during the war did little to win hearts and minds.
• The refugee crisis (5m) further exacerbated this, and President Najibullah’s 1986 ‘Policy of National Reconciliation’ did little to change this.

Question 23

afghanistan evolution- mujahidin strengths

Answer 23

• The Mujahideen developed a guerrilla warfare strategy well-suited to Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain.
• They mobilized local intelligence from civilians to plan ambushes and hit-and-run attacks, turning the conflict into an attritional war.
• Their goal was to deny the Soviets and Afghan government control of rural areas, isolating them in the cities.
• Their tactics included meticulously planned ambushes and surprise attacks, benefiting from close relationships with local villagers and their knowledge of the language.
• Benefiting from years of experience and local knowledge, they also used local intelligence to track Soviet movements.
• majority of the population supported them. Lacking firepower, the insurgents relied on guerrilla warfare tactics suited to the terrain.
• Small-scale raids, terror, ambushes and hit-and-run tactics were hugely successful against slow moving but heavily armed Soviet formations. They couldn’t chase the Mujahideen who knew that the Soviets couldn’t hold territory either.
• They used motorbikes, horses, and donkeys to quickly escape into the mountains and employed booby traps, such as mines on transport routes, since Soviet patrols often stuck to main roads.
• Despite internal divisions, skilled leaders emerged among the Mujahideen. Ahmad Shah Massoud was one of the most notable, using charismatic leadership and effective guerrilla strategies to thwart numerous Soviet operations in the Panjshir Valley.
• Mujahideen troops were often more motivated, fighting for Jihad, affirming tribal loyalties, or for protecting families. At their height, up to 85,000 active Mujahideen fighters were in the field in 1988-89.
• The Soviets even arranged a ceasefire with him from 1982 to 1984.
• The Mujahideen could easily retreat across porous borders into safe havens, where they were resupplied and recruited from madrasas in Pakistan.
• Groups in the west could escape into Iran, while those in the east had access to China.

Question 24

afghanistan evolution: foreign support

Answer 24

• biggest threat came from Soviet airpower. But after 1986, the insurgents used US-made air to ground stinger missiles to negate this advantage. The Mujahideen would also helped by resupply and safe havens in Pakistan/Iran - the USSR failed to stop these supply routes.
• The Mujahideen received support from various foreign nations opposed to the Soviet invasion, with most Islamic countries backing them. Significant funding came from Saudi Arabia via Pakistan, and over 2,000 Arab fighters joined their ranks.
• CIA provided 3.2 billion dollars worth of aid The U.S. provided arms through the CIA’s covert Operation Cyclone, which included supplying Stinger missiles after 1986. Also trained various mujahideen rebel groups These missiles were responsible for downing over 100 Soviet helicopters.
• Muslim countries provided thousands of fighters as part of the Jihad, forming the Afghan Arab group of Mujahideen, inc. Osama Bin Laden.
• China also supported Maoist groups in the eastern parts of Afghanistan. The Afghan Interim Government (AIG) in exile attempted to coordinate this foreign assistance.
• Morton Abramowitz, who directed the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the time, noted in 1997 that in 1985, there was genuine concern that the Mujahideen were struggling, suffering high losses and losing their effectiveness against the Soviets.

Question 25

afghanistan consequences- human cost and displacement

Answer 25

• The Soviet policy of subjugation and Sovietisation aimed at physical extermination with a totalitarian ideology to disrupt Afghanistan’s economic, social, cultural, and religious legacy.
• This policy involved the indiscriminate bombing of villages, resulting in extensive physical damage.
• Estimates indicate tens of thousands of people were killed, injured, and rendered homeless.

Short-term impact:
- Between 900,000 and 1.3 million people were killed.
- 1.5 million Afghan civilians became physically disabled.
- The 1979 census estimated Afghanistan’s pre-war population at 13.05 million, while other reports suggested it was between 15-17 million, including the nomadic population.
- The war created an army of orphans and widows, turning half the population into internally displaced persons and refugees, with six million fleeing outside the country.

Displacement & Refugees:
- In the 1990s, six million refugees lived in destitute conditions, constituting one-third of the pre-war population, forced into neighboring countries like Pakistan and Iran and lived under terrible conditions
- moving away from villages meant that Large numbers of people were left without skills, who could have otherwise practiced or learned farming and cottage industries.
- Many were denied the ability to learn a trade, engage in agriculture, or manage/herd livestock.
- The population of Kabul swelled as rural dwellers sought protection from air attacks.
- Families suffered from the loss of income sources previously provided by fathers and sons, leading to financial and social costs, including decreased social welfare.
- Women and children faced particular suffering, encountering increasing adversities without traditional familial support, which was especially devastating in Afghanistan’s traditionalist and patriarchal society.

Long-term impact:
- Psychological trauma remains unquantifiable and untreated due to a lack of facilities and personnel alongside stigmatizing culture
- The USSR left millions of mines behind, continuing to kill and maim Afghan civilians.

Question 26

afghanistan consequences- economic disruption

Answer 26

• despite soviet investment in infrastructure the war meant it lacked regular maintenance therefore neglected and personnel were not properly trained to operate machinery By the early 1990s, 60% of schools did not possess a physical structure.
• By 1987, agricultural output declined to ⅓ of its 1978 figures due to only 1/2 of land being cultivatable
• General destruction accounted for the loss of 1,800 schools, 31 hospitals, 11 health centers, and 14,000 km of telephone cables.
• Sharp decline in standard of living and higher prices for imported goods as the Afghan currency fell in value.
• Inflation soared: increase of 980% during the 1980s.
• Impacted by the mines sown by the Soviets.
• Trade deficit rose in 1989 from $69 million to $649 million in 1999.
• Foreign debt rose from $1.2 billion in 1980 to $5.1 billion in the same time span.

Question 27

afghanistan consequences- civil war

Answer 27

1. Soviet Withdrawal and Collapse of the Communist Government (Pre-1992)
   - Significant Soviet support allowed the communist government to maintain power in Kabul until early 1992.
   - The Afghan War created substantial political instability in the region.
   - The United Nations attempted, but failed, to establish a transitional process acceptable to all parties.
2. Formation of the Northern Alliance and Initial Conflict (1992)
   - In February 1992, an alliance of two powerful militias formed the Northern Alliance.
   - On April 15, 1992, government-aligned militias mutinied and took control of Kabul airport.
   - President Najibullah sought refuge in the UN compound.
   - On April 26, the Northern Alliance partners agreed to form a new coalition government, excluding Hizb-i Islami (led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, backed by Pakistan).
   - Hikmatyar launched missile attacks on Kabul.
   - In June 1992, Burhanuddin Rabbani became president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA).
   - Rabbani was re-elected president in December 1992.
3. Escalation into Civil War (1992–1994)
   - Fighting developed between rival factions, with Hikmatyar continuing strikes on Kabul.
   - By the end of 1992, thousands had been killed, and half a million residents had fled Kabul.
   - Armed conflicts between factions emerged from 1992 to 1996, primarily in urban areas, particularly Kabul.
   - In January 1994, Hikmatyar allied with General Abdul Rashid Dostum to oust Rabbani, launching a full-scale civil war in Kabul.
   - The increased flow of weapons and military training exacerbated the conflict.
   - Shifts in alliances among factions complicated the conflict landscape.
4. Rise of the Taliban (1994–1996)
   - The Taliban emerged in 1994 from US-Saudi-Pakistan-supported mujahideen, quickly gaining territory.
   - The power vacuum after the superpowers left facilitated their rise.
   - Ahmad Shah Massoud led the Northern Alliance/United Front against the Taliban from 1996 to 2001, refusing roles offered by them due to ideological disagreements.
5. International and Humanitarian Consequences
   - The UN continued attempts to find a resolution but lacked international engagement.
   - The US withdrew from the peace process until after the Taliban took Kabul in 1996.
   - Displacement of millions resulted in a refugee crisis and humanitarian challenges.
   - Economic devastation weakened state institutions and governance.
   - Ethnic tensions intensified as different groups vied for control.
6. Aftermath and Long-Term Impacts
   - Violence mostly ended around 1996, but ethnic divisions persisted.
   - Long-term impacts on infrastructure and social cohesion contributed to ongoing conflict.

• large power vacuum emerged after Afghanistan withdrawal resulted in armed conflict between factions that emerged in the fighting for power
• Taliban emerged from the U.S. Saudi Pakistan supported mujahideen
• taliban ideology grew in afghan refugee camps allowing them quickly gain power in 1996
• led to further Cold War tensions , end of SALT II refused to join Moscow Olympics and ended detente restarted Cold War
• central committee members tried to distance themselves from Gorbachev decision to send troops into Afghanistan and later denounced Soviet insavsion led to disunity
• Gorbachev wanted to withdraw with dignity without foreign influence therefore wanted to stabilize afghan government and allow for the afghan army to slowly take over
• gorbachev leadership realized they could fight war due to economic burden of space race and economic hardship therefore
• US perished in supporting mujahideen including providing guns and aircraft missiles
• when war ended USA largely abandoned Afghanistan which left it to Pakistan for settlement and helped create the taliban which adhere to strict tribal and Islamic rules

Question 28

Sihanouk weaknesses vs strengths

Answer 28

Strengths
- Founded the Sang Kum movement and became war-appointed head of state after an easy election victory, enjoying widespread support from peasants who viewed him as a god-king from Cambodia’s previous era of greatness.
- Avoided getting involved in the Vietnam War, maintaining good relations with both Americans and Chinese.
- Fostered good ties with China and allowed Vietnamese communists to set up bases in Cambodia.
- Sihanouk was seen as a superstitious figure who was widely revered; his call toward the Khmer Rouge united many.
- In the early stages of the war, Sihanouk assisted the Khmer Rouge, claiming they “would not have had the peasants’ support without him.”
- The backing of the peasants, who constituted the vast majority of the population, provided considerable potential recruits for the Khmer Rouge.
- educational policy increases educational opportunities but the lack of employment opportunity also led to turn toward communism due to political ferment and over half of peasants were chronically in debt

Weaknesses:
- His rule became increasingly authoritarian, leading to rising discontent.
- Used police and corruption to secure victory in the 1955 elections said that 99.8% of population approved of him a reign of terror
- Employed authoritarianism to suppress political opposition on the left.
- Closed down free media, limiting public discourse.
- Nationalized the economy, resulting in a lack of foreign investment and crony socialism, with state monopolies given to loyal retainers.
- Although he followed a policy of neutrality, it frustrated both sides, as Americans perceived it as pro-communist.
- After the assassination of Diem in Vietnam, relations soured, and he leaned toward the communists.
- This shift led to discontent, prompting Sihanouk to appoint anti-communist general Lon Nol as prime minister in 1967.
- Sihanouk attempted to rebuild relations with Americans while ignoring the massive U.S. bombing of Cambodia, which forced communists deeper into the jungles.
- Following protests by an estimated 40,000 Vietnamese communists, Lon Nol seized power, and the U.S. recognized his government, leading to a civil war against the Khmer Rouge.
- received aid from China but also refused to sign SEATO self indulgent spending 1/5 of annual budget on sea games despite financial crisis
- regime was open to bribery and motivated by money venality but also corrupt and nepotistic

Question 29

lon nol coup and response

Answer 29

• The Lon Nol regime was unpopular, corrupt, and incompetent.
• Organized a coup, leading to a quick change in leadership and subsequent instability.
• Lon Nol’s alignment with the U.S. and the resulting bombings disturbed peasants, making the regime appear weak and dependent on American support.
• The government was brutal, suppressing protests and demonstrations, which alienated the population through violence and purges of opponents.
• Economic failings resulted in rampant inflation, reaching 300% by the end of 1973, with the economy becoming reliant on limited U.S. assistance.
• The economy became largely
  reliant on US assistance but as America came under pressure to avoid the cost of another
  intervention in Indochina, congress imposed a tight limit on aid to Cambodia. This was significantly below the military aid requested by Nol, and his economic issues meant that he was unable to purchase supplies or gain foreign credit.
• Limited U.S. aid led to a lack of resources and supplies, while corruption further hindered government funding for soldiers.
• Militarily ineffective, Lon Nol exhibited poor leadership and sought advice from a monk, undermining military strategy and effectiveness.
• Nol’s military leadership was poor. After initial success in the Chenla II campaign the
  Khmer Rouge rallied and launched overwhelming counter-attacks that led to the loss of 3,000 of Nol’s best trained soldiers and 15,000 desertions. Nol’s intelligence was also ineffective. In September 1970 he called in US airstrikes on 66 training camps which were in fact political meetings in public buildings. His government failed to focus on achievable military objectives, and its actions further alienated the population.
• The regime’s inability to address the needs and grievances of the populace fueled opposition and discontent.
• Widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to provide security and stability contributed to the rise of the Khmer Rouge.

Question 30

khmer rouge

Answer 30

• The Khmer Rouge had a clear ideological stance focused on the restoration of former Cambodian glory.
• They emphasized the role of peasants as the “true national class,” aiming to eradicate foreign and capitalist influence, which gained popularity as peasants benefited from land redistribution.
• Under Pol Pot’s leadership, the party became more militant and radical, shifting its aims from revolution to political reform.
• The Khmer Rouge effectively blockaded Phnom Penh through the Mekong and, in February 1974, destroyed a large government shipment of ammunition.
• In 1951, Vietnamese communists, working with Cambodian supporters, formed the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP), intended to be a Cambodian communist party, though initially controlled by Vietnamese communists.
• Sar (Pol Pot) joined the KPRP’s central committee in 1960 and became the party’s de facto leader in February 1963.
• In mid-1963, Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) and his followers, facing arrest, fled the capital Phnom Penh and relocated to remote northeast Cambodia, linking up with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong allies.
• With Vietnamese support, the Khmer Rouge established a base camp.
• Pol Pot’s leadership made the party more militant and radical, reforming in 1966 to the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK).
• The party abandoned traditional Marxist ideology, arguing that the only path to a classless, communal society was to empower Cambodia’s peasant farmers and eradicate all vestiges of Western influence, including intellectualism and technology.
• The Khmer Rouge effectively utilized propaganda to promote their ideology and gain popular support among rural populations.
• They capitalized on widespread discontent with the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime, portraying themselves as defenders of Cambodian sovereignty.
• Their organizational discipline and guerrilla warfare tactics allowed them to effectively challenge government forces.
• The ability to forge alliances with local communities and offer security and stability during turmoil enhanced their appeal.
• The Khmer Rouge’s promise of land reform and social justice resonated with impoverished peasants, increasing their support base.
• They promoted a vision of an agrarian utopia, where the peasant class would lead the nation, rejecting urbanization and modernity.
• The ideology included the belief in cleansing Cambodian society of perceived enemies, including intellectuals, professionals, and anyone associated with foreign influence.
• The Khmer Rouge sought to create a self-sufficient economy based on agriculture, rejecting foreign aid and investment as detrimental to national pride.

historiography:
- Revisionist - Khmer Rouge victory can be explained by success of the movement and support internally and externally
- more conservative view that emerged in defence of US actions. Like Vietnam, this view acknowledges that although US tactics were misguided, it was the right war to fight. Instead, the success of the Khmer Rouge can be explained by their viciousness and willingness by some like Prince Sihanouk to use them to try to regain power. Support from the PRC and North Vietnam was also hugely influential.

Question 31

impact of vietnam

Answer 31

• The war in Vietnam was a crucial factor in the rise of the Khmer Rouge for several reasons.
• Cambodian leader Norodom Sihanouk’s attempt to pursue neutrality in the U.S.-Vietnam conflict failed.
• The Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh trail crossed into Cambodia as a supply route, prompting over 3,000 B-52 raids by the U.S. in 1969 to attack it.
• This destabilized the Cambodian government and led to the coup on March 18, 1970, which removed Prince Sihanouk and established a Western-aligned government led by Prime Minister Lon Nol.
• At this point, Khmer Rouge forces numbered only around 10,000.
• With U.S. support, Lon Nol sought to destroy the communists in Cambodia, but continued U.S. bombing of Vietnamese forces further undermined government stability.
• U.S. bombing campaigns from April to June 1970 pushed Vietnamese forces deeper into Cambodian territory.
• Due to the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese established bases in provinces like Stoeng Treng in 1970 and began training Khmer fighters.
• Vietnamese forces played a military role in the Cambodian countryside, with 40,000 troops present by 1970, using Cambodia to attack U.S. forces in Vietnam.
• By the end of 1971, U.S. intelligence reported that Khmer Rouge forces were not seen as a significant threat compared to the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia.
• Vietnamese forces fought alongside the Khmer Rouge, assisting in taking considerable territory in southwest Cambodia by June 1972.
• Khmer Rouge dependence on the Vietnamese militarily was evident when failures occurred after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in 1972.
• When Khmer Rouge forces attempted to take Phnom Penh in the summer of 1973, thousands were killed due to being outgunned.
• Aid to the Khmer Rouge resumed only after President Nixon secured a treaty between the U.S. and communist Vietnam.
• In early 1974, nearly 1.5 million tons of vital military supplies were distributed from Vietnam to Cambodia, enabling the Khmer Rouge to seize power.
• The Khmer Rouge were assisted by Vietnamese communists, even as Pol Pot began purging pro-Vietnamese and pro-Sihanouk cadres.
• The Vietnamese provided military and logistical support, establishing bases and training Khmer fighters.
• Cambodia’s eastern regions were infiltrated and invaded by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, leading to American intervention and sustained bombing.
• This devastation fueled opposition to the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime and triggered a recruiting surge for the Khmer Rouge.
• The destabilization of the government led to the coup that removed Sihanouk and established Lon Nol.
• Sihanouk called for the formation of a United Front, urging his supporters to fight the government, effectively supporting the Khmer Rouge.
• This resulted in a civil war in Cambodia.

Question 32

US bombing

Answer 32

• Aerial and tank attacks in Kampong Cham alienated many Cambodians, resulting in the deaths of 200 people.
• An estimated half of the population became refugees, with between 50,000 to 150,000 people killed due to the 3 million tons of bombs dropped.
• While the bombing eliminated thousands of NVA, Viet Cong, and Khmer Rouge soldiers, it also killed Cambodian civilians and destroyed homes, farmland, and livestock.
• This devastation triggered a recruiting surge for the Khmer Rouge.
• The bombing destroyed villages, displaced hundreds of thousands, and turned rural populations against the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime.
• The destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods pushed desperate peasants toward the Khmer Rouge, who positioned themselves as defenders against foreign aggression.
• The devastation from U.S. bombings not only killed thousands but also destroyed homes and livelihoods, creating fertile ground for Khmer Rouge recruitment.
• Survivors of the bombing harbored deep resentment toward the U.S. and the Cambodian government.
• The Khmer Rouge exploited this anger, using anti-American and nationalist propaganda to recruit fighters.
• Pol Pot’s forces grew from a few thousand in 1970 to over 200,000 by 1975, partly due to rural support fueled by U.S. attacks.

historiography:
- Orthodox - Rise of the Khmer Rouge the result of US bombing and spill over from Vietnam War

Question 33

invasion by vietnam

Answer 33

Vietnam Invasion: Background/Context
- The Khmer Rouge period was dominated by terror and paranoia, with Pol Pot aiming to secure his position against all perceived threats.
- The greatest threat was seen as coming from Cambodia’s traditional enemy: Vietnam.
- Following several border attacks from the Khmer Rouge into Vietnam, Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of Kampuchea in late December 1978.
- Phnom Penh fell on January 7, 1979, and Khmer Rouge leaders fled to the jungle, continuing a guerrilla war against the Vietnamese.
- Cambodia was renamed the People’s Republic of Kampuchea.

Reasons for Conflict
- The Khmer Rouge supported a Maoist form of peasant Communism, whereas the Vietnamese followed Soviet-style communism.
- The Soviets supported Vietnam, while China supported the Khmer Rouge, leading to rivalry and Chinese concerns about being surrounded by Soviet allies.
- There was a desire to revive the glories of the Angkor Empire.
- The Khmer Rouge resented how Cambodian territory had been used during the war.
- Cambodians feared that Vietnam aimed to unify Indochina under its control.
- During 1977 and 1978, the Khmer Rouge conducted brutal attacks across the border into Vietnam, resulting in approximately 30,000 Vietnamese deaths.

Invasion by Vietnam

• In December 1978, Democratic Kampuchea was invaded by nearly a quarter million soldiers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
• The Khmer Rouge, lacking foreign allies and an industrial base to support their military, was hopelessly outgunned by Vietnamese aircraft, tanks, and armored vehicles.
• Phnom Penh fell to the Vietnamese in just two weeks, forcing Pol Pot and his followers to seek refuge in western Cambodia.
• They remained in jungle hideouts for two decades, leading a small but persistent insurgency against the new order.
• The Vietnamese eventually withdrew from Cambodia in 1989.
• Support for the Khmer Rouge continued to decline, and Pol Pot ultimately died in 1998.

Question 34

khmer rouge economic policies

Answer 34

• Wanted to completely demolish capitalism in Cambodia and establish a self-sufficient state (Autarky), independent from the aid provided by China.
• Collectivization was introduced in areas under their control in 1973, this was for practical reasons, ensuring food supplies for the armed forces and helping promote control for the population
• Most of the Khmer Rouge’s economic policies were stressed during their Four Year Plan, which aimed to replicate the successes of China’s Five Year Plans of mass labor while neglecting industrialization. Cambodia’s economic revolution was much more radical and ambitious than that in any other communist country.
• Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge became a cashless society; the government confiscated all means of currency. Shops closed, and workers received their pay in the form of food rations, because there was no money in circulation.
• Markets and private trade were banned. People were not allowed to buy or sell goods, and all economic activity was controlled by the state.
• This policy led to severe shortages of basic necessities, as there was no mechanism for distributing goods effectively.
• Urban populations were forcibly evacuated to rural areas, and cities were emptied. People were told that this was to eliminate class distinctions and create a society based on equality, whilst promoting communal living. People ate in communal kitchens and shared resources. Personal possessions were also confiscated.
• Urban centers were seen as symbols of capitalism and corruption, so cities were forcibly evacuated, and their populations were sent to rural areas to work in collective farms.

Question 35

khmer rouge political policies

Answer 35

Political System
- Cambodia was renamed the Democratic Kampuchea.
- Leadership under Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) was less visible compared to other dictatorial regimes; he did not cultivate a personality cult and was referred to as “Brother Number One.”
- The regime aimed to construct a classless communal society free from foreign influences, middle-class intellectualism, and non-communist ideas.
- Cambodia’s legal system and courts were virtually abolished; justice was dispensed by Khmer “death squads” and “reeducation camps.”
- Pol Pot and his followers declared April 1975 as “Year Zero,” symbolizing a complete reset of society.
- Their beliefs echoed some Chinese ideologies, though they denied this connection for reasons of nationalistic pride:
- Emphasis on the triumph of human will.
- Downgrading of intellectuals.
- Sanctity of manual labor and peasantry.
- Commitment to collectivization.
- Strategy of surrounding cities with a strong rural base.

Nationalism
- Extreme nationalism was promoted; dissent was deemed unacceptable and punishable by death.
- There was strong opposition to foreign intervention.
- Individuals who spoke foreign languages or wore glasses were labeled as parasitical intellectuals.
- The regime became a closed society, fueled by suspicions of the violent nature of the regime held by the Vietnamese.
- Areas near the Vietnamese border were purged because of fears that the Vietnamese could exert control over those regions.

Evacuation of Rural Areas
- Evacuations were driven by ideological, economic, and military factors:
- Ideological: Cities were seen as centers of capitalism.
- Field laborers were deemed necessary to prevent “imminent” food shortages.
- Cities were viewed as vulnerable to military attacks.
- Many cities became ghost towns as residents were abruptly ordered to evacuate for three days.
- Approximately 2 million residents were deported from overcrowded Phnom Penh under the pretext that Americans were about to bomb the city.
- By 1979, roughly 650,000 evacuees died from execution, overwork, disease, lack of medical care, or starvation.

Question 36

khmer rouge social policies

Answer 36

Lifestyle

• During the four years of Khmer Rouge rule, between 1.2 and 2.2 million Cambodians and foreigners died, either at the hands of Pol Pot’s murder squads or from starvation and disease.
• The regime aimed to eliminate social classes, claiming to boost the lives and rights of peasants.
• The only acceptable lifestyle was that of poor agricultural workers; factories, universities, and hospitals were shut down.
• Professionals such as doctors and lawyers were considered a danger to the regime.
• Marriage partners were chosen by the state, with forced marriages occurring frequently.
• Individuals could not choose their clothing or place of work.
• The population lived in villages administered as cooperatives, with families often separated and children placed in labor camps.
• There were no civil rights; personal freedoms were severely restricted.

Education
- Schools and colleges were closed, and formal education was abolished in 1977.
- Children aged 8 and older were taken to labor camps for reeducation, as they were seen as easily moldable and indoctrinable.
- Intellectuals and urbanites were targeted for execution; approximately 85% of teachers and 95% of intellectuals were killed.
Religion
- Loyalty to the state was prioritized over family and religion.
- All forms of religion were banned, along with music, radios, money, jewelry, gambling, private property, and most reading materials.
- The Muslim Cham were viewed as a threat to uniformity due to their opposition to communal eating; about 100,000 of 250,000 Cham peasants were killed or worked to death by January 1969.
- Islam, Buddhism, and any religions practiced by ethnic Khmers were outlawed; Khmer Krom (ethnic Khmers in Vietnam) faced massacres between 1975 and 1977.
- Hill tribes were accepted, contrasting with the treatment of other ethnic groups.

Healthcare
- Healthcare infrastructure was destroyed, with healthcare equipment, supplies, and personnel nearly obliterated.
- By 1979, only 45 medical doctors remained, of whom 20 chose to leave the country; there were just 26 pharmacists, 28 dentists, and 728 medical students at that time.
- Rampant malnutrition led to an estimated 90% of women stopping menstruation.
- The number of births declined by 570,000 over the four-year regime.

Question 37

international response

Answer 37

International Response
- The Paris Peace Accords were signed by 19 countries and included the formation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
- Although the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea ended the genocide and suffering, Vietnam faced widespread condemnation from the international community and was itself threatened with invasion. The United Nations recognized the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of Kampuchea.

Cold War Politics
- The USSR and China were hostile to each other, while China and the USA experienced improved relations.
- On one side were the Soviet Union, Vietnam, the Soviet Bloc countries, and the new Cambodian government led by Hang Samrin.
- On the opposing side were China, the United States, Thailand, Singapore, and most other Western countries.
- USA: After its defeat in the Vietnam War, the U.S. could not tolerate any increase in Vietnamese power.
- Thailand: Viewed itself as the dominant economic power in Indochina and perceived Vietnam as a potential threat.
- ASEAN Nations: Concerned about Vietnamese expansion increasing the Soviet Union’s influence, they worried about a strong Communist Vietnam allied with the USSR.
- Australia: Followed U.S. policy and stopped all aid to Kampuchea.
- Impact on Cambodians: The removal of the Khmer Rouge did not lead to immediate improvements in living conditions. Famine struck in 1979, forcing many to flee to the Thai border, where refugee camps were established.
- The international community eventually recognized the famine’s severity and sent aid, but they were reluctant to send it directly to Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese.

• Although Vietnamese troops were initially welcomed as saviors in 1979, their prolonged presence (with 200,000 troops remaining) led to perceptions of them as invaders, a view promoted by the U.S. and the UN. The influx of Vietnamese settlers into Cambodia revived historical fears of Vietnamese expansion.

Vietnamese Withdrawal:
- A struggling Vietnamese economy.
- The impact of Perestroika in the Soviet Union, which limited Soviet financial support for Vietnam’s war in Cambodia.
- Promises from the U.S. to initiate diplomatic relations with Vietnam upon withdrawal, which Vietnam hoped would lead to trade agreements.
- A belief that the Khmer Rouge were no longer strong enough to reclaim power in Cambodia.
- Vietnam had suffered significant casualties during the invasion, with 55,000 dead and 60,000 wounded.

elections
- In 1991, a temporary coalition government was formed, and a peace agreement was signed between opposing parties. Elections were scheduled for 1993, resulting in the election of Prince Sihanouk, who later entered a power-sharing agreement with the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and Hun Sen.
- Pol Pot continued to lead the Khmer Rouge as an insurgency until 1997 when he was arrested and placed under house arrest. The organization persisted until 1999, by which time most members had defected, been arrested, or died.

Question 38

french indochina causes- preconditions

Answer 38

• One of the main preconditions of the first Indochina revolution was the frustration with the actions of the French as colonizers.
• had been seeking to overthrow the french colonial rule for decades, japanese occupation from 1940-45 created a power vacuum, liberating large parts of vietnam from japan meant that vietminh became powerful enough to decalre independence, yet return of french meant they refused to grant independence
• Violations and oppression of Vietnamese citizens, along with the lack of free and equal rights, wrecked Vietnam’s national unity arising from the uprising.
• Economic exploitation included forcing the population to use opium and alcohol, robbing raw materials, and imposing unjustified taxes, leaving the peasantry in extreme poverty.
• This exploitation increased widespread public dissent and set the stage for the growth of Vietnamese nationalism as a political force seeking to fight against French occupation.
• There was inherent frustration over the French siding with fascists, as many Vietnamese believed they deserved the right to freedom and independence after fighting alongside the Allies against fascism.
• This state of discontent united the Vietnamese people, leaving them determined and mobilized to resist French rule, both physically and mentally.
• The Japanese occupation removed the French from power, creating a power vacuum.
• This allowed Ho Chi Minh’s Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) to play a key role in forming the anti-Japanese resistance, effectively controlling all of northern Vietnam by June 1945.
• belief in their right to self determination and decolonization, result of Roosevelt
• Truman impact due to WW2 and changing cw dynamics
• promises post war hinting at possibility of granting independence

Question 39

french indo-china- rise of communism and foreign support

Answer 39

• Young Vietnamese activists like Ho Chi Minh became radicalized after the failure of the Versailles Peace Conference to grant self-determination to Vietnam.
• Ho Chi Minh was seen as a patriot who cared for ordinary Vietnamese people, with his land, educational, and health programs winning over the peasantry.
• Japanese occupation from 1940 to 1945 set the stage for the Indochina War by removing the French from power and positioning Ho’s Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) as a key player in the anti-Japanese resistance.
• The Japanese removal of French colonial forces in March 1945 created a political vacuum in Indochina, allowing the Vietminh to recruit additional soldiers and effectively control all of northern Vietnam by June 1945.
• The vietminh was poised to take surrendered Japanese troops and declare independence; however, the Allies agreed to divide Vietnam at Potsdam. British and French forces landed in southern Vietnam, restoring French authority and ignoring the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).
• The failure to recognize Ho Chi Minh’s DRV put France on a collision course, facilitated by British support. Without British forces, the French might not have returned.
• The U.S. complicated matters by failing to support Vietnamese independence, despite Ho Chi Minh’s appeals to President Truman.
• Despite promises during the Second World War to support independent nations and Roosevelt’s anti-imperialist stance, Truman supported the French return to Vietnam.
• The growing Cold War and Red Scare made it politically impossible for Truman to abandon France. By 1946, French forces had regained all of southern Vietnam and were planning to take the north.
• Heightened nationalist sentiment and the power vacuum left by the removal of French forces were key catalysts for the First Indochina War. The Vietminh gained increased power and influence as the sole opposition to the Japanese.
• The Allies’ failure to recognize the DRV made conflict imminent, especially amid the breakdown of peace talks regarding full independence.
• Fears that full independence for Vietnam would spread communism in Asia led the Allies to support the French, who were important NATO allies.

Question 40

french indochina war - haiphong incident

Answer 40

• Attempting to avert war, Ho Chi Minh began political talks with France in March 1946. Realizing the impossibility of fighting France, Ho agreed to French control of Indochina with 15,000 troops, and Vietnam would become part of the French Union.
• In return, the French promised to recognize the DRV as a free state with its own government and army. However, talks broke down in September 1946 when the French refused to consider full independence.
• With the Vietminh government of the DRV refusing to accept French colonial control, armed struggle seemed imminent.
• Fighting eventually broke out in the northern port of Haiphong in November 1946.
• On 20th November, seizing a Chinese junk suspected of smuggling into Haiphong, in response the Vietnamese fired upon the French ship. The French issued an ultimatum to the Vieminh demanding disarmament, this resulted in the Vietnamese forces beginning a preemptive attack as they viewed the demand as a threat which heightened the urgency amongst the Vietminh to respond militarily.
• Fearing an attacking on DRV capital of Hanoi, Vietnamese forces began a pre-emptive attack on the French on 19th December 1946. Lasting over a month, the Battle of Hanoi saw Vietminh forces defeated.
• on 28th November, the French navy began shelling the city, killing 6,000 civilians and then occupying Haiphong.

Question 41

french indochina evolution- french weakness

Answer 41

• The Vietnamese National Army (ANV) of 150,000 only had about ¼ of units which had tactical mobility.
• Many units remained understrength and ill-trained due to political opposition to the war in France.
• There were constant equipment shortages and forces relied on ex-WW2 material.
• Metropolitan and colonial volunteer regiments relied on just 300 artillery guns.
  The air force was heavily relied upon with the helicopter fleet totalled only 32.
• French-led forces in Indochina were held together by string and sealing wax. Ill-paid professionals rather than conscripts, they were weak in manpower, madly juggling their best forces round by road and air to stem an advance here, extricate a unit there, or, in yet another location, to seize some opportunity which suddenly presented itself.
• They were weak in equipment, much of it distinctly secondhand, and where it was new, inexperienced and inadequately trained in its use, particularly the case with aircraft.
• Some of the French generals were competitive and even quarrelsome.
• There were constant leadership changes, making it challenging for troops to cope with the tactics employed by each leader
• At some point, General Salan was even caused the french forces to become increasingly isolated and surrounded in the delta region
• In the United States, those who later made the decision for war saw Dien Bien Phu, where the French succumbed defeat as a result of tactical errors an indication of French weakness rather than of Viet Minh strength. (Windrow)
• The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (CEFEO) began the war as a conventional army, ill-equipped compared to the VM’s use of guerilla warfare.
• War Weariness - Popular discontent with the war was increasing in France where it was known as the ‘dirty war’ by the left. The government refused to allow conscription to support the war effort yet was unwilling to make political concessions to end the war.
• French Strategy - The French failed to realise the importance of hearts and minds and winning over the native population. Instead, French strategy focused on winning set piece battles at isolated strongpoints such as the Battles of Cao Bang and Dien Bien Phu. This left their forces exposed, overstretched, and isolated.
• French Force Structure - The CEFEO compromised mostly poorly-trained colonial troops led by French volunteer officers. The lack of manpower meant French offensives were limited in scope. Heavy armour was useless in the terrain and airpower was often grounded due to poor weather. Leadership was inconsistent, with 6 Generals within 7 years.

historiography
Orthodox historians argued that the French were to blame for losing this war. Their military strategy was weak. They did little to win hearts and minds and failed
The French-led forces in Indochina were Ill-paid professionals rather than conscripts, they were weak in manpower. They were weak in equipment, much of it secondhand, and where it was new, inexperienced and inadequately trained in its use (Windrow)

Question 42

french indochina evolution- vietminh tactics & leadership/ nationalism

Answer 42

• The Viet Minh, led by General Vo Nguyen Giap, avoided direct confrontation with the better-equipped French forces. Instead, they relied on hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, sabotage, and raids. This strategy wore down French morale and resources.
• viet Minh fighters blended into the rural population, receiving food, intelligence, and shelter from peasants. This made them nearly impossible to eradicate.
• By 1953–54, the Viet Minh shifted to large-scale conventional warfare, culminating in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954), where they successfully besieged and destroyed a fortified French garrison.
• Viet Minh Strengths - Viet Minh guerrilla tactics utilised the physical geography of the country. They would make surprise attacks then retreat to the jungles and mountains which were enveloped by monsoon mists half the year. In contrast, road-bound French armoured columns struggled on Vietnam’s frequently flooded dirt tracks. The Viet Minh also fought for an inspiring cause, Vietnamese freedom and social justice.
• As the leader of the Viet Minh and the Communist Party, Ho Chi Minh was a unifying figure who framed the war as a nationalist struggle against colonialism, not just a communist revolution. His charisma and propaganda efforts kept morale high.
• Ho’s Popularity - In late 1951, a US official pointed out the unpopularity of the French puppet emperor, Bao Dai whose government ‘has no appeal… to the masses’. Ho was seen by many as a patriot who cared about ordinary people. His fairer policies of redistribution of land and education and health-care programmes helped win over the peasantry.
• Loss of the Border - The 1950 Border Campaign ended in the Battle of Route Coloniale 4 where the French lost control of the Vietnam-China border. This left Viet Minh supply lines from China completely uncontested, and enabled the Viet Minh to rearm and retrain their regular forces in the Viet Bac and Thai Highlands.
• The Viet Minh redistributed land to peasants, winning rural loyalty. Their propaganda framed the French as foreign oppressors, reinforcing nationalist resistance.
• Giap was a master strategist who adapted tactics based on the situation. His willingness to learn from mistakes (e.g., early failed offensives in 1951) and his ability to organize logistics (such as transporting artillery to Dien Bien Phu) were crucial.
• Giap’s Leadership - Vo Nguyen Giap was a strategic genius who implemented Mao’s approach to guerrilla warfare. Comparing the French to an elephant and his forces as a tiger, he sought to surround and overstretch the enemy before switching to more conventional mobile warfare after 1950. By 1952, he commanded over 250,000 regular soldiers and 2 million militia.
• Many Vietnamese saw the Viet Minh as fighting for independence, not just communism. France’s brutal tactics (e.g., aerial bombing, forced relocations) alienated the population and drove support to the Viet Minh.
• Political Indoctrination - Motivated by a patriotic cause, the Viet Minh were willing to suffer for their country and their freedom, marching over mountains and through jungles, often with insufficient food. Units held self-criticism sessions, during which errors were admitted and forgiven. Giap paid great attention to winning over the ordinary people.
• Logistical Support - Each Viet Minh division was supported by over 40,000 porters carrying rice or ammunition along jungle trails and over mountain passes. Many porters were unmarried women, the so-called ‘long-haired army’ whom the Viet Minh found more effective than the male porties because they were easier to train, had no family ties and were seen as less threatening by the enemy.

Dien Bien Phu:
- Giap in December 1953 ordered the bulk of his forces to move from the Tonkin delta to surround the Dien Bien Phu valley. He considered a decisive attack against this base to be war-winning - the success of Navarre’s strategy was based on it.
- By March 1954, the French base at Dien Bien Phu was surrounded. The VM had used over half a million porters to supply their 50,000 strong forces in a 500 mile supply chain. 200 artillery guns and 20 anti-aircraft guns were secretly setup to attack the 20,000 strong French garrison.
- On 27th March 1954, the bombardment began, immediately destroying the French airfield and preventing resupply. Holding out until May, the outpost was overwhelmed.
- the huge defeat at Dien Bien Phu was a psychological turning point. The French government realised they couldn’t win, decreased US support

• pre-planned Geneva Conference beginning on 8th May, the French negotiating position was severely weakened. The VM insisted on French withdraw from Indochina. China feared continuing the war would only draw in the US, whose United Action plan was calling for Western intervention.
• In the end, the Geneva Accords accepted Zhou Enlai’s proposals to a ceasefire, to divide Vietnam at the 17th parallel and arrange reunification elections in 1956.

historiography:
- Revisionist - The Viet Minh won this war
Although the French made huge mistakes, focusing on this hides the fact of Viet Minh strengths. Ho and Giap’s strategy was successful and Viet Minh tactics outclassed the French.

Question 43

french indochina evolution- foreign influence

Answer 43

• After 1950, China supplied artillery, rifles, machine guns, and ammunition (mostly captured from defeated Nationalist forces or Soviet-supplied).
• Chinese generals trained Viet Minh troops in conventional warfare tactics, crucial for battles like Dien Bien Phu (1954).
• The Viet Minh used southern China as a rear base for training, medical care, and resupply.
• Before 1949, the Viet Minh were mostly a guerrilla force.
• After 1949, they could wage large-scale conventional warfare, leading to victories like the Border Campaign (1950) and Dien Bien Phu (1954).
• Zhou convinced them to accept a temporary partition at the 17th parallel, arguing:
  The Viet Minh lacked the strength to take the South immediately, A prolonged war risked U.S. intervention (like in Korea), Elections in 1956 would likely favor the communists anyway.
• Zhou held secret talks with French PM Pierre Mendès France, offering concessions to speed up a deal.
• He reassured Western powers that China did not want war in Indochina, easing fears of communist expansion.
• zhou therefore supported communism but avoided reckless expansion and diplomacy helped to avoid direct clashes in vietnam
• The USSR did not directly intervene but supplied China with weapons, some of which were passed to the Viet Minh.
  Soviet political and diplomatic support at the UN helped legitimize the Viet Minh as an anti-colonial movement.
• The Soviet-China alliance ensured a steady (if modest) flow of modern arms.
  Soviet propaganda framed the war as part of the global struggle against imperialism, boosting Viet Minh morale.
• the U.S. initially supported France (financing 80% of the war by 1954) to contain communism in Southeast Asia.
  But… French Weakness Backfired: U.S. aid propped up an unpopular colonial regime, alienating Vietnamese nationalists and driving many toward the Viet Minh.
  Geneva Conference (1954): The U.S. opposed French negotiations but failed to prevent Vietnam’s temporary division, setting the stage for later U.S. involvement.
• Lack of US support - Despite funding over 75% of the French war effort, President Eisenhower was unwilling to escalate the US military involvement in Vietnam. He had just won the election having promised to end the Korean War. The British refused to support US airstrikes to help the French and some in the US feared antagonizing the Chinese.
• foreign influence did not win the war for the Viet Minh, but it accelerated their victory by providing critical resources after 1949. The core reasons for their success remained nationalism, guerrilla-to-conventional adaptability, and leadership (Ho Chi Minh & Giap)—foreign aid merely amplified these strengths.

Question 44

vietnam causes- quagmire theory

Answer 44

• Predominant perspective that the US government got involved in Vietnam little by little, one step at a time. Eventually, the country was mired in the conflict and couldn’t get out.
• Schlessinger argued that American presence in Vietnam was the result of “the triumph of the politics of inadvertence” and that the war itself was a “tragedy without villains
• Rejects domino theory and emphasizes that Vietnam lacked strategic significance in Cold War
• By the end of 1960, Eisenhower had stood down after two terms as President. Diem’s regime in South Vietnam was as unpopular as ever and losing the war - the Viet Cong were estimated to be supported by 75% of all villages.
• It can be argued that Vietnam was Eisenhower’s war. He ignored the Geneva Accords, instead promoting a rollback of communism by seeking to setup an anti communist state in the South.
• He ignored Diem’s authoritarianism, increased military and economic aid, and placed the US in a commitment trap.
• In 1961 President Kennedy was faced with a tough choice. He could either continue to support a failing regime, withdraw US support completely, or replace Diem’s regime with a more democratic and popular leader.
• • By 1953 Truman had given $3 billion to France. Eisenhower had given $7 billion to Diem. Vietnam and SE Asia’s raw materials were vital to world trade. The US was committed economically to this.

historiography:
- orthodox opinion

Question 45

vietnam causes- american expansionism

Answer 45

• Marxist historiography differs in a crucial way from the orthodox liberal realist narrative because it is rooted in the notion of inevitability
• in this case the assumption that the United States as the world’s leading capitalist power was driven by imperialist economic imperatives to intervene in Indochina to stop the advance of Communism and/or radical nationalist movements.
• This determinism in effect renders moot any discussion of what the United States might or should have done by denying the possibility of alternative options its policy makers might realistically have chosen
• American expansionism played a role in the Vietnam War as the U.S. sought to maintain its global influence and protect its economic interests.
• There was an increased focus on containment, with Eisenhower articulating his “domino theory,” which posits that if one Southeast Asian country falls to communism, others would follow, reducing U.S. access to raw materials and foreign labor markets.
• US military strategy was based on containment and the domino theory - if the RVN fell, then war would come eventually to other nations. The US had to keep up the credibility of its deterrence across the world - military failure would embolden insurgencies elsewhere.
• Containment was seen as a necessary response to the global Communist threat, with Vietnam becoming a key Cold War front.
• Eisenhower viewed the Geneva Accords as a communist victory and responded by creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) to protect South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
• The U.S. sought to circumvent the Geneva stipulation that prohibited Vietnam from entering foreign alliances or hosting foreign troops by establishing SEATO, which indirectly supported these countries without violating the treaty’s terms.

historiography:
- The revisionist narrative defends the application of America’s Cold War policy of containment to Vietnam, a policy initiated during Harry Truman’s presidency.
- The war was part of a broader strategy to assert U.S. dominance in the face of communist expansion and to ensure that Southeast Asia remained aligned with Western capitalist interests.

Question 46

indochina impact- political

Answer 46

end of colonial rule:
- truce between the french and the vietminh, nationwide democratic elections held in 1956 and vietnam reunified
- geneva conference resulted in french forces agreeing to withdraw, ended nearly a century of french colonial dominance in the region
- communists govern nrthern vietnam from hanoi and diem would govern southen vietnam, divided at the 17th parallel
- the stuggle against colonialism galvanysed support for communist ideologies, promised independence and social reforms
- however communist regime in north was as unpleasant as diem in south, Ho chi ming’s PAVN put down revolut in 1956, 6000 peasants killed or deported

• US broke the spirit of these Accords by building up an anti communist regime in the south, appointed ngo dinh diem as prime minister, his power rested in rich landowning class who were predominantly catholic, reversed 1945 land reform which forced peasants to purchase their land
• Government became corrupt and dominated by Diem and his cronies, including his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu who became his chief political advisor. Diem used his power to destroy what remained of the communist underground.
• In 1956, his ‘Denounce the Communists’ campaign reduced an estimated 10,000 Viet Minh supporters in 1955 to around 2,000 in 1959. Re-education, mass arrests and executions were the primary methods.
• Despite the warning signs, the US continued to support Diem, with President Eisenhower inviting him to tour the US in 1957 and claiming he was the “miracle man of Asia”.
• By 1961, Eisenhower had provided over $7 billion in aid. Diem ignored US calls for ‘democratic reforms’.
• Once France had freed itself from the powder keg that was Indo-China, it lost an important part of its colonial prestige, fuelling the independence movements already active in French North Africa.
• Dramatic loss of French colonial control, French authority in indochina collapse triggering a crisis of confidence within the French government and military, leading to widespread political turmoil
• Exacerbated existing political divisions within France

Question 47

indochina impact- social

Answer 47

• The war and subsequent internal conflicts forced thousands to flee their homes, especially in rural areas
• As war continued there was more discontent for the war from the French public
  There was lack of popularity for the french puppet emperor Bao Dai whose government has “no appeal whatsoever to the masses”
• The war in france was known as “drity war” by the left. The government refused to allow conscription to support the war effort yet was unwilling to make political concessions to end the war
• Diem’s government of South Vietnam (non-communist regime), Policies emphasis on military solutions rather than social and economic reform that dominated US assistance to Diem
• Diem favoured his fellow Catholics from the wealthy landowner class (not appealing to ordinary people), Viet Minh advocacy of greater economic equality could win so many peasant hearts
• Diem disliked meeting his people, was reluctant to tour South Vietnam at the behest of his American patrons who rightly feared he lacked ‘common touch’
• Hanoi’s conservatism gave Diem the opportunity to arrest/execute many southern Communist activists (dropping from 10,000 in 1955 to near 2000 by 1959)
• Forcing the South’s Communists into open revolt and by 1960 Hanoi had decided to give liberation equal priority with consolidation
• The Strategic Hamlet Program was implemented in 1962 to isolate rural populations from communist influence by relocating peasants into fortified hamlets.
• The program was unsuccessful, leading to increased resentment and contributing to the growth of the Viet Cong’s influence.
• It was canceled after President Ngo Dinh Diem’s overthrow in November 1963.

Question 48

indochina impact- economic

Answer 48

• Both rural and urban areas were ruined, the economy shattered and the people exhausted
  Vietnam remained one of the poorest nations in the world for the twenty years following the end of the war
• Diem promised a land reform programme, but proved ‘uncommitted to it’ = Long An province (near Saigon) fewer than 1000 out of 35,000 tenants received property
• Diem infuriated peasants demanding payment for land they had been given for free in the war against the French
• The US was impressed by the way Diem’s ruthlessness in dealing with opponents, the Eisenhower administration provided economic aid of hundreds of millions of dollars
• In May 1950, President Truman offered $10 million in support of the French military effort, which increased to $100 million by December 1950. This aid covered nearly 80% of the French war costs.
• The U.S. provided significant military aid, including $385 million worth of armaments under Eisenhower, to support the French against the Viet Minh.
• Despite U.S. aid, the French threatened to exit the Indochina War if American support was not maintained.
• The war cost the French government three billion francs, with France paying about 70% and the U.S. covering the remainder.
• The U.S. refused to intervene directly by launching an air strike at Dien Bien Phu, which contributed to the French defeat and led to their decision to withdraw from Indochina.

Question 49

vietnam evolution- political leadership weakness

Answer 49

• Opposition to the war in the US grew as the conflict dragged on.
• During the Tet Offensive, 84,000 VC troops switched to conventional warfare and launched simultaneous attacks across all major cities throughout South Vietnam including the US embassy in Saigon. The public nature of the offensive, having been playing live on TV, heavily depleted the support of the general public as the US forces struggled to contain the uprising
• acted as a huge psychological blow for the US as previous dissent on the conflict dragging on and the draft falling mostly on young ethnic minorities had already garnered significant backlash.
• credibility gap between what the political figures had promised and the reality of the progress in Vietnam had been exacerbated by the Tet Offensive and undermined the general public’s support and trust in President Johnson and his seemingly contradictory policies
• By striking everywhere at once, it seemed as if the VC were winning the war.
• It led Johnson to decide that he wouldn’t stand for re-election that year. In fact, in March 1968 he admitted defeat by refusing to increase troop numbers, ended Operation Rolling Thunder, and replaced General Westmoreland with General Abrams.
• US didn’t officially declare war, and the draft fell mostly on young ethnic minorities.
• New forms of media reporting further eroded public support.
• War aims had no definite end, and the public couldn’t understand the nature of the war.
• cost of war being over $20 million a year, the government’s policy strayed away from the domestic social and economic issues and the “great society” reforms, instead much more weight was put upon the funding of the war leading to the US deficit rising from $1.6 billion in 1965 to %25.3 in 1968
• March 1968 Johson’s approval rating had dropped to 36% as it became clear that a credibility gap
• Conscription alienated thousands of people as did the use of torture in Operation Phoenix. - Divisions in government emerged from 1967 with Robert McNamara resigning.
• casualties mounted and media portrayals became increasingly negative, large-scale- protests emerged across the country. In particular, by 1967, over 70,000 protested against the war in Washington, and in 1968 riots occurred at the democratic national convention
• significantly depleted morale amongst political leaders and troops alike
• US forces relied on strategic airpower to airlift forces into the jungle in search and destroy missions. This enabled rapid deployment but lost the element of surprise which was vital to capture VC. The overuse of airpower only alienated civilians.
• US failed to use its full capabilities. Seeking not to escalate the war, US airpower was restrained against the North until the use of B-52 bombers against Hanoi during Operation Linebacker in 1972.

historiography:
- revisionist viewpoint that the US defeat in the Vietnam War was inevitable due to the lack of adequately planned military strategies and the overall weakness of political leadership. While it could be argued that their military superiority gave them a substantial advantage over their opposition, the US lacked focus on the wider strategic defeat despite success in tactical victories.

Question 50

vietnam evolution US strategy/ tactics

Answer 50

• misjudged the conflict due to hubris this therefore led to the failure in strategic planning as they misapplied a policy of containment in Vietnam. In particular, the failure of General Westmoreland’s war of attrition strategy meant that the strategy was militarily ineffective and failed to win the “hearts and minds” of the people.
• Having believed that the war could be won in 3 years, the strategy was tested in the Battle of La Drang in October 1965 where the US had been surrounded and forced to flee to Cambodia.
• by mid-1967, it became clear that attrition had failed as they struggled to secure territory leading to the reinforcement of 200,000 VC in 1968.
• Although the US won most battles, VC/PAVN losses could be more easily replaced. US losses only increased protest. The US was also fighting a limited war, failing to invade the North,
• while the attrition tactics had sought to find and eliminate the Viet Cong in rural areas, the failure of the troops to identify the VC from the civilians meant that there were significant civilian casualties. To the general public, this represented the notion that the tactics had been more effective in killing people than in protecting them.
• The bombing of the DRV failed to disrupt the rural economy enough, and failed to interdict supplies along the Ho Chi Minh trail.
• Most weapons and supplies were imported from PRC/USSR, therefore couldn’t be targeted. Use of airborne defoliants in the South like Agent Orange only alienated Vietnamese peasants further, with ⅓ of peasants moving to urban areas.

historiography:
- orthodox, containment misapplied in vietnam, the US misjudged the internal dynamics of conflict, wrongly supporting south vietnam and placing itself in the midst of a civil war
- wrongly conceived from ignorance and hubris, therefore inevitable defeat

Question 51

vietnam evolution- vietcong strengths

Answer 51

• Guerilla warfare tactics were hugely successful. Surprise attacks, booby traps, use of jungle cover, and use of extensive tunnel systems enabled the Vietcong to choose engagements carefully, maintaining the initiative.
• This negated US technological superiority. It also relied on working with peasants for food and intelligence, winning hearts and minds. The VC were also aided by knowing the terrain they were fighting in.
• Vietcong and PAVN troops were dedicated to national independence and social reform via communism. Land reform wedded troops to the regime. Political education was extensive amongst units, and self criticism encouraged. Military and ideological discipline was high.
• The Viet Cong used hit-and-run attacks and ambushes to harass US forces, often blending into the civilian population to avoid detection. This made it difficult for the US to distinguish between combatants and non-combatant
• Giáp was particularly skilled in logistics, as evidenced by his development of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a complex network that allowed the North Vietnamese to supply troops and materials across the border into South Vietnam
• demonstrated adaptability in military tactics, shifting from rapid attacks to more cautious strategies when necessary.
• renowned for his strategic brilliance, combining conventional and guerrilla warfare tactics effectively.
• The Tet Offensive, launched in January 1968, aimed to spark a general uprising against the South Vietnamese government and demonstrate that the US could not win the war. Although it failed to achieve its military objectives, it was a significant political victory for the North Vietnamese
• The offensive involved simultaneous attacks on major cities across South Vietnam, including the US embassy in Saigon.
• led to the erosion of public trust
• Throughout the war the North were supported by China and the USSR. $2 billion USD was received by the DRV in supplies, including MiG jets, 8,000 anti aircraft guns and 200 anti-aircraft missile sites. 320,000 PLA soldiers helped with logistics in North Vietnam. - The Soviets gave 1,216 million roubles. But VC/PAVN soldiers did most of the fighting
• At the start of the conflict, the Vietcong only numbered around 40,000 guerillas, reaching a peak of 400,000 by 1968. They were supported by 300,000 highly-trained regular troops of the PAVN. Against them, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) numbered almost one million soldiers.

historiography:
- post revisionist, north vietnamese strategy of people’s war united vietnamese, had superior motivation and willingness to sacrifice
- nationalistic communist system more popular than the south’s capitalist system

Question 52

vietnam outcome- political impact

Answer 52

• Shortly after the US left, the north Vietnamese took over the country entirely. The newly unified Vietnam was reunited as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Le Duan became the leader of Vietnam, his view of socialism was statist, highly centralised and managerial, especially in agriculture.
• “Reeducation” camps were set up for enemies of communism and supporters of the previous south vietnamese government.
• A personal dossier/written biography was kept of everyone to determine if they should be considered for reeducation.
• Those whose records were ‘good’ had better job opportunities or access to university education.
• Media, schools and religious institutions were brought under government control, Christianity was viewed most suspiciously, some institutions were closed, portraits of Ho Chi Minh were put on altars. All of Vietnam’s government remains communist today.
• The fall of Saigon triggered a massive refugee crisis, with hundreds of thousands fleeing Vietnam, seeking asylum in other countries

USA:
- War Powers Act:
- now required congressional approval of any overseas troop deployment

Challenged US exceptionalism:
- prior to the war, they believed that they were the strongest nation, led by well-meaning people, saving democracy from the hands of tyrants
- military victory (in most battles) meant that the loss of the war was due to a wider failure of
political policies and national morale

Political leadership and effectiveness of military questioned
- defeated, leaders lied about winning, soldiers committed atrocities
- chose the wrong cause, wasn’t the saviour but a meddlesome bully in Vietnam (My Lai Massacre, claiming that a US ship was attacked in order to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution)
- national mistrust “Vietnam Syndrome”

Testing the Vietnam Syndrome:
- Reagan’s small invasion of Grenada (1983), a tiny island just north of Venezuela, with 6000 soldiers, awarding 8700 medals for their bravery
- President H. W. Bush’s Gulf War (1991), Vietnam Veteran generals, quick and ruthless strategy with achievable aims, Bush proclaimed “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all!”
- Fear of another Vietnam in the ‘war on terror’ after 9/11

Trauma of Vietnam Veterans
- vets saw more combat that WW2 in a shorter time, and was abruptly brought home in defeat
- poor veteran care, government denied vets suffered from PTSD, professional care only in the mid-1980s, estimated some 850,000 veterans suffered PTSD
- hostile reception back home, no celebrations, ridiculed

Question 53

vietnam outcome- economic impact

Answer 53

Vietnam:
- Vietnam’s economy was severely strained. It was primarily agricultural, underdeveloped, and isolated from global markets due to its centralized economic planning and communist rule
- South Vietnam’s economy had been heavily reliant on foreign aid, particularly from the U.S., which supported military development and infrastructure. After reunification, Vietnam faced significant economic challenges, including poverty and underdevelopment
- The destruction of land meant the country could not produce enough food for the population, previously Vietnam had been a major rice exporter.
- Many skilled and professional workers left the country for fear of persecution (emigration of 2 million from late 1970-early 90s).
- Illegal activity increased (half a million women became prostitutes), the growth of the black market grew as did the drug trade in the south especially.
- Private property was confiscated, the population was de-urbanised with some relocated to New Economic Zones located in remote highland areas.
- A broad free-market policy was put in place in 1986 and only then did the economy begin to improve, boosted by oil export revenues and and influx of foreign capital.
- Long-term economic stability as Broad Free Market policy in 1986 improved the economy boosted by the oil revenues + influx of foreign capital

USA:
- created public distrust of government due to hige military expenditure ($1 trillion in today’s market)
- The OPEC Crisis in 1974 led to an increase in oil prices by about 400%; this meant that the Americans, in addition to the South Vietnamese, suffered badly in terms of their economy.
- The Vietnam War, to an extent, played a role in the US’s inflation, however this would mostly be attributed to other factors including spending on the Korean War.
- the reason for inflation during the Vietnam War, though, was that President Johnson was unwilling to raise taxes due to the lack of public support, so he inflated prices.
- halted military aid to cambodia led to sihanouk seeking another source of help