class 5 powerpoint Flashcards

1
Q

A causal pass

A

occurs prior to any hostile takeover

the bidder may attempt some informal offer to the target firm’s management

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2
Q

A toehold

A

a purchase of an initial accumulation of the target firm’s shares by a hostile bidder

leads to lower average cost of acquisition, and a dual role

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3
Q

A value leakage

A

hostile bidders should see whether the target firm has important contracts that could be lost following the acquisition

(i.e., lower value and lower bid)

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4
Q

when could a value leakage take place?

A

could take place due to information asymmetry

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5
Q

A fiduciary out clause

A

exists in merger agreements whereby a bidder and a target firm seek to pursue a friendly agreement

the latter’s board is required to still consider other bids so as to ensure shareholder wealth maximization

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6
Q

The optimal bid

A

when the initial bidder structures its first bid so as to discourage other bids while not overpaying

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7
Q

The premium offer stemming from single bidder is relatively higher or lower that the one offered by an initial bidder in a takeover contest involving multiple bidders?

A

The premium offer stemming from single bidder is relatively higher

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8
Q

A bear hug

A

takes place when a bidder contacts the board of the target firm with an expression of interest in acquiring that firm

the bidder tends to reach the shareholders with a tender offer if the overtures are not effective

less expensive takeover tool

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9
Q

two kinds of bear hugs

A

A teddy bear hug

more aggressive bear hug

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10
Q

A teddy bear hug

A

does not encompass a price or specific deal terms (i.e., less threatening)

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11
Q

more aggressive bear hug

A

the bidder offers a specific price so as to determine a specific range for damages in potential shareholder lawsuits

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12
Q

A long-form merger

A

a statutory merger that requires the target firm’s shareholders approval of the deal

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13
Q

A short-form merger

A

occurs if the bidder acquires 90%+ (e.g., Delaware)

the remaining shareholders receive the same compensation the others received, and no voting is necessary

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14
Q

A two-step tender offer

A

starts with the first step as the tender offer, while the second one is a short- or long-form merger (ownership level dictates)

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15
Q

which is usually quicker between a tender offer and a long-form merger?

A

a tender offer

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16
Q

Reasons that motivate a tender offer

A

A faster deal completion than other alternatives

The bidder may be able to circumvent unfavourable management and board

While a tender offer could trigger an auction process and by extension increase its transaction cost, it could increase returns to shareholders

17
Q

how can tender offers be paid?

A

An all-cash offer

An exchange offer stands for the use of the bidder’s own shares (attractive as it could be considered tax-free to target shareholders)

A double-barreled offer occurs when target shareholders have a choice: cash or securities

18
Q

Response of the Target Management to tender offers

Schedule 14D-9

A

Recommend acceptance

Recommend rejection

State that it has no opinion and is neutral

State that it cannot take a position on the bid

19
Q

Considerations about resisting a bid

A

A winner’s curse could yield value to target shareholders

The original bidder could simply withdraw its bid

A potentially treacherous move, since a target firm may receive an increased offer that is better than the gains that shareholders could enjoy: resistance could erode firm value

20
Q

A winner’s curse

A

i.e., flocking in competing bids, which ultimately increases premiums

21
Q

Investment bank

A

provides the requisite financing and advisory service through the tender offer

22
Q

Legal advisors

A

savvy attorneys on tactics and defences employed to fend off tender offers

23
Q

Information agent

A

a proxy soliciting firm in charge of forwarding tender offer materials to shareholders

24
Q

Depository bank

A

handles the receipt of the tender offers and the payment for the shares

25
Q

Forwarding agent

A

enhances the resources of the depository bank and transmits tenders received to the depository bank

26
Q

how does a two-tiered tender offer (also known as a front end-loaded tender offer) function as follows

A
  1. a better compensation quality (e.g., cash or stock)
  2. subpar compensation quality (e.g., subordinated debentures)

–> A coercive approach

27
Q

Shareholder’s dilemma

A

target shareholders may get unwanted cash to avoid the back end

28
Q

Glamour firms

A

bidders with low B/M ratio due to their overconfidence in managing an acquisition

tend to underperform ex post: firms with low B/M tend to make poor acquisition decisions

29
Q

when do Target shareholders realize positive cumulative abnormal returns?

A

around the announcement month of the tender offer

such a pattern persists for a while even in the case of rejected bids

30
Q

which type of directors are more supportive to shareholder value?

A

Independent directors

non-independent ones are wankers

31
Q

who tends to substantially increase the number of press releases disseminated to financial media during the private negotiation of a merger? what about those who dont?

A

Fixed exchange ratio bidders

floating exchange ratio bidders have no incentive to manage their media during the merger negotiation

32
Q

true or false

active media management reduces takeover costs

A

true

33
Q

Gross Stock Spread (GSS) formula

A

GSS = OP - MP

OP = Offer Price

MP = Market Price

34
Q

Risk Arbitrager’s Annualized Return (RAR) formula

A

RAR = GSS/(I * (365/P))