Clarke and Chalmers (Computationalism) Flashcards
what did Clark and Chalmers call into question
the boundry of the mind
what are the three views about the boundary of the mind
- Traditional view: The skin and the skull
- Some mental content and some meaning actually extends into the world (externalists)
- The mind literally extends beyond the skin and skull into the environment (extended mind thesis) (wide computationalism, active externalism)
what brand of mental theory does the boundary of the mind fall under
functionalism
what is wide computationalism
the idea that the mind LITERALLY extends beyond the skin and skull into the environment
also called active externalism
what is externalism
SOME mental content and some meaning actually extends into the world
what is the goal of the “extended mind”?
1) argue that the mind extends beyond the skin and skull (this is literal and not a metaphor)
2) The environment plays an active role in mind —a CENTRAL and active role
3) the common view of the mind is only held by tradition
what are the three cases of human problem solving
.1 Person sitting in front of a screen, asked to fit shapes into sockets- do so mentally
- Person sitting in front of a screen, asked to fit shapes into sockets- they have the option to mentally move it or press a button to move it physically
- Person with an neuro implant sitting in front of a screen, asked to fit shapes into sockets-they can perform the rotation as fast either way neuro implant or mentally
what is the difference between epistemic and pragmatic action
Epistemic Actions: alter the world in order to aid or augment cognition (requires a distribution of epistemic __??__)
Pragmatic Actions: alter the world because some physical change is desirable
fill in the blank
“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world __________________.” (who said this)
is part of the cognitive process
“If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for ___________, we must admit that __________gives us a clue how this could be done.” (who said this)
1)the subjective character of experience
2) no presently available conception
Objectivity is insufficient
experience is intimately related to
pov
who wrote the “extended mind”
Clarke and Chalmers
What is the Parity Principle
Epistemic Action: This is an action taken to gain knowledge or improve understanding (e.g., writing notes, using a calculator, or searching online). It’s part of how we come to know things.
Spread of Epistemic Credit: When someone relies on tools or collaborators to know something, the credit for knowing is shared—between the person and the external resources or agents involved.
Parity Principle: Proposed by Clark and Chalmers, it says that if an external process functions like a cognitive process (as if it were in your mind), then it should be treated as part of the mind—thus deserving equal epistemic status.
Fill in the quote: “If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world _________.
is a part of cognitive process
Explain Extending Cognition
Coupled Systems as Cognition
When a person is tightly coupled with an external tool (like a Tetris screen, notebook, or calculator), the two form a single cognitive system. The tool isn’t just aiding cognition—it is part of the cognitive process. This coupling is ongoing and functionally integrated.
External Components Play a Causal Role
These external parts (e.g., screen rotation in Tetris) actively contribute to how decisions are made. They are not just memory aids or shortcuts—they dynamically interact with the mind to produce behavior, just like internal brain processes do.
Extended Condition (via Parity Principle)
If an external tool performs the same functional role as an internal cognitive process, and if removing it degrades cognitive performance, then it meets the Extended Condition:
→ It counts as part of the mind.
→ Epistemic credit must be shared across the coupled system.
explain how a pen and paper is part of extending cognition according to Chalmers and
The pen and paper aren’t just accessories floating around the cognitive process—they’re integrated components of it.
You can’t just remove them without consequence. Doing so alters the behavior of the entire cognitive system—just like damaging a part of the brain would.
These external elements are causally relevant: they shape thought, store memory, aid reasoning, and support problem-solving in real time.
So what happens if you rip them away?
→ The person’s computational power drops.
→ Their ability to think, solve, or remember things is impaired, just like if an internal cognitive function were damaged.
That’s why, under the Extended Condition, these tools count as part of the cognitive system—because they are functionally and causally essential.
what is a objection #1 towards it
Consciousness Feels Internally Bound
Even if tools like notebooks or screens are useful for thinking, our conscious experience—what it feels like to think—is still confined to the brain. Writing something down doesn’t feel like my mind is in the paper.
The Examples Don’t Prove Extension of Mind Proper
The Tetris or Otto examples are often seen as intuition pumps—thought experiments designed to nudge us toward a surprising conclusion. But critics argue they don’t demonstrate actual cognitive extension, especially not of conscious processes.
Confusing Functional Help with Cognitive Integration
Just because something helps me think (like a calculator or notebook) doesn’t mean it is part of my mind. The objection says the parity principle is overstretched—functionally similar ≠ cognitively identical.
What is active externalism
Cognitive processes can extend beyond the brain and body to include active interaction with the environment.
Imagine Otto, who has Alzheimer’s and writes everything down in a notebook. He consults it the same way someone else might consult biological memory.
Under active externalism, his notebook is part of his memory system—part of his mind.
What is Clarke and Chalmers response to objection #1
The fact that we’re not consciously aware of the pen and paper as part of our thinking isn’t a strong objection. Much of cognition is invisible to consciousness, whether it’s in the head or spread across a coupled system.
Objection #2
The brain and body form a stable, portable cognitive system—they travel with us, stay integrated, and make up the core of our minds.
In contrast, external tools (pen, notebook, phone) are fragile add-ons. They can be lost, broken, or left behind. That suggests they’re not truly part of the mind, but just useful extensions, not essential components.
Reply to objection #2
Reply to Objection #2: Contingency and Portability Don’t Undermine Cognition
Contingency Doesn’t Disqualify Cognition
Just because something is contingent—like a tool that can be lost—doesn’t mean it’s not part of cognition. Many cognitive processes (e.g., language use, writing) rely on external and changeable supports, yet we still count them as cognitive.
Future Technology Makes This Clear
If we had brain-implanted modules that could be swapped or updated, we’d likely consider them part of our minds—despite their contingent or even replaceable nature. So contingency doesn’t prevent something from being cognitively real.
Portability Is a Red Herring—Reliability Is the Real Concern
The objection confuses portability with reliability. If I carry a pocket calculator everywhere and use it seamlessly as part of my thinking, it becomes functionally integrated. What matters isn’t whether I carry it or implant it, but whether it’s reliably available and used as part of my problem-solving.
Explain the cognition to the mind
Clark and Chalmers argue it’s not just that cognitive processes can extend beyond the brain—but that mental states, like beliefs, can too.
If a belief functions as a belief would inside the head—if it’s available when needed, relied upon automatically, and plays a role in reasoning—then it counts as part of the mind, even if it’s stored in the world (like in a notebook or device).
What is the Inga story
Inga is a typical person with biological memory. She wants to go to the Museum of Modern Art, so she remembers the location and heads there.
what is the Otto story
Otto has Alzheimer’s and can’t rely on biological memory. Instead, he writes everything down in a notebook. When he wants to go to the museum, he consults his notebook, sees the address, and goes.
Explain why Clarke and Chalmers use the Otto story
Clark and Chalmers argue that Otto’s notebook functions just like Inga’s memory:
It’s accessible when needed.
He trusts the information in it.
It guides his behavior.
So, they conclude:
If we say Inga believes the museum is on 53rd Street, then Otto does too—but his belief is partly stored in the world (in his notebook).
→ Mental states like belief can extend beyond the brain.
Explain why the Twin Otto supports Clarke and Chalmers?
Twin Otto Thought Experiment: Belief Depends on External Content
1)Two Ottos, Two Notebooks:
Otto A has written “The Museum is on 53rd Street.”
Twin Otto has written “The Museum is on 51st Street.”
Same Internal State, Different Belief
Internally, both Ottos are identical—same desires, same brain processes, same memory limitations.
→ But because their external notebooks differ, their beliefs differ too.
Why This Matters
Otto A will go to 53rd Street.
Twin Otto will go to 51st Street.
Each acts on what’s written in their notebooks—they genuinely believe different things.
→ So, if we accept that Otto’s belief includes his notebook, then what he believes is partly determined by what’s in the external world.
Conclusion
The belief isn’t just “in the head”—it’s in the coupled system.
Two identical internal agents can have different beliefs if their external resources differ.
→ This supports the idea that beliefs (and minds) can literally extend into the world.
Fill I this quote: What makes some information count as a belief is _____________
is the role it plays
is computationalism a form of functionalism?
yes
What can a critic say about accessibility with Otto and his notebook?
Critics argue that Otto doesn’t really have beliefs stored in his notebook, because there are times he doesn’t have access to it—like when he’s in the shower or without it.
What is the Clarke and Chalmers reply to Objection: Otto Isn’t Always Connected to His Notebook (e.g., in the Shower)
1) Inaccessibility Happens Internally Too
Inga can also be temporarily cut off from her own beliefs—if she’s asleep, drunk, distracted, or even emotionally overwhelmed. That doesn’t mean she no longer has those beliefs.
→ So occasional inaccessibility doesn’t disqualify a belief from being part of the mind.
2) Question-Begging Assumption
Clark and Chalmers say this objection assumes the notebook isn’t part of the mind—which is exactly what’s being debated.
→ So to reject Otto’s belief on that basis is to beg the question.
3) Belief Retrieval Involves Phenomenology
It’s often the case that memory retrieval, even from the brain, involves a phenomenological action—a feeling of trying, searching, or mentally “looking” for something.
→ Otto does something very similar: he searches, looks, recognizes.
→ The process of accessing beliefs, internally or externally, often feels similar.
Conclusion
The fact that Otto isn’t always accessing his notebook doesn’t mean the belief isn’t real.
Neither is Inga always accessing hers. What matters is that the information is typically available, plays the right functional role, and is trusted and used to guide action.
When does external information count as belief to Clarke and Chalmers?
1) The Notebook Is Constantly Available
2) The Information Is Directly Accessible
3) The Information Is Automatically Endorsed
4) It Has Been Consciously Endorsed in the Past
A consequence of this view is that _______________ can be partly constituted, in principle, by other thinkers.
mental states
Explain this A consequence of this view is that mental states can be partly constituted, in principle, by other thinkers.
Other words: our mind sometimes extend to other minds
Imagine an elderly couple in a restaurent. Been together. Server asks what would you like to eat. Husband cant remember. The wife says waffles. Clarke and Chalmers want to say that minds that are coupled together under the right conditions can be coupled together. His belief is stored in hers. Someone else could act as a notebook for someone else.
We have evolved to be able to ____________
extend our minds
Offload computational processes into our environment
Our minds take advantage of create tools out of our environment.
what were the philosophers who rejected Clarke and Chalmers views
Adams, Aizawa and Searle
What was Aizawa’s critique?
What they point out is that just recall the distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality. Intricis intentionality is the hallmark of the mental. Derived intentionality is intinetionalltiy that is derived from some other mental activity.but then derives intentionality out of it. The I tentionalltiy of the sentence
The museum of modern art is 53rd street is clearly derived intentionality in the notebook.
If intrinsic is the hallmark of the mental. That sentence is derived. The sentence in the notebook is not mental in nature. It must have intrinsic itneionalltiy. It cant literally be a belief.
