Chapter 6, Stability and Change Flashcards
explain what the security dilemma is.
to feel more secure, states will arm up. but, because the system is anarchic, that is inevitably threatening to other states, who will then arm up in return. indeed, it is impossible for states to be fully certain of other states’ intentions. this creates a vicious cycle of obtaining more arms in order to defend oneself, creating a more unsafe world.
in the security dilemma, what are the states’ dominant strategies?
both states have an incentive to buy more guns, leading to mutual defection.
what do power-gap minimizers try to do?
they try to prevent a state from becoming too powerful by intentionally preserving the balance of power.
what do power-gap maximizers try to do?
they try to create an unbalanced distribution of power tilted in their favour. because there exists a hegemon in the system, no other state will dare come after it, unintentionally maintaining the balance of power.
what are the two main balance-of-power mechanisms?
balancing and bandwagoning.
what is balancing?
it is the act of preventing a rising power from becoming the hegemon.
define internal balancing.
states will increase their own military power to match the challenger’s.
define external balancing.
states will ally with the weaker side to either defend themselves against or attack the challenger.
how do alliances impact the bargaining range?
alliances can help reduce the costs of war, making the bargaining range smaller.
what is bandwagoning?
it is the act of allying with the dominant side.
define appeasement.
weaker states will join the dominant side in the hopes of not getting attacked (if you can’t beat them, join them).
define ambition.
states will bandwagon in the hopes of sharing the goods their new alliance has won.
why is bipolarity considered stable?
bipolar orders are unambiguous. it is very clear who your allies are and who your enemies are. moreover, the two superpowers are less economically interdependent.
why is multipolarity considered less stable?
the great powers experience important interdependence, meaning that the fall of one of them has dramatic effects on the rest. it is very difficult for them to find a common ground and to settle on a decision that is in everyone’s best interest. additionally, it is hard to be absolutely certain of who your enemies are and who your allies are, as danger can come from multiple different states.
according to Gilpin, what determines the stability of the system?
stability is determined by the relationship between the distribution of material power, the distribution of prestige, and the rights and rules that set parameters of behaviour.
explain what prestige is.
prestige is the probability that a command will be obeyed. it is the idea that the most powerful state in the system is recognized as such.
on what four pillars does the legitimacy of hegemony rest?
- the hegemon’s victory in the last hegemonic war
- the hegemon’s ability to impose force on others
- the hegemon’s ideology, which should be respected by most states
- the fact that the hegemon’s rule is frequently accepted
what is a status quo state?
it is a state that is mostly satisfied with the current systemic order. it does not want to try to change the system.
what is a revisionist state?
it is a dissatisfied state that wants to bring about change in the systemic order. they feel as if there exists a disjuncture between their material power and their position on the hierarchy of prestige. they will try to gain more and more power in order to reduce that gap.
what are the endogenous factors that explain a dominant state’s decline?
because the dominant state isn’t constantly pressured by security threats, it does not actively try to defend itself. but, rising states feel the intensifying need to secure themselves, and so they will look for new ways to grow faster.
what are the four phases of Gilpin’s theory of systemic change?
- system in a state of equilibrium
- redistribution of power in the system
- disequilibrium
- resolution of systemic crisis
according to Gilpin, what happens in the first phase of systemic change?
states live in equilibrium, as the most powerful states in the system are relatively satisfied with the current order. for them, the benefits of change are way smaller than the costs of bringing about such change.
according to Gilpin, what happens in the second phase of systemic change?
the hegemon isn’t constantly faced with security threats, which reduces its incentive to grow and increase its power. this decreases the power gap between the hegemon and the challenger, who has strong incentives to arm up.
according to Gilpin, what happens in the third phase of systemic change?
the challenger starts to grow faster than the dominant state, but, because the order is too rigid, it does not represent the new distribution of prestige. that makes the challenger become more and more of a revisionist state. for the challenger, the benefits of change outweigh the costs of bringing about such change.
according to Gilpin, what happens in the fourth phase of systemic change?
the order is yet again too rigid, forcing the two states to go to war with one another. the dominant state can launch a preventive war while it still has the military advantage, or the challenger can launch a war to ensure that the hierarch of prestige reflects its military capabilities. other states in the system will be forced to choose a side. the peace settlement written after the war will establish a new status quo.
why is the self-help system resistant to change?
deviance from the current norms is badly punished and decision-makers have a tendency to confirm pre-existing beliefs, making change nearly impossible.
what can help transform the system, other than war?
norms can help relax the rigidity of the system. by reinforcing the norm of sovereignty, war can be less probable. because sovereign states perceive each other as sovereign, invasion and security threats are non-existent. if states participated in a sustained practice of cooperation, they could create a new collective identity, therefore changing the system.
(change in norms = change in practices = systemic change)
describe the four phases of systemic change according to critical strategic theory.
- breakdown of consensus
the state questions collectively shared knowledge and undergo a legitimacy crisis. - denaturalization of existing identities
the state goes through a critical self-reflection, questioning its identity - changes in one’s practices
the state creates new practices aligned with new identities - changes in collective identity
other states start reciprocating all of that work, which makes the system move towards a new collective identity
what are regulative norms?
norms that regulate interstate interactions (e.g.: what behaviour is (il)legitimate?).
what are constitutive norms?
norms that define who the main actors are what their capacities are (e.g.: what does it mean to be a great power?).
what are the four neorealist predictions about the end of the Cold War?
- the Cold War would continue as long as bipolarity in the system would continue
- the system could only change through hegemonic war between the U.S. and the USSR, or the emergence of a third superpower
- if the USSR were to fall, the U.S. would completely eliminate the Soviet threat to assert its dominance
- if the USSR were to fall and the order would go from bipolar to unipolar, other states would form an alliance against the U.S.
what are the domestic factors that brought about the end of the Cold War?
non-violent domestic revolutions started erupting throughout Eastern Europe in response to the Brezhnev Doctrine. Gorbachev decided to allow some reforms in satellite states, in the hopes of bringing to power similarly minded decision-makers. he wanted to give those states more autonomy over their politics, while still ensuring that they would follow Soviet interests through their foreign policies. but, this failed tremendously. instead, satellite states brought anti-communist parties to power, due to a long history of repression by the Communist party. this undermined the legitimacy of communism and of the USSR. this soon led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
how did U.S. foreign policy help end the Cold War without forcing the two superpowers to fight a war?
the U.S. moved beyond containment by credibly committing to not taking advantage of the USSR during that period of change. it invited the USSR to join the international community, focusing on a new partnership instead of on their old rivalry. the U.S. promoted the continuity of leadership in the USSR instead of imposing democratization.
how do constructivists define hegemony?
hegemony isn’t imposed but rather accepted by subordinate states. the hegemon spreads its ideology, which helps legitimize the hegemonic order. subordinate states either believe the order is in their best self-interest or are simply convinced of its fairness.
name and define the three modes of social control.
- coercion (realism)
subordinate states fear the punishment of the rule enforcers, therefore they comply with the rules. - self-interest (liberalism)
actors see the rules as being in their own self-interest. - legitimacy (constructivism)
actors feel the rules are legitimate and should be obeyed.
what are the three forms of hegemonic socialization?
- normative persuasion
- external inducement
- internal reconstruction
what is hegemonic socialization?
it is the inducement of the internalization of social norms by the hegemon (basically, the hegemon ensures that subordinate states are internalizing its norms)
define normative persuasion.
the hegemon socializes the subordinate state through ideological persuasion and indoctrination. the foreign elites then normalize the hegemonic norms and then end up conforming with them by institutionalizing new policies.
(normative persuasion → norm change → policy change)
define external inducement.
the hegemon induces the subordinate state to change its policies through coercion or simply because it is in the subordinate state’s best interest. elites eventually come to accept the hegemonic norms to avoid cognitive dissonance, or to ensure they stay in power. they may end up internalizing those norms.
(external inducement → policy change → norm change)
define internal reconstruction.
the hegemon directly intervenes in the subordinate state to transform its domestic politics. the hegemon imposes new policies, which now include the hegemonic norms. foreign elites gradually accept those norms as their own.
(internal reconstruction → policy change → norm change)
why would the current western liberal order be maintained even if the U.S. were to disappear?
- security co-binding
the states within the collective security experience security interdependence, to the point where the idea of war between them seems unthinkable - penetrated reciprocal hegemony
the U.S. is permeable to the demands of the periphery, which makes its hegemonic rule more tolerable for subordinate states - semi-sovereign, partial great powers
the old revisionists were internally reconstructed by the U.S., which prevents them from becoming more powerful - economic openness
the states within the collective experience a lot of economic interdependence - civic identity
the collective has built a collective identity based on ideological convergence
give an example of external inducement post-WWII.
the U.S. put a lot of money into the physical and economic reconstruction of Europe after WWII through the Marshall Plan. this made European states believe it was in their best self-interest to follow the new U.S.-led order.
give an example of internal reconstruction post-WWII.
the U.S. wrote Japan’s constitution after the war and forced Germany to undergo democratization and federalization.
how can states balance soft power?
states can engage in soft culture wars, in which they propose an alternative political culture. the challenger has to present a credible anti-hegemonic ideology in the goal of delegitimizing the current hegemon.
define institutional balancing.
states can use institutions to hold the hegemon accountable. either the hegemon will restrain itself or it will break its own rule, which could end up hurting the legitimacy of its hegemony. through institutions, other states can ensure that the hegemon lives up to its reputation.
is the current order still unipolar?
most scholars believe that the current order is still unipolar, especially because the data shows that the U.S. has a huge advantage over its challengers. indeed, its military power is still way bigger than that of any other state.
the only possible challenger would be China, as China’s economy is growing steadily.
is China a revisionist or a status quo state?
China is seen as a mix of both. while China is actively working on its soft power in order to show its discontent with the order and possibly propose a counter-hegemonic culture, it still actively participates in international institutions created by the liberal order.
in what ways can unipolarity be unstable?
- counter-hegemonic balancing
because the hegemon is inevitably threatening to some states, balancing mechanisms will activate to keep its power in check. moreover, regional rivals will face a security dilemma, forcing them to arm up and become more powerful. this will unintendedly reduce the power gap between the hegemon and regional rivals. it will be difficult for the hegemon to maintain its position in the system, but that can be very hard for subordinate states, as they depend on the hegemon for their survival - lazy hegemon
because the hegemon isn’t constantly facing security threats, it does not worry about becoming more powerful. at the same time, other great powers face constant security threats, which gives them an incentive to grow. therefore, the challenger grows faster than the hegemon, reducing the power gap between the two. - overburdened hegemon
to maintain the order and its legitimacy, the hegemon has to pay most of the costs. this makes it difficult for the hegemon to keep up with the economic and military growth of other great powers, reducing the power gap
in what ways can unipolarity be stable?
- unipolar threshold
one the hegemon passes that threshold, it becomes too powerful to be effectively balanced against. the power gap between the hegemon and other states is simply to create, which doesn’t allow potential challengers to exist (they could never pose a serious threat to the order). arming up against the hegemon would be self-defeating at this point, especially because counterbalancing would be too costly. instead, great powers focus on regional threats and follow the logic of balancing regionally, bandwagoning globally - nuclear balancing
the existence of nuclear weapons makes the immense power gap more tolerable to other states. because a potential challenger couldn’t effectively bring the hegemony to an end, they have less incentive to balance against the hegemon (nuclear weapons make wars very costly) - engagement vs isolationism
if the hegemon doesn’t engage in subordinate states to protect them, those states will feel the need to arm up to ensure their own security. they will become more and more powerful, reducing the power gap between them and the hegemon - balance of threat theory
the association of power and threat isn’t necessarily true. a state can be powerful, but still not be threatening (benign hegemon), depending on its foreign policy. enforcing a credible and strong hegemonic ideology can help stabilize the system
