Chapter 5, The Causes of War

Question 1

what does the length of the bargaining range depend on?

Answer 1

1. states’ power capabilities (their ability to win a war)
   this includes economic power, material capabilities and military power
2. resolve (states’ willingness to fight)
   *keep in mind that if states can get the same outcome without having to go to war, they will always choose the peaceful option

Question 2

the smaller the _________, the ____ likely it is that states _____________.

Answer 2

the smaller the BARGAINING RANGE, the MORE likely it is that states WILL GO TO WAR.

Question 3

what is a reversion outcome?

Answer 3

it is that outcome that happens when no bargain is reached. this oftentimes means that states will simply go back to the status quo.

Question 4

what is bargaining power?

Answer 4

it is the power resources a state has when arriving at the negotiation table. the less bargaining power you have, the more desperate you are to make a deal, which forces you to make more concessions.

Question 5

what is crisis bargaining?

Answer 5

it is bargaining under the threat of war. this means that if no bargain is reached, the reversion outcome will inevitably be war (if you don’t reach a deal, you’re going to war).

Question 6

what is expected utility?

Answer 6

the expected utility of each state is represented by all the status quo that will be challenged by the given state. if the status quo falls in the expected utility of a state, the state will challenge it by going to war.

Question 7

what is deterrence?

Answer 7

it is the act of discouraging someone from doing something by instilling doubt and/or fear about the consequences of that action.

Question 8

what is compellence?

Answer 8

it is the act of coercing someone into action (coercion is the important concept here. it is what differentiates compellence from deterrence. for example, if you’re actively threatening another state, that is compellence).

Question 9

what are the three main bargaining problems?

Answer 9

1. incomplete information
2. indivisible goods
3. commitment problems

Question 10

how does incomplete information lead to war?

Answer 10

because states don’t have all the information necessary on their adversaries, they will have different perceptions of the strategic setting, each state’s costs of war and material capabilities (perception gap). this creates two different bargaining ranges. if these two don’t overlap, war is inevitable.
states have an incentive to exaggerate their strength and misrepresent their weaknesses, appearing more threatening than they really are.

Question 11

explain the four main strategies that can help states overcome the problem of incomplete information.

Answer 11

1. tying hands (by making your statement public, you are putting your reputation at stake)
2. paying for power (you can show the world how powerful you are by having a public military buildup)
3. brinkmanship (you can take actions that make the risks of going to war really high to show your rival that you are serious about fighting)
4. increase transparency (this will reduce the perception gap, possibly making bargaining ranges overlap)

Question 12

how does indivisibility lead to war?

Answer 12

in some instances, states believe that the good they are fighting over cannot be divided between them. it’s either you get X or you get nothing. this creates a very small bargaining range, making the possibility of going to war more likely.

Question 13

explain the two main strategies that can help states overcome the problem of indivisibility.

Answer 13

1. joint / shared control of the good
2. issue-linkage (instead of arguing over only one indivisible good, states can bargain over a package of goods)
   * keep in mind that indivisibility can be socially constructed. goods that may seem indivisible can in fact be divided between actors.

Question 14

how do commitment problems lead to war?

Answer 14

1. first-strike advantage
   the idea that if A starts the war, A has more chance to win
   therefore, if A would rather go to war than take any of the offered deals, A will take advantage of the first-strike advantage and launch a pre-emptive war.
2. future bargaining advantage
   happens when the systemic order is slowly changing. the challenger is rising, due to an increase in its power and material capabilities. at the same time, the dominant state is declining. to prevent the shift of power, the dominant state, while it still has more material capabilities than the challenger, will launch a preventive war.

Question 15

explain the three main strategies that can help states overcome commitment problems.

Answer 15

1. states can credibly commit to not using the first-strike advantage
2. the challenger can credibly commit to not use its power advantage against the dominant state in the future
   * in both cases, states have an incentive to lie. it is very difficult to make a credible commitment in an anarchic setting
3. states can call on outside enforcement (by involving a third party, the states are making it more costly to not respect previous commitment)

Question 16

what is one way that states can reach an agreement without using force?

Answer 16

states can lengthen the bargaining range by increasing the cost of war.

Question 17

what do realists believe is the main cause of war?

Answer 17

because states evolve in an anarchic setting and a self-help system, they are constantly trying to ensure and maximize their security. but, increasing one’s security is a direct threat to another state’s security. indeed, you can never be certain about another state’s intentions, especially because these intentions may change.

Question 18

why have major, interstate wars been on the decline?

Answer 18

there are multiple cons of going to war, such as how costly it is (human lives, money, future votes) and the possible reality of losing.
moreover, norms concerning war are changing. interstate war (between western states, because western states still invade pre-colonized states and enforce violence in low-income communities) is now seen as immoral and repulsive. warfare is only an invention, not an inherent human desire. this means that our collective perception of war can be changed.

Question 19

what is the theory of democratic peace?

Answer 19

it is the expectation that democratic states do not go to war with one another. this is explained by the fact that democracies share liberal values and democratic norms that enables them to be more prone to compromises. democracies usually condone the use of force and respect the right to self-determination. because they require their population’s consent, they cannot agree to fight a war without the people’s approval.

Question 20

according to some scholars, what are the actual reasons explaining why, historically, democracies haven’t fought each other?

Answer 20

1. democracies share many international institutions, which in turn enforce peace
2. democracies, prior to WWII, tended to be far way geographically. it was more difficult to fight with another state if you didn’t share borders.
3. democracies, because they share liberal values, tend to create alliances. violence is not tolerated within an alliance.
4. democracies experience high economic interdependence with one another, making it difficult to fight each other without dramatically impacting their own economic power.
5. peace is mainly caused by stable political systems, which we can often find in democratic states.

Question 21

what is the definition of civil war?

Answer 21

it is an armed conflict between organized actors, at least one of which is a non-state actor, within a state and that meets some minimum threshold of severity.

Question 22

why do non-state actors sometimes resort to violence?

Answer 22

because non-state actors are often faced with an asymmetrical power relation between them and the target (often the state), they resort to violence to attain political goals.

Question 23

why do civil wars happen?

Answer 23

1. grievances (minority group will arm up and fight against their discrimination and/or exploitation)
2. greed (rebel groups will arm up to gain control of the state or of some of its resources)

Question 24

why can we perceive civil wars as bargaining failures?

Answer 24

1. incomplete information (rebel groups have more information about the government than the government does about rebel groups)
2. commitment problems (both actors have an inability to commit to peaceful deals and to not use force)
3. indivisible goods (both actors have a zero-sum approach to bargaining, making the bargaining range non-existent)

Question 25

how are rebel groups able to overcome collective action problems?

Answer 25

1. group-level explanation
   rebel groups have strong beliefs and motivation that help them build a collective identity based on a shared sense of injustice. moreover, they oftentimes have clear and strong group governance, in which one or more people exert powerful leadership.
2. country-level explanation
   first, if rebel groups could gain important economic power by gaining control of the state, members have an incentive to act as a group.
   second, because governments can be ready to effectively fight back against rebel groups, rebel groups need to be properly organized. this can raise the cost of civil war, making it less likely.
3. international level explanation
   foreign states can play an important role in civil wars. they can arm rebel groups or governments, depending on their self-interests. they can also use civil wars to launch proxy wars with other regional rivals.

(I need to review that lecture cause I’m not too sure about my notes, so this answer may change!)

Question 26

what is terrorism?

Answer 26

it is organized violence carried out by organized and rational groups that strategically plan attacks.

Question 27

why do some scholars define terrorist groups as rational actors?

Answer 27

terrorist groups are rational actors that respond to events happening around them. violence is simply another strategic means to attain political goals.

Question 28

explain terrorist groups’ triangular logic.

Answer 28

terrorist groups attack innocent civilians in the goal of coercing the target (usually the government) into making concessions.

Question 29

what are the four main strategic decisions that terrorist groups make?

Answer 29

1. coercion (killing civilians to coerce the target into action)
2. provocation (provoke an overreaction from the target so that it can legitimize the terrorist group’s demands)
3. spoiling (sabotaging the relationship between the target and the regional leader)
4. outbidding (two or more terrorist groups competing for support, each carrying out more and deadlier attacks than the other)

Question 30

why can we perceive terrorism as a bargaining failure?

Answer 30

1. incomplete information
   states lack information about terrorist groups, as they are very secretive and tend to exaggerate their strength.
2. commitment problems
   the target is unable to credibly commit to not come after the terrorist group once its members reveal themselves.
3. indivisibility
   both actors use an all-or-nothing mentality, making the bargaining range non-existent.

Question 31

what are the five main counterterrorism strategies?

Answer 31

1. deterrence
   the target can threaten the terrorist group with a counter-attack, but this could lead to important collateral damage.
2. preemptive offence
   the target can try to stop terrorist groups before they carry out an attack, but this could also lead to important collateral damage.
3. defence
   governments can take drastic defensive measures, such as security measures implemented in airports and on airplanes.
4. criminalization
   governments can catch terrorist groups’ members, make them stand trial and possibly imprison them for their crimes.
5. negotiation and compromise
   this can be a difficult strategy, as conceding can send a signal to other extremist groups that they can use violence as much as they want.

Question 32

why can counterterrorism be considered a threat?

Answer 32

counterterrorism can impose dramatic collateral damage. therefore, civilians are targeted by both terrorist groups, but also by governments. civilians end up paying the costs of both actors’ tactics.