Chapter 4, Bargaining and Cooperation

Question 1

what are absolute gains?

Answer 1

all states can gain something and benefit from cooperating (what I win is the only thing that matters)

Question 2

what are relative gains?

Answer 2

states have to compete with each other to increase their own benefits (what I win is what you lose, and vice-versa)

Question 3

what are the two cooperation games?

Answer 3

collaboration and coordination.

Question 4

what is coordination?

Answer 4

both actors work together because they both want to avoid a certain outcome.

Question 5

what is collaboration?

Answer 5

both actors cooperate because they both desire the same outcome.

Question 6

what is the main obstacle to coordination?

Answer 6

lack of communication

Question 7

what is the main obstacle to collaboration?

Answer 7

both states have an incentive to cheat.

Question 8

what is a dominant strategy?

Answer 8

strategy that is best for one actor, no matter what the other player does.

Question 9

what is a nash equilibrium?

Answer 9

outcome in which the two replies are the best for each other.

Question 10

what is a pareto-optimal outcome?

Answer 10

when no other combination will maximize your profit more, without minimizing the other player’s profit.

Question 11

define bargaining.

Answer 11

states bargain in order to divide benefits between them.

Question 12

define cooperation.

Answer 12

states cooperate in order to produce greater benefits for all actors involved.

Question 13

in the prisoner’s dilemma, what is each player’s preference ordering?

Answer 13

DC > CC > DD > CD

no matter what player B does, player A will always defect.

Question 14

in the stag hunt game, what is each player’s preference ordering?

Answer 14

CC > DC > DD > CD

if everyone believes everyone will cooperate, everyone will cooperate.

Question 15

in the chicken game, what is each player’s preference ordering?

Answer 15

DC > CC > CD > DD

this is explained by the fear of mutual defection.

Question 16

how can international regimes help states to cooperate?

Answer 16

international regimes can institutionalize and codify strategies of cooperation. they can help spread norms that render cooperation easier and lower transaction costs.

Question 17

what are the three strategies of cooperation?

Answer 17

altering the payoff structure, lengthening the shadow of the future, and reducing the number of players.

Question 18

what are the three ways to alter the payoff structure?

Answer 18

1. states can take unilateral measures (e.g. : switch from offensive to defensive measures, publicize a threat or promise)
2. states can make their play conditional on what another state did in another game (issue-linkage)
3. states can be more transparent with one another by reducing private information.

Question 19

what are the three ways states can lengthen the shadow of the future?

Answer 19

1. states can build their reputation and show others that they have an incentive to cooperate (if you have the reputation of a cheater, others won’t want to cooperate with you)
2. states can link present and future behaviours, thus creating an iterated game (issue-linkage)
3. states can use strategies of reciprocity
4. 1 it’s important for states to agree on what kinds of behaviours are cooperative, and what kinds represent defection (problem of recognition)
5. 2 to be able to adapt to others, states need to be able to successfully change their strategies according to the other players’ moves.

Question 20

why is reducing the number of players helpful when it comes to cooperation?

Answer 20

by reducing the number of players, states have to deal with less private information, which helps with transparency.
when there are too many states trying to cooperate, finding mutual interests and outcomes is difficult.

Question 21

what is strategic restraint?

Answer 21

states present self-restraint by self-imposing reticence in using military force.

Question 22

how does strategic restraint help to bring about stability in the international system?

Answer 22

international institutions can help reinforce the norm that military force is unnecessary. by doing so, they influence the power and military capabilities distribution, locking states into stable relations. this reassures states that others, particularly the hegemon, won’t use arms against them, making hegemony more tolerable.

Question 23

what does the international system look like without cooperation?

Answer 23

states feel forced to always end up at mutual defection, the pareto-suboptimal outcome. states live in the constant fear of being exploited and thus prefer to arm themselves.

Question 24

what does the international system look like with cooperation?

Answer 24

there exists deliberate cooperation among great powers because they all expect each other to cooperate. moreover, mutual defection is very costly, because it will be met with a collective response.

Question 25

what are the three goals of collective security systems?

Answer 25

goal #1 : deter aggression
goal #2 : neutralize aggression
goal #3 : mitigate the need for military buildup

Question 26

what are the two main challenges for collective security systems?

Answer 26

challenge #1 : joint decision-making
challenge #2 : collective action problems
collective security is a public good, meaning it is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. this can lead to free-riding.

Question 27

why do concert systems tend to emerge after hegemonic wars?

Answer 27

the bond between the counter-hegemonic allies is still very strong. furthermore, the fear that the old hegemon could come back creates an incentive for the great powers to cooperate.

Question 28

what do security communities rely on?

Answer 28

they rely on most states’ collective perception of security and collective identity.

Question 29

what do we mean when we say that international law is a consent-based system?

Answer 29

this means that the law cannot legally bind a state unless the state consents to it (ratifies the treaty).

Question 30

what are the two main sources in which we can find rules constructed by international law?

Answer 30

we can find laws in treaties and through international customs.

Question 31

what are the main differences between international customs and treaties?

Answer 31

when a state ratifies a treaty, it is consenting to its rules, meaning that the treaty is legally binding.
international customs are a way to regulate behaviours, meaning that states presume they have to act this way. customs aren’t legally binding, but rather reinforced by repetition of certain behaviours.

Question 32

what are the six main reasons why states respect treaties and/or international customs?

Answer 32

1. states can expect reciprocal reactions from others. if you don’t sign a certain treaty or fail to act a certain way, other states may do the same to you when your interests are at play.
2. states can expect retaliation from others. if you don’t sign a certain treaty or fail to act a certain way, other states can harm your interests in other ways when the time comes.
3. states can expect reputational costs. not signing a treaty or not abiding by international customs can affect your ability to cooperate in the future.
4. NGOs can pressure their own government into ratifying a treaty that supports their interests.
5. when violating a treaty, you can hurt your prestige level and your legitimacy as a state.
6. states can internalize certain norms and laws by incorporating them into their domestic laws, forcing them to comply to those norms.

Question 33

according to Finnemore, what are the three main ways international organizations (IOs) can exercise power?

Answer 33

1. IOs can classify the world by creating certain categories of actors and actions (the way we define certain things influences how we act)
2. IOs can fix meanings
3. IOs can diffuse new norms

Question 34

what is the main goal of the United Nations?

Answer 34

the United Nations aims to maintain international peace and security.

Question 35

what are the six main problems encountered by the United Nations?

Answer 35

1. the UN is overloaded with security issues.
2. the UN wasn’t established to deal with the changing nature of conflicts.
3. there is currently little to no harmony among the major powers, making it difficult for the UN to function properly.
4. the structure of the security council is problematic.
5. the UN has been heavily participating in and organizing military actions, contrary to its mission of maintaining peace.
6. there are still debates surrounding the concept of collective security.