Chapter 16: Incentive Based-Regulation: Practice Flashcards

1
Q

How has Cap-and-Trade and Pollution Taxes worked in practice?

A
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2
Q

Lead in Gasoline: First Success

A

EPA instituted early 1980’s “lead banking” program to reduce complaince costs lead phaseout in gasoline. Widespread participation

  • Cost Savings: 10% over CAC approach
  • Achieve more stringent lead standards cost-effectively

Reasons for the Success:

  1. Refiners granted permits based on performance - market power not emerge
  2. Markets not thin - trading nationwide
  3. Permits shrinkings, issue of permit life not emerge
  4. Hot sports not persist
  5. Monitoring and enforcement good: lead content in gasoline already reported
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3
Q

Chlorofluorocarbons

A

1988: introduced similar as gasoline legistation

  • Also imposed tax: encourage consumers switch substitute products

CFCs successfully phased out of the US

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4
Q

Trading Urban Air Pollutants

A
  • Attempts implement tradable permits at local level: mixed results

Three marketable permit Experiments:

  1. EPAs Emissions Trading Program
  2. L.A. Basin’s RECLAIM and mobile emissions trading program
  3. East coast NOx trading
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5
Q

Trading Urban Air Pollutants

EPAs Emissions Trading Program:

A

(1976) Allows limited trading of emission reduction credit for five pollutants: Carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, particulates, nitrogen oxides

Credits earnned for controlling emissions beyond standard:

  • Credits could be traded or banked

Trading Programs:

  1. Offsets: desgined accommodate siting new pollution sources in non-attainment areas
  2. Netting Policy: allows trading within single plant
  3. Buggle Policy: allows trading within limited geographical area

Problem:

- Thin markets greatly reduced effectiveness of emissions trading
- Hot-spot problem with non-uniformly mixed pollutants
- Increased transaction costs under bubble program
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6
Q

Trading Urban Air Pollutants

RECLAIM: Policy Failure

A

Regional Clean Air Incentive Market (California): Textbook cap-and-trade for NOx

  • Excess supply permits (for political buy-in) lead to slow start 1995
  • Required continuous emissions monitorning and electronic reporting
  • Energy Crisis 2002:
    • Increased permit prices so much had to cancel cap and trade
    • Return to CAC program
    Illustrate PRICE VOLATILITY
  • 2005: RECLAIM back on track and second round of cuts sheduled
  • 2018: Goals could not be strengthened - program replace with CAC
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7
Q

California’s Clunkers

A

Stationary sources purchase and scrap high polluting vehicles and obtain pollution credits to avoid clean-air upgrades

  • Increases hot sports (environmental justice concerns)
  • Strong incentive for fraud
  • President Obama took program national as measure stimulate auto sales in face recession
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8
Q

Marketable Permits and Acid Rain

Legislation and Preformance

A

Acid Rain? Sulfur dioxide and nitrogren oxide transformed while in atmosphere into sulfuric and nitric acid

Problems:

  1. Damage water and forest resources
  2. Erosion of buildings, bridges and statues
  3. Reduce visibility
  4. Sickness and premature death

Legislation:

1990 Clean Air Act: capped emissions at 1986 levels, required >60% cuts by 2000.

Permits given away freely - based historical pollution levels

  • Broad, nationwide ⇒ prevent market power
  • Uniformly mixed → no hot-spots
  • Industry expected ten years worth of trading
  • Required continuous monitoring
  • PRovided retaining programs for job losses

Preformance:

  • Emissions fell sharly
  • Ambient levels declined

Based on health benefits: passed efficiency test

(Surprise) Dramatic cost savings.

  • Cost: $1 billion/year (forecast of $4 billion)

Why?

  1. Not: Short run cost-effectiveness inter-firm trading
  2. Yes: “long-run” changes in technology

Most firms switched low sulfur coal or developed new fuel blending techquines rather than installing expensive scrubbers

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9
Q

What is offset?

A

Offset: Reduction greenhouse gasses achieved offsite 3rd parties and then packaged and sold.
Must be additional: Project (reforestation, reduction in fugitive emissions) not already occured under business as usual

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10
Q

Europe: European Trading System

A
  • Continent-wide Cap and trade (Kyoto Complaince)
  • Allows for offset trading w developing countries as part of Clean Development Mechanism
  • Concerns about monitoring and enforcement
  • Prices consistently been low, indicating emissions shrinking within cap
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11
Q

Pollution Taxes in the US

A

Some manicipalities use *“Unit pricing” instead of lump sum free, to reduce waste flows

One study found that unit pricing:

  • Reduce generated waste by 10%
  • Reduced waste flow to landfills by 30%
  • Reduce waste management costs by 10%
  • Communities increased curbside recycling
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12
Q

Pollution Taxes outside of the US

A
  • BC and several European countries have carbon tax
  • Germany, France, Netherlands ⇒ instituted effluent charges for water pollution

📎 Effluent Tax Systems: Grafted on to CAC system, mandates standards and control technologies

Lessons from Europe:

Taxes introduced low level and slowly raised

Real value taxes not been eroded inflation

  • Direct funds raised into investment in improving water quality
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13
Q

Effluent Tax Systems

A

📎 Effluent Tax Systems: Grafted on to CAC system, mandates standards and control technologies

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14
Q

Indirect Pollution Taxes:

A

Ex: rather than tax water pollution runoff from farms, tax pesticides are input into the farm

  • Can generate counterproductive results: pesticide tax might discourage new products entering market
  • Potential uninteded preverse effects → direct tax on pollution is prefered to indirect tax

Direct pollution tax more theoretically appealing, but indirect tax often more feasible

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15
Q

Other incentive-based tools:

A
  1. User fees for public lands
  2. Environemntal bonds
  3. Insurance and liability requirements
  4. Energy taxes
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