Cases 4th batch Flashcards
The petitioner, Apolonio G. Maleniza, was twice elected Provincial Governor of Camarines.
He filed an application for the commutation of his alleged accumulated vacation and sick leave for a total of 160 days.
However, Respondent Commission on Audit denied the application.
Provincial Circular No. 24 and a previous opinion by the Secretary of Justice clarify that only government employees who are appointed are eligible for vacation and sick leave under Section 286 of the Revised Administrative Code. This means that elected officials are not entitled to these leave benefits.
In the absence of a provision of law explicitly granting leave privileges to the members of Congress, Mr. Paredes’ claim for commutation of his alleged vacation and sick leave credits may not be favorably acted upon
Petitioner filed for a Motion for reconsideration but was also denied. Respondent said that it cannot merely rely on the case cited because there are additional audit requirements that must be met. It means that elective officials must first show indubitably under what provision of law that he has earned and accumulated leave before he can be entitled to the commutation thereof.
Issue: Whether or not an elective official may be entitled, in the event that he be separated from the service, to the commutation of his vacation and sick leave?
No.
Ratio: Chapter 13, entitled Leave Law, of the Revised Administrative Code provides for those who are entitled for leave privileges. They are the justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, judges, teachers and, in general, employees of the national, provincial, city and municipal governments. Leave is based on attendance in accordance with the forty hours-a-week law to give respite when needed and without loss of pay to officers and employees whose hours of work are fixed. Thus, part-time officers and employees are not entitled to leave. (Sec. 15, Rule XVI, Revised Civil Service Rules)
There’re also evidence suggesting that the other employees mentioned in the Leave Law are similarly appointive employees from national and local governments.
In the cited case of Manuel Vs Gen. Auditing Office, the petitioner mentioned Section 12(c) of Commonwealth Act 186. Section 12(c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as inserted by Republic Act 1616 was amended by Republic Act 4968 on June 17, 1967. It was only on this date that retirement benefits were extended to elective officials. However, the extension of retirement benefits in favor of elective officials does not automatically entitle the latter to the commutation of “unused vacation and sick leave” since such privilege would depend on the existence of a law expressly granting elective officials leave privileges.
In other words, before a retiring official or employee may be entitled to commutation of his vacation and sick leave which he may have to his credit at the time of his retirement, he must first show entitlement to such leave credit because in the absence of such entitlement, he enjoys no such right of commutation for there is nothing to commute. There must be a law authorizing such privilege.
In this case, there is no such statutory authority insofar as elective officials are concerned except Sec. 2187 which authorizes sick leave of mayors only. The petitioner in the case at bar, who was a provincial governor is not covered. The reason is obvious. If it were the intention of the law to authorize accumulation of leave to provincial governors, it could have so easily provided under the chapter governing provincial governors. The absence of any such authority gives rise to only one conclusion and that is, that all elective officials, with the exception of municipal mayors, are not entitled to commutation of leave privileges since there is no law authorizing said elective officials to earn and accumulate leave credits.
Another reason for their exemption is that they are not required or bound to observe the prescribed government office hours as in the case of appointive officers who are so required under the Civil Service Rules. Thus, as a general proposition, their entitlement to salary is not dependent upon actual attendance in office. In fact, they are not even required to keep a record of their daily attendance.
Former Presiding Judge Alex Z. Reyes of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) requests the inclusion of his leave credits earned from the Armed Forces and the exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in the computation of his terminal leave as Presiding Judge of the CTA for retirement purposes.
Judge Reyes was compulsory retired on November 24, 1991, with 37 years, 9 months and 7 days in the government service, the last 11 years, 3 months and 23 days of which were continuously rendered in the judiciary.
His record shows a gap in his government service of seven years, from December 1946 to February 16, 1954.
The Supreme Court Administrative Office did not include Judge Reyes’ accumulated leave credits earned for services with the AFP, by virtue of the application of a 1st endorsement dated May 2, 1957, of the then Bureau of Civil Service.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Reyes is entitled to the inclusion of his leave credits earned from the Armed Forces and the exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in the computation of his terminal leave for retirement purposes.
Whether or not Judge Reyes is entitled to the inclusion of his leave credits earned from the Armed Forces and the exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in the computation of his terminal leave for retirement purposes.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted Judge Reyes’ request.
Judge Reyes is entitled to the inclusion of his leave credits earned from the Armed Forces and the exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in the computation of his terminal leave for retirement purposes.
Ratio:
The Court based its decision on the interpretation of relevant laws and regulations.
There is no special law governing the specific issue of leave credits for judges.
The Court emphasized the special protections given to judges in the interpretation of statutes or rules governing their retirement benefits.
Previous cases have imposed cut-off dates for claims for terminal leave differentials, considering practical considerations and budgetary constraints.
In this case, the Court determined that Judge Reyes is entitled to the requested inclusion and exclusion based on the absence of a special law and the need to maintain the independence of the judiciary.
Petitioner Maynard R. Peralta was appointed as a Trade-Specialist II in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on September 25, 1989.
Before his appointment, he worked at the Philippine Cotton Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation under the Department of Agriculture.
On December 8, 1989, Peralta received his initial salary. Still, the DTI deducted the amount corresponding to his absences during the covered period, which included Saturdays and Sundays.
Peralta inquired about the law on salary deductions for employees without leave credits. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) responded that if an employee is on leave without pay a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, those non-working days shall also be without pay.
Peralta questioned whether an employee on leave without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday should also be considered on leave without pay on those non-working days.
Issue:
Whether or not the CSC policy mandating salary deductions for employees without leave credits who are absent on the day immediately preceding the working day valid?
The Supreme Court declared the CSC policy invalid.
The Court emphasized that the legislative intent, as stated in Republic Act No. 2625, was to grant employees fifteen days of vacation leave and fifteen days of sick leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.
The Court held that government employees, regardless of whether they have accumulated leave credits or not, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays and, therefore cannot be declared absent on such non-working days.
The Court further stated that a different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.
The Supreme Court ruled that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, and thus cannot be declared absent on such non-working days. Accordingly, they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days.
Respondent, Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement under R.A. 910, which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges, and was approved by GSIS.
· For more than nine years, he continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001, when he failed to receive his monthly pension.
· He learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because the DBM informed GSIS that he was not qualified to retire under R.A. 910, since it was only meant to apply to justices and judges.
· Respondent wrote GSIS several letters, seeking to secure benefits under R.A. 660, but he received no response until 2007 when he received a letter from GSIS, refusing to accede to his request because he chose to retire and have retired under a different law, and that the law provides for exclusivity of benefits which means that a retiree may choose only one retirement scheme available to him to the exclusion of all others.
· Respondent filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, which resolved to grant his petition, finding that it was not de Leon’s fault he was allowed to avail of benefits under R.A. 910, and even if his retirement was erroneous, he was entitled to a monthly pension under the GSIS Act; and that this was not a case of double retirement, but merely a continuation of the payment of de Leon’s pension benefit. He cannot be penalized for the error committed by GSIS itself.
· Thus, GSIS filed a petition before the SC assailing the decision of the CA.
Issue: WON respondent Fernando de Leon was entitled to continued monthly pension benefits?
where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees’ pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.
It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No. 910, following jurisprudence laid down by this Court. One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on petitioner’s interpretation of the pertinent retirement laws, considering that the latter is tasked to administer the government’s retirement system. He had the right to assume that GSIS personnel knew what they were doing.
Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of respondent, he cannot be prejudiced by the same. His right to receive monthly pension from the government cannot be jeopardized by a new interpretation of the law.
GSIS’ argument that respondent has already been enormously benefited under R.A. No. 910 misses the point. Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee’s loyalty and service to the employer, and are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of having to worry about his financial support or upkeep.
As to GSIS’ contention that what respondent seeks is conversion of his retirement mode, which is prohibited under R.A. No. 8291, the Court agrees with the CA that this is not a case of conversion within the contemplation of the law. The conversion under the law is one that is voluntary, a choice to be made by the retiree. Here, respondent had no choice but to look for another law under which to claim his pension benefits because the DBM had decided not to release the funds needed to continue payment of his monthly pension.
Respondent himself admitted that, if the DBM had not suspended the payment of his pension, he would not have sought any other law under which to receive his benefits. The necessity to “convert” was not a voluntary choice of respondent but a circumstance forced upon him by the government itself.
In the SC’s 1994 decision, it was held that government service rendered on a per diem basis is not creditable in computing the length of service for retirement purposes.
§ Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the said decision and argued that services rendered on a per diem basis may be creditable for retirement purposes, for it is the nature of the service rendered and not the manner of compensation which shall prevail in the determination of creditable government service.
§ Belo insisted that the services rendered by her as Vice Governor of Capiz, between December 31, 1975 to January 1, 1979, be considered as creditable for purposes of retirement notwithstanding the fact that from 1976 to 1979 she was paid on a per diem basis. On the other hand, Baradero, who contends the same, was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of La Castellana, Negros Occidental between January 1, 1976 to October 10, 1978 where he was likewise paid on a per diem basis.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the GSIS is the proper government agency to determine what service is creditable for retirement purposes.
(2) Whether full time service rendered by a government employee receiving per diem as compensation is creditable for retirement purposes.
(3) Whether said employee may avail of retirement benefits notwithstanding his failure to make contributions to the GSIS for the duration he was receiving per diem as compensation.
(1) Yes, GSIS has the power to determine what service is creditable for retirement purposes. Presidential Decree No. 1146 (Government Service Insurance Act of 1987) vests such power in the GSIS.
(2) Yes, while what respondents Belo and Baradero received were denominated as “per diem,” the amounts received were actually in the nature of a compensation or pay. As used in the GSIS Law, “per diem” is a daily allowance given for each day whenever an officer or employee of government is away from his home base. Since it is generally held that an allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of an office is not a salary of office, it follows that if the remuneration received by a public official in the performance of his duties does not constitute a mere “allowance for expenses” but appears to be his actual base pay, a “per diem” would take the allowances received by petitioner from the term service with compensation for the purpose of computing the number of years of service in government. Furthermore, the services rendered by respondents having been continuous should be credited for purposes of retirement.
(3) Yes, it cannot be asserted that petitioners could not avail themselves of the benefits of the policy because no deductions were made from their salaries during the disputed periods when they were paid on a per diem basis. The respondents assumed in good faith that they continued to be covered by the GSIS insurance benefits considering that in fact and in practice the deductions are virtually mandatorily made from all government employees on an essentially involuntary basis.
Belicena, the Petitioner in the present recourse, was appointed Acting Undersecretary, in the Department of Finance. While being Acting Undersecretary of Finance, the president designated him subsequently as Acting Secretary of Finance, while the Secretary of Finance, Roberto de Ocampo, was in Hongkong, on official business for the government. The petitioner received his one (1) days salary as Acting Secretary of Finance. In anticipation of his impending compulsory retirement, the Petitioner submitted his application for terminal leave; thus a corresponding disbursement voucher was issued. However, Assistant Secretary Ma. Eleanor F. dela Cruz refused to sign the voucher, claiming that, in the computation of Petitioner’s terminal leave pay, his one-day salary as Acting Secretary of Finance should not be considered as his last monthly salary. The same should be based on his salary as Acting Undersecretary of Finance.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s highest monthly salary for purposes of computing his terminal leave pay shall be that corresponding to the position of Acting Undersecretary of Finance or that of Acting Secretary of Finance.
t shall be based on the position of Acting Secretary of Finance.
The well-settled rule is that the money value of the terminal leave of a retiring government official shall be computed at the retiree’s highest monthly salary.
When the President designated the petitioner as Acting Secretary, he did so under a well considered opinion that the absence of Secretary de Ocampo was of such an extent that the latter would be unable to perform his duties and, by reason of such opinion, the President extended a temporary designation to petitioner under Section 17 of the Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, his highest monthly salary is that corresponding to position of Secretary of Finance which petitioner received while he was Acting Secretary from May 22 to 25, 1997, during the travel abroad of the Secretary.
Petitioner Cena entered the government service in 1978 and served in various positions, from Legal Officer II to Supervising Staff Officer and lastly, as Registrar of R.O.D. of Malabon, the position he held when he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65.
By this time, he would have rendered a total government service of 11 years, nine months, and six days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice through L.R.A. Administrator Bonificio that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old-age pension under Sec. 11 of par. (b) of PD 1146.
For his part, the L.R.A. Administrator sought a ruling with the C.S.C. on whether or not to allow the extension of service Cena.
C.S.C. denied Cena’s request for an extension of services, declaring that Cena shall be considered retired when he reaches the compulsory retirement age. After that, the C.S.C., upon the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration by Cena, set aside its resolution and allowed Cena a one-year extension of his service.
After which, Cena filed a second Motion for Reconsideration., but C.S.C. denied this. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, nine months, and six days of government service, be allowed to continue in the service and complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an old-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.
HELD: YES
RATIO:
The Court held that a statute creating a pension or establishing a retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to benefit.
The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law so that the efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.
The governing retirement law in the instant case is P. D. 1146, otherwise known as the “Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.”
The rule on limiting to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but has less than 15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990 cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to or connection with any provision of P.D1146 supposed to be carried into effect.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, allowing extension of service only for one year (instead of what is needed to complete the 15-year service requirement for retirement), cannot prevail over Sec. 11 (b), PD 1146, which allows an extension to complete the 15-year service requirement. This ruling was re-examined and modified in Rabor Vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111812, May 31, 1995, where the Supreme Court said that when it enunciated the Cena ruling, it took a narrow view of what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is permissible and valid. It likewise laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees by allowing the extension of services without considering the significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement at the age of 65. Henceforth, CSC MC No. 27, series of 1990, is deemed valid and effective, and Sec. 11, P.D. 1146, is to be read together with CSC MC 27. However, the head of the agency is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow the extension of service of an official or employee who has reached 65 without completing 15 years of government service, although this discretion is to be exercised conformably with CSC MC 27.
On 23 January 1963, Petitioner was first employed with the Department of Health (DOH) as Dental Aide. He remained employed at the DOH for fourteen years until he resigned. On 9 November 1977, petitioner was hired as company dentist by LUSTEVECO, a private domestic corporation. Subsequently, respondent PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation acquired and took over the shipping business of LUSTEVECO, and petitioner was among those who opted to be absorbed by the Respondent.
Sometime in 1995, the petitioner requested to be included in the next retrenchment schedule. However, his request was turned down. Eventually, the petitioner retired after serving the Respondent and LUSTEVECO for 17 years and 4 months upon reaching his 60th birthday. He received retirement pay which is equivalent to one month pay for every year of service and other benefits.
The cases of Dr. Rogelio T. Buena and Mrs. Luz C. Reyes, who were holding permanent/non-redundant positions but were willing to be retrenched under the program were retrenched and paid a 2-month separation pay for every year of service under Respondent’s Manpower Reduction Program.
Given the action taken by Respondent in the retrenchment of Dr. Buena and Mrs. Reyes, the petitioner filed a complaint at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the full payment of his retirement benefits.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s service with the DOH should be included in the computation of his retirement benefits.
No. Respondent’s Retirement scheme pertinently provides: SEC 4.1. Normal Retirement Date/Eligibility. – The normal retirement date of an employee shall be the first day of the month next following the employee’s sixtieth (60th) birthday. To be eligible for the retirement benefit described under Sec. 4.2, the employee must have rendered at least ten (10) years of continuous service with the Company.
In case the retiring employee has rendered less than ten (10) years of service with the Company, he shall be entitled to one (1) month’s final monthly basic salary (12/12) for every year of service. It is clear therefrom that the creditable service referred to in the Retirement Plan is the retiree’s continuous years of service with Respondent.
Since the retirement pay solely comes from Respondent’s funds, it is but natural that Respondent shall disregard petitioner’s length of service in another company for the computation of his retirement benefits. We cannot uphold petitioner’s contention that his fourteen years of service with the DOH should be considered because his last two employers were government-owned and controlled corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law.
It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are government-owned and controlled corporations, they have no original charters; hence they are not under the Civil Service Law. Obviously, totalization of service credits is only resorted to when the retiree does not qualify for benefits in either or both of the Systems. Here, petitioner is qualified to receive benefits granted by the Government Security Insurance System (GSIS).x
The petitioners in this case calls for the determination of the validity and constitutionality of R.A. 7056, “An Act Providing for the National and Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor.”
· Petitioners, who are public officials, challenges the act on the following grounds:
o Being violative of the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on May 2, 1992;
o The 2nd par. Of Section 3 providing that all incumbent provincial, city, and municipal officials, shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992, and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified;
o Same paragraph in effect shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on Nov. 2, 1992;
o Section 8 thereof providing thereof for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the Constitution under the title “Commission on Elections;”
o So-called many difficulty if not insurmountable problems mentioned in RA 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on May 2, 1992, are not sufficient valid justification for postponing the local elections to November 2, 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself.
· In its comment, Solicitor General prays for the denial of the petition arguing that the questions raised by the petitioners are political in nature and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The Solicitor General contends that RA 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.
Issue: WON R.A. 7056 is unconstitutional?
yes
Under Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice – President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year – noon of June 30, 1992.
The term synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.
“It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.”
Also, there is Section 8, Article X of the Constitution which provides that:
“The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. x x x”
But if the local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years as provided for by the Constitution.
Then also, Section 9, Article IX of the Constitution provides that:
“Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.”
Petitioner Mario D. Ortiz was appointed Commissioner of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos for a term expiring on May 17, 1992.
On March 5, 1986, Ortiz, along with two other commissioners, sent a letter to President Corazon C. Aquino, stating that they were placing their positions at her disposal, following the example of the justices of the Supreme Court.
On March 25, 1986, the Freedom Constitution was promulgated, which provided for the reorganization of the government and the separation of public officers and employees.
On April 16, 1986, the COMELEC approved the retirement applications of two commissioners, and on July 21, 1986, the President accepted the “resignations” of Ortiz and the other commissioners.
Ortiz filed a petition for retirement benefits, which was denied by the COMELEC. He then appealed to the Commission on Audit (COA), but received no response. He filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Ortiz, who submitted a “courtesy resignation” during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution, is entitled to retirement benefits.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ortiz, stating that his resignation lacked clear intention and he should be entitled to retirement benefits.
The Court held that Ortiz’s separation from government service as a result of the reorganization under the Freedom Constitution cannot be considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law.
Resignation requires a clear intention to relinquish or surrender the position, accompanied by the act of relinquishment.
Ortiz’s letter did not categorically state that he was unconditionally giving up his position, and it was actually a response to the example set by the justices of the Supreme Court.
A “courtesy resignation” should not be interpreted as a resignation in the legal sense, but rather as a manifestation of submission to the will of the political authority.
Ortiz’s cessation from the service was not due to any voluntary act on his part, but rather a result of the reorganization.
Equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to have completed his term of office and be entitled to retirement benefits.
Francisco M. Lecaroz, the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, and his son Lenlie Lecaroz were involved in the case.
Lenlie was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays.
Jowil Red won as the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz in the 1985 election.
Red was appointed by then President Marcos as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan representing the KBs of the municipality.
Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as a member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment.
Red received his appointment papers in January 1986, but he was still not allowed to sit as a sectoral representative in the Sanggunian.
Lenlie continued to receive his salary with the approval of the Mayor.
Red filed several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie for their refusal to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative.
The Ombudsman filed thirteen counts of estafa through falsification of public documents against the petitioners.
Issue:
Whether Red validly assumed the position of KB sectoral representative and whether Lenlie Lecaroz could hold over after his term expired.
Whether the petitioners committed the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
Whether there was conspiracy between the petitioners.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and acquitted them of all the charges.
Ratio:
The court held that Red did not validly assume the position of KB sectoral representative due to the lack of authenticated appointment papers and a valid oath of office.
Lenlie Lecaroz remained the legitimate representative of the youth sector in the municipal council in a holdover capacity.
The court found that the petitioners did not commit the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
The certifications made by Mayor Lecaroz were conclusions of law expressing his belief that Lenlie Lecaroz was legally holding over as a member of the Sanggunian.
There was no evidence of criminal intent or malice on the part of the petitioners.
The court held that conspiracy was not proved in the case.
The fact that the accused Mayor certified the payrolls authorizing payment to his son did not qualify as proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent.
There is no presumption in law that a conspiracy exists simply because the conspirators are father and son.
The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioners of all the charges and reversed the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
There was a lack of evidence to establish criminal intent or conspiracy in the actions of the petitioners.Theory of Sandiganbayan: the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB.
· SC: Sandiganbayan is incorrect!
· The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
· In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the lawmaking body favors the same.
· Law abhors vacuum in public office: (1) prevent public convenience from suffering; and (2) avoid hiatus in the performance of gov’t functions.
· (TOPICAL) Red’s taking of oath before BP member Reyes in 1985 did not make him validly assume the presidency of KB.
ü Under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, specifically Sec. 21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths.
ü It was only after the approval of RA No. 6733 on 25 July 1989 that members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Jowil Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all.
ü To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. Until then, he has none at all. And for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to the position. As such, he could not be considered an intruder and liable for encroachment of public office.
The case “In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices” involves the interpretation of retirement laws for judges and justices in the Philippines.
The Office of the Court Administrator brought the matter before the Court en banc through a memorandum filed by Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro on February 14, 1990, and an urgent memorandum filed on August 16, 1990.
The issue revolves around the financial components of the monthly pension to be paid to retired judges and justices.
Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) 910, as amended by R.A. 5095, states that upon retirement, judges and justices are entitled to a lump sum of five years’ gratuity based on the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living, and representation allowances they were receiving on the date of their retirement.
A different version of Section 3 was published in the Official Gazette, which includes the provision for a further annuity payable monthly during the retiree’s natural life after the initial five-year period.
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) has been computing the retirement benefits for judges and justices based on the first version of Section 3 since 1978.
The Commission on Audit (COA) issued a memorandum in 1989 stating that the monthly pension should only consist of the highest salary, highest longevity pay, and highest representation and transportation allowances (RATA).
Issue:
Whether the monthly pension for retired judges and justices should include transportation, living, and representation allowances.
The Court ruled in favor of including transportation, living, and representation allowances in the monthly pension of retired judges and justices.
The Court held that the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement should include the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living, and representation allowances the retiree was receiving on the date of his retirement.
Ratio:
Retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited.
The purpose of retirement laws is to entice competent individuals to enter government service and provide relative security for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident.
Any doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes.
The GSIS has been computing the retirement benefits based on the inclusion of transportation, living, and representation allowances for around twelve years without any objection or reprobation.
A pension is a form of deferred compensation for services performed.
The GSIS’s computation is correct and in line with the policy of the retirement law.
The Government Service Insurance System was directed to continue implementing the computation of the monthly pension that includes the highest salary, highest longevity pay, and highest representation and transportation allowances.
Lydia M. Profeta, a former college president, served as Executive Dean of the Rizal Technological Colleges from October 24, 1974, to October 15, 1978, and was appointed Acting President from October 16, 1978, to April 30, 1979.
She was then promoted to President of the same college on May 1, 1979.
After the 1986 EDSA revolution, Profeta filed her courtesy resignation as President, which was accepted on March 21, 1986.
On November 4, 1988, she was appointed Acting President of Eulogio “Amang” Rodriguez Institute of Science and Technology (EARIST) and became its President on March 29, 1989.
After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) on June 16, 1989, Profeta inquired from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) if she could extend her services to avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits.
On October 6, 1989, President Aquino extended her term as President of EARIST until she completed the required fifteen (15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty-five (65) or for an additional period of two (2) years, seven (7) months, and twelve (12) days.
In March 1990, an administrative complaint was filed against Profeta, and she was placed under preventive suspension.
In July 1990, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary recommended her compulsory retirement.
An Ad-Hoc Committee was created to investigate the administrative charges against her.
Pending resolution of the charges, Profeta was detailed with the DECS Central Office.
She filed a petition for reinstatement, which was dismissed.
She also filed a complaint with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which was denied.
The Office of the President dismissed the administrative complaint against Profeta but declared her compulsorily retired as of October 15, 1991.
She requested the GSIS to determine the exact date of her retirement, and it fell on August 14, 1992.
Profeta filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Office of the President.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction over the issue of Profeta’s compulsory retirement from government service.
No.
Retirement benefits for public employees are valuable parts of the consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office or employment. They serve a public purpose and aim to induce competent persons to enter and remain in public employment and render faithful and efficient service.
Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree to provide for their sustenance and well-being when they can no longer continue earning a livelihood.
The GSIS has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine a member’s qualification for the old-age pension benefit based on the computation of their years of service with the government.
The Office of the President cannot shorten the extension of service granted to a member by the GSIS, as it would deprive the member of the opportunity to avail of the old-age pension plan.
The period of service of a member, including sick leave and part-time service, should be reflected in their service record.
Marcelino A. Dechavez was the president of the Negros State College of Agriculture (NSCA) from 2001 until his retirement on April 9, 2006.
On May 5, 2002, Dechavez and his wife were involved in a vehicular accident while using the college service vehicle.
Dechavez filed an insurance claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and was granted claims amounting to P308,000.00.
Twenty faculty and staff members of NSCA filed a complaint with the Commission on Audit (COA) and later with the Ombudsman, accusing Dechavez of dishonesty.
Issue:
Whether Dechavez should be dismissed from service for making a false insurance claim following the vehicular accident even when he has already filed a resignation?
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. Italics supplied, citation omitted
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez, 22 we held:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Respondent’s resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. Emphases ours; citations omitted
Thus, from the strictly legal point of view and as we have held in a long line of cases, jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be defeated by the acts of the respondent, save only where death intervenes and the action does not survive.
The incumbent Governor of Nueva Ecija, Eduardo L. Joson, had an indefinite sick leave; thus, creating a temporary vacancy in his Office. As Vice Governor, Nario took over as Acting Governor. But as fate would have it, Nario himself fell ill shortly afterwards, and so executed a “waiver” of his “right” to the office of Governor. Four (4) days later, apparently feeling that his illness had worsened, Nario sent a letter to the Secretary of local Governments tendering his resignation as Vice- Governor of Nueva Ecija. Nario subsequently discovered, after undergoing further medical examination, that his illness was not as serious as originally feared, and having thus been convinced of his physical fitness to resume work, Nario wrote to Secretary Santos withdrawing his “Letters of resignation as Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija and waiver as Acting Governor,” and requesting that they be considered “as without legal force and effect.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the letters of resignation are without legal force and effect
The letters of resignation are without legal force and effect, because the same was not accepted by proper authority.
Mere tender of resignation, without acceptance by competent authority does not create a vacancy in public office; resignation is not complete until accepted by proper authority.
It was not within the power of respondent Nario to dictate the time of the effectiveness of his resignation, or otherwise impose conditions thereon. That was the prerogative of the Secretary of Local Governments, as the proper authority to act thereon. It was well within the Secretary’s power and discretion to accept or reject the resignation. Nario therefore continued as Vice-Governor despite his tender of resignation and despite his absence from office for a few days on account of sickness. Never having lost the office of Vice-Governor, it was also lawful and logical for him to assume the position of Acting Governor, temporarily vacant due to the infirmity of the incumbent, as he eventually did on instructions of the Secretary of Local Governments.
