Cases 3rd batch Flashcards
The case involves a petition for the Writ of Amparo filed by Lourdes Rubrico and her children against several respondents, including military and police personnel.
The petitioners alleged that Lourdes was kidnapped and detained without any legal basis, but was subsequently released.
They also claimed that they were harassed by unknown persons believed to be military or police personnel.
The petitioners filed the petition to seek proper investigation of the alleged kidnapping and to address the acts of harassment they experienced.
They also claimed that the Ombudsman violated Lourdes’ right to a speedy disposition of her case and put her and her witnesses in danger due to its inaction.
Issue: Whether the petition for the Writ of Amparo should be granted.
The court ruled that the petition against the President should be dismissed based on her immunity from suit during her term. This immunity is necessary to ensure the President can effectively perform her duties without being distracted by legal actions.
The court rejected the application of command responsibility in Amparo cases. Command responsibility is a substantive rule that establishes criminal or administrative liability, which is different from the purpose and approach of the Amparo Rule. The Amparo Rule is a procedural protective remedy against violations or threats of violations of constitutional rights, and it does not determine liability.
The case involves the enforced disappearance of James Balao, who was abducted by unidentified armed men.
* The petitioners, who are the siblings of James Balao, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo in favor of James.
* The named respondents in the petition were then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and several government officials and military personnel.
* The petition alleged that James had reported surveillance on his person prior to his abduction and that his disappearance was politically motivated due to his involvement in the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a non-government organization working for the rights of indigenous peoples.
* The trial court granted the petition for the writ of amparo but denied the prayer for inspection, production, and witness protection orders.
* The court found that there was substantial evidence to establish an enforced disappearance and that the government had violated James’s right to security.
Whether President Arroyo be immune from suit and should be dropped as a party-respondent
YES, President Arroyo is immune from suit. The court also dropped former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as a party-respondent, citing presidential immunity. Moreover, the petition is bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners’ protected rights. The case was remanded to the trial court for further investigation and monitoring of the investigative activities.
we have clarified that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be impleaded not actually on the basis of command responsibility but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department Manager of the National Development Company (NDC), a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. He was appointed by the Board of Directors, Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary of NDC as Vice-President for Finance effectiveJune 14, 1991while remaining as a regular employee of NDC. The additional employment entitled him to honoraria equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of his basic salary at NDC and various allowances attached to the office. In the course of the regular audit, the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued notices of disallowances against Mr. Ramon R. Yap which were predicated on the ground that appellants appointment to MGC in addition to his regular position as Department Manager III of NDC and the subsequent receipt of the questioned allowances and reimbursements from the former directly contravened the proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the Constitution. Mr. Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the questioned benefits were all approved by the MGC Board of Directors.
Petitioners appeal was denied by the CAO II, which affirmed the MGC Corporate Auditors findings.Unperturbed, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from respondent COA arguing that his assignment to MGC was required by the primary functions of his office and was also authorized by law, namely Executive Order No. 284 issued on July 25, 1987. In turn, respondent COA denied petitioners appeal in herein assailed COA Decision No. 2002-213.It upheld the CAO IIs ruling that characterized the disallowed allowances and reimbursements as prohibited by the Constitution.Furthermore, it also ruled that the said allowances and reimbursements claimed by petitioner failed to pass the test of public purpose requirement of the law and further emphasized that it is not enough that payments made to petitioner be authorized by the Board of Directors of the MGC but it is likewise necessary that said payments do not contravene the principles provided for under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 on the use of government funds, more specifically on the public purpose requirement that is provided in Section 4(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.A Motion for Reconsiderationwas subsequently filed by petitioner, but this was likewise denied by respondent COA in COA Decision No. 2003-087.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it used as a basis the public purpose requirement in affirming the questioned disallowances.
HELD: COAs decision is affirmed.
POLITICAL LAW: public purpose test
Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to government employees and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose. Public purpose in relation to disbursement of public funds means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of right.Thus, it has also been defined as an activity as will serve as benefit to the community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of government.However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes.Here as elsewhere, the idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded.In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that the term public purpose is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards.It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice.Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use is now equated with public interest,and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.
In view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered.In the same vein, additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the government officers and employees.Petitioners theory that the compensation and benefits of public officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement is wrong.That theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government.Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.
Zosimo M. Dimaandal was designated as Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer for
Administration by Governor Vicente A. Mayo of Batangas on November 23, 1992.
* Dimaandal filed a claim for the difference in salary and Representation and
Transportation Allowance (RATA) for the whole year of 1993, amounting to P61,308.00.
* The Provincial Auditor only allowed P8,400.00, which corresponds to the difference in
allowances attached to the designation and the position occupied by Dimaandal.
* The disallowed amount of P52,908.00 was required to be refunded by Dimaandal.
* Dimaandal appealed to the Commission on Audit (COA), but the COA upheld the
decision of the Provincial Auditor.
* The COA opined that Dimaandal was not entitled to receive an additional salary and the
difference in RATA because the party designating him to the position was not the “duly
competent authority” as provided by law.
Is an employee who is designated in an acting capacity entitled to the difference in salary
between his regular position and the higher position to which he is designated?
The Supreme Court ruled against Dimaandal and upheld the decision of the COA.
* The Court stated that the designation of Dimaandal as Acting Assistant Provincial
Treasurer for Administration by Governor Mayo was invalid because the Governor did
not have the authority to make such a designation.
* The law applicable is Section 471(a) of the Local Government Code, which states that the
appointment or designation of an assistant treasurer must be made by the Secretary of
Finance from a list of eligible recommendees of the governor or mayor.
* Since the designation was defective, Dimaandal had no right to claim the difference in
salaries and allowances attached to the position.
* The Court also clarified that the nature of Dimaandal’s designation as Acting Assistant
Provincial Treasurer and the absence of authority from the Governor to authorize the
payment of additional salary and RATA without the appropriate resolution from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not make him a de facto officer.
Commission on Human Rights Employees’ Association (CHREA) filed a petition against
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
* CHR adopted an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission on September 4, 1998
* Scheme was approved by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) and
intended to be implemented in the same year
* Department of Budget and Management (DBM) denied the request for approval, stating
that the reclassification would elevate the field units to a higher level than previously
denied and would change the context from support to substantive without actual change
in functions
* CSC-National Capital Region Office recommended rejection of the subject appointments
due to DBM’s disapproval
* CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation and upheld
the validity of the upgrading scheme
* CHREA appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the
CSC-Central Office
* CHREA further appealed the case to the Supreme Court
Whether the CHR has the authority to implement upgrading and reclassification
schemes without the approval of the DBM
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of CHREA, stating that the CHR does not have the
authority to implement upgrading and reclassification schemes without the approval of
the DBM. The Court held that all government offices, including those with fiscal autonomy, must
comply with the Salary Standardization Law
* The grant of fiscal autonomy does not exempt government agencies from seeking
approval from the DBM for reclassification and upgrading of positions
* The fiscal autonomy granted to the CHR is limited to the automatic and regular release
of its approved annual appropriations
* The Court based its decision on the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law and the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 49, which define the
scope and extent of fiscal autonomy
- The DBM plays a crucial role as the government agency tasked with implementing and
administering a unified compensation system - All government offices, including those with fiscal autonomy, must seek approval from
the DBM for reclassification and upgrading of positions.
Encarnacion E. Santiago filed a motion for clarification of the dispositive portion of the Decision in this case on September 13, 2007.
The decision was promulgated on June 15, 2006.
Santiago requested the Commission on Audit (COA) and the Municipal Mayor of Goa, Camarines Sur, to pay her representation allowance, additional compensation allowance, productivity bonus, year-end bonus, clothing allowance, and other benefits, excluding her salary, based on the dispositive portion of the Decision.
The COA replied that they cannot pay the requested items because the Court has already clarified that they can withhold petitioner’s salary and other emoluments.
Santiago then requested clarification on whether the emoluments due to her as Municipal Treasurer are excluded from the items that can be withheld.
The Court based its ruling on Section 21, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, which is substantially the same as Section 37 of PD No. 1445, the legal basis of COA.
The COA can direct the proper officer to withhold the petitioner’s salary and other emoluments.
The State Auditor’s finding of cash shortage against Santiago, which has not been disputed, is considered prima facie evidence against her.
Therefore, the COA can withhold her salary to safeguard the interest of the Government.
However, the withheld salary and other emoluments should be considered merely withheld until a final resolution on Santiago’s indebtedness.
If she is found not liable for the cash shortage, the withheld amount will be released to her.
If she is found liable, it will be applied to her indebtedness.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect and abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created the BSP.
Eight years later, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Contention of the Petitioner:
Petitioners challenge that it makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, specifically between BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law and the rank-and-file who are not exempted from the coverage of the SSL.
This classification is allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel’s position.
Petitioners further contend that subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law of establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP, the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL while the BSP rank-and-file are not.
Petitioner posits that classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Contention of the Respondent:
Respondent counters that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided that it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as “fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP,” and the mandate of the Monetary Board “establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management.”
SolGen:
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary defended it by saying that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rank-and-file employees of the BSP are unduly discriminated upon by exempting BSP officers (SG 20 and above) from the Salary Standardization Law thus violates the equal protection of law clause. (Simply stated: Whether or not the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.)
Yes, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
Equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate – so long as the classification is not unreasonable. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons themselves, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file and the resulting discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. However, in the subsequent passages of the amendment on the charters of other Government Financial Institutions (GFI), the surrounding circumstances of the case changed.
The provision in question, initially valid, became unconstitutional due to subsequent laws exempting all other rank-and-file employees of GFIs from the Salary Standardization Act.
The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter (i.e., express authorization to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure, and explicit exemption – without distinction as to salary grade or position – all employees of the GFI from the SSL) resulted to the oppressive results of Congress’ inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFI.
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
The exemption granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs, while denying the same exemption to the BSP rank-and-file employees, violates the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Petitioners were incumbent officers of Local Water Utilities Admin, a GOCC. The
petitioners were receiving rice subsidy for every 2 months in pursuant to board resolution..
On July 1, 1989, congress passed RA 6798 also known as Salary Standardization Law.
Pursuant to such, the DBM issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC
No. 10). Paragraph 5.5.1 of DBM-CCC No. 10 included a rice subsidy as among the
allowances/fringe benefits not likewise integrated into the basic salary and allowed to be
continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989 but subject to the condition that the
grant of the same is with appropriate authorization either from the DBM, Office of the
President or legislative issuances.
The LWUA Corporate Auditor, however, disallowed a series of payrolls intended for the
rice allowances for the years 1991 to 1994, citing Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 and its
implementing rule DBM-CCC No. 10.
Consequently, petitioner De Vera sent a letter-appeal to respondent COA for
reconsideration of the disallowance of the rice subsidies AND argued that the
disallowance of the rice subsidies was without legal basis considering that DBMCCC No.
10, upon which the disallowance was based, was never published in the Official Gazette.
De Vera also invoked the due process and equal protection clauses and the principle of
non-diminution of salary and compensation to further his appeal.
Thereafter, COA denied the appeal on the ground that until DBM-CCC No. 10 was nullified
by the proper court, respondent COA must faithfully observe and carry out its mandate.
Issue: WON RESPONDENT COA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE DISALLOWANCE OF THE
RICE ALLOWANCE OF LWUA OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES.
YES.
The Supreme Court upheld the entitlement of LWUA officials and employees to the rice
subsidy , since it was shown that the benefit has been existing prior to the effectivity of
RA 6758 and has not been included in the standardized salary rates, and that grant
thereof is limited to incumbents as of July 1, 1989 ( not to upset the policy of non-
diminution of pay) .
Respondent Zenaida Pangandaman is a
director II and Manila Information and
Liaisoning Officer of Mindanao State
University (MSU) since 1995. In 1998,
responded received a copy of Special Order
designating a certain Agnes Mangondato as
Acting Director in her place in view of the
alleged expiration of her term and was no
longer allowed to report for work. She
verified her appointment and found out that
the same was not submitted to Civil Service
for attestation.
Respondent immediately brought this matter
to the CSC on the validity of the termination,
however the CSC upheld the dismissal for
lack of attestation and prolonged absence
without official leave from the time she was
removed from her post as a result of the
special order.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the CSC
found merit on her motion and declared her
removal from office as illegal, exonerated
her from the charge of being on absence of
leave without official leave and ordered her
reinstatement to her former position.
However, disallowed the payment of back
salaries for the period she was not working
as a result of illegal dismissal.
According to CSC, she is governed by the
principle of quantum meruit (as you work, so
shall you earn. The appointment, while
already effective, by itself is not a basis for
payment of salary but assumption of duties
of her office.
After the finality of the reinstatement, the
respondent for the first time questioned the
portion of the CSC resolution, prohibiting
the payment of back wages and other
benefits for the period that she was
terminated.
However, CSC reiterated their decision that
respondent, during the time of her
termination does not perform the duties of
her position, therefore, there can be no
basis for the grant of back salaries in her
favor.
Respondent appealed to the CA, the latter
ruled that back wages should be paid to
respondent from the time of illegal dismissal
until she was ordered reinstated by the CSC
in 2001.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to
receive back salaries and other benefits for
the period that she was illegally dismissed?
The Court ruled in affirmative.
The Court said that, there is more
substantial evidence on the record
consisting of the general payroll attendance
sheets to prove that petitioner assumed and
exercised the functions of Director II and
Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer at
MSU as early as June 1995 after the
approval of her permanent appointment
which was issued earlier on April 10, 1995.
The Court said in a decided case, that an
illegally dismissed government employee
who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to
back wages and other monetary benefits
from the time of his illegal dismissal up to
his reinstatement.
Respondent cannot be faulted for her
inability to work or to render any service
form the time she was illegally dismissed up
to the time of her reinstatement.
Verily, to withhold her back salaries and
other benefits during her illegal dismissal
would put to naught the Constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure for those in
the civil service.
● Isabelo Galang is a Branch Manager Land Bank Baliuag Bulacan
● Allegedly, Galang demanded money in return for reduction of interest rates and condonation of penalty, and unauthorized disbursements for the repair of company car.
● He was charged with an administrative case for committing such acts
● The hearing officer of landbank dismissed the charges
● The Land Bank’s General counsel reversed it and recommended Galang’s dismissal
● The Merit Systems Protection board sustained the penalty imposed upon Galang.
● Upon appeal to the CA, it held no substantial evidence to hold galang administratively liable and ordered his reinstatement.
● Land Bank did not file an appeal to the supreme court under rule 45 but instead filed
an appeal by certiorari under rule 65.
● Such appeal was dismissed by the supreme court. The court concluded that the petition was merely an afterthought.
● Galang now claimed that
○ His reinstatement be effected on october 1 1997 when the decision of the CA becomes final and executory.
○ That the basis of his back salary computation be at the time of his reinstatement
● Land bank also raised the question of
○ Whether Galang is entitled to receive PERA, RATA, meal Allowance and rice subsidy.
● PERA- Personnel Relief Economic Allowance
● RATA- Representation and transportation allowance
Issue 1: WHether or not the reinstatement of Galang be effected in October 1, 1997
Ruling: Yes, Landbank received the CA resolution on September 15, 1997 and had 15 days
to file an appeal. Yet, it failed to do so. Instead, It filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme court on November 14, 1997. However, an original action for certiorari is not a
continuation of the previous case. It does not interrupt the course of the original action. The
CA resolution becomes final and executory after the 15 day period to appeal has lapsed. In
this case, the resolution had become final and executory on October 1, 1997. Therefore,
Galang’s reinstatement should be reckoned from October 1, 1997.
Whether or not the basis of Galang’s backsalary computation be at the time of his
reinstatement.
Ruling: In this case, there are two scenarios
First, is the back salary of Galang due to his illegal dismissal. Second is his back salary due
to his late reinstatement.
In the first scenario, Galang’s back salary should be computed at the rate received by him
or his original salary. The controlling rule on the computation of back salary is that the
illegally dismissed employee be paid back at the rate he was receiving when he was
terminated, unqualified by salary increase and without deductions from earnings received
elsewhere during the period of his dismissal.
For his back salary due to late reinstatement, Galang’s back salary should be computed at
the rate prevailing at the proper date of his reinstatement inclusive of allowances, benefits
and increase in salary prior to reinstatement. Simply put, it must be computed at the rate of
his salary during reinstatement.
Whether Galang is entitled to receive PERA, RATA, meal Allowance and rice
subsidy.
PERA- Galang is entitled to receive PERA. PERA is granted to all government officials as a
replacement for COLA. It is granted to all government officials and galang is entitled to
receive the same
RATA- Galang is only entitled to receive from the year 1990-1992. The General
appropriations act in year 1993 up until galangs reinstatement requires the actual
performance of duty as a condition for the grant of rata. (1993 until reinstatement cannot
actually perform because of his illegal dismissal)
Rice subsidy- Galang received his rice subsidy for the period of 5 years which is the
maximum number of years for the computation of back salary. His claim is without legal
basis.
Meal allowance- the landbank claims that it already paid the same. But jurisprudence
provide that the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rest on the employer. In this
case, land bank fails to prove such payment. The disbursement it presented lacks the
signature of Galang as recipient.
Petitioner Eduardo Balitaosan was one of the public school teachers dismissed by the
Secretary of the Department of Education Culture and Sports for participating in a
teacher’s mass strike and ignoring the return to work order.
* An administrative complaint was filed against Balitaosan, along with two others,
charging them with various offenses.
* Balitaosan failed to provide an explanation for the charges and was subsequently
dismissed from service.
* He appealed to the Merit System Protection Board, but his appeal was dismissed.
* He then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, but his appeal and motion for
reconsideration were both denied.
* Balitaosan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which ordered his
reinstatement without backwages.
* Balitaosan filed a motion for partial reconsideration seeking backwages, but it was
denied.
- Is Balitaosan entitled to backwages for the period during which he was not allowed to
work?
The Supreme Court denied Balitaosan’s petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’
denial of backwages.
* Balitaosan never questioned the competence and composition of the investigating
committee, except for a general allegation of denial of due process.
* He raised this issue for the first time in his petition for review before the Court of
Appeals, which is not allowed.
* Issues raised for the first time on appeal cannot be considered as it is unfair to the other
party and offensive to the rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
* Balitaosan’s reinstatement was not the result of exoneration but an act of liberality by the
Court of Appeals.
* Since Balitaosan did not render any service during the period for which he is claiming
backwages, there is no legal or equitable basis to order the payment thereof.
* The general rule is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if no service
has been rendered.
Petitioners Generoso P. Abellanosa, et al. are employees of the National Housing Authority
(NHA), they received incentive allowances under NHA Board Resolution No. 464. However, the
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed these payments, asserting that they lacked a legal basis
under pertinent laws and regulations. The petitioners contested COA’s decision, arguing for the
legality of the allowances.
ISSUE:
Whether or no the incentive allowances granted under NHA Board Resolution No. 464 is legal
under existing laws and regulations governing government employee compensation.
The Supreme Court, after deliberation, found the petition without merit and upheld COA’s
decision. The Court determined that Resolution No. 464 lacked a legal basis as it conflicted with
relevant laws and regulations. Notably, Presidential Decree No. 1597 repealed all decrees and
issuances allowing allowances inconsistent with the National Compensation and Position
Classification Plan, while Republic Act No. 6758 integrated all allowances into standardized
salary rates, with specified exceptions. Since the incentive allowances granted under Resolution
No. 464 were not among the exceptions listed under RA 6758 and were not specifically
determined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) hence, they were deemed
illegal. Despite petitioners’ arguments about the necessity and incidental nature of the
allowances, the Court emphasized the importance of adhering to express provisions of the law.
Consequently, the Court affirmed COA’s authority to disallow illegal expenditures, even if made
in good faith. Thus, the petition was dismissed, and COA’s decision was affirmed.
