CASES Flashcards
The case involves petitioner Salvador H. Laurel, who is seeking a reconsideration of the court’s decision declaring him a public officer as the Chair of the National Centennial Commission (NCC). The petitioner also requests that the case be referred to the Court En Banc. The main issue raised by the petitioner is that the composition of the NCC violates the Constitution because it includes members of the Cabinet, the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court, who are prohibited from holding any other office during their term. The petitioner argues that the court disregarded the pronouncement in Manila Electric Co. vs. Panay Transportation Co. that the Supreme Court and its members should not be required to exercise any power or perform any trust not connected with the administering of judicial functions.
Is the petitioner, as the NCC Chair, considered a public officer under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman?
public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
* The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer.
* The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an ‘ad-hoc body’ make it less of a public office.
* The fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an incidence and forms no part of the office.
* The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; – that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was disqualified by the Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Respondent Lee was the second placer in the canvass and claimed that the votes cast in favor of petitioner should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or the incumbent Vice-Governor should take over the said post due to permanent vacancy due to Frivaldo’s ineligibility.
1) Was the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office?
2) Is disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for or be elected to or hold public office?
1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of Congress, 2) by naturalization or 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not specifically state a particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at least 1 year residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least 35 years old on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office to ensure that no alien, or person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of his office began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. In other words, the law’s purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern — and not anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all the previous elections. The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner retroacted upon the date of filing of his application.
2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Leon G. Maquera seek to ask Republic Act No. 4421 requires “all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices” to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate,
Republic Act No. 4421 requires “all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices” to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there being no more than four (4) candidates for the same office;”
In compliance with said Republic Act No. 4421, the Commission on Elections had decided to require all candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives to file a surety bond, by a bonding company of good reputation, acceptable to the Commission, in the sums of P60,000.00 and P40,000.00, for President and Vice-President, respectively, and P32,000.00 for Senator and Member of the House of Representatives;
In consequence of said Republic Act No. 4421 and the aforementioned action of the Commission on Elections, every candidate has to pay the premium charged by bonding companies, and, to offer thereto, either his own properties, worth, at least, the amount of the surety bond, or properties of the same worth, belonging to other persons willing to accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in favor of said bonding companies;
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 4421 constitutional.
The effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is, to prevent or disqualify from running for President, Vice-President, Senator or Member of the House of Representatives those persons who, although having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, cannot file the surety bond, owing to failure to pay the premium charged by the bonding company and/or lack of the property necessary for said counter-bond;
Republic Act No. 4421 has, likewise, the effect of disqualifying for provincial, city or municipal elective offices, persons who, although possessing the qualifications prescribed by law therefor, cannot pay said premium and/or do not have the property essential for the aforementioned counter-bond;
It has the effect of imposing property qualifications in order that a person could run for a public office and that the people could validly vote for him;
Said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office
Lenlie was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election for the Kabataang Barangay, Jowil Red won as the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as a member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. Red finally received his appointment papers in January 1986, but he was still not allowed to sit as a sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile, Lenlie continued to receive his salary with the approval of the Mayor. Red filed several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie for their refusal to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. The Ombudsman filed thirteen informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against the petitioners, and one information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan found the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa but acquitted the Mayor of the charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan denied their motion for reconsideration, prompting the accused to elevate their case to the Supreme Court
whether the accused, Francisco M. Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz, should be held liable for estafa through falsification of public documents and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. Until then, he has none at all. And for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to the position. As such, he could not be considered an intruder and liable for encroachment of public office.
The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
· In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the lawmaking body favors the same.
· Law abhors vacuum in public office: (1) prevent public convenience from suffering; and (2) avoid hiatus in the performance of gov’t functions.
The case of Mendoza v. Laxina, Sr. involves a disputed barangay captain in Batasan Hills, Quezon City. Manuel D. Laxina, Sr. was proclaimed as the winner in the 1997 Barangay Elections and took his oath of office on May 27, 1997. However, his rival candidate, Roque Fermo, filed an election protest and was declared as the winner on January 18, 1999. Respondent filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC while Fermo filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the motion for execution pending appeal, leading to respondent vacating the position and relinquishing it to Fermo. However, the COMELEC later annulled the order granting execution pending appeal and ordered Fermo to cease and desist from performing the functions of Barangay Captain. Despite this, Fermo refused to vacate the premises of the barangay hall. Respondent, on the other hand, continued to discharge his functions and even appointed new barangay officials. Petitioners, who were barangay councilors, filed a complaint against respondent for violation of anti-graft and corrupt practices act and falsification of legislative documents. The Special Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases found respondent guilty of grave misconduct and recommended a 2-month suspension. The Quezon City Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the Committee and appointed a new acting barangay chairman. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court seeking to annul the decision of the City Council. The trial court rendered a summary judgment in favor of respondent, exonerating him of the charges and ordering the restoration of all benefits due to him. Petitioners filed a petition for review, raising questions of law.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether the taking of an oath of office anew by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective official is a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office where the COMELEC orders the relinquishment of the contested position.
The Supreme Court ruled that once a duly proclaimed and elected official has taken his oath of office, he is entitled to assume office and exercise the functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions. Unless his election is annulled by a final and executory decision, or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the office to which he has been elected. In this case, the COMELEC annulled the execution of the decision unseating respondent and reinstated him in office. Therefore, his assumption of office from the date of service of the writ of execution is valid. The re-taking of his oath of office is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office. The Court also held that the charges against respondent for violation of anti-graft and corrupt practices act and falsification of legislative documents were baseless. The trial court correctly exonerated respondent and ordered the payment of all benefits due to him during the period of his suspension.
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created in 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of 7 members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.
After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. However, in 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada. Section 1, Rule II thereof provides that ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the National Government Audit Office disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio members’ representatives, to no avail.
Are the representatives de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances?
No. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. (National Amnesty Commission vs. COA, G. R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004)
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee’s right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere designation.
In Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal
September 15, 1961: Filed his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal
September 18: Petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy, which the Comelec approved.
September 21: Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.
Petitioner then filed a suit for injunction (CFI Rizal) against respondent, which held that:
(a) The former had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed;
(b) Respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such;
(c) Petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office; and
(d) Petitioner must pay respondent P1,000.00 as moral damages.
CA: Affirmed in toto except for the award of moral damages, which was eliminated.
Court then laid the general rule that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title that applies in the present case.
Rationale: For the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers.
As applied: Here, the issue is the possession of title, not of the office. A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.
The case involves the unlawful replacement and demotion of Julieta Monserate, a civil service appointee, in the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). Monserate was appointed as Manager II in the Resource Management Division of the PPA. However, Ramon Anino, who ranked second for the position, protested the appointment to the PPA Appeals Board. As a result, Monserate was replaced by Anino and reassigned to the position of Administrative Officer, which was lower than her previous position.
Was Monserate validly replaced by Anino?
Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service. However, the moment the discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause. Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the revocation of respondent’s appointment by demoting her.
When the CA reinstated Monserate to her post, it merely restored her appointment to the said position to which her right to security of tenure had already attached. Her position as Manager II never became vacant since her demotion was void. In this jurisdiction, “an appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil service is null and void ab initio.”
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which contains a provision allowing members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation of not more than two positions. Petitioner maintains that EO 284 is unconstitutional being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 13 prohibits the President, VP, members of the cabinet and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office during their tenure unless otherwise provided by the Consitution.
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution.
Petitioners insist that because of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON EO 284 is unconstitutional?
The Court held that the prohibition against holding multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants. The Court emphasized that the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on these high-ranking officials.
The Court also clarified that the prohibition does not apply to ex-officio positions or positions that are required by the primary functions of the official’s office. The additional duties and functions assigned to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet members, and their deputies or assistants must be required by their primary functions and must be performed in an ex-officio capacity without receiving any additional compensation.
The Court emphasized that the purpose of allowing additional duties and functions is to ensure efficiency, policy direction, continuity, and coordination among different offices in the Executive Branch. However, the Court acknowledged the practical consequences of strictly applying the prohibition, but emphasized that the concentration of attention, knowledge, and expertise of department heads in their primary positions outweighs the benefits of holding multiple offices.
The Court ordered the respondents who were holding other offices or employment in addition to their primary positions to immediately relinquish those positions. However, the Court recognized that the respondents may be considered de facto officers and entitled to emoluments for the actual services rendered during their tenure in the questioned positions.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 46 It has been held that “in cases where there is no de jure,officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services.
On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte.
On March 25, 1988, Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued a resolution where it held invalid the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. The Regional Director of the Department of Local Government, wrote a letter that the resolution be modified and salary be paid to Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. The Acting Governor and SP refused to correct the resolution. Menzon filed a petition for the nullification of Resolution.
In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the province of Leyte.
During the pendency of the petition, more particularly on May 16, 1990, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00, for the actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor.
On August 28, 1990, this Court dismissed the petition filed by Aurelio D. Menzon.
On September 6, 1990, Leopoldo Petilla, by virtue of the above resolution requested Governor Larrazabal to direct Menzon to pay back to the province of Leyte all the emoluments and compensation which he received while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. Menzon filed a motion for reconsideration.
By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession provided in LG Code for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office.
In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. Menzon is a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment.
Menzon’s right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated to Menzon, following the example in Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code, and pursuant to the proscription against double compensation must only be such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor.
Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498 votes as against Malaluan’s 9,792 votes. Malauan filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court. The trial court declared Malaluan as the duly elected municipal mayor.
Malaluan immediately assumed office through an Execution Pending Appeal. Evangelista appealed to COMELEC. COMELEC ordered Malaluan to vacate the office and so declared Evangelista to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. Malauan was ordered to pay as part of damages constituting salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995 that would have accrued to him had there not been an execution of the trial court’s decision pending appeal therefrom in the COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON Malauan is a de facto officer? WON he is entitled to salary?
Malaluan was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right,] the Malaluan exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared Malaluan as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the risk of sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a winning candidate’s right to assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. We deem Malaluan, therefore, to be a “de facto officer who, in good faith, has a possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus “legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective official who has been proclaimed by the COMELEC as winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office and entered into the performance of the duties of that office, is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances legally provided for the position.
